

PROCLUS

Commentary on Plato's Timaeus

VOLUME IV

Book 3, Part II:
Proclus on the World Soul

TRANSLATED WITH AN
INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

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IVA GILDOW KNIGHT

1913–2008

bibliophile, grandmother, friend

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In spite of all this help, I am all too aware that, when it comes to ancient mathematics and harmonic theory, I am operating at or beyond the limit of my competence. This is highly specialised subject matter and I'm no expert. (Festugière's translation ((1966–8), vol. III, 211 ff.) of this portion of Proclus' text has notes from Charles Mugler.) Indeed, I don't have much of a head for quantitative questions even when they are framed in a perspicuous modern notation, much less in Proclus' ancient conventions for writing fractions or expressing different functions. I certainly have not provided a commentary on the more technical aspects of Proclus' discussion that would exhaust its interest. My limited acquaintance with ancient harmonics suggests to me that there are more interesting things to be said about Proclus' text. My modest hope is that I will have made available a relatively accurate translation that will allow others with the relevant background to carry the investigation forward.

This book is dedicated to someone whose contribution toward this volume is rather less direct than anyone named thus far. My maternal grandmother, Iva Gildow Knight, was born on the family farm in the foothills of the Appalachians and educated at Crow School – a one-room

Acknowledgements

educational institution at the crest of Crum Ridge in Noble County, Ohio. Though she excelled in her studies, the high school in Caldwell was too far away to make the trip on a daily basis and the family had no money for her to live away from home. Her formal education thus ended with grade 8, though her autodidactic journey continued throughout her life. Her enthusiasm for the written word, and especially for poetry, contributed to my childhood love of reading. My attempts to turn Proclus' tortured sentence structure into readable English are a far cry from the rhythm and well-turned phrases of her own verse. Nonetheless, I hope she would have taken this offering for what it is worth and have conceded that, in some rather attenuated sense, we are both on the same page.

Note on the translation

In this translation I have sought to render Proclus' text in a form that pays attention to contemporary ways of discussing and translating ancient philosophy, while trying to present the content as clearly as possible, and without misrepresenting what has been said or importing too much interpretation directly into the translation. I have not sought to reproduce Proclus' sentence structure where this seemed to create a barrier to smooth reading, for which reason line and page numbers will involve a degree of imprecision. The French translation by A. J. Festugière is an invaluable starting-point, and it is still a useful and largely faithful rendition of Proclus' Greek.¹ However, my collaborators and I consider it worthwhile to try to make the philosophical content and arguments of Proclus' text as plain as possible. To that end, we have not hesitated to break lengthy sentences into smaller ones, shift from passive to active voice, or provide interpolations that are indicated by square brackets.

The philosophy of late antiquity now stands where Hellenistic philosophy did in the early 1970s. It is, at least for the anglo-analytic tradition in the history of philosophy, the new unexplored territory.² The most impressive contribution to studies in this area in the past fifteen years has been the massive effort, coordinated by Richard Sorabji, to translate large portions of the Greek Commentators on Aristotle.³ R. M. van den Berg has provided us with Proclus' *Hymns*, while John Finamore

¹ Festugière (1966–8). We are enormously indebted to Festugière's fine work, even if we have somewhat different aims and emphases. Our notes on the text are not intended to engage so regularly with the text of the *Chaldean Oracles*, the *Orphic Fragments* or the history of religion. We have preferred to comment on those features of Proclus' text that place it in the commentary tradition.

² To be sure, some of the seminal texts for the study of Neoplatonism have been available for some time. These include: Dillon (1973), Dodds (1963), O'Neill (1965), Morrow (1970), Morrow and Dillon (1987). There are also the translations by Thomas Taylor (1758–1835). While these constitute a considerable achievement, given the manuscripts from which Taylor was working and the rate at which he completed them, they cannot compare well with modern scholarly editions.

³ The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (Duckworth and Cornell University Press). The first volume in the series, Christian Wildberg's translation of Philoponus' *Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World*, appeared in 1987. There are a projected sixty volumes including works from Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Porphyry, Ammonius, Philoponus and Simplicius.

and John Dillon have made Iamblichus' *de Anima* available in English.⁴ Sorabji's Commentators series now includes an English translation of Proclus' essay on the existence of evil, his essay on providence, and his commentary on Plato's *Cratylus*.⁵ There is also a new edition of Proclus' eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world.⁶ I hope that my efforts will add something to this foundation for the study of late antiquity. If I have resolved ambiguities in Proclus' text without consideration of all the possibilities, or failed to note the connections between a particular passage in the *Timaeus* commentary and another elsewhere, then I can only plead that our team is working to begin the conversation, not to provide the final word.

In all five volumes in this series, the text used is that of Diehl.⁷ Deviations from that text are recorded in the footnotes. On the whole, where there are not philological matters at issue, we have used transliterated forms of Greek words in order to make philosophical points available to an audience with limited or no knowledge of Greek.

Neoplatonism has a rich technical vocabulary that draws somewhat scholastic distinctions between, say, intelligible (*noêtos*) and intellectual (*noeros*) entities. To understand Neoplatonic philosophy it is necessary to have some grasp of these terms and their semantic associations, and there is no other way to do this than to observe how they are used. We mark some of the uses of these technical terms in the translation itself by giving the transliterated forms in parentheses. On the whole, we do this by giving the most common form of the word – that is, the nominative singular for nouns and the infinitive for verbs – even where this corresponds to a Greek noun in the translated text that may be in the dative or a finite verb form. This allows the utterly Greek-less reader to readily recognise occurrences of the same term, regardless of the form used in the specific context at hand. We have deviated from this practice where it is a specific form of the word that constitutes the technical term – for example, the passive participle of *metechein* for 'the participated' (*to metechomenon*) or comparative forms such as 'most complete' (*teleôtaton*). We have also made exceptions for technical terms using prepositions (e.g. *kat' aitian*, *kath' hyparxin*) and for adverbs that are terms of art for the Neoplatonists (e.g. *protôs*, *physikôs*).

⁴ van den Berg (2001), Finamore and Dillon (2002). Other important, but somewhat less recent, additions to editions and modern language translations of key Neoplatonic texts include: Segonds (1985–6) and the completion of the *Platonic Theology*, Saffrey and Westerink (1968–97).

⁵ Opsomer and Steel (2003), Steel (2007), Duvick (2005).

⁶ Lang and Macro (2001). Cf. the first translation of the reply to Proclus by the Christian Neoplatonist, Philoponus, Share (2005a) and Share (2005b).

⁷ Diehl (1904).

This policy is sure to leave everyone a little unhappy. Readers of Greek will find it jarring to read ‘the soul’s vehicles (*ochêma*)’ where ‘vehicles’ is in the plural and is followed by a singular form of the Greek noun. Equally, Greek-less readers are liable to be puzzled by the differences between *metechein* and *metechomenon* or between *protôs* and *protos*. But policies that leave all parties a bit unhappy are often the best compromises. In any event, all students of the *Timaeus* will remember that a generated object such as a book is always a compromise between Reason and Necessity.

This volume in particular calls for some special comment on specific terms that appear frequently in it. The term ‘*ousia*’ exhibits a delicate sensitivity to context in this portion of Proclus’ commentary. On the one hand, it is frequently used in the sense of ‘essence’, where it is often contrasted with power (*dynamis*) and activity (*energeia*). This is because Proclus adopts Iamblichus’ set of headings for organising an account of the soul; a systematic psychology considers first the soul’s essence, then its powers, then its activities.⁸ This sense of ‘*ousia*’ as essence frequently bleeds over into a discussion of the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being (*ousia*) into which Plato’s Creator God blends a third, specifically psychic, kind of Being (*Tim.* 35a1–5). Where this transition occurs in a way that helps to explain the connection that Proclus sees between the soul’s essence and the genera of Being, I alert the reader to this fact by including the transliterated term in brackets. But there is also a third sense that frequently crops up: the Aristotelian sense of *ousia* as substance. Here too there is a relation to the other uses, for the psychic essence, considered as a composite kind of Being, is what makes the World Soul ‘what it is’ (*ti esti*) and ‘a this’ (*tode ti*). In spite of the fact that Proclus refers to the mixture of divisible and indivisible Being as ‘dough’ (*phyrama*, in *Tim.* II. 272.22) I have resisted the temptation to play on modern associations with ‘substance’ as ‘substrate’, for Proclus also insists that the psychic essence is not *really* a substrate of the soul (II. 221.31).

There is a similar context sensitivity to the terms *mesos* and *mesotês*. On one hand, discussion of the geometric, harmonic and arithmetic *means* that the Demiurge inserts into the World Soul (*Tim.* 36a2–b5) plays a dominant role in Proclus’ commentary. One translation of ‘*mesos*’ or ‘*mesotês*’ is thus ‘mean’ or the middle term in a proportion. On the other hand, the World Soul is also constituted from an *intermediate* kind of Being between the realm of Forms, associated with the indivisible kind of Being, and the realm of sensible things, associated with the divisible kind of Being. As a result, ‘*mesos*’ is also frequently ‘intermediate’ and here

⁸ Finamore and Dillon (2002).

too Proclus often sees an analytic connection between the fact that the World Soul has the various *means* in it and the fact that it is an *intermediate* sort of thing between Being and Becoming. In addition, he sometimes draws an analogy between the soul's role as an intermediate and the function of the middle term (*mesos*) in Aristotelian syllogistic (*in Tim.* II. 104.1–3). A third use of the '*mesos*' word group relies on the ambiguity of '*logos*'. In one sense, a *logos* can be a ratio and the terms in a proportion stand in ratios; hence there is a link to the first sense. In another technical Neoplatonic sense a *logos* is a rational-forming principle.⁹ Very roughly, a rational-forming principle *mediates* something at a higher order of reality to lower levels. For instance, the *logoi* within the World Soul mediate the participated Forms to matter. As a result, I sometimes translate terms from the '*mesos*' word group as 'intermediary' where it is the soul's *role* in relating intelligible to sensible reality that is at issue, rather than its *status* as something intermediate between them.

I follow Andrew Barker's policy of leaving the technical harmonic vocabulary of *epogdoos*, *bêmiolios* and *epitritos* untranslated. The first is the 9:8 ratio that corresponds to the tone, the second the 3:2 ratio that is associated with the musical fifth, and the third the 4:3 ratio associated with the musical fourth. It is common to translate '*epogdoos*' as 'tone'. Festugière simply uses the fractions $\frac{3}{2}$ and $\frac{4}{3}$ for *bêmiolios* and *epitritos*. But as Barker points out, this vocabulary can be used to refer to the ratio of a musical interval or to the interval itself.¹⁰ Sometimes Proclus will write '*bêmiolios logos*' so that it is clear that he means the 3:2 ratio. Other times, he will leave off '*logos*' but it seems clear enough that it is the *ratio* that is at issue. In such cases, I supply '3:2 ratio' in brackets as a supplement. At other points, Proclus will speak of 'the *epogdoos* of 2048' where it is clear that the referent is that number that *stands in the ratio* to 2048 rather than the 9:8 ratio itself. In order to preserve these ambiguities and thus not prejudice interpretive questions one way or another, I have followed Barker's practice of simply using the transliterated terms.

Our volumes in the Proclus *Timaeus* series use a similar system of transliteration to that adopted by the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle volumes. The salient points may be summarised as follows. We use the diaeresis for internal breathing, so that 'immaterial' is rendered *aiilos*, not *abulos*. We also use the diaeresis to indicate where a second vowel represents a new vowel sound, e.g. *aiidios*. Letters of the alphabet are much as one would expect. We use 'y' for υ alone as in *physis* or *hypostasis*, but 'u' for υ when it appears in diphthongs, e.g. *ousia* and *entautha*. We use 'ch' for χ, as in *psychê*. We use 'rh' for initial ρ as in *rhêtôr*; 'nk' for γκ, as in *anankê*; and 'ng' for γγ, as in *angelos*. The long vowels η and ω are,

⁹ Witt (1931). ¹⁰ Barker (2007), 267.

of course, represented by \hat{e} and \hat{o} , while iota subscripts are printed on the line immediately after the vowel as in *ôioгенês* for $\omega\omicron\gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{\eta}\varsigma$. There is a Greek word index to each volume in the series. In order to enable readers with little or no Greek to use this word index, we have included an English–Greek glossary that matches our standard English translation for important terms, with its Greek correlate given both in transliterated form and in Greek. For example, ‘procession: *proôdos*, $\pi\rho\acute{o}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ ’.

The following abbreviations to other works of Proclus are used:

- in Tim.* = *Procli in Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, ed. E. Diehl, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–6).
in Remp. = *Procli in Platonis Rem publicam commentarii*, ed. W. Kroll, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1899–1901).
in Parm. = *Procli commentarius in Platonis Parmenidem (Procli philosophi Platonici opera inedita pt. III)*, ed. V. Cousin (Paris: Durand, 1864; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1961).
in Alc. = *Proclus Diadochus: Commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato*, ed. L. G. Westerink. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1954). Also used is A. Segonds (ed.), *Proclus: Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon*, tomes I et II (Paris, 1985–6).
in Crat. = *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Cratylum commentaria*, ed. G. Pasquali. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1908).
ET = *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).
Plat.Theol. = *Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne*, ed. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, 6 vols. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1968–97).
de Aet. = *Proclus: on the Eternity of the World*, ed. H. Lang and A. D. Macro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

Proclus frequently mentions previous commentaries on the *Timaeus*, those of Porphyry and Iamblichus, for which the abbreviation *in Tim.* is again used. Relevant fragments are found in:

- R. Sodano, *Porphyrii in Platonis Timaeum Fragmenta* (Naples: Istituto della Stampa, 1964), and
 John Dillon, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973).

Proclus also frequently confirms his understanding of Plato’s text by reference to two theological sources: the ‘writings of Orpheus’ and the Chaldean Oracles. For these texts, the following abbreviations are used:

Or. Chald. = Ruth Majercik, *The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation and Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 1989);

Orph. fr. = *Orphicorum fragmenta*, ed. O. Kern (Berlin: Weidmann, 1922).

Majercik uses the same numeration of the fragments as E. des Places in his Budé edition of the text.

References to the text of Proclus' *in Timaeum* (as also of *in Remp.* and *in Crat.*) are given by Teubner volume number, followed by page and line numbers, e.g. *in Tim.* II. 2.19. References to the *Platonic Theology* are given by Book, chapter, then page and line number in the Budé edition. References to the *Elements of Theology* are given by proposition number.

Proclus' commentary is punctuated only by the quotations from Plato's text upon which he comments: the lemmata. These quotations of Plato's text and subsequent repetitions of them in the discussion that immediately follows that lemma are in bold. We have also followed Festugière's practice of inserting section headings so as to reveal what we take to be the skeleton of Proclus' commentary. These headings are given in centred text, in italics. Within the body of the translation itself, we have used square brackets to indicate words that ought perhaps to be supplied in order to make the sense of the Greek clear. Where we suppose that Greek words ought to be added to the text received in the manuscripts, the supplements are marked by angle brackets.

Introduction to Book 3, Part II^{*}

THE BACKGROUND TO PROCLUS' COMMENTARY ON THE WORLD SOUL IN *TIMAEUS*

Proclus' treatment of the composition of the World Soul and the harmonic ratios within it is the most in-depth portion of the surviving commentary. Proclus expends 216 pages of text on the 86 OCT lines from *Timaeus* 34b2–37c5. This yields a page-to-line ratio that slightly outstrips the effort that Proclus expends on the Demiurge and his model (*Tim.* 27c1–31b3) in Book II of the *Timaeus* commentary. (To be precise: 2.51 pages/line versus 2.39 pages/line.) The interest of the latter passage to a Platonist is obvious; we are talking about nothing less than the identity of the Demiurge and the nature of the Intelligible Paradigm to which he looks in creating the visible cosmos. It is true that Proclus must also contend with what he takes to be seriously mistaken views of this part of Plato's text, viz. those previous interpreters who suppose that Plato describes here a creation of the cosmos in time. Hence a great deal of time and effort go into refuting the views of previous interpreters, such as Plutarch and Atticus.

Naturally, the subject of the World Soul is equally interesting to a Platonist. However, I think that Proclus' level of effort on the World Soul is largely determined by the difficulties of detail in Plato's text that had already generated a considerable literature. Proclus engages at length with these alternative interpretations and in the course of doing so tells us a great deal about such figures as Severus and Theodore of Asine. Indeed, the longest and most detailed testimonia that we possess about the latter come from just this portion of Proclus' commentary. Thus in order to put Proclus' work into some sort of context, we need to consider it against the backdrop of the history of interpretations of *Timaeus* 34b–37c. The following remarks will add little to the work of Baltes and Brisson,¹ but they will perhaps be sufficient for shedding some light on Proclus' relation to the previous tradition.

^{*} The following section discusses Proclus' treatment of the composition of the World Soul in *Timaeus* 33b2–37c5. For an overall orientation to Proclus' commentary, see the General Introduction in volume I of this series.

¹ Baltes (1976), Brisson (1974).

Previous interpretations of the psychic composition

Plutarch of Chaeroneia's essay, *On the Generation of the Soul in Plato's Timaeus*, makes clear that by the first century CE there was an established set of 'problems' (*zêtēmata*) around this portion of the *Timaeus*. The one that occupies most of Plutarch's attention is the way in which we are to understand the blending of the kinds from which the Demiurge composes the soul – not only the simple question of what is being asserted by *Tim.* 35a1–b1, but also the question of what the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being are. Plato's text is grammatically puzzling and there are different versions of it, so the two questions are not really separable. The second set of problems involves the quantity of numbers or portions involved in the composition of the soul, their arrangement and their function in Plato's cosmology (*An. Proc.* 1027c). With respect to the first issue concerning the interpretation of *Tim.* 35a1–b1, Plutarch identifies a tradition of conflicting views that go back to the Old Academy. He juxtaposes what he takes to be the views of Xenocrates and his pupil Crantor.² According to the former, the mixture of the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being in the Demiurgic composition of the soul signifies the generation of number.³ By contrast, Crantor seems to have stressed the epistemological significance of the soul's composition from a kind of Being associated with the intelligibles and a kind of Being associated with the sensible world.⁴ At least this is the aspect of Crantor's account that Plutarch seeks to highlight. In both cases, Plutarch concentrates on the combination of the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being. The role of Sameness and Difference is minimised, with the two of them forming a kind of addition to the blend of divisible and indivisible Being. This understanding of the Demiurge's activities is quite natural given Plutarch's reading of the text – a reading that deviates in several ways from our OCT, but most importantly by having the singular αὐτήν for the plural αὐτῶν at *Tim.* 35a6.⁵ Plutarch thus understands a process in which the Demiurge takes the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being and blends them together into a composite form. This is then combined with Sameness and Difference to create the "psychic dough" from which the Demiurge takes portions in 35b4–36b5. Note that in this process, we do not meet with Sameness and Difference of the divisible and indivisible sort. Only Being is thus differentiated: Sameness and Difference

² Cherniss (1976), 163 thinks that the manner in which Plutarch introduces their views suggests that he may not have known their works first hand, but is instead working from some other source that summarises their interpretations.

³ Cf. Xenocrates, fr. 188, Isnardi-Parente (1982). ⁴ Brisson (1974), 303.

⁵ Plutarch's version of the Demiurge's activities and the difference between his text of the *Timaeus* and ours is well analysed in Opsomer (2004).

tout court are then blended with the composite form of Being. This is made clear at 1025b where Plutarch explains how the mixture of divisible and indivisible Being facilitates the combination of Sameness and Difference. Since the indivisible sort of Being is akin to Sameness, while the divisible sort of Being is akin to Difference, the composite of the kinds of Being is able to make possible the combination of things that are normally antagonistic.

Our evidence is not extensive, but there is some reason to believe that this understanding of *Timaeus* 35a1–b1 was not just confined to Plutarch. Alcinoüs glosses the process this way:

Declaring that there exists an intelligible essence which is indivisible, and another which is divisible about bodies, he constructed from these a single essence, explaining that thus it can grasp in thought each of the aforesaid two essences; and seeing that sameness and difference occur both on the level of the intelligible and of divisible things, he put the soul together out of all these things. (*Handbook*, 14.2, trans. Dillon)

This passage notes that both divisible sensibles and indivisible intelligibles fall within the scope of Sameness and Difference, yet it falls short of distinguishing divisible and indivisible Forms of Sameness and Difference.⁶ Plutarch's exegesis of Xenocrates suggests that his attention was similarly directed to the fact that the soul contains both divisible and indivisible *Being* – and Proclus' testimony on him is consistent with this.⁷ Similar remarks apply for the remains of Crantor's earliest commentary on the *Timaeus*.⁸ Sameness and Difference seem to enter in only as a means to account for the Motion and Rest that the soul manifests.⁹ If either of them derived psychic stability and the capacity to move from a specifically *intermediate* Form of Sameness and Difference – analogous to the Being that is blended from the divisible and indivisible kinds – our evidence leaves us no trace of this.

This strikes us as odd because Proclus' reading of this passage has more or less won the day since the mid- to late twentieth century.¹⁰ On Proclus' version, as we shall see, the Demiurge similarly performs two steps in composing the World Soul, but the first step is more complicated than on Plutarch's reading. He does not merely combine divisible and indivisible kinds of Being, but also divisible and indivisible kinds of Sameness and Difference. The intermediate kinds of all three are then mixed together to constitute the “psychic dough” from which the Demiurge will take portions. Therefore one reason that Proclus dedicates a

⁶ ὁρῶν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν ταυτότητα τε καὶ ἑτερότητα, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεριστῶν . . .

⁷ Cf. *in Tim.* II. 165.3–13 = Test. 189 (Isnardi-Parente). ⁸ Mette (1984).

⁹ *De An. Proc.* 1013d = Crantor, Test. 10.3 (Mette). ¹⁰ Grube (1932).

great deal of attention to the exegesis of this part of the *Timaeus* is because he is seeking to correct what he takes to be a serious misunderstanding of Plato's text at 35a1–b1.

In the case of Plutarch and Atticus, there are other, even more serious misconceptions about Plato's text that Proclus seeks to correct. Plutarch's essay on the generation of the soul argues that this is a genuinely temporal creation. Moreover, Plutarch associates the kind of Being that is divisible in the realm of bodies with a pre-existing evil soul. Proclus has argued at length in Book II of his commentary that the creation of the cosmos by the Demiurge is not a creation in time, so there is little need to revisit this issue extensively. Proclus does address Plutarch's claim that the Indivisible Being in the World Soul is an irrational soul that pre-exists the rational soul (153.25–154.1). Proclus' explicit reply to this idea is very succinct (154.15–18) and it is immediately followed by his exegesis of *Timaeus* 35a4–6 which concerns precisely the point that has just been under discussion – the role of the divisible and indivisible kinds of Sameness and Difference in the World Soul's composition. So perhaps the real force of Proclus' response is positive rather than negative; by showing the correct reading of the text, he removes much of the evidence for Plutarch's account. After all, this account makes essential use of the idea that it is divisible Being – and not divisible Sameness and Difference – that is to be identified with the irrational soul.¹¹ So Proclus' motives for detailed attention to the composition of the World Soul coalesce around 35a1–b1.

Previous interpretations of the psychic harmonies

There are three other standard problems (*zêtēmata*) that Plutarch identifies in his essay. These also provide Proclus with reasons to treat *Timaeus* 35b4–36b5 in great detail. As Plutarch's essay shows, these lines were already the subject of detailed mathematical and numerological speculations by earlier interpreters. By the time of Plutarch's essay, these have become rigidified into standard problems. Let us consider them in turn, since they provide another important part of the background against which Proclus writes his commentary.

Plato's text describes the Demiurge setting out portions of the psychic stuff that he has just mixed and these portions have ratios among them, e.g. the second portion is twice the first, the third is three times the first and half again as much as the second, and so on. It is a short step, but an important one, to go from talking about the *ratios of these portions* to one another to talking about *numbers* within the soul. The commentary

¹¹ Cf. *De An. Proc.* 1015e, 1025f–1026a.

tradition moves easily between these, though there is sometimes a sort of implicit recognition that these are slightly different issues. If the first portion were a numerical unit that serves as the measure of numbers, then it should be indivisible into smaller units (*Rep.* VII, 525e). But, on the other hand, if the initial portion is merely a quantity that stands in the 1:2 ratio to the second portion, then nothing precludes us from thinking of it as being divisible into further parts. As we shall see, Proclus exploits this duality in both treating 384 as the value of the unit, and also treating it as a ‘monad of the soul’. The problems that Plutarch catalogues also involve this movement between conceiving of Plato’s project in the psychogony as setting out a number sequence and setting out portions that stand in ratios.

The first problem identified by Plutarch involves the *arrangement* of the portions of soul stuff and their corresponding numbers set out by the Demiurge in *Timaeus* 35b4–36a1. There we find the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8 and 27 – described in just that order. One view, assigned to Crantor, arranges these in the shape of a lambda, Λ , with the doubles on one side and the triples on another. (Note that the numbers are in fact 1, 2, 3, 2^2 , 3^2 , 2^3 , 3^3 .) The alternative view, which Plutarch assigns to Theodorus of Soli, is that we should imagine the portions set out in a single line.

The second problem involves the *quantity* of numbers that are inscribed into the World Soul’s substance and the *value* of each of them. Recall that Plato tells us that the Demiurge ‘fills in’ the intervals between the original numbers in three stages. First, he puts in the harmonic and arithmetic means in the double and triple intervals (35c2–36a6). The placement of these means produces ratios corresponding to the musical fourth (4:3), the fifth (3:2) and the tone (9:8) (*Tim.* 36a6–7). The second step involves the Demiurge ‘filling’ all the 4:3 ratios with the ratio of the tone (*Tim.* 36b1). This leaves us with the *leimma* – literally, ‘the left-over’ – or the ratio of the semi-tone, which Pythagorean tradition identifies with the ratio of 243:256. The placement of the numbers corresponding to the semi-tones is the third and final step (*Tim.* 36b2–5).

The first steps of this process are relatively easy to follow. The insertion of the means is straightforward. The following table shows the Original numbers and the Harmonic and Arithmetic means in the double and triple intervals.

	O	H	A	O	H	A	O	H	A	O
Double	1	$\frac{4}{3}$	$\frac{3}{2}$	2	$\frac{8}{3}$	3	4	$\frac{16}{3}$	6	8
Triple	1	$\frac{3}{2}$	2	3	$\frac{9}{2}$	6	9	$\frac{27}{2}$	18	27

The problem about the quantity of numbers delineated in the Demiurge's activities here intersects with the first problem about the arrangement of the psychic mixture in which the numbers are inscribed. Suppose we follow Crantor's lambda arrangement. Let ' $= p \times \dots$ ' mean 'is equal to the prior value times \dots '. Then we'll imagine the following filling in:

	O	H	A	O	H	A	O	H	A	O
Double	1	$\frac{4}{3}$	$\frac{3}{2}$	2	$\frac{8}{3}$	3	4	$\frac{16}{3}$	6	8
		$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{9}{8}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{9}{8}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{9}{8}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$
Triple	1	$\frac{3}{2}$	2	3	$\frac{9}{2}$	6	9	$\frac{27}{2}$	18	27
		$= p \times \frac{3}{2}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{3}{2}$	$= p \times \frac{3}{2}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{3}{2}$	$= p \times \frac{3}{2}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{3}{2}$

In this sequence, every term has to the term prior to it (p) one of the three ratios – that of the fourth, 4:3; that of the fifth, 3:2 or the ratio of the tone, 9:8. If we side with Theodore of Soli, then we'll imagine a single line of numbers created by the filling in of the means.

1	$\frac{4}{3}$	$\frac{3}{2}$	2	$\frac{8}{3}$	3	4	$\frac{9}{2}$	$\frac{16}{3}$	6	8	9	$\frac{27}{2}$	18	27
	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{3}{2}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{9}{8}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{9}{8}$	$= pp \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{9}{8}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{9}{8}$	$= p \times \frac{3}{2}$	$= p \times \frac{4}{3}$	$= p \times \frac{3}{2}$

In this sequence, nearly every term (except the first, of course) has to the one prior to it (p) one of three ratios: 4:3, 3:2 or 9:8. The only exception is $\frac{16}{3}$, where we must go back a term to 4 in order to generate it from one of the musical ratios. (Hence, 'pp' for predecessor of the predecessor.) This is the only point in the number sequence where terms that figured only as harmonic means between terms in the double and triple sequence lie adjacent to one another.

In the next stage Plato instructs us to insert additional numbers in between each pair of terms where the successor (s) stands to the prior (p) in the ratio of 4:3. So, for example, in between 1 and $\frac{4}{3}$ we can insert two tones. $1 \times \frac{9}{8} = \frac{9}{8}$ and $\frac{9}{8} \times \frac{9}{8} = \frac{81}{64}$. An attempt to insert a third tone would "overshoot" by giving us $\frac{729}{512}$, which is more than $\frac{4}{3}$. However, multiplying $\frac{81}{64}$ by the fraction corresponding to the ratio of the semi-tone yields exactly the sought-after $\frac{4}{3}$. So we will 'fill in' the intervals between $\frac{3}{2}$ and 2, 2 and $\frac{8}{3}$, 3 and 4, 6 and 8, $\frac{27}{2}$ and 18 with the tones and semi-tone, just as we did the interval between 1 and $\frac{4}{3}$.

When we do this in the interval between 4 and $\frac{16}{3}$ the displeasing break in the sequence between $\frac{9}{2}$ and $\frac{16}{3}$ is mended: $4 \times \frac{9}{8} = \frac{9}{2}$ and $\frac{9}{2} \times \frac{9}{8} = \frac{81}{16}$. This, in turn, multiplied by the fraction corresponding to the ratio of the semi-tone yields $\frac{16}{3}$. So the number sequence here is 4, $\frac{9}{2}$, $\frac{81}{16}$, $\frac{16}{3}$.

We can see already at this point that the fractions make the procedure messy. It seems that Crantor was the first to multiply the entire sequence by 384 in order to clear the fractions and express the harmonic ratios in the World Soul in whole numbers.¹² The necessity for this may itself have been a matter of contention. Plutarch, at least, replies to the potential objector who says that such a step is unnecessary (*De An. Proc.* 1027d). One of his replies is, I think, revealing in its honesty. If we do not assign some number to the unit, so as to eliminate the fractions, then this ‘debars us from another speculation (*theôria*) that has a charm that is not unphilosophical’. That is, it precludes us from the joys of the various numerological associations and debate about which interesting mathematical patterns are revealed. As we shall see, such speculations were a mainstay of the tradition of interpretation around the *Timaeus*.

But there may also be a deeper reason than simply clearing the fractions.¹³ If we suppose that we aren’t dealing with numbers here directly, but rather ratios between the “sizes” of portions, then when you put a harmonic mean between the first and second portions, it will stand to the first in the ratio of 4:3. If you take three equal parts of the first portion, it will take four parts of that size to make the portion that establishes the harmonic mean. Hence the first portion has to be conceived of as something that is divisible into at least three equal parts. If one thinks of these parts atomistically, then when you work through the whole sequence, you will find that 384 such “atoms” are required in the first portion. Of course, there is strictly no need to think about it atomistically, but the duality in the notion of the first portion discussed above pulls the imagination very much in that direction. This duality is really that of the distinction between absolute and relative quantity, to put it in the terms that Nicomachus uses (*Arith.* I.3.1). Arithmetic is the science of the first kind of quantity. It works with an indivisible unit, and it is prior to harmonics, which is the science that is concerned with relative quantity. That is to say, numeric quantity is prior to quantitative ratios. So it may not simply be a matter of making the expressions of the psychic ratios tidier ones between whole numbers that drives this enterprise. In any event, Plutarch also reveals to us that

¹² *De An. Proc.* 1020c = Crantor, Test. 11a (Mette).

¹³ I am grateful to John Bigelow for pointing this out to me.

there was no consensus about what number to multiply by in order to clear the fractions. Crantor opted for 384. Plutarch himself seems to prefer 192, as did Theon of Smyrna.¹⁴ The Platonist Severus argued for 768, perhaps on the grounds that the sequence of portions is split into two when the Demiurge cuts the strip of psychic mixture lengthwise (*Tim.* 36b5–7), thus necessitating twice as many units in the initial portion.¹⁵

Suppose we use a first value of 384 to clear the fractions from Plato's sequence of numbers. How many numbers will we arrive at if we follow Plato's directions for constructing it? Proclus' answer is 34. However, there is a tradition prior to Proclus according to which this sequence involves 36 numbers. It is equally possible to mount an argument that the answer is 29 or 37. To see that this is so, let us just ask *where* we are to insert the ratios of the tone and the semi-tone? Only in the 4:3 intervals? Or in the 3:2 intervals as well?

Let us consider the conservative approach that says we should insert tones and semi-tones only in the 4:3 intervals. One might justify this by a very stringent approach to Plato's text. Though he says ἡμιολίων δὲ διαστάσεων καὶ ἐπιτρίτων καὶ ἐπογδῶν γενομένων ἐκ τούτων τῶν δεσμών ἐν ταῖς πρόσθεν διαστάσεσιν – which might be taken to imply that the intervals of the tones are bonds among *both* the 4:3 and 3:2 ratios – he follows this general remark with the specific instruction that τῷ τοῦ ἐπογδῶν διαστήματι τὰ ἐπίτρίτα πάντα συνεπληροῦτο, λείπων αὐτῶν ἐκάστου μόριον. So there is textual support of a sort for what I'll call the conservative approach. Now, let us suppose that we prefer the lambda arrangement that permits numbers to appear twice. Then we'll have these two sequences shown in the table, below.¹⁶

This version of the numbers within soul is conservative and reduplicative. It inserts tones only in the 4:3 ratios. It also permits the same number to appear twice. It yields 37 numbers. It would also be possible to take a conservative approach that didn't count the duplicated numbers twice. In this case we would have 29.

¹⁴ Theon of Smyrna (late first–early second century) was the Platonist who wrote *Aspects of Mathematics Useful for the Understanding of Plato*. Greek text, Hiller (1878); English translation, Lawlor and Lawlor (1979).

¹⁵ Proclus, in *Tim.* II. 191.6 = Severus, 16 T Gioè (2002).

¹⁶ In my table, T indicates that the number stands in the ratio of the Tone to what comes before, H that it is a Harmonic mean between the initial portions set out in the double and triple series, A that it is an arithmetic mean between initial portions. These portions are indicated by O₂, O₃, etc. to indicate the numbers that are the multiples of the originary series 2, 4, 8, and 3, 9, 27.

Previous interpretations of psychic harmonies

Double		384		Triple
43 ²	T		H	576
486	T		T	648
51 ²	H		T	729
576	A		A	768
648	T		O ₃	1152
729	T		H	1728
768	O ₂		T	1944
864	T		T	2187
972	T		A	2304
1024	H		O ₉	3456
1152	A		H	5184
1296	T		T	5832
1458	T		T	6561
1536	O ₄		A	6912
1728	T		O ₂₇	10368
1944	T			
2048	H			
2304	A			
2592	T			
2916	T			
3072	O ₈			

A non-conservative approach inserts the tones not only into the 4:3 ratios, *but also into the 3:2 intervals*. If we arrange the number sequence in a single line so as to avoid reduplication, this will yield a sequence where every number stands to its predecessor either in the ratio of the tone (9:8) or the ratio of the semi-tone (243:256). In this case there will be 34 numbers. This is the approach that Proclus takes, since he understands

Plato to be directing us to include tones within both the 4:3 and 3:2 ratios.¹⁷

Why does this matter? Again, it seems to the modern reader to be a bit of a tempest in a teacup, but Plutarch's essay and the epitome of Plato's *Timaeus*, entitled *On the Nature of the World and the Soul* and attributed to the Pythagorean Timaeus, show that this was a matter of some moment in antiquity. One issue concerns the extent of harmonic theory that is revealed in the *Timaeus*. Proclus claims that one reason why the Pythagorean Timaeus' version of the harmonies in the World Soul includes 36 terms is because it is meant to reveal the ratio of the *apotomê* or major semi-tone (*in Tim.* II. 188.10–19). (The nature of the *apotomê* and the semi-tone will be discussed in more detail below.) Plato clearly shows us the ratios associated with the fourth, the fifth, the tone and the semi-tone. Can we credit him with revealing the ratio of the major semi-tone as well? Ps.-Timaeus' *On the Nature of the World* probably included a table of 36 numbers that expressed the ratio of the *apotomê* twice – first in its lowest whole number expression (2048 : 2187) and then again at three times these numbers.¹⁸ Proclus thought that we should not adjust the quantity of numbers specified by Plato's instructions to include the *apotomê* since Plato himself does not mention it. So one substantive issue that turns on the quantity of numbers in the psychic harmonies is the question of just how much harmonic theory there is in the *Timaeus*.

Plutarch's third standard problem concerns the *significance and function* of the harmonies in the World Soul. These numeric sequences are inscribed in the “psychic dough” that is rolled out and split down the middle to become the circle of the Same and the circle of the Different (*Tim.* 36b2–c5). These circles are, in turn, associated with the celestial equator and the path of the ecliptic (c5–d1). The circle of the Different is then divided into seven circles corresponding to the Sun, Moon and planets (d1–7). So, should the harmonic ratios in the substance of the World Soul have any correlation to the planetary orbits? And if so, what should they correlate with? Their relative speeds? Their distance from Earth? Their size? We have evidence not only from Plutarch, but also from Calcidius, Macrobius and Hippolytus that there was plenty of speculation about this question. Once one equates the planetary circles with heavenly spheres, what is at issue here is the question of the harmony

¹⁷ *in Tim.* II. 185.3–6: καταπεπύκνυνται δὲ οἱ ὅροι καὶ τὰ διαστήματα πάντα ταῖς τε ἀρμονικαῖς καὶ ἀριθμητικαῖς μεσότησι, καὶ τῶν ἡμιολίων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτρίτων αἱ διαιρέσεις εἰς τε τὰ ἐπὶ γδοα καὶ τὰ λείμματα γεγόνασιν. The most detailed of the modern commentaries – Taylor (1928) – agrees with Proclus' calculation.

¹⁸ The question is somewhat complicated by textual issues. See Tobin (1985), 21–2 and Proclus, *in Tim.* II. 188.14–18.

of the spheres. Plutarch's text gives a good indication of the scope of the speculations about the manner in which the harmonic ratios might be realised in the heavens (*De An. Proc.* 1028b–1029a). Like Proclus, Plutarch pours cold water on such flights of fancy, but they nonetheless remain a part of the background that a Platonist commentator must address.

The mathematical and harmonic background

In addition to these issues about the interpretation of Plato's text, Proclus' commentary also appears against a backdrop of handbooks of arithmetic and harmonics. Theon's *Mathematics Useful for the Understanding of Plato* is expressly addressed to the would-be reader of Plato. Other handbooks, such as Nicomachus of Gerasa's *Introduction to Arithmetic* and *Manual of Harmonics*, are not so specifically directed toward Plato's *Timaeus*, but nonetheless seek to communicate information about concepts, such as geometric, harmonic and arithmetic means, that are central to Plato's dialogue. In addition, we know of some works that seem to have been primarily on harmonics but which were apparently written as commentaries on at least part of the *Timaeus* – viz., the works of Adrastus and Aelianus quoted by both Porphyry and Theon.¹⁹ The former is called a Peripatetic and only the latter a Platonist,²⁰ so it was perhaps possible to write a work on harmonics by writing a commentary on the *Timaeus*, or perhaps simply on that part that concerns the harmonies in the World Soul.

Both Proclus' commentary and Plutarch's *De An. Proc.* – which was written for the benefit of the latter's sons – reflect this background in their substantial didactic content. Plutarch interrupts his interpretation of Plato's text with straightforward exegesis of central mathematical concepts. Sometimes this interruption is rather abrupt (1019c). Sometimes it draws on earlier sources, as when Plutarch explains Eudorus' method for arriving at means. Proclus' exposition of the requisite mathematical concepts is less intrusive and abrupt, but nonetheless recognised as an essential preliminary step for grappling with the philosophical import of Plato's text.

These matters having been articulated to the extent that it is possible, it is necessary to get a grip on such matters concerning numbers and the harmonies of the soul as is necessary for those who intend to understand must have at hand, lest we attempt the exegesis of the following section of the text in vain. It is surely necessary, then, if we wish to speak about this part of the dialogue, to have

¹⁹ Cf. Barker (1989), 209–35.

²⁰ Porphyry, *Commentary on Ptolemy's Harmonics* 96.1–7, Düring (1980).

grasped beforehand the things that are typically discussed in works on harmonics. (in *Tim.* II. 167.24–30)

Proclus' text often follows various handbooks quite closely. Sometimes this is simply a structural similarity where Proclus treats the order of topics in the same way that, say, Theon does. Other times the dependence is much closer. At one point Proclus pulls a sentence almost verbatim from Nicomachus' *Introduction*. Proclus, however, omits the table of numbers that follows in Nicomachus' text, thus rendering the point almost unintelligible (177.5–7). (Or at least, if Proclus' commentary ever contained such a table, neither our manuscripts nor the scholia on them give any indication of it.) In any event, the didactic element in Platonic tradition of writing about and around the *Timaeus* also explains why Proclus spends so many pages over so few lines of that work.

Even if this mathematical background material is largely didactic, it is not free from controversy. Proclus belongs to the Pythagorean tradition in harmonics, as do the predecessors discussed above. It seems to have been part of the tradition for such Platonist and Pythagorean writers to point out the issues that divide them from the Aristoxenian tradition.²¹

For the Pythagorean tradition, the pitches of different notes are conceived of quantitatively.²² Most often this is interpreted in terms of the relative frequency of impacts of the air that has been moved by the sounding object striking the ear. However, the quantitative character of music is a matter of discrete, as opposed to continuous, quantity. The theoretical orientation is arithmetic – not geometric. Musical intervals are conceived of as *ratios* between numbers. In the Greek arithmetic tradition, there is no room for intervals that would correspond to ratios involving irrational numbers. Finally, the Pythagorean tradition treats harmonics as another branch of mathematics. As a result, the terminology for discussing musical intervals is that of mathematics, not the terminology of practising musicians.

Many of the texts in the background to Proclus' commentary include variations on the story of how Pythagoras discovered the correspondence between the intervals of the octave, the fourth and the fifth with the ratios 2:1, 4:3 and 3:2. Nicomachus' *Manual of Harmonics* tells us that Pythagoras noticed that the sounds made by different hammers used by a blacksmith corresponded to the octave.²³ Further investigation revealed

²¹ Barker (2007) provides an outstandingly clear account of these competing traditions up to the time of Theophrastus, with a short addendum on Porphyry and later writers who touch on topics in harmonics.

²² Cf. Barker (1989), 7–8.

²³ *Harm.* chapter 6 is copied by Iamblichus in his *Life of Pythagoras*, chapter 26. See also Macrobius (*Som. Scip.* II. 1, 9–14) and Boethius (*Inst. Mus.* I. 10–11).

that the weight of the hammers stood in the ratio 2:1, and similarly for the other ratios. More and less plausible variations on the story include pipes of different lengths and strings with different weights attached to them.²⁴ The Pythagorean tradition recognises as the primary concordances only those that are expressed by simple ratios – that is, those that are multiples, such as 2:1 for the octave, 3:1 for the twelfth and 4:1 for the double octave, or those that are super-particulars (*epimoria*), such as 4:3, 3:2. The three primary concords can all be constructed from the numbers found in the ‘tetractys’ or the numbers 1–4.

With Archytas we have a second ‘musical’ tetractys: 6, 8, 9, 12. This second tetractys is achieved by taking the harmonic and arithmetic means within the double interval of the first tetractys: 1, $\frac{4}{3}$, $\frac{3}{2}$, 2. Multiply by the smallest number that will clear the fractions and it yields the sequence 6, 8, 9, 12. When these are combined with the three musical proportions – the arithmetic, geometric and harmonic – further mathematically satisfying facts are revealed. The number 9 forms the arithmetic mean between 6 and 12. 6:9 expresses the ratio of the fifth, while 9:12 expresses the ratio of the fourth. The number 8 forms the harmonic mean between 6 and 12 and 8:6 is a fourth, while 8:12 is a fifth. The ratio of the extreme terms, 6 and 12, is that of the octave. We can think of the proportion 6, 9, 12 as expressing an octave composed of a fifth followed by a fourth. The proportion 6, 8, 12 is an octave constructed of a fourth followed by a fifth. The ratio 8:9 thus expresses the difference when a fourth is ‘subtracted’ from a fifth.²⁵ This is the ratio of the tone revealed in the ‘musical’ tetractys and it forms the basis for the construction of the Pythagorean diatonic scale that we find in Plato’s *Timaeus*.

<i>Nêtê</i> (6)		4:3	2:1
	9:8		
<i>Paranêtê</i>	9:8		
<i>Tritê</i>	256:243		
<i>Paramesê</i> (8)	9:8		
	9:8	4:3	
<i>Mesê</i> (9)	9:8		
<i>Lichanos</i>	9:8		
<i>Parhypatê</i>	256:243		
<i>Hypatê</i>			

²⁴ Adrastus ap. Theon 56.9–57.10; Aelianus ap. Porphyry, *Comm.* 33.16 ff.

²⁵ Cf. Theon, 70.7–13.

This Pythagorean tradition stands opposed to a more empirical approach to harmonics that stems from Aristoxenus. Aristoxenus did conceive of acoustic space as a continuum and this fact helps explain the central point of disagreement with the Pythagorean tradition: the division of the tetrachord. The Pythagoreans equate the fourth with the ratio 4:3 and the tone with 9:8. The interval of the fourth is “bigger” than two tones, since $\frac{9}{8} \times \frac{9}{8} < \frac{4}{3}$. If the remainder or *leimma* were exactly half of a tone, then there would have to be a rational square root of $\frac{9}{8}$. But this fraction is a super-particular or *epimorion*. That is, it has the form $\frac{n+1}{n}$ and the super-particular ratio is such that it is impossible to insert one or more geometric means between the terms. So there is no rational number, x , such that $8 : x = x : 9$, nor any pair of rational numbers such that $8 : x = x : y = y : 9$.²⁶ Any such value would involve an irrational number, such as the square root of 8, and such irrationals lie outside the Pythagorean conception of a number as a determinate collection of units. So what is left over when one takes two tones from the musical fourth is not *half* a tone. Taking the musical fourth to be composed of two tones and such a remainder, the Pythagoreans calculated that its ratio must be 256:243.²⁷

By contrast, Aristoxenus and those who followed him were content to divide the tone into halves, thirds, or even quarters since they deemed each of these to be ‘melodic’ (*El. Harm.* 21.20–8). The determination of this question for the Aristoxenians was presumably musical practice, rather than the austere, mathematical reasoning of the Pythagoreans.

It seems to have been traditional for exegetes of Plato’s *Timaeus* to highlight these points about the narrow range of legitimate consonances and the fact that the semi-tone is not really *half* a tone. Plutarch’s *De An. Proc.* certainly does so and so too does Proclus.

Let us now turn our attention to those exegetes of Plato that are both more proximate in time to Proclus and also regarded by him as philosophical allies. *We* would call them ‘the other Neoplatonists’ but Proclus just thinks of them as particularly enlightened Platonists.

Proclus’ bacchic chorus

We have fragments from *Timaeus* commentaries by two of those Platonists whom Proclus regards as among the more insightful of the Platonist

²⁶ This is proved by Archytas, DK 47A19. For a characteristically clear discussion, see Barker (2007), 303–5.

²⁷ $(\frac{4}{3})/(\frac{9}{8})^2 = \frac{256}{243}$.

tradition: Porphyry and Iamblichus.²⁸ Indeed, much of our knowledge of these earlier works comes from Proclus' own commentary. In addition, Proclus also discusses the views of Amelius and Theodore of Asine on the proper interpretation of the World Soul. These Platonists, like Porphyry and Iamblichus, make Proclus' list of enlightened Platonists. It is unclear whether Proclus knew the work of Amelius and Theodore directly, or whether he was relying on the contents of the commentaries of Porphyry and Iamblichus.²⁹ The controversies over the *Timaeus* that feature in Plutarch or Timaeus Locris form a somewhat distant part of the background to Proclus' own commentary, but the writings of those Platonists whom Proclus regards as more or less correct readers of Plato are arguably a much more important piece of the background.

What issues emerge from what we know of the commentaries of Porphyry and Iamblichus? The first and most obvious controversy in the backdrop to Proclus' commentary is the question of the hypercosmic soul. According to Iamblichus 'every order is presided over by the unparticipated monad, prior to the participated entities' (*in Tim.* fr. 54, Dillon). This is a general principle of Iamblichus' view on emanation. He distinguishes between the unparticipated (*amethektos*), paradigmatic cause and the participated one (*metechomenos*). The latter is related to the things that participate in it, while the former remains transcendent and unrelated to the things for which it is the paradigmatic cause.³⁰ It follows from this general principle that, when we come to the class of souls, there must be an unparticipated soul. But this cannot be the World Soul, since in animating the cosmos such a soul is participated – that is to say, it is the soul of *some body*. So there must be a hypercosmic soul prior to the World Soul.

According to Proclus' reports, Iamblichus did not think that Plato's *Timaeus* was silent on the subject of the hypercosmic soul. Iamblichus took various distinctions in Plato's text to be distinctions between a variety of *different souls*: the hypercosmic soul, the World Soul and the souls of various beings within the cosmos. In this respect, it seems that Iamblichus' view was similar to that of Theodore of Asine – or at least Proclus treats them as holding similar views.³¹ On the other hand,

²⁸ Proclus characterises Plotinus, Amelius and Porphyry, Iamblichus and Theodore of Asine as a chorus of bacchants following the divine Plato (*Plat. Theol.* I. 6.16–7.8).

²⁹ Cf. Dillon (1973), 337–8 on Proclus' direct acquaintance with Amelius. For a study of Proclus' knowledge of Numenius, with some broader morals drawn from this, see Tarrant (2004).

³⁰ There is a third distinction between the participated cause and the cause *in* the participants. This third way of being is described as *kata methexin* or *en schesei*. Cf. Dillon (1973), 33.

³¹ Cf. Iamblichus, *in Tim.* fr. 52.

Proclus also presents objections that purport to come from a work by Iamblichus entitled *Refutations of Amelius and his school, and of Numenius*. However, these objections seem to be directed primarily at the views of Theodore of Asine, so the relation of his ideas on the subject of souls prior to the World Soul to the thought of Iamblichus is left rather mysterious. In any event, Proclus chooses to portray them as in agreement on the proposition that there is a soul prior to the World Soul. In addition, both seem to have read the *Timaeus* as containing such a doctrine.

On the latter point, at least, they stand in opposition to Porphyry. At several points in his commentary, Proclus juxtaposes the views of Porphyry and Iamblichus. Iamblichus thought that *Timaeus* 34b2–3 described the hypercosmic soul (fr. 50, Dillon). Porphyry claims that it deals with the World Soul (fr. 61, Sodano). Iamblichus thought that lengthwise splitting of the “psychic stuff” at *Timaeus* 36b6–7 introduced two souls, one hypercosmic, the other the soul of the universe (fr. 54, Dillon). Porphyry’s commentary remarks on how the splitting of the psychic strip generates a X in a circle, a symbol of the World Soul (fr. 70, Sodano). This is unsurprising since Porphyry treats the subject of *Timaeus* 34b–37b as one and the same thing – the World Soul – throughout. Proclus’ position on this question is a complex one, as we shall see below.

Some issues in the commentaries of Iamblichus and Porphyry are continuous with earlier work. So, for instance, the tendency to look for deep numerological significance among the numbers that make up the harmonies in the World Soul that we noted in Plutarch is very much present in Iamblichus’ work (fr. 53). Proclus describes him as ‘singing hymns’ on the number sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27. Both Theon and Plutarch note that 27 has the distinctive property of being equal to the sum of the numbers that come before it.³² However, Iamblichus goes beyond this in locating the cubic numbers 8 and 27 within the mechanics of emanation where they correspond to the phase of *reversion* upon the cause.³³ By contrast, Theodore of Asine seems to read the psychic numbers in terms of correspondences with things within the cosmos – 9, for instance, is the number of water.³⁴ As we shall see, Syrianus and Proclus similarly interpret the numbers within the World Soul in terms of procession, reversion and remaining in the cause, thus following the lead of Iamblichus. Proclus regards Theodore’s numerological speculations as having a certain level of sophistication (*ouk amousos*, 218.9), but

³² Theon, 96.5–8 (Hiller); *De An. Proc.* 1018d–e.

³³ For an overview of the triad: procession, reversion, remaining, see Siorvanes (1996), 105–9 and Lloyd (1982).

³⁴ Proclus, *in Tim.* II. 216.30 included in Theodore, Test. 22 (Deuse).

as insufficiently connected with the text of the *Timaeus*. I suspect another work lurking in the background may be the *Theology of Arithmetic*.³⁵ This short book catalogues various symbolic associations with the numbers that form the decad (1–10). It has been attributed to Iamblichus, but it seems to be a pastiche of selections from Nicomachus of Gerasa's lost work of the same name and from Anatolius' *On the Decad and the Numbers Within It*. Whatever its authorship, it or something like it seems to form part of the background to Proclus' numerological associations. Many of Proclus' claims that seem wholly unmotivated actually gain some sense when viewed against the fuller treatment in the *Theology*. So, it is not obvious why the number 7 is 'motherless and not at all womanish' (in *Tim.* II. 236.19) unless one knows from the *Theology* that 7 is unique among the numbers in the decad in having no other member as a factor. Hence it is 'motherless' in as much as it is born of the unit alone. Since it is not a factor of any number less than 14, it has no 'offspring' in the decad and so is, in this respect, not at all 'womanish'. However contrived or uninteresting some modern readers might find such associationist thinking about numbers, this tradition forms a significant part of the backdrop to Proclus' commentary.

Above I noted that Plutarch's essay on the soul in the *Timaeus* contained a significant quantity of didactic material on mathematics and harmonics. Porphyry's commentary seems to have similarly contained explanations of fundamental concepts and harmonic doctrines distinctive to the Pythagorean tradition. Sodano's collection of fragments from Porphyry's *in Timaeum* contains extensive extracts from Book II of Macrobius' *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* in fragments 65–8. Within these passages we find the enumeration of the legitimate consonances and the claim that the semi-tone is not really half a tone (fr. 67). Sodano notes parallel passages in Theon of Smyrna. Theon makes use of Adrastus, and so too does Porphyry, so it is unsurprising that there are similarities among these texts.³⁶ Sodano also notes parallels to the Macrobius text in Proclus. Though Proclus never announces that he is drawing on material in Porphyry's commentary in his exegesis of the salient bits of harmonic theory, it remains a distinct possibility that the didactic portions of Proclus' text reflect the content of Porphyry's earlier work.

The place of Theodore of Asine in the background to Proclus' commentary deserves special mention since Proclus seems to go out of his way to explain his views. Theodore seems to fall into the tradition that speculates on the significance of the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being

³⁵ Greek text, Falco (1922); translation, Waterfield (1988).

³⁶ As Runia notes in his Introduction to Book II of Proclus' *Timaeus Commentary*, a new study of Porphyry's commentary is probably in order. Runia and Share (2008), 10.

that the Demiurge combines in making the soul. According to Proclus, Theodore related these to two different *intellects* – one containing ideas of wholes, the other of particular things (*merika*). The soul is supposed to be an intermediate between these in as much as it is established from both of them.³⁷ What Proclus tells us about the provenance of this idea is intriguing. It is one that Theodore discovered, which derives from the Persians through Porphyry – so perhaps the impetus was something that Theodore discovered in Porphyry’s writings on the *Chaldean Oracles*. But there is another interesting remark here too: Proclus adds ‘Or at least this is what Antonius, who was the student of Ammonius, reports.’ The Antonius in question was an associate of Plotinus’ teacher, Ammonius Saccas. The intellect that contains ideas of particulars seems to have contents that would be properly described as *individual Forms* – the subject of Plotinus’ treatise V.7 and an issue on which some commentators suppose Plotinus remained ultimately undecided or inconsistent.³⁸ This notion of an intellect containing ideas of particulars is one that Proclus elsewhere tells us that Theodore derived from Amelius, Porphyry’s fellow student under Plotinus.³⁹ The context for this remark is interesting, since Amelius seems to be discovering individual Forms from *Timaeus* 30c5–7.⁴⁰ So another issue among the more recent Platonic interpreters seems to be that of individual Forms.

This issue emerges in our section of the text only in connection with the World Soul’s knowledge of both intelligibles and sensibles (*Tim.* 37b3–c3). Both Iamblichus and Porphyry interpreted this passage in terms of the image of the soul as chariot-driver with two horses in *Phaedrus* 246a ff. On Porphyry’s reading, the Circle of the Different is that through which the World Soul possesses the knowledge of sensibles. It knows these sensibles, not because it is affected by causes lower than itself, but because it is both the source of the sensible things themselves, and also the repository of the knowledge of sensibles had by the whole soul. Hence Porphyry says ‘the knowledge of sensible things is both carried out [from the Circle of the Different] toward that which is external but also bent round again and brought back into the soul itself’. However, Iamblichus reads this passage and the chariot image generally in such a way as to make the chariot-driver the *hypercosmic* soul. This hypercosmic soul rouses up the Circle of the Different – a thing distinct from

³⁷ II. 154.4–9 (= Theodore, Test. 19, Deuse).

³⁸ There is an extensive literature on this subject. See the selection of primary texts and the bibliography assembled by Sorabji (2005), 363–7.

³⁹ I. 425.16–22 (= Theodore, Test. 11, Deuse).

⁴⁰ Plato’s text here is ἀτελεῖ γὰρ εἰκὸς οὐδὲν ποτ’ ἂν γένοιτο καλὸν – οὐ δ’ ἔστιν τᾶλλα ζῶα καθ’ ἑν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια and these interpreters seem to have inferred that individual Forms (καθ’ ἑν) are being contrasted with the universal Forms (κατὰ γένη μόρια).

itself – thus stirring up the *logoi* of the things of sense, and reports on them to the soul in general. However, in doing so, it turns out that even the Circle of the Same possesses the knowledge of sensible things. Does Porphyry's view that the Circle of the Different is both the proximate causal source of sensible things and the repository of knowledge of them imply that there are something like paradigms of individuals within it? Should we regard these as individual *Forms* or merely as the *logoi* of sensibles? The answer is clear enough to Proclus. He will insist that the Circle of the Different possesses only 'projected rational-forming principles' (*proballomenoi logoi*) of sensibles.

Proclus also tells us a great deal about Theodore's exegetical techniques involving letters (or linguistic items generally), characters and numbers.⁴¹ These innovative interpretive techniques include the use of *isopsêphia* or *gematria*. So, for instance, the soul is shown to be essentially alive by appeal to the fact that its first and last letters correspond to the numbers that, in turn, can be turned back into letters that yield the phrase, 'it lives'. The letter ψ is used to represent 700. This is the 'third heptad' in the sequence 7, 70, 700. Theodore believed that if one concentrated on the first heptad, all would be made clear. The number 7 is represented by the letter ζ . If you combine this letter with the last letter of $\psi\chi\eta$ it yields $\zeta\eta$ – or more precisely $\zeta\eta$ for 'it lives'. Theodore's interpretive toolkit is not exhausted by the letter–number correlations of *gematria*. In another example, he again discerns the soul's status as an intermediate between intellects from the position of the υ in $\psi\chi\eta$. This is said to be between 'two spheres' – one of which is hotter and life-engendering because of the *pneuma* in it. Here I think it is not the fact that ψ and χ correspond to 700 and 600 that is salient. Rather it is the shape of the letters themselves. Plato's own text has the two psychic strips of soul stuff in the shape of a χ (*Tim.* 36b8) which is then bent round to form two circles corresponding to the sphere of the heavens defined by the celestial equator and the path of the ecliptic. The letter ψ might plausibly be so bent round too. Since these letters can be transformed into spheres, and the activity of a sphere's motion around its centre is the visible analogue of *noêsis* (*Laws* X. 898a, cf. in *Tim.* II. 69.15), by being located between these letters the υ in $\psi\chi\eta$ reveals that soul is an intermediate between two intellects.

These flights of interpretive fancy are too much even for Proclus and Iamblichus. Proclus tells us that Iamblichus composed a work entitled *Refutations of Amelius and his school, and of Numenius*.⁴² Theodore is not named in this connection, but Proclus follows his exposition of

⁴¹ in *Tim.* II. 274.10–15 included in Theodore, Test. 6 (Deuse).

⁴² in *Tim.* II. 277.26–278.25 = Iamblichus, in *Tim.* fr. 57 (Dillon).

Theodore's views with the rebuttal from Iamblichus' work as if it didn't much matter: Amelius, Numenius, Theodore – any of that mob who go in for such interpretive excesses as this! The fact that Proclus lumps them all together suggests that Theodore was not alone in regarding the shapes of letters or correspondences between letters and numerals as salient aspects of Plato's text to be interpreted. This is an issue to which Proclus and Iamblichus must respond, however. Their insistence on the unity of each dialogue in its *skopos* means that their own commentaries labour over what we modern readers might regard as irrelevancies and coincidences.⁴³ So why should one stop there? If, by Iamblichus' lights, the indisposition of the person absent from the previous day's discussion at *Timaeus* 17a4–5 must be read in a way consonant with the dialogue's *skopos* in physics, why should not the shapes of the letters in ψυχή be fair interpretive game as well? So another issue in the background of Neoplatonic readings of the *Timaeus* is the question of what properties of Plato's text are legitimate targets for interpretation.

A final issue lurking in the Neoplatonic background to this section of Proclus' commentary is the status of the numbers, especially those in the World Soul. His teacher, Syrianus, seems to have developed quite extensive views on the various modes in which numbers may exist. The first and most important distinction is between Form numbers and mathematical ones. The latter correspond to a plurality of units and are subject to mathematical operations like addition. The former are not able to be added and correspond to 'what it is to be (e.g.) seven'. Syrianus further distinguished between 'substantial psychic numbers' and insubstantial mathematical or monadic numbers. The substantial psychic numbers seem to be some sort of intermediate between Form numbers and mathematical numbers.⁴⁴ They will be differentiated from the latter by being indivisible and not subject to mathematical operations,⁴⁵ but Proclus tells us that they are nonetheless *participated* and this presumably differentiates them from Form numbers. This is a more complex scheme than the division found in, say, Nicomachus of Gerasa between divine and scientific (*epistêmonikos*) numbers.⁴⁶ There is also a further question of how the ratios (*logoi*) between the psychic numbers exercise their influence on the sensible realm. Some commentators seem to have tried to assimilate these to the *spermatikos logos*, an equation that Proclus resists.⁴⁷ But the matter is complex since the Neoplatonists credited Pythagoras himself with a notion of number explained in terms of such seminal *logoi* and it would be easy enough to confuse the idea that 'number is the extension

⁴³ On the role of the *skopos*, see the General Introduction to this series in volume I, p. 12.

⁴⁴ in *Tim.* II. 164.19–165.6. ⁴⁵ in *Tim.* II. 193.23–6.

⁴⁶ Cf. *Arith.* I. 6.1–4. ⁴⁷ in *Tim.* II. 193.26–30.

and activation of the *spermatikoi logoi* in the monad' with the idea that the psychic numbers and the ratios in which they stand are similarly *spermatikoi logoi*.⁴⁸

THE STRUCTURE OF PROCLUS' COMMENTARY

The text translated in this volume corresponds to the latter two-thirds of Book III of the commentary. The first part of Book III (volume III in this series) is dominated by the idea of the 'ten gifts of the Demiurge'. Proclus treats the text of *Timaeus* 31b–40a as enumerating ten gifts that the Creator bestows upon the 'god who will at some time be' (34a8–b1). Each of these endowments plays a role in making the ensouled and intelligent cosmos a 'visible god'. The present volume is far longer than volume III in our series, but while it described six gifts that the Demiurge bestowed on the body of the world, this volume deals only with the seventh Demiurgic gift: the fact that the cosmic body is animated by a divine soul (*in Tim.* II. 5.25–6).

This is not to say that the present volume has no organising architectonic. In fact, Proclus thinks that this part of Plato's text is structured by the same order of topics as Iamblichus' *De Anima*. Iamblichus' work is structured by the idea that first one inquires into the substance or *ousia* of the soul (§§2–9), then its powers (§§10–15), and then its activities (§§16–19).⁴⁹ This order of questions is perhaps one that Iamblichus arrived at by reflecting on what he took to be the shortcomings of Aristotle's way of categorising previous theorising about the soul (*De An.* I.2, 403b25, ff.).⁵⁰ Whatever the origins of the Iamblichean order of exposition in psychology, Proclus treats Plato's text as conforming to it. The commentary in this volume divides into five main headings. First there is a transitional section in which Proclus discusses the relation between the World Body and the World Soul (102.7–119.24). Then he turns to the composition of the World Soul, and in particular its

⁴⁸ Syrianus, *in Metaphys.* 142.11–21; cf. Iamblichus, *in Nic. Arith.* 10.12–17.

⁴⁹ Or at the very least, John Stobaeus transmits the fragments of Iamblichus' work under the headings *περί συνόψεων ψυχῆς* (*Anth.* I. 49.33.1) and *περί τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῆς ψυχῆς* (I. 49.36.1). It must be said that these headings fit very neatly over the content that he then reports from Iamblichus' work. It is possible, of course, that this way of systematising things is one that Stobaeus draws from elsewhere (though it is unclear where that might be, save Proclus' commentary) or one that he imposes himself. But the fact that Proclus explicitly uses it too makes it far more plausible that it derives from Iamblichus. In personal correspondence, Dillon tells me that it is, to his knowledge, original to Iamblichus.

⁵⁰ Iamblichus' remarks on the ambiguities of Aristotle's three main categories (*De An.* §1) seem somewhat at odds with the praise for Aristotle's essay by Iamblichus that ps.-Simplicius reports (*in De An.* 1.11).

ousia (119.29–166.14). From the psychic *ousia* we pass to a discussion of the psychic harmony (166.15–237.7). This portion of the commentary is very long because it includes two considerations of the lemma text *Tim.* 35b4–7. As noted above, it is part of the tradition in discussions of this section of the *Timaeus* for there to be a considerable didactic element concerning proportions and harmonies. The section on the psychic harmonies is followed by discussion of the “form” or “shape” of the World Soul (237.8–257.29). Literally, of course, the World Soul has no spatially extended shape – a point that Proclus hammers home repeatedly by drawing a distinction between the visible heavenly bodies that travel along the ecliptic and the immaterial, purely psychic counterparts to the paths that the visible bodies will traverse. Yet Plato does communicate to us important truths about the soul by treating it as two strips which are bent round to form two circles, one of which is subdivided, etc. This section on the form of the World Soul is followed by a discussion of its powers (257.30–279.16) and then a discussion of its activities (279.19–316.4). This structure is announced at 125.10–127.25 and the reader is reminded of it at particular intervals.⁵¹ Proclus even has a justification of sorts for what he regards as a merely apparent deviation from Iamblichus’ three-fold treatment of issues in psychology (II. 126.30–127.11). The question of psychic harmony and form is subordinate to that of the soul’s substance or *ousia*. So we have the primary triad: *ousia*, power, activity. But the first member of the triad, *ousia*, is itself triple: *huparxis*, harmony and form. So Plato’s discussion of the soul falls into five parts. And it is fitting for it to be a pentad since the soul is an intermediary between the intelligible and sensible realms, while the pentad is the arithmetic mean between those numbers in the decad that sum to ten, as the diagram in the *Theology of Arithmetic* would have illustrated.⁵²

1	4	7
2	5	8
3	6	9

Runia notes in his introduction to volume II in this series that Proclus’ method in his commentary conforms only loosely to the later structure of *theôria* and *lexis*. This structure is clearly apparent in a work like

⁵¹ 160.18–23; 223.21–4; 258.1–3; 279.20–5.

⁵² Cf. *Theol. Arith.* 31.12–16. The diagram is missing from our manuscripts, but it is easy to construct. The pairs of numbers that sum to ten appear on the middle horizontal, the middle vertical and at the diagonals. In each case, the arithmetic mean is five.

Olympiodorus' *Commentary on Plato's Gorgias*. This work is the record of Olympiodorus' lectures, as indicated by the use of *apo phônês* in the title. As a consequence, Plato's text is dealt with in fifty lecture-sized chunks. In each lecture, the teacher provides a general interpretation, which may also involve the resolution of interpretive problems and the answering of potential objections. This is the *theôria*. The text under discussion was then likely read out and the teacher would comment on significant words or phrases. This is the *lexis*. Some aspects of Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus* conform very roughly to this model. Often a discussion of individual words or phrases concludes the treatment of a lemma. Sometimes such detailed discussion is explicitly contrasted with the general interpretation that has preceded it. Thus the treatment of *Timaeus* 34b10–c2 at *in Tim.* II. 113.15–116.1 falls neatly into the pattern of *theôria* and *lexis* and Proclus marks the passage from one to the other explicitly: 'Right now, however, if you are willing, let us consider each of the words in Plato's text' (113.26–7). What is certainly lacking, however, is anything like the relatively uniform divisions of the text that we find in Olympiodorus' *Commentary on Plato's Gorgias* – divisions that owe to the commentary's origins in a context of lectures of more or less uniform duration.

I noted above that it seems to have been traditional for works on this portion of Plato's *Timaeus* to contain considerable material on mathematics and harmonics of a more or less didactic nature. Proclus conforms to this expectation in ways that affect the otherwise regular structure of his commentary. He *repeats* the lemma at *Timaeus* 35b4–6 ('First He took a single portion from it', etc.). After a brief introduction to the topic of the World Soul's harmony (166.16–167.25), Proclus gives a mathematical preface, followed by the initial quotation of *Timaeus* 35b4–6. This first quotation of the lemma is then followed by a discussion of such basics of harmonic theory as multiples; harmonic and arithmetic means; the epimoric ratios corresponding to the fourth, the fifth and the tone; the semi-tone; as well as the *apotomê* and the *komma*. The alternative constructions of the scale by Adrastus, Timaeus Locris and Severus are discussed.

To this point, the discussion is mostly a technical one about harmonic theory and the extent of harmonic theory to be found in Plato's text. (For instance, does Plato reveal to us the *apotomê*, as well as the semi-tone?) But at 193.6 the discussion turns to an 'exegesis of the text that is *pragmateiôdês*'. This term occurs just once in Plato, at *Parmenides* 137b1 where it means something like 'serious' or 'laborious'.⁵³ We find no occurrences of the term in Plotinus, Porphyry or Iamblichus, but the

⁵³ ἐπειδὴ περ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, κτλ.

Athenian school beginning with Syrianus and Proclus seem to have given it a new career. Sometimes it seems to mean no more than ‘substantive’ or ‘important’ – as Morrow and Dillon translate it in Proclus’ *Parmenides* commentary. But in the context at *in Tim.* II. 193.9 it seems to mean something more like ‘exegesis that involves correlations between concepts in the text of Plato and things’. Under this heading Proclus seeks to disabuse the reader of mistaken correlations, such as the correlation between psychic divisions and arithmetic numbers, or between the psychic ratios and material, Stoic *spermatikoi logoi*. The mistaken ideas that he dismisses cannot do justice to the fundamental fact that the World Soul is both divisible and indivisible, both a single whole and a plurality. So the correct understanding of the passage pays attention to the soul’s status as an intermediate and requires Proclus’ distinctions among (a) the whole prior to the parts, (b) the whole composed from the parts, and (c) the wholeness in each part. It also requires seeing the World Soul as simultaneously monadic and dyadic, as well as simultaneously Apollonian (in virtue of being harmonised) and Dionysian (in virtue of being divided). Proclus caps this section off with correlations between the three means within the soul and the daughters of Themis, as well as correlations between various ratios and mixed participation relations. There is a concluding section as well (211.10–30) that summarises the important point that we should look upward from the divisions within the World Soul to their intellectual Demiurgic causes – not downward to correlations between them and things in the sensible realm.

The structure of this section of the text might lead to the expectation that this is Proclus’ final word on the subject, but this expectation is not met. Instead Proclus quotes *Timaeus* 34b4–6 a second time. He then says:

As we said earlier [174.15], it is necessary to interpret what has been said by Plato not only mathematically, but also physically or philosophically. For the substance of the soul has not been composed from mathematical numbers and ratios, but instead all these ratios and numbers symbolise (*apeikonizein*) the soul’s genuine substance and the Demiurgic and life-generating divisions within it. But what things the mathematical ratios symbolise in this iconic manner, and how they disclose the substance of the World Soul, this is not easy to explain to those who fail to pay attention to the very thought of Plato. (212.3–12)

Proclus then returns to dismissing mistaken views, such as the idea that the psychic divisions in the World Soul correspond to motions, sizes or speeds of the heavenly bodies. Amelius is listed as among those who give a view that is *pragmateiôdês*. His interpretations include just the sort of correlations of numbers with things that I suggested is characteristic of an exegesis of this sort. So, for instance, the World Soul is said to

exercise providence over domesticated animals by virtue of the presence of the number 8 in the initial psychic portions, while it cares for wild animals by virtue of the number 27. (The odd number is proper to what is 'more dignified and authoritative', while the even (female!) number corresponds to what is subordinate.) It appears that Proclus, however, still wants to read the numbers corresponding to the psychic portions "upward" – as images of higher, divine causes (214.31–215.2). Following an account of the various numerological speculations of Porphyry, Iamblichus and Theodore of Asine, Proclus turns to 'another mode of reasoning' which he credits to his teacher, Syrianus. This is a mode of reasoning built around the central insight, noted earlier, that the soul is both a unified whole and also a divided plurality, a one–many.

The account of Syrianus' teaching has a structure not too dissimilar to that which we encountered under the first quotation of *Timaeus* 34b4–6. There Proclus began by discussing the three kinds of wholeness (195.24 ff.). Similarly here he begins from the perspective of wholeness (218.30). In this version, however, he talks about three cycles of procession, remaining and reversion. The number one corresponds to a entity remaining in its cause. The number two or the dyad corresponds to procession into plurality. Three is correlated with the reversion of that which proceeds upon its cause. Nonetheless, this corresponds structurally to the triad of three kinds of wholeness: that prior to the parts, that of the parts, and that in the parts. In the next phase, he takes up the perspective of division (220.5). This corresponds, albeit not so exactly, to the earlier discussion of the soul's simultaneously monadic and dyadic character (196.19 ff.). In both cases, one of the things to be explained is how some of the psychic ratios are inclusive of others. Nothing in the later treatment of *Timaeus* 34b4–6 corresponds to the earlier – essentially Orphic – reading of the Demiurge's Apollonian and Dionysian activities in creating a soul that is both unified and divided. Nonetheless, the next phase⁵⁴ of Syrianus' reading returns to the theme that the various means in the World Soul have intimate connections to principles of distributive justice. This corresponds to the earlier reading of the arithmetic, harmonic and geometric means in terms of the daughters of Themis (198.14–28).⁵⁵ Correspondences between the remaining portions of the two texts – that is, those at 200.21–211.10 and 221.4–224.3 – are far less easy to discern, in part because the texts themselves are collections of

⁵⁴ Cf. 220.24 ἔπειτα δεικνυσιν, ὅτι καὶ αἱ δύο μεσότητες αὐταὶ κτλ.

⁵⁵ Note that the material on Themis and her daughters is reprised in the Appendix tacked on to the end of Book III (316.4–317.19). It is not, however, in exactly the same words that we find at 198.14–28. It is probably too tenuous to make any very confident inferences from this, but it would be a scrap of text that would fit somewhere around 221.4.

remarks with far less thematic unity. However, the parallels observed thus far suggest certain possibilities.

The appearance of the same lemma twice in Proclus' commentary raises the initial expectation that the first quotation will be followed by didactic material that reminds the audience of the salient facts about harmonics – facts that are essential for seeing the point of Plato's text. This is just what we would expect when we consider Proclus' text against the backdrop of works like Plutarch's *De An. Proc.* To a large extent this expectation is met. We might anticipate that the second quotation of the lemma would provide the occasion to turn from an examination of Plato's text *mathematikôs* to an interpretation *physikôs* and *philosophikôs*. This expectation too is met, and in just these terms. This leaves the end of the first treatment of the lemma (195.24–211.30) as a bit of a mystery. It is certainly *not* largely didactic treatment of the salient mathematical and harmonic facts. In fact, it is a series of really quite extravagant speculations on the manner in which the numbers and ratios in the World Soul function as images of higher, intelligible causes. But so too is the passage in the second treatment of the lemma at 218.20–224.3 and this is expressly said to be an account of the teachings of Syrianus.

One hypothesis that might explain this is that we have here something approaching a Proclean doublet. That is, the more speculative material at *in Tim.* II. 195.24–211.30 that is appended to the preparatory mathematical information represents a re-working and expansion of Syrianus' ideas in 218.20–224.3 by Proclus. This may have occurred at some later stage, after the initial composition of the text.⁵⁶ Our existing text is thus perhaps at a stage where this new material has not been fully incorporated and digested. The exegesis *pragmateiôdês* that intrudes at 193.6 is in competition with the examination of the text from a physical and philosophical point of view that follows the second quotation of the lemma. The latter is clearly identified as the view of Syrianus. It is possible that the former section represents Proclus' expansion of his teacher's exegesis.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PROCLUS' COMMENTARY

Within this overall architectonic, what does Proclus accomplish in his commentary? Some of these achievements are ones that promote a clearer understanding of Plato's text. Others are innovations in Neoplatonic philosophy.

⁵⁶ For what little we know about the circumstances of its initial composition, cf. Marinus *VProc.* §§12–13 and the General Introduction to this series in volume I, pp. 13–15.

The psychic composition

Proclus' commentary is the first source we possess from antiquity that takes what most people now regard as the proper reading of *Timaeus* 35a1–8. It is not known whether this is something that was already clear in Porphyry's commentary, or that of Iamblichus, or whether it is a reading that Proclus derived from Syrianus. If so, no traces of any such earlier version have survived. The problem with the interpretation of this line of text centres around the words αὐτὸν περί in the second clause of the problematic sentence:

[a1] τῆς ἀμερίστου
καὶ αὖτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα
γιννομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο
οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταύτου φύσεως [αὐτῆς περὶ] καὶ τῆς τοῦ
[5] ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς
αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν
αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρον
φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτὸν συναρμόττων βίαν.⁵⁷

Most editors have sought to omit or amend αὐτὸν περί in spite of the fact that it is in all our manuscripts. The effect is then to identify Sameness and Difference with the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being. This makes the mixing process described in the second clause one in which the Demiurge combines the third kind of Being blended from the divisible and indivisible kinds again with the original ingredient – the divisible and indivisible Being – thus rendering καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ repetitive and redundant.⁵⁸

Proclus, however, refuses to *equate* the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being with Difference and Sameness respectively (*in Tim.* II. 155.20–156.8). He offers several arguments against such an identification. Among other things, this would violate the axiom that all things are in all, though each according to its ability. Those mistaken Platonists who equate indivisible Being with Sameness and divisible Being with Difference have jumped from the fact that Sameness *predominates* in intelligible, indivisible things to the conclusion that Difference is not there

⁵⁷ *Timaeus* 35a1–8 in the OCT text. a4 αὐτὸν περί (περὶ) A F P Y Pr. Plut. Eus. Stob. : om. (bis) Sext. Emp., non vertit Cic. a5 ταῦτα F: τὰ αὐτὰ Eus.: ταῦτα A P Y Stob.

⁵⁸ Taylor (1928), 108–9 has more or less the same reading as Plutarch – the reading contested by Proclus and later by Grube. He excuses the repetition that his proposed omission would produce as follows: ‘This seems a repetition of what had already been said three lines above, but has a point if the object of the clause is to remind us that the Same and the Different of 4–5 are identical with the Indivisible and Divisible of 45–6.’

at all. But this is surely wrong, since even intelligibles are, in a sense, differentiated one from another.

Because he refuses to identify Sameness and Difference with the indivisible and divisible kinds of Being, Proclus sees what function the second occurrence of αὖ περὶ is serving. There are divisible and indivisible kinds of Sameness and Difference, as well as Being. So αὖ περὶ in a4 indicates that the Demiurge does again that which he did in the case of Being: he combines the indivisible kind of Sameness with the divisible kind to form a third, intermediate kind. He does the same thing with the divisible and indivisible forms of Difference. Thus the end of the first stage of Demiurgic activity results in the production of three kinds of ingredients for the World Soul – three intermediate gradations of Being, Sameness and Difference, which have resulted from the blending together of the divisible and indivisible kinds.

That Proclus has the best explanation of Plato's text has been largely accepted since the publication of G. M. A. Grube's two-and-a-half-page note in *Classical Philology* in 1932.⁵⁹ Rather than covering the same ground again, then, let us ask what prompts Proclus' insight and what results he produces as a consequence of reading Plato's text this way.

In my opinion, the primary reason why Proclus is inclined to resist the equation of indivisible Being with Sameness and divisible Being with Difference, to which other readers seem to have succumbed, is because he thinks that Plato's *Sophist* sheds essential light on the text of the *Timaeus*. In the *Sophist*, Being, Sameness, Difference, Motion and Rest are the *five* greatest kinds. They are proved to be distinct and five in number. Proclus appeals directly to the *Sophist* at II. 132.18 and 133.25 in his defence of this point. Plutarch, by contrast, utilises only a single reference to the *Sophist* in his *De An. Proc.* and this is to argue against those interpreters who suppose that the soul's motion and rest owe to the presence of Sameness and Difference in it. Plutarch notes that in the *Sophist*, Motion and Rest are distinct from Sameness and Difference. Hence Sameness and Difference ought not be treated as the source of Motion and Rest in the soul. He apparently fails to appreciate that similar reasoning should tell against his own equation of Sameness and Difference with intelligible and sensible Being. Or perhaps he did not think that the *Sophist* was tied particularly closely to the *Timaeus* and thus uses the discussion of the five greatest kinds only dialectically against alternative interpretations of the *Timaeus*. Proclus, however, composed a commentary on the *Sophist* and

⁵⁹ For a list of those who have accepted Grube's solution, as well as the few dissenters, see Opsomer (2004), 140–1. Opsomer also gives an extremely lucid explanation of the differences between Plutarch's quotation of Plato's text and the OCT version and how they matter. I have benefited enormously from it.

makes frequent reference to it both in his work on the *Parmenides* and in his *Platonic Theology*, but also in his *Timaeus* commentary.⁶⁰

Supposing that Proclus reads Plato's text correctly, what does he do with this insight? One thing he does is to develop another means of differentiating among souls. There is a long-standing issue among Platonists about the relation between the World Soul and individual souls. This is evident in Plotinus' treatise on whether all souls are one (IV.9), and also in the remains of Iamblichus' *De Anima* in the discussion of the number of souls (*DA* §25). Iamblichus characterises Amelius' position as monistic: there is just numerically one soul that is multiplied, not intrinsically, but by its relations to things. Your soul, or the soul that animates the Moon, is the World Soul *standing in a certain relation to a body*. Iamblichus rejects such an explanation of multiplicity – or the appearance of multiplicity.⁶¹ In the descent of souls from the World Soul, there is a substantial change, so that a descended human soul both is and is not the same in essence as the World Soul. As Carlos Steel puts it in his study of the nature of soul in Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus:

Iamblichus believed that, if the *intermediary* character of the soul is given its due, one must accept that it changes also in its *substance*. For he who considers the substance of the soul as something unchangeable, lapses unaware into the position of Plotinus for whom 'something', the highest part of the soul, always remains pure and unaffected. According to Iamblichus temporality and change are not accidental to the soul but affect its very substance. But throughout this substantial change, the soul still preserves its identity or, as Iamblichus says, 'the soul simultaneously changes and remains'.⁶²

If there can be a plurality of kinds of such substantial change, depending on the extent to which a soul has descended, this would entail that the multiplicity of souls is not merely a matter of their relations to numerically distinct bodies. Rather it is grounded in intrinsic differences in their substance or being. Hence Iamblichus would have good reason to deny the view that he identifies as Amelius'.

Proclus rejects Iamblichus' paradoxical position, arguing instead that *all* soul is eternal in its substance, but temporal in its activities (*ET* 191; in *Tim.* II. 124.17–19). This position might be thought to be plagued with two problems. First, must Proclus then accept the 'relational differentiation' view of Amelius on the apparent plurality of souls? After

⁶⁰ Proclus' citations from the *Sophist* are collected by Christian Guérard to Annick (1991). However, this list is complete only with respect to his *in Parm.*, *in Alc.*, *in Crat.*, *Tria Opuscula* and the first five books of *Theol. Plat.* No systematic study has been made of Proclus' use of the *Sophist* in his *Commentary on the Timaeus*.

⁶¹ Cf. in *Tim.* fr. 56 and Finamore and Dillon (2002), 145. ⁶² Steel (1978), 61.

all, if your soul, the soul that animates the Moon, and the World Soul are all the same in their essence, differing only in their activities, then isn't this just a version of the position of Amelius? That view seems to make the relation of souls to various bodies the origin of such multiplicity as we may say is present among souls. (But how could material objects be a principle of multiplicity for that which is superior to them?) Perhaps the Proclean view is equally relational – it is just that the relation is a relation between the psychic essence and its *activity*, not between a soul and a *body*. (This, however, does not escape the worry that what is lower might be a principle of plurality in what is higher, since Proclus regards essence as prior to activity.) Second, Steel argues on the basis of *in Tim.* II. 131.20–5 that there is a kind of tension in Proclus' view. On the one hand, he is committed to the general principle that what is present in a thing's activity is prefigured in its essence, since *ousia* is prior to *energeia*. So the 'seed' of the soul's temporal life and activity is present in its essence. On the other hand, he seeks to maintain that all souls are the same and eternal in their essence. Steel thinks that this tension is not really resolved by Proclus' view that the soul's essence is not in Becoming insofar as it is whole, but is in Becoming insofar as it has parts (*in Tim.* II. 131.23–5; 144.5–7).

I think that the role of the divisible and indivisible kinds of Sameness and Difference has been overlooked in this debate. Proclus is not particularly vocal about this, but he uses the presence of these kinds of Sameness and Difference within the psychic essence to provide an intrinsic principle of differentiation among souls, but one that allows them all to have the same essence or substance. It is certainly true that the bulk of Proclus' discussion of the issues around the differentiation of souls occurs in his discussion of *Timaieus* 35a1–4. His discussion of the second clause that begins with the problematic second occurrence of αὖ πάλιν at 35a4–6 is rather shorter (*in Tim.* II. 155.2–156.24). However, following an even briefer discussion of the mixture of these three intermediate kinds (*Tim.* 35a6), Proclus raises the question of why this mixture of the intermediate kinds of Being, Sameness and Difference is such as to constitute the *World Soul*, as opposed to some other soul (*in Tim.* II. 158.3–15). His answer is twofold. First, the admixture of ingredients that constitutes the World Soul is drawn from the *universal* intellect (for the indivisible kinds) and the *universal* corporeal nature (for the divisible kinds). A second, important addition to this explanation⁶³ is that in this particular psychic mixture, Being predominates. This fact makes a soul divine. By contrast, a predominance of Sameness makes a soul daemonic, while a predominance of Difference makes it a partial or human soul. This

⁶³ Note the καὶ μέντοι καὶ at 158.9.

means that Proclus has the resources to allow for intrinsic differentiations among souls that are descended to different degrees, but without denying them the same psychic essence or substance. The *ousia* of each and every soul is an admixture of the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being, Sameness and Difference. He can thus deny Iamblichus' view that the essence or substance of a soul is altered in descent. All of them have one and the same *ousia*. Yet there can be variations within this shared substance that explain the difference between, say, human and daemonic souls by appeal to a fact that is intrinsic to the soul in question – the predominance of Sameness or Difference. This is not a matter of its relation to other things, as in Amelius' solution. Proclus refers to this solution again in his discussion of the 'second and third degree of purity' found in the mixture from which mortal souls are composed at *Timaeus* 41d. There he says:

In addition to this, the kinds [from which mortal souls are composed] are the same and different, for while all souls are composed from the intermediate [kinds of Being, Sameness and Difference], some souls are composed from the first of these, some from the leftovers and the last . . . Moreover, the manner [of composition] is simultaneously the same and not the same, for there is more Difference in the case of partial souls. (*in Tim.* III. 245.13–18; cf. 254.2–10)

What enables this solution is the correct reading of *Timaeus* 35a1–6 with its repetition of αὐτὸ περί. This reading prevents the equation of Sameness with indivisible Being and Difference with divisible Being that we see in Plutarch, and later, Taylor. This, in turn, gives Proclus his two additional factors that can be varied within any soul's essence. This particular use of the correct reading of this passage may strike us as odd. For us, it seems clear enough that Proclus' interpretation makes the best sense of the grammar of Plato's sentence. But there is a genuine issue for any Platonist about what makes the difference between souls of different orders – some way of giving sense to Plato's highly mythical language at *Timaeus* 40d. Proclus' reading of the vexed syntax of *Timaeus* 35a1–6 gives him the resources to do this.

The other traditional problems of the psychogony

What about Plutarch's other 'problems' about the composition of the World Soul? These involve the *arrangement* of the psychic divisions – a single length or a Λ -shape – the *quantity* of such divisions and the values of the psychic numbers involved in them, and finally the *function* of the psychic harmonies (*De An. Proc.* 1027c). With respect to the first issue, Proclus follows Theodorus of Soli in setting them out as a single sequence of numbers, rejecting the view of Crantor, Plutarch and

Adrastus.⁶⁴ Proclus' reasons for doing so do not seem to add substantially to the reasons against the position that Plutarch himself reports (1022d). On the question of the *quantity* of terms in the series of numbers that Plato describes, Proclus argues against the 36-term reading of Timaeus Locris which includes the ratio of the *apotomê*.⁶⁵ Instead, he advocates the 34-term reading that requires us to fill not only the 4:3 ratios with tones, but also the 3:2 ratios in Plato's sequence. I noted above Proclus' most obvious argument against the 36-term reading: Plato does not mention the *apotomê*. But Proclus also tries to argue that Plato's scale is diatonic and the number 34 is proprietary to the diatonic scale. Following Nicomachus, he regards the tone with its 9:8 ratio as distinctive to the diatonic scale. Indeed, he thinks that its name derives from the fact that it alone 'progresses through tones' (*Harm.* 12.1.35–40). 18 has to 16 the ratio of the tone – that is, 18:16 :: 9:8 – and the sum of these numbers is 34. So, Proclus says, the number of terms that compose Plato's diatonic scale is just right.⁶⁶ This may not strike us as a particularly convincing bit of evidence for Proclus' interpretation of the number of terms in the Platonic sequence but it is, to my knowledge at least, unique.

With respect to the values of the numbers, Proclus makes the value of the initial unit 384 in order to present all of the numbers in the sequence without fractions. This measure goes back to Crantor and is common to most of the subsequent commentators on the *Timaeus*.⁶⁷ Proclus' most original contribution in this respect comes not in this book, but later in Book III where he considers the differentiation of souls. At *in Tim.* III. 255.30–256.21, Proclus insists that all encosmic souls – the World Soul, daemonic souls and those of mortals – must have the same ratios in them since Plato mentions these ratios in connection with the latter (*Tim.* 41d6).⁶⁸ In the case of the World Soul, these ratios are given in their lowest possible terms (*pythmên*, 256.5). Nothing, however, prevents the

⁶⁴ For Plutarch's apparent endorsement of the Λ arrangement, see *De An. Proc.* 1017e. Proclus names, and argues against, only Adrastus. Others who adopted the Λ arrangement include Clearchus, Theon of Smyrna and Macrobius. Cf. Cherniss' note c on p. 319, Cherniss (1976).

⁶⁵ *in Tim.* II. 188.10–190.10.

⁶⁶ *in Tim.* II. 189.4–6. There is supposed to be some sort of additional evidence in the presence of 16 since 'this second number is fitting to the second procession of the soul from its primary intelligible principle'. This is a bit opaque. Normally Proclus accepts the Pythagorean equation of the number 6 – not 8 – with the soul.

⁶⁷ Cf. Plutarch *De An. Proc.* 1020c and Cherniss' note ad loc. The dissenter is Plutarch himself who makes 192, though this would not, in fact, succeed in clearing the fractions in the Platonic sequence.

⁶⁸ The question of the numbers and harmonies present in *hypercosmic* souls is a vexed question. See Winnington-Ingram's notes on Proclus' discussion at 251.29–255.2 in Festugière (1966–8).

same ratios being present in lower souls in doubles or other multiples of these lowest terms, depending on their rank (256.7–9). So while the first portion in the World Soul corresponds to the number 384, the soul of one of the visible heavenly gods might begin with 768. Your own soul's unit might be 1152 or even higher. As in the case above with the different admixtures of Being, Sameness and Difference, Proclus can draw differentiations among ranks of souls while still preserving their essential structural sameness.

Plutarch's third traditional problem around the psychogony in the *Timaeus* involves the *function* of the harmonic ratios in the World Soul. Proclus concurs with Plutarch's negative judgement that these ratios should *not* be seen as encoding information about the distances between, or the relative speeds of, the heavenly bodies. Plutarch's positive view is that the psychic harmonies are meant to signify the World Soul's concord with itself – a concord that further characterises at least the heavenly regions of the cosmos that this soul animates (*De An. Proc.* 1030c).

The views of Syrianus and Proclus on the significance of the psychic harmonies have been discussed above in the section on the structure of Proclus' commentary. In general terms we may say that they, like Plutarch, seek to avoid any one–one matching between things in the cosmos and either specific number or ratios in the World Soul. This is true for attempts to assign planetary distances or speeds to specific psychic numbers, as well as for attempts to equate particular proportions with worldly elements, as we find in Theodore of Asine. Like Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus discern the three phases of remaining in the cause, procession and reversion upon the cause in these numbers and ratios. Proclus is unique, I believe, in regarding the different forms of ratio in the World Soul as causal precursors to different *participation relations*.

All the ratios within the World Soul are either super-particular or super-partient. Those of the fourth, fifth and the tone are super-particular since they have the form $n + \frac{1}{n}$. The semi-tone, however, is a super-partient since it is $243 + \frac{13}{243}$. Participation relations can imitate either of these kinds. When you participate in Humanity, Proclus thinks that this is an image of the super-particular, since you have the whole of Primate, plus one part (i.e. *homo sapiens*) of it. Hybrids, such as the mule, however, participate in the mode of super-partients. The mule has the whole of the genus Equus. However, it has, not one, but *two* parts or species within it – one of donkey, one of horse. Hence its participation relation resembles the form of the super-partient $n + \frac{2}{n}$. To my knowledge, such speculations about variations within the participation relation are unique to Proclus.

Harmonic theory in Proclus' commentary

Consistent with the tradition of works on the *Timaeus*, Proclus' commentary contains a considerable exegesis of harmonic theory. He declares his Pythagorean–Platonist credentials by providing us with three arguments for the proposition that the semi-tone is not really half of the tone. This, Proclus tells us, is one thing that sets the followers of Aristoxenus apart from the Pythagoreans (*in Tim.* II. 183.20–2). However, Proclus maintains a studied neutrality on the other question that sets them apart. Is the octave plus a fourth or the 'musical eleventh' concordant? The Pythagoreans say No, since it would correspond to an untidy superpartient ratio, 8:3.⁶⁹ The followers of Aristoxenus, however, say Yes, because it sounds right. Ptolemy is seen by Proclus as making some concessions to the Aristoxenian point of view.⁷⁰ Though Ptolemy accepts the Pythagorean proposition that the semi-tone is not really half of a tone (*Harm.* 21.21–23.19), he nonetheless regards the octave plus a fourth as a harmony (*Harm.* 13.1–8). Proclus insists, however, that we may pass over this second question in silence. It is clear from what the divine Plato has written that the semi-tone is not half a tone, but since he says *nothing* about the octave plus a fourth, Proclus thinks that he need not say anything either.

I leave it to experts in the area of ancient music to further assess the value of Proclus' contributions in his commentary. The following seem to me to be passages worthy of noting.

Proclus provides an elegant demonstration of the relations of the terms in the musical tetractys: 6, 8, 9, 12. If we have four terms in continuous geometric proportion like this, then if one of the intermediate terms forms the arithmetic mean between the extremes, the other forms the harmonic mean. Moreover, if there are four terms a , b , c , d such that c is the arithmetic mean between a and d , while b is the harmonic mean, then the proportion is a geometric one (*in Tim.* II. 173.11–174.10). This demonstration reprises material in the final chapter of Nicomachus' *Introduction to Arithmetic*, though Proclus' presentation is much more succinct and clear. This reciprocal relation between the harmonic and arithmetic means, on the one hand, and the geometric on the other serves to ground the judgement that the geometric proportion is the 'most perfect' (Nicomachus) or 'the only one that is true proportion' (Adrastus).⁷¹ It is interesting to observe that this theorem forms the final part of Nicomachus' *Introduction* and is not explicitly articulated in

⁶⁹ Cf. Barbera (1984).

⁷⁰ For Ptolemy and his somewhat more empirically oriented strain within the Pythagorean tradition, see Barker (1989), 270–4.

⁷¹ ap. Theon, 106.12–17.

Theon's *Mathematics Useful for the Understanding of Plato*. Proclus, however, drops it in as a brief addendum at the conclusion of his discussion of nature of the three kinds of proportion and the method for arriving at them. This kind of material is, of course, common to Theon (116.8–119.17) and Nicomachus (2.23.1–25.5). But the reciprocity of the means is entirely absent from Theon and given as the final word in Nicomachus. (Indeed, Nicomachus illustrates the proposition with the example of the musical tetractys, 6, 8, 9, 12.) This perhaps indicates that Proclus' text is one for the very advanced Platonist–Pythagorean.

Proclus provides three arguments for the Pythagorean claim that the semi-tone is not really *half* a tone (*in Tim.* II. 179.10–180.26). First, there is the fact that super-particular ratios cannot be halved – at least not in such a way as to yield a rational number.⁷² We can see this by doubling the numbers in ratio of the tone so as to yield whole number ratios. This yields 18:16. But 18:17 is not equal to 17:16. Thus far the line of argument is familiar from other sources.⁷³ Proclus goes on to show, in effect, that $256/243 < 18/17 < \sqrt{9/8}$. Hence not only is there no division of the ratio of the tone into two equal half-tones, but the 256:243 ratio that Plato identifies with the semi-tone is revealed to be the *minor* semi-tone.

Proclus' second argument creates a geometric proportion that advances by the ratio of the semi-tone:

$$256^2 : (243 \times 256) = (243 \times 256) : 243^2$$

Hence

$$65,536 : 62,208 = 62,208 : 59,049$$

If each of these ratios really corresponded to *half* a tone, then the *epogdoos* or one-and-one-eighth of 59,049 should be equal to 65,536. But if you multiply this number by $9/8$ it yields 66,430 and $1/8$ – a number larger than 65,536. So this shows that the ratio of the semi-tone is not equal to half that of the tone. I have located no other source that vindicates this conclusion by a similar use of brute arithmetical force.

Proclus' third argument utilises a notation that makes it clear how he arrives at fractions and performs various functions on them. This argument too strives to show the non-identity of the ratio 243:256 with *half* of a tone. Proclus sets out to find the number that is $9/8$ of 243. He does this by finding an eighth of 243 and adding this to 243. He takes an

⁷² Archytas, DK 47 A19 and Euclid, *Sect. Can.* 9.

⁷³ Cf. Adrastus ap. Theon 69.14–15 and Aristides Quintilianus, *Mus.* III.1.43–53.

eighth of 243 by a method that is reminiscent of Egyptian arithmetic.⁷⁴ He writes 243 as $240 + 2 + 1$ and then takes an eighth of each of these, obtaining λ καὶ δ' καὶ η' – an expression that reads literally ' $30 + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8}$ '. Adding $30 + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8}$ to 243 yields the *epogdoos* of 243. But $(273 + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8}) : 256$ is greater than $256 : 243$. So since 256 does not fall exactly in the middle of the tone expressed by $243 : 273 + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8}$, the semi-tone is not half a tone.

Proclus also provides a proof in the manner of the *Sectio Canonis* that $243:256$ is in fact that ratio of the semi-tone (181.25–182.25) and that these are the lowest possible terms in which it is expressed (182.25–183.1). The latter uses the method of mutual subtraction described in Book VII of Euclid's *Elements*. We also find a calculation of the value of the major semi-tone or *apotomê* in its lowest terms in the ratio $2048 : 2187$ (180.27–181.24).

Proclus completes his account of the necessary mathematical background for understanding Plato's *Timaeus* by a calculation of the value of the comma (183.30–185.1). This ratio expresses the extent to which the *apotomê* or major semi-tone exceeds the *leimma* or minor semi-tone. Proclus tells us that 'the ancients' said that this was 531,441 to 524,288. Here too Proclus' calculations are interesting. He calculates the larger number above 256 that expresses the same ratio that $256 : 243$ expresses with 256 in the place of 243. In essence this is $256 \times \frac{256}{243}$ or $\frac{256^2}{243}$. The ratio between this number and the number that is a whole tone below 243 will be the ratio of the *komma*. He denotes the semi-tone from 256 as $\sigma\epsilon\theta$ καὶ διακοσιοστοτεσσαρακοστότριτα τρισκαίδεκάκις δεκατρία or $269 + (13 \times \frac{13}{243})$.⁷⁵ Why does he write the number this way? The best explanation is that in order to ease his calculations Proclus is thinking of $\frac{256^2}{243}$ in a way that allows him to cancel a great many of the fractions. To square 256, he presents it as $(243 + 13) \times (243 + 13)$. He can then cancel the 243 to yield $243 + (2 \times 13) + \frac{13^2}{243}$. This, in turn, can be simplified to $= 269 + \frac{13^2}{243}$ or $269 + 13 \times \frac{13}{243}$. This illustrates a similar manner of handling fractions to that which he took in calculating one-eighth of 243 above by conceiving of 243 as really amounting to $240 + 2 + 1$ – each element of which readily yields an obvious one-eighth part.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ I am indebted to John Bigelow for pointing this out to me.

⁷⁵ In fact, our text has $\sigma\epsilon\theta$ καὶ διακοσιοστοτεσσαρακοστότριτα δεκατρία or $269 + \frac{13}{243}$ but the mathematical facts of the matter require us to systematically amend the text, as Festugière argues.

⁷⁶ It also seems to me that it shows that Proclus' methods for dealing with fractions go beyond those of the Egyptians since the latter only rarely use fractions with a number other than 1 in the numerator. Comparative mathematics, however, is well beyond my very limited competence in these matters. I leave it to the experts to investigate such matters further.

Proclus and the previous Neoplatonic commentators
on the *Timaeus*

Iamblichus and the hypercosmic soul

As I noted in pages 15–16 above, one issue that seems to have divided Iamblichus and Porphyry was the question of the hypercosmic soul. The former reads several passages in Plato's *Timaeus* as concerned with a soul that is beyond the cosmos and thus superior to the World Soul. Porphyry, by contrast, insists that Plato's *Timaeus* is concerned with the soul that animates the cosmos. Proclus often juxtaposes these divergent readings of Plato's text.⁷⁷ What, then, is Proclus' view of the matter?

This is not easy to discern. On the one hand, Proclus' *Elements of Theology* seems to be unequivocally committed to the idea of hypercosmic souls. Dillon argues convincingly that Iamblichus' own commitment to the idea of an unparticipated, hypercosmic soul follows from his general metaphysical principle that 'every order is presided over by an unparticipated monad that is prior to those that are participated' (fr. 54). Proclus accepts the very same principle in *ET* 21 and it is one of the cornerstones of his metaphysical system. One might find it therefore unsurprising that in proposition 166 of the *Elements* he speaks of both encosmic and hypercosmic souls. On the other hand, at the point in his *Timaeus* commentary where he most obviously juxtaposes the views of Iamblichus and Porphyry on the hypercosmic versus encosmic soul, he *rejects* Iamblichus' reading. In fact, as Dillon notes, Proclus reports Iamblichus' view in indirect speech and does not fully identify with it. By contrast, he reports the view of Syrianus' alternative interpretation in direct speech and commends it as 'more in keeping with the words of Plato'.

What is this interpretation? Syrianus claimed that the World Soul itself has a certain hypercosmic *aspect* (*ti*) that transcends the universe and through which the World Soul is in touch with Intellect. This hypercosmic aspect is identified by both Plato in the *Phaedrus* (248a3) and "Orpheus" in the *Sacred Discourse on Hipta* with the 'head' of the soul (*in Tim.* II. 105.29–106.1). Nothing requires that such a hypercosmic aspect of the World Soul be itself a soul. Indeed, the identification with the head tells against such a view; a head is a *part* of a person, not itself a person.

One easy way to reconcile this apparent tension is by reminding ourselves that there may be two separate questions here. First, are there

⁷⁷ The most notable example of such a juxtaposition is 104.30–105.27, but see also 142.27–143.21, 240.4–29, 252.21–9 and 313.15–24 where Proclus reports Iamblichus' interpretations of the *Timaeus* in terms of a hypercosmic soul.

hypercosmic souls according to Proclus? Second, does Proclus think that *Plato's text* discusses a hypercosmic soul? I think Dillon's position is that Proclus answered the first question in the affirmative but the second in the negative. Dillon notes that at *in Tim.* II. 240.4 (= Iamblichus, *in Tim.* fr. 54) Proclus has a not too subtle dig at Iamblichus by suggesting that in his reading of Plato he is 'busy with higher matters, as it were, and scrutinising things invisible'.⁷⁸ Dillon comments, 'For Proclus to indulge in jocularities – to the extent of quoting Aristophanes – at the expense of the divine Iamblichus, there must be grave provocation.'⁷⁹ Based on a somewhat parallel criticism of Iamblichus in fragment 3 (*in Tim.* I. 19.10), Dillon suggests that Proclus regards Iamblichus' interpretation as involving some excessive subtlety.⁸⁰ The divine Iamblichus might be right about the facts – there really is a hypercosmic soul – but wrong to see this soul being alluded to in Plato's *Timaeus*. Proclus sides with Syrianus, and against Iamblichus, at *in Tim.* II. 105.29 simply as an expositor of Plato's text. Nonetheless, there is, in his view, a hypercosmic soul.

I think that Dillon is probably correct about Proclus' view, but I would like to raise the further speculation that his teacher Syrianus rejected Iamblichus' view about the hypercosmic soul, not merely as a reading of Plato's text, but as a bit of philosophical doctrine. Our present volume contains what seems to me to be one good objection to the very idea of hypercosmic souls.

Therefore hypercosmic souls, if indeed there are such things, and if they cognise discursively – for every soul cognises in this manner, and in virtue of this there is a difference between soul and intellect – nonetheless these hypercosmic souls produce for themselves the grasp (*hypolêpsis*) of the objects of cognition many at a time (*kata pleiōn*), for it is necessary for such souls to think *a plurality* of things simultaneously since they are closer to an intellect that thinks *all* things simultaneously. But the World Soul is the first of those that think things one at a time, which is exactly what has made it encosmic. In any case, (*goun*) it is by this that all encosmic souls have been set apart from hypercosmic ones. (*in Tim.* II. 289.29–290.6)

If there were indeed such things as hypercosmic souls, their discursive thinking would have to be an intermediate between Intellect, which thinks *all things* at once, and the World Soul which thinks *one big thing* – a universal cosmic intelligible⁸¹ – at a time. This means that a hypercosmic

⁷⁸ Aristophanes, *Clouds* 224–32; cf. *Apology* 19b4–c3. ⁷⁹ Dillon (1973), 335.

⁸⁰ There is a typographical error in Dillon's commentary on fr. 54 (p. 335). The words *ὁ δὲ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβελιχος ὑψηλολογούμενος ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ῥήσει* belong to fragment 3, not 6.

⁸¹ Cf. *in Tim.* II. 290.14–15 *δεῖ γὰρ κόσμου ψυχὴν οὕσαν τὸ κοσμικὸν αὐτῆς ὅλον νοητὸν ἀνελεῖν*.

soul would have to think *discursively* a plurality of things all at once, but a plurality short of the totality of intelligibles that Intellect cognises all at once non-discursively. But such a manner of thinking would seem to make the hypercosmic soul implicated in a greater degree of plurality than the supposedly inferior World Soul. After all, the former is discursively thinking a plurality of objects, while the latter thinks just one. So in the first case there is a greater departure from unity and thus perfection.

Proclus returns to the question of the hypercosmic soul in a digression in his commentary on *Timaeus* 41d4 and the mixing of the lesser kinds of soul in the Mixing Bowl. As noted, he chides Iamblichus for reading in a reference to the hypercosmic soul where Plato's text is clearly discussing the World Soul.⁸² Proclus' view seems to imply that Plato's view does not mention hypercosmic souls explicitly.⁸³ Nonetheless, he thinks that the existence of such souls is a worthy question to pursue and begins it by a series of objections to those who posit such souls.

Doubtless to those who posit the existence of such unparticipated souls [they suppose them], on the one hand, to think discursively, and in this respect differ from intellect, but, on the other hand, are more composite and not one, and in this respect they are superior to encosmic souls. (The procession does not go at once from thinking all things at the same time to thinking one individually, but happens because of thinking more than one – although not all things simultaneously.) For these reasons, it is therefore incumbent upon those who posit [such hypercosmic souls] prior to the World Soul to say how the former are intermediate between the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being. And if they are divisible, what is the divisible [element in them]? And if they have been divided, have they been configured similarly [to encosmic souls]. Finally, what answer can be given for why these souls are prior to the others since they do not differ from them with respect to the kind of existence (*hypostasis*) that they have? (*in Tim.* III. 251.32–252.9)

Prior to the questions that it is incumbent upon the proponent of hypercosmic souls to answer, we have a description of the cognition of hypercosmic souls that nearly coincides with that of *in Tim.* II. 289.29–290.6. The parenthetical remark amounts to a sort of reply to the objection that I claimed was implicit. The order of procession, which involves a series of minimal differences, requires that intermediate between the thinking of all things simultaneously and the thinking of one thing at a time, there must be a stage that involves the thinking of many – though not all – things at once. We are now in a position to see, however, that

⁸² *in Tim.* III. 251.21–9 = Iamblichus, *in Tim.* fr. 82A (Dillon).

⁸³ Cf. *in Tim.* III. 251.31–2 οὐδαμοῦ διαρρήδην τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἶναι λέγοντος τοιαύτην ψυχὴν and III. 255.1–2 κἀν μὴ λέγει Πλάτων ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον.

this intermediate stage need not involve the greater degree of plurality that I suggested above. For at this point in the dialogue, Proclus has discussed time and distinguished hypercosmic from encosmic time (*in Tim.* III. 53.6–55.2). Though the activities of both hypercosmic and encosmic souls will be discursive – since this is one thing that distinguishes souls from intellects – the discursive activity of the hypercosmic souls will take place in hypercosmic time. Unlike encosmic time, this sort of time involves *both* procession and remaining in its cause, while encosmic time exists in conjunction with change (III. 53.14–16). Proclus reads this distinction into what is quite probably Plato’s innocent use of both *logos* and *dianoia* in *Timaeus* 38c3–4.⁸⁴ The former corresponds to the higher, hypercosmic time, the latter to the encosmic time that requires change. Proclus does not say so explicitly, but I think that this will imply that the “discursive” activity of hypercosmic souls will have a different, more unified character than the dianoetic activity of encosmic souls. It is thus plausible to suppose that Proclus’ order of procession from thinking all things in no time at all (Intellect) to “discursively” thinking a plurality of things in a more unified temporal manner (hypercosmic soul) to thinking one thing in ordinary time (World Soul) does *not* involve a move from greater plurality to lesser plurality.

To whom should we credit the objections that Proclus considers against the idea of a hypercosmic soul? I think they belong to his teacher, Syrianus. Note that the objections that Proclus considers all aim at a position that posits not merely a hypercosmic aspect to the World Soul, but the existence of a *soul* that is hypercosmic and thus superior to the World Soul. The first objection just discussed presupposes that souls *qua* souls have a distinctive, discursive activity. The other objections similarly turn on the idea that there is a deep commonality between the hypercosmic soul and the World Soul. The objector would like to know how it is supposed to be superior to the World Soul, since if it is a *soul* it must have the same “shape” (i.e. be composed of a circle of the Same and a circle of the Different, demarcated with the psychic numbers and harmonies). None of these objections would tell against the view that the World Soul itself had some aspect or part of itself that was hypercosmic. Hence I think we should see these objections that Proclus considers as part of Syrianus’ position – a position developed in opposition to that of Iamblichus.

Proclus goes on to attempt to provide answers to the other questions that any proponent of hypercosmic souls must answer. I believe he does so in his own voice. Having articulated them, he goes on, ‘If it is necessary to convey something [about these matters] through my own

⁸⁴ ἐξ οὗν λόγου καὶ διανοίας θεοῦ τοιαύτης πρὸς χρόνου γένεσιν, κτλ.

insight...⁸⁵ Proclus' solutions to these problems are not easy to interpret. Festugière's translation includes a series of twelve notes by Professor Winnington-Ingram on the passage in which Proclus does this. The general nature of Proclus' speculations is clear enough. Since hypercosmic souls, unlike encosmic ones, are not the souls of any *body*, they will have a different set of numbers in them. They will not need the cubes 8 and 27 that are related to three-dimensional bodies (III. 252.21–7).⁸⁶ Therefore the complement of 'Platonic portions' that the Demiurge places into the World Soul (*Tim.* 35b4–c1) is abbreviated in their case. Hypercosmic souls will thus differ "structurally" from encosmic ones in this respect.⁸⁷ This variation among the structure that we find within souls goes hand in hand with Proclus' idea that differences among ranks of souls can be explained by appeal to different percentages of Sameness or Difference in their basic psychic substance that we discussed above in connection with *Timaeus* 35a1–6. Proclus' overall strategy is to proliferate the variable elements within a kind of entity, like a soul, in order to provide a differentiation among levels by appeal to such variations. These variations are not essential differences. Hypercosmic souls with an abbreviated sequence of Platonic portions, a greater admixture of Sameness, and perhaps even different harmonies, are still *souls*. It is just that some souls are purer and closer to the unity of Intellect than others!

Individual Forms and the World Soul's knowledge of sensible things

Proclus tells us a quite a lot about the views of Theodore of Asine and he does so for a variety of reasons. One aspect of Theodore's view that crops up twice is the fact that he posits two intellects prior to Soul – one containing ideas of wholes, the other of *particular things*.⁸⁸ Earlier I suggested that this notion of an intellect containing ideas of particular or partial things (*merika*) was entwined with the question of individual

⁸⁵ III. 252.9–10 καὶ εἴ τι δεῖ τῇ ἐμῇ μαντείᾳ προσέχειν, κτλ. He concludes his discussion with a similarly explicit comment on the status of the preceding remarks: 256.20–1 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἡ ἐμῇ μαντείᾳ περὶ τούτων. Cf. II. 169.3 καὶ εἴ με δεῖ τὴν ἐμὴν λέγειν μαντείαν, κτλ. and in *Remp.* II. 53.5–6 εἰ δεῖ τῇ ἐμῇ μαντείᾳ προσέχειν, κτλ.

⁸⁶ In fact, this line of reasoning leads Proclus to speculate that there might be two kinds of hypercosmic souls. One kind contains only the first three Platonic portions: 1, 2, 3. The kind intermediate between these hypercosmic souls and the encosmic ones will contain the squares as well, so their psychic structure consists in the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 – and presumably the means inserted between them.

⁸⁷ Proclus seems to think that such differences may result in different harmonies in the two, and as Winnington-Ingram notes, it is hard to see why this should be the case. But let us leave this puzzle aside.

⁸⁸ in *Tim.* I. 425.16–22; II. 154.4–9.

Forms that occupies Plotinus. What is Proclus' view on this controversy among his fellow Neoplatonists?

Proclus certainly did not feel one of the incentives that Amelius is alleged to have had for positing Forms of individuals. As we saw above, Amelius seems to have taken Plato's *Timaeus* 30c5–7 to indicate that there were paradigms of particulars (*in Tim.* I. 425.16–22). Proclus does not have this textual incentive, since he reads this passage with Iamblichus who, far from seeing in this a notion of individual Forms subordinate to general ones, regards Plato's use of *kath' hen* as indicating the monadic cause in the intelligible Living Being that is prior to the kinds of living beings that it encompasses. We ourselves may find neither of these readings of Plato's text particularly plausible. The point is that Proclus did not feel compelled to posit Forms of individuals as Amelius did because of the authority of Plato's text.

Perhaps another incentive for positing Forms of individuals was to allow the World Soul to 'have opinions and convictions [about them] that are stable and true' (*Tim.* 37b6–9). The opinions and convictions could not derive such a character from the sensibles themselves, since they are unstable and have a kind of truth that is 'obscure' (*in Tim* II. 51.16). Moreover, it would be contrary to the order of procession for the sensible particulars to *cause* such true opinions in the World Soul. They are causally downstream from the World Soul and thus do not cause anything in it. It is certainly possible that Amelius introduced his second intellect, containing ideas of particular things, in order to solve both these problems. The contents of such an intellect would have the truth and stability that the particulars themselves lack. Moreover, if World Soul were itself partially a product of this intellect, there would be no violation of the downward causal order in emanation. The knowledge of sensibles would be encoded in the World Soul from above – not received as a result of causation from what is secondary to soul in the order of being.

Proclus does not feel this incentive either. The nature of the knowledge about something depends upon the character of the *knower* – not the *object known*. This is a view that Proclus also adopts from Iamblichus.⁸⁹ It is used by Proclus to solve the problem of divine foreknowledge, since the gods may determinately know a future that is itself indeterminate or contingent. They may have a single indivisible awareness of things that are themselves divided.⁹⁰ Similar reasoning is applied to the case of the World Soul's knowledge of sensible things (*in Tim.* II. 304.29–305.25).

Moreover, the World Soul is not *affected* by sensibles (*in Tim.* II. 311.16–25). This is because the World Soul knows sensibles by knowing

⁸⁹ ap. Ammonius, *in De Int.* 135.14. ⁹⁰ *Prov.* 63.6–64.4; *ET* 124.

their causes – causes which are antecedently comprehended (*prolambanein*) within itself. Proclus likens the narrative that unfolds among the sensible things that constitute the cosmos to a drama. The World Soul is like the author. He does not need to watch the actor's performance in order to know that, in the final scene, Oedipus blinds himself (II. 305.6–15).

What are these causes within the World Soul and how close are they to Forms of individuals? Since they subsist within a soul, they are not intelligible entities and thus not Forms in as much as one thinks of Forms as strictly *noêta*. In another passage, Proclus likens them to 'projected concepts' or 'projected rational-forming principles' (*proballomenoi logoi*, II. 311.20). This terminology has its origins in Iamblichus' account of perceptual recognition.⁹¹ Perceptual judgements by souls are not brought about by the action of external sense objects upon them. Rather, the soul, on the occasion of having a stimulation of the sense organs, 'projects' an innate concept of the sensed quality and it is about this object that it makes its judgement.

...upon it [sc. the sense organ's] being acted upon, the perceptive soul may project (*proballomenê*) the common concepts (*logoi*) within it of the sensible things in a way appropriate to the effect (*pathos*) and recognise (*gnorizein*) the sensible object through its own activity, being in a state of accord with the Form (*eidos*) of the sensible object. ('Simplicius' in *De An.* 124.34–125.2, trans. Sorabji (2005b), 40)

The creature that is the cosmos, of course, has no sense organs.⁹² It doesn't need them since it has the highest sort of sense perception which 'includes the sense object in and of itself' (in *Tim.* II. 83.19). So these are not *concepts* such as our souls project when our sense organs are affected by objects external to us. Rather, they are the rational-forming principles or *logoi* of the objects in the sense world. They are, in short, *Forms* of the things within the cosmos that the World Soul understands in its 'convictions and opinions that are stable and true' (*Tim.* 37b6–9).

Proclus, however, distinguishes a vast variety of different sorts of Forms, only some of which are intelligible. At in *Parm.* 969.16–26 he differentiates eight kinds of Forms: (1) those that are primal and intelligible Forms; (2) those that are intelligible but *in* that which is intellectual; (3) those that are such as to connect universals or wholes; (4) those that are such as to bring to completion intellectual and hypercosmic things; (5) those that are intrinsically intellectual; (6) those that assimilate secondary things to intellectual Forms; (7) transcendent and hypercosmic Forms that unify the Forms that are divided among the cosmos;

⁹¹ Cf. Priscian *Metaphrasis in Theophrastum* 7.11–20. ⁹² Cf. in *Tim.* II. 86.10–89.1.

(8) Forms in the cosmos. If the causes within the World Soul are Forms in any sense, they can only be so in the last way. Within this eighth category, Proclus distinguishes further ranks:

Some [among the encosmic Forms] are intellectual, others psychic, others physical, and others sensible. Among the latter, some are immaterial, while some are material. It is down to these that the procession of Forms descends from the intelligibles, appearing first at the limit of the intelligibles, and making its last manifestation at the limit of the sensibles. (*in Parm.* 969.26–32)

It seems likely that what are described here as ‘encosmic Forms’ are called in the *Timaeus* commentary ‘projected rational-forming principles’ (*proballomenoi logoi*, II. 311.20). I say this because they seem to play a similar role in Proclus’ metaphysics. For instance, shortly after the passage quoted above from the *Parmenides* commentary, Proclus again returns to the lowest level of Forms which he now calls ‘*atoma eidē*’.⁹³ Here an *atoma eidos* is the last step in the line of causation that terminates in an *individual*. For example, in the *Parmenides* commentary we are told that each such *atoma eidos* is ‘that which is immediately followed by the individual in the truest sense, when it has proceeded down to the ultimate material division’.⁹⁴ Like the ‘projected rational-forming principles’ of *in Tim.* II. 311.20 these are the most specific instructions in the World Soul’s “script” for the narrative that plays itself out in the sensible realm.⁹⁵

So does this mean that Proclus accepted Forms of individuals, as did Amelius and – perhaps – Plotinus? The right answer to this question, I believe, is ‘in name only’. What makes the notion of an individual Form look questionable to many modern philosophers is the fact that this is putatively a *universal*, but one that cannot be ‘had by many’.⁹⁶ By contrast, the most controversial aspect of the idea of Forms of individuals among the Neoplatonists was as much ethical as metaphysical. It was the consequence that a portion of the soul would remain “unfallen”. If there were a Form corresponding to the individual soul, then since the

⁹³ In some contexts, it is clear that we should translate *atoma eidē* as ‘infimae species’ – the most specific *kind* to which individuals may belong, such as Hairy-nosed Wombat or Common Wombat. For example, *in Tim.* II. 132.16 and 24 where Man and Horse are given as examples of *atoma eidē*.

⁹⁴ *in Parm.* 970.23–4, trans. Morrow and Dillon.

⁹⁵ Compare Porphyry, *Isagôgē* 7.16–19 λέγεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν γενικώτατον κατὰ πάντων τῶν ὑφ’ ἑαυτὸ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν καὶ ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ γένος τὸ πρὸ τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου κατὰ πάντων τῶν εἰδικωτάτων καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ μόνον εἶδος κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ ἄτομον ἔφ’ ἐνὸς μόνου τῶν κατὰ μέρος.

⁹⁶ This aspect of Aristotle’s definition of a universal (*Int.* 17a39–40) is accepted by such realists as Armstrong as a good reason for denying that there can be such a property as ‘being identical to John’. Cf. Armstrong (1978), 93.

individual is his soul, some aspect of the soul would remain fully present to the intelligible realm.⁹⁷ What then would be the need for philosophy in order for the soul to reascend?

Proclus' notion of *atoma eidê* or maximally specific 'projected rational-forming principles' in the World Soul manages to evade both these problems. With respect to the first, there is a tendency in later Neoplatonism for the role of Forms as universals to be eclipsed by their role as causes.⁹⁸ Simplicius' *Categories* commentary (83.10–12) treats them as common *causes* of things – not common *natures*. Proclus' teacher, Syrianus, similarly highlights the role of Forms as the causal origins of things (*in Metaphys.* 106.26–107.1). The distinction that Proclus adopts from Iamblichus between the unparticipated and participated Forms makes the latter Form as cause – not as shared nature (*in Parm.* 650.19–34). Thus, because Neoplatonic Forms play a rather different role from universals in contemporary metaphysics, the first objection to the notion of an *atomos eidos* is not so pressing. But Proclus' notion of a maximally specific "recipe" for a particular thing in the World Soul also avoids the Neoplatonic objections to Forms of individuals. These *atoma eidê* are not in the intelligible realm at all. Thus, one can hold that there are 'particular Forms' in Proclus' sense while still accepting that every particular or partial soul descends entirely (*ET* 211).

Theodore and the minimal interpretive unit

In a very learned appendix to his book, Stephen Gersh raises a very good question about Iamblichus' and Proclus' attitudes toward the interpretive methods of Theodore of Asine. On the one hand, Proclus goes to considerable effort to tell us about how Theodore drew conclusions about the soul on the basis of 'linguistic items, characters, and numbers' (*in Tim.* II. 274.13). On the other hand, he also reports and endorses what he regards as Iamblichus' devastating criticisms of these methods.⁹⁹ Why does Proclus spend almost four pages of his commentary on views that he regards as so misguided? Gersh also notes that there appear to be plenty of places where both Iamblichus and Proclus engage in similar interpretive strategies to those that they condemn in Theodore. What explains this?

Gersh (1978) helpfully teases apart three strands in Theodore's interpretive practice. First he is concerned with the *phonetic* analysis of terms like 'hen' (one). This concentrates on the inferences about the principles of reality that can be drawn from the way in which the Greek words

⁹⁷ Proclus, *in Alc.* 227.2–228.6.

⁹⁸ This line of argument is developed at length in Sorabji (2005), vol. III, §5.

⁹⁹ *in Tim.* II. 277.26–278.25 = Iamblichus, *in Tim.* fr. 57 (Dillon).

that are used for them are pronounced. Second, Theodore drew inferences from the *graphic* qualities of the letters composing these words. As noted above, this goes so far as to consider not merely the appearance of the ψ and the χ that figure in $\psi\chi\eta$ but the circular shape that these letters would assume if they were bent round upon themselves. Finally, Theodore used the *correlations between letters and numbers* in the Greek practice of writing numerals to draw inferences about the realities named by terms such as $\psi\chi\eta$.

Gersh helpfully examines similar uses of the phonetic, graphic and arithmetical properties of terms among both philosophers and magicians prior to or contemporary with Theodore. Gersh goes on to argue that both Proclus and Iamblichus engage in similar analyses, or at the very least signal their interest in such uses of phonetic, graphic and arithmetical aspects of terms. This, he thinks, makes their criticism of Theodore somewhat puzzling.¹⁰⁰

With respect to the first form of analysis, Gersh notes that Nicomachus of Gerasa reports that the seven vowels derive their names from the seven planetary spheres and that this fact explains the use of ‘hissing, clucking and inarticulate and discordant sounds’ in theurgical acts of worship.¹⁰¹ Both Proclus and Iamblichus, of course, were practitioners of theurgy – the use of ritual magic to bring about union with the divine. Gersh then points out that Proclus discusses a similar theory which involves a relationship not only between the vowels and the seven spheres, but between all 24 letters and the signs of the zodiac (*in Remp.* II. 65.12–20). Proclus assigns this view to Nestorius and he seems to give it a limited endorsement of sorts, since he says that it was by means such as this that Nestorius was able to gain certain astrological insights. However, it is far from clear that Proclus supposed that analysis of the words of Plato’s text by reference to the letters that make them up was a fruitful interpretive method. He speculates that by means of such speculations one might regulate the marriages and births (*Rep.* V, 459e–461a) in Plato’s ideal city:

And this might be the most proper goal of this [Nestorian] theory of triangles – not to consider this [goal of regulating marriages and child-bearing] merely mathematically or dialectically, but also hieratically – since this activity in itself particularly demands the providence of the gods. (*in Remp.* II. 66.15–19)

¹⁰⁰ ‘[T]he problem remains why Iamblichus chose to make these particular criticisms [sc. the ones that Proclus summarises and endorses at II. 278.1–21] when our evidence suggests that he himself or at least the school of philosophy to which he belonged had advocated many doctrines not dissimilar to those which he attacks’ (Gersh (1978), 303).

¹⁰¹ Nicomachus, *Excerpta* 6 (ed. Jan); text and translation in Gersh (1978), 295.

Such astrological and magical techniques would doubtless be thought useful and one can well imagine Proclus endorsing them. But it is a further question whether Plato's text should be interpreted right down to the level of its phonetic elements. Nothing in this passage from Proclus suggests that it should.

Similarly Proclus also does not engage in the same kind of interpretive methods regarding the graphic aspects of language that Theodore of Asine does. Gersh suggests that he does by appealing to *in Remp.* II. 143.14–144.12 and *in Tim.* II. 255.31–256.11. I think we need to draw some subtle distinctions here.

In his *Republic* commentary, Proclus does say that the letter χ is proper to all souls. But this is not on the basis of the appearance of this letter in the word $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$. Rather, it is because in the *Timaeus*' psychogony (36b6) the soul's essence is split into two strips which are conjoined in the shape of a χ . It may well be that Proclus identified a confluence of authority around the association between the soul and χ since he tells us that the theurgists in their 'unknowable signs' associate the two (*in Remp.* II. 143.26). So it seems likely that it may have been part of theurgical practice to draw associations between the graphic elements of words and things. But nothing that Proclus says here suggests that he thinks that the text of Plato should be read down to the level of graphic elements. Such associations as he draws between χ and the soul in the passage from his *Republic* commentary seem to me to be quite consistent with his endorsement of Iamblichus' criticisms of Theodore's use of the graphic level of interpretation in reading Plato.

Similar remarks apply to *in Tim.* II. 255.31–256.11. Proclus does indeed endorse the idea of a general 'psychic character' which is the letter χ , in addition to individual psychic characters or names. But Plato 'beheld these things in an intellectual manner' (256.2) and handed them on to other wise men who were anxious to follow. That is to say, Plato links the letter χ with the soul because he understood the nature of the psychogony, not on the basis of the graphic properties of the word $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$. Those who came after him, such as theurgists, may have apprehended this deep truth in another way. Moreover, the case of the universal psychic character χ is here combined with the idea that the Demiurge baptises aspects of the World Soul with proper names, and that there may additionally be names that are proper to individual souls. There is no suggestion whatsoever that the graphic elements of $\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu$ or $\theta\alpha\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ show us why the Demiurge named these aspects of the soul correctly (*in Tim.* II. 255.10–15). Nor do the examples of *individual* true psychic names that Proclus discusses make use of graphic connection. He thinks that the gods doubtless told Plato and Heracles the proper names of their souls – though, of course, Proclus does not tell us what these might be!

His other example is slightly more illuminating. When Dionysius hints to Pentheus what his real psychic name might be, it is not the graphic or phonic elements that matter. It is rather the *semantic* connection between *penthos* (grief) and Pentheus.¹⁰²

I do not think that Gersh's puzzle about Iamblichus' (and Proclus') apparent inconsistency over the use of phonic and graphic levels of interpretation is as pressing as he supposes. Certainly he is right to think that, as practitioners of theurgy, they supposed that characters and sounds had magical efficacy. But at no point can I find an example where they see fit to interpret Plato's text right down to this level. This, in itself, might seem to be a bit surprising. After all, Iamblichus and Proclus seem to think that there are few elements in Plato's works that are too minor to play a role in contributing to the significance of the dialogue – hence the time that they spend, for instance, interpreting character and setting. Why should they pass up any opportunity for yet more elements of Plato's text to serve as grist for their hermeneutic mill?

I think there is a principled answer to this question in Proclus' views about language. Theodore's phonetic, graphic and arithmetic methods assume that there is some natural relation between a name and what it names. Proclus too thinks that there is a sense in which names are natural. But he adopts a hylomorphic view of names that distinguishes between a formal and a material aspect. The phonetic and graphic elements fall on the side of matter.

Somewhat ironically, Proclus' hylomorphic view of names probably emerged from his arguments *against* Aristotle's purely conventionalist views on language.

To the syllogism of Aristotle which goes as follows: 'things that are natural are the same for all men, but names are not the same for all men, so things that are natural are not names and names are not natural'. Proclus objects to the major premise as follows: 'if the name is a Form observed in different matter, because it is Form, it is the same for all men; but the first, therefore the second'. (*in Crat.* §58.1–7, trans Duvick)

Since Proclus takes the message of Plato's *Cratylus* to be that there is a sense in which names are natural and a sense in which they are conventional, the hylomorphic distinction provides him with just the tool that he needs. The formal aspect of a name is associated with naturalness, while the matter contributes the conventional and contingent character.¹⁰³ The formal aspect is what is informative to us, since it is in this respect that names seem to be like the things that they name:

¹⁰² *in Tim.* II. 256.6, cf. Euripides, *Bacchae* 507–8. ¹⁰³ Cf. *in Crat.* §10.12.

Conclusion

In terms of Form all names are the same, have one power and are natural; but in terms of matter they differ from each other and are conventional. For in Form they are like their objects, but in matter they differ from them. (*in Crat.* §17.20–3, trans. Duvick)

It is by no means easy to see exactly what ‘Form’ is supposed to encompass here. But it is clear what aspects of a linguistic item constitute the matter – certainly its sound (*in Crat.* §49.10) and by the same reasoning also presumably its graphic shape. In a passage that I think is important for our present discussion, Proclus criticises those ‘grammarians’ who derive the name of Agamemnon from his vehement (*agan*) features – not, as Plato does, from his admirable (*agastos*) qualities (*Crat.* 495b). Plato, Proclus says, ‘despises matter’ and ‘adheres most to the Form’. Grammarians, however, look at things from the point of view of matter and so mistake the meaning of Agamemnon’s name.¹⁰⁴ The phonic or graphic similarities between ‘Agamemnon’ and *agan* are not nearly as salient as the *semantic* connection between the admirable qualities of the hero and the word ‘*agastos*’. From this point of view it is easy to see how Proclus could endorse Iamblichus’ criticism of Theodore’s methods. There is too much contingency – too much matter – involved in Theodore’s observation that since ψυχή ends in ῥ and this corresponds to the number 8, which is a cubic number, the very word for ‘soul’ tells us that it mediates Forms to three-dimensional reality. Given Proclus’ views on language, he *should* reject such observations as not well founded.

CONCLUSION

No single issue dominates Proclus’ commentary on the psychogony in the *Timaeus* in quite the way in which the issue about the number of elements dominated Proclus’ observations on the creation of the cosmic body in the previous volume in this series. Nonetheless, here too he is responsive to traditions of commentary on Plato’s text that pre-date his own work. Because there is a multiplicity of issues in this earlier tradition, this portion of Proclus’ text seems an even more bewildering ‘grab bag’. I hope that this introduction provides some overview of the context in which he was writing about *Timaeus*’ psychogony and alerts the reader to some of the salient controversies. It is often not at all easy to ‘see the woods for the trees’ in Proclus’ commentary and this is perhaps even more true of this often quite “technical” portion of it.

¹⁰⁴ *in Crat.* §90.1–6.

On the Timaeus of Plato: Book 3, Part II

Proclus on the World Soul

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I. The relation between the World Soul and its body

In the middle of it he placed Soul, extending it throughout the universe and then covering the body externally with it. (34b3-4)

A. The order of Plato's treatment of the question

God brings forth all things all at once (*athroôs*) and throughout eternity. 102.7
 For it is through his very being and through his eternal thinking of
 wholes that he engenders all the things that result from him – the total-
 ity of things both hypercosmic and encosmic: intellects, souls, natures,
 bodies and matter itself. If you ask me, demiurgic creation exhibits this 10
 ‘all at once’ aspect more than the Sun’s illumination does. In the lat-
 ter case, the entire light (*to holon phôs*) proceeds simultaneously from
 the Sun. But even though the Sun imitates the Father through visible
 (*emphanês*) creation, this is clearly inferior to the Father’s eternal and 15
 invisible (*aphanês*) production. Therefore, as we said, though all things
 have come about from the act of creation eternally and all together
 (*homou*), nonetheless (*homôs*) the order of effects is still preserved; for all
 things proceed all together and each with its own order since there was
 present in that which produced it an eternal intelligence and an order
 prior to the things that have been ordered. Hence, even if all things 20
 result at once from one thing, nonetheless some of them are of primary
 worth while others have a lesser value. Some have proceeded to a greater,
 others to a lesser degree. Some have been joined together by the Demi-
 urge through unification (*kath’ henôsin*), others through connection (*kata*
synaphên), and still others through participation (*kata methexin*). So intel-
 lect is capable of being connate with intellect through unification. But
 soul naturally is able to be connected to intellect, while body is only able 25
 to participate; for example, even those things at the far end of the earth
 share in the radiance of the Sun.

Among all the things in the cosmos – intellect, soul and body –
 although it is the case that all of them have proceeded all at once, there
 nonetheless exists among these things the order which comes down from
 the Demiurge, and for this reason [Timaeus]’ account at one time starts 30
 from above in the mode of procession and ends at the limit of creation,
 but at another time it sets out from the last things and through rever- 103
 sion goes back up to the highest forms of all things, taking its lead from
 the things themselves. For all things proceed from and revert upon the
 cause and first principle from which they have proceeded, and in this pro-
 cess a kind of cycle of creation is made manifest. So, Plato has given us 5
 the order of the things that are the essential constituents of the cosmos
 in the preceding passages in accordance with their procession, i.e. he

fabricated the universe by constructing intellect with soul, soul with body (30b5). But in what follows (31b5 ff.) the order is discussed in accordance with their *reversion*: first, he assumed the opposites within the universe and added two means (*mesos*) to these and unified them through proportion. Next, he filled the cosmos out as a whole constituted from wholes (33a7), and surrounded with an intellectual shape and the capacity to participate in divine life and a motion imitating intellect,¹ and by these additions he made it ever more complete. But in addition to all this, he introduced the soul into the universe and filled all things with life (though different things have different kinds of life) and made intellect preside over soul itself. Because of this fact, soul is connected with its own source (for the World Soul is connected with the intelligibles by participating in intellect). So in this way he ended with the principle from which encosmic intellect and soul and corporeal mass have proceeded.

Having divided the universe into three – intellect, soul and body – he gives the account of the first things that have come down since the manner of exposition that accords with reversion is like this. The account of the creation of the body reaches an end with the provision of its essence, shape and motion. But the consideration of the soul is conjoined to this part of the account in just the same way that body itself depends upon the divine soul. The ensoulment which the account has now related is the seventh Demiurgic gift to the cosmos.

But I think that the discussion of the soul likewise falls in two parts. One part concerns the essence (*ousia*) of the soul, but the other involves its association (*koinônia*) with the body. Now Plato doubtless initially distinguishes the second of these and deems it worthwhile to mention it prior to the remaining topic. Perhaps this is because the association with the body is a middle term (*mesos*) between reasoning about the body and speculations about the soul – for the relation (*schesis*) of the soul to the body is a kind of middle term between the body and the soul itself, and it is necessary to make the advance toward first principles through middle terms.² Or perhaps it is because Plato does not wish to imply either that the soul is intertwined with the body at some time nor that, having been

¹ The spherical shape of the cosmos makes it capable of rotation on its axis. This movement – ‘regular, uniform, always in the same place and around the same point’ – is an image of the activity of non-discursive thought or *noêsis*. Cf. *Laws* X, 898a and in *Tim.* II. 69.15.

² δεῖ διὰ τῶν μέσων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀγωγὴν may be supposed to remind the reader of Aristotelian *epagôgê* through which one reaches the indemonstrable starting points of demonstration – the *archê*. If so, then Plato’s choice to begin with the relation of the soul to the body (the middle term) rather than with the soul itself (the *archê*) is not a deviation from the order of working from causes to effects. Rather it is a just a good Aristotelian (and thus ultimately Platonist) methodology.

separate and existing by itself, it is then conjoined to the cosmos. But to give an account of the communion of the soul with the body prior to the “generation” of the soul contributes toward this end. The generation of soul is sufficient to show that the corporeal mass is also [temporally] ungenerated. For even if Plato confers generation upon things that are ungenerated, this would have to be some different manner of generation that he is discussing. And if prior to the apparent generation of the soul, he treats soul and body on a par, then such generation as it has is really a state of being ungenerated, and the process of ensoulment would be everlasting (*aïdios*). It will neither be the case that there is a generation of soul in time nor will there be a temporal difference between the existence of soul and the existence of body. But this is enough about the order of topics.

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B. The World Soul’s position in the middle of the cosmos

1. Various interpreters

On the subject of the position of the soul in the middle, some commentators explain it differently from others.³ Some say that the middle is the centre of the earth, but others say that the moon is the middle in as much as it is an isthmus between the generated and divine things.⁴ Still others say that the Sun is established in the place of the heart. Then there are those who go right up to the sphere of the fixed stars. And among these, some say that the soul’s position is at the circle of the equator in as much as it demarcates the breadth of the heavens, but others say that it is the circle of the ecliptic. Furthermore, some position the commanding faculty (*to hêgemonikon*) of the universe in the centre, others in the moon, and yet others in the Sun.⁵ Some say it is in the equator and others in the zodiac.⁶ The power of the centre provides evidence for the first verdict since it is this which connects the entire vault of heaven. In the second case, one can point to the fact that the movement of the moon alters

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³ The identity of these commentators is unclear. Dillon (1973) conjectures that this may be a doxography of pre-Plotinian commentators compiled by Porphyry, whose views Proclus soon goes on to discuss. If this is correct, then it seems likely that Porphyry used the disagreement among these earlier interpreters to make the point that they are all thinking in terms that are too concrete and spatial. The high-minded Plato is not telling us where the physical centre of the universe is or locating the World Soul at some specific point in space.

⁴ I.e. the stars. For the moon as isthmus, cf. II. 87.32.

⁵ The term ‘commanding faculty’ is Stoic and the assignment of it to the Sun is found in Cleanthes (Diogenes Laertius VII. 139 = *SVF* II.644).

⁶ τὸν διὰ μέσων is equivalent to τὸν διὰ μέσων τῶν ζῳδίων κύκλον or the ecliptic. Cf. Hipparchus I.9.3, 4 and Proclus, *Hyp.* 4.1.1.

generation [here in the sublunary realm] in various ways. The evidence for the Sun as the commanding faculty is the fact that its heat gives life to things. The evidence for the fourth candidate is the ease of movement on the part of the equatorial circle. In the final case one can point to the cyclical passage of the stars through the signs of the zodiac.

2. Porphyry and Iamblichus

However, Porphyry⁷ and Iamblichus⁸ argue against all these views in their writings, blaming these people both for understanding the middle [that Plato is discussing] as something that is localised and possessing spatial dimensions (*diastêmatikôs*) and for shutting the soul of the whole cosmos up in some particular part of it when in fact it is present in a similar way everywhere and exercises authority over everything and leads all things by her own motions.

Among these divine men, Porphyry assumes that the soul that is at issue is the soul of the universe and interprets 'the middle' in terms of the psychic essence, since soul is a middle between the intelligibles and the sensibles.⁹ But if the phrase is taken in this way, it would appear to contribute nothing to advancing the argument that Plato is surely providing here. For if we take the words in this way – that the universe has been composed from Intellect, Soul and Body and is a Living Being, ensouled and endowed with intellect (30b8) – then we shall find that the soul is the middle term in this arrangement. Therefore, having already stated this, it would appear that Plato now says nothing more than that the World Soul is throughout the universe and that it is allotted a middle order within it. For it is always the case that the secondary things participate in the things that are prior to them, thus¹⁰ body participates

⁷ 104.30–105.6 = Porphyry, in *Tim.* fr. 61, Sodano (1964).

⁸ 104.30–105.28 = Iamblichus, in *Tim.* fr. 50, Dillon (1973). What is at issue is the existence of a distinct hypercosmic soul superior to the World Soul. In accordance with his principle that, set over every participated entity, there is an unparticipated and transcendent monad, Iamblichus posited a hypercosmic soul that is prior to the World Soul. This World Soul is 'participated' in the sense that it is the soul of some particular body – the cosmos. The Hypercosmic Soul is prior to this by virtue of being a soul that enters into no relation with any particular body. In the present passage, this allows Iamblichus to say that it is *this* soul that is placed in 'the middle' in *Tim.* 34b2. By being unrelated to any particular body it is, in a sense, nowhere and thus, in a sense, everywhere.

⁹ This is presumably because *Timaeus* will soon describe the World Soul as being composed from the intelligible, indivisible kind of Being as well as the divisible kind of being associated with the sensible realm.

¹⁰ As Festugière points out, the adverb here gives the sense of a particular application of the general principle. Cf. 109.19 for a similar construction.

in soul (the one being the last thing and the other the middle) and soul participates in intellect which is prior, in turn, to it.

The philosopher Iamblichus, however, thinks it right to interpret this middle in terms of a transcendent, hypercosmic and liberated soul that exercises authority over all things. For according to him Plato's argument is not about the cosmic soul, but rather about the unparticipated soul which has been arranged above all the souls within the cosmos as a monad. For the first soul is this sort of thing and 'the middle' follows it in as much as it is similarly present to all things by virtue of the fact that it is not the soul *of* any body, nor has it come to have any kind of relation in any manner. This soul has animated all things in a similar fashion and yet is independent from all of them to an equal extent. After all, it is not independent of one to a lesser extent and independent from another to a greater extent – for it is devoid of relations (*aschetos*) – but is similarly independent from all of them. (But of course not all of *them* are independent of *it* in the same manner, for among the participants there are greater and lesser degrees of participation.)

3. Syrianus

But the interpretation of our teacher [Syrianus] was devised to be more in keeping with the words of Plato. There is in the World Soul a certain hypercosmic aspect (*τι*) that transcends the universe, through which it is connected to the intellect. This is the aspect of it which both Plato in the *Phaedrus* (248a3) and Orpheus in his *Sacred Discourse on Hipta*¹¹ call the "head" of the soul. But it also has a different plenitude of powers proceeding from this monad [i.e. its hypercosmic aspect] which apporportion themselves around about the cosmos and are present in all the parts of the universe in a manner appropriate to each. It is present in one way

¹¹ Reading ἡπίτας rather than ἡπιπας with Festugière. The relevant texts are collected in Kern's *Orphica*, fr. 199. As West (1983) reconstructs the content of the *Rhapsodies* narrative, Hipta receives the infant Dionysius from the thigh of Zeus. She places him in a winnowing basket with a snake wrapped around it and carries this on her head to Mount Ida.

Proclus interprets the Orphic story on Hipta and Dionysius at *in Tim.* I. 407.22 and II. 222.20. I think that the earlier passage casts light on Syrianus' strategy here against Iamblichus. Hipta – identified with the World Soul – becomes a receptacle of intellectual being by virtue of the most divine part or aspect of herself (τῷ γὰρ ἑαυτῆς θειοτάτῳ γίγνεται τῆς νοεῖας οὐσίας ὑποδοχή, 408.1). This makes her the receptacle of the encosmic intellect. This is the 'hypercosmic and transcendent *aspect*' of the World Soul mentioned here. It need not be a separate, hypercosmic soul such as the one that Iamblichus posits. Rather, we should think of this only in terms of the World Soul's 'various psychic powers' (106.11). Proclus' relation to the views of Syrianus is a complex one. See pp. 37–41 in the Introduction.

5 in the middle, but in another way in the Earth, and in yet another way
in the case of the Sun, and in a different way yet again in the case of each
of the spheres. The present discussion stated all these things, indicating
that the soul animates in the middle in one manner, but the entire vol-
ume in another, and that it also separates off some other thing which is
prior to these and transcends the universe. But in order to avoid hearing
these words in a merely cursory manner and that we might accept [what
10 he says] about there being a variety of psychic powers, we ought to say
this much: that the soul is a living cosmos long before the body, and
is both one and number. By virtue of being one, it is greater than all
forms of relation. But by virtue of multitude, it administers the various
15 different parts of the universe. By virtue of its guardian powers, it holds
together the centre. (For the whole sphere is steered from thence and
converges on the centre. Moreover, all the troubles in the world have
been corralled in its middle and it is necessary that there should be a
divine guardian who is capable of marshalling them and keeping them
within their proper bounds. It is for this reason that the Theologians end
20 the processions of the highest gods at this location and the Pythagore-
ans call the middle 'the tower of Zeus' or 'the guardpost of Zeus'.)¹² By
virtue of powers that are stable and simultaneously life-giving, it holds
together the sphere of the earth. But it is by its perfective and generative
powers that it maintains the water sphere. It is in virtue of connective and
25 motive powers that it holds together the air. There are immaculate pow-
ers for the fire, and intellectual ones by virtue of which it holds together
the whole heaven. And among these [regions of the heavens] they hold
together the sphere of the moon in one manner, but the solar sphere in
another manner, and the sphere of the fixed stars in yet another way – for
the particular souls corresponding to each of these bodies govern their
own proper region in conjunction with [the soul] of the whole.

Since this is the kind of process of ensouling that is at issue, Plato
30 begins, as he is accustomed to do, from the last terms in the mode of
reversion. He first animates the middle, then the universe and leaves
some third aspect (*ti*) of the soul outside the universe. For as the body
[of the universe] has been established prior to its soul, and the parts prior
107 to the whole, so too in this case he describes the process of ensoulment by
beginning from the end points. He has mentioned earlier that soul that
proceeds from above, 'putting the intellect in the soul and the soul is in

¹² For 'the Theologians', see *Or. Chald.* 34 where the lightning bolt from the 'source of sources' leaps forth (i.e. proceeds) to the 'hollows of the worlds'. See also *Or. Chald.* 65 quoted at 107.10. For the Pythagoreans, Festugière refers us to *in Tim.* I. 199.3 and Aristotle fr. 204. The 'troubles' in the world congregated at the centre refers to the sublunary world of qualitative change.

the body' (30b5). But in these words he now teaches us [about the World Soul] in the mode of reversion when he first animates the centre and then the universe. For the life-bringing channel (*zôogonias ochetos*) proceeds up until the centre, as even the Oracles say, when speaking about the middle of the five centres which extends from up above through to the opposite side via the centre of the earth.

And there is the fifth in the middle, another channel of fire, where the life-bearing (*zôêphorios*) fire descends as far as the material channels (*ochetos*). (*Or. Chald.* 65, trans. Majercik)

Accordingly in beginning from these things in which the ensoulment process has terminated, Plato traces the universal life-giving process back to the whole and considers the transcendent power of soul that is prior to this. Therefore, [in contrast to the previous interpreters] we do not position the commanding faculty of the soul in the centre (for this commanding faculty transcends the universe). Instead we find there a certain *power* of the soul that is guardian over the whole order, for no other part of the universe is such that shifting that part around could be more utterly destructive of the whole than shifting the centre and the power of the centre – the point around which the whole universe dances.

On account of this, it seems to me that Plato writes in a marvellous manner when he says, not that the Demiurge 'placed *the* soul in the middle of the universe', but rather 'placed *soul* in the middle'. These claims differ from one another because the first words imply that the *whole* soul is placed in the centre, but the latter formulation establishes one of its *powers* in the middle and other powers in other places. Therefore Plato writes exactly this: **in the middle of it he placed Soul** which is the same thing as saying 'giving even the centre participation in soul and stretching it throughout the universe, he sent forth its powers to make a whole,¹³ while leaving outside the universe an even more divine [power] which has been established from itself and sustains the whole cosmos in a transcendent manner'. But why is it necessary to say anything, hunting high and low for Plato's meaning? The philosopher himself a short while later says concerning the manner of the ensoulment process 'the

¹³ διατείνας αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ πᾶν τὰς ὅλας δυνάμεις ἀφῆκεν ἔξω τοῦ παντὸς τὴν πασῶν θειοτέραν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἰδρυμένην καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ἐξηρημένως συνέχουσιν. The words τὰς ὅλας δυνάμεις cannot be given a literal sense here of 'entirety of powers' since there is an additional and more divine power external to the cosmos. τὸν ὅλον κόσμον perhaps gives the clue. The soul's powers that are stretched through the cosmos are those that constitute that cosmos as a whole, even if some part of the World Soul's power remains external to it. Moreover the feminine τὴν θειοτέραν must refer to 'power', not 'soul'. If it were otherwise, the contrast between Iamblichus' hypercosmic soul and Syrianus' hypercosmic aspect or power of the World Soul would be lost.

108 soul was interwoven from the middle on out in every direction to the
 outermost edge of the heaven, and covered it from outside in a circle,
 revolving within itself' (36e2–4). These things differ not at all from the
 the words that are presently before us, for the phrases 'extending it from
 the middle in every way' and 'interwoven from the middle on out in
 every direction to the outermost edge of the heaven' come to the same
 thing except that in the one case the soul itself from itself has illuminated
 by its own powers the centre of the universe and the whole sphere, but
 5 in the present case the Demiurge is the cause of ensoulment when he
 transplants the soul into the universe. The same thing results from both
 of these: in the one case in a demiurgic and intellectual mode by the
 cause, but in the other case in a self-moving mode by the soul. But at
 this point in the dialogue, the philosopher provides an account of the
 bond [between body and soul] that results from the sole act of creation.
 10 This is because we primarily refer wholes and good things back to divine
 causes, but we do not think that partial or particular things and those
 things that are not good are worthy of divine creation. Rather, we attach
 these effects to other more proximate causes. But even so, these things
 too exist in thanks to god, as has often been observed.

C. *The association of the soul with the body*

15 Now, the association with the body comes about both in the case of
 divine souls and in the case of partial or particular souls (*merikos*). In the
 former, when it comes to be in accordance with a will that is good in
 form (*agathoeidēs*) and does not depart from the intelligible procession,
 it is divinely inspired (*entheos*). But in the latter, when it comes about
 through the loss of wings (*Phdr.* 248c) or audacity (*tolma*) or flight, it is
 godless (*atheos*) – though even in that [soul] there is an involvement with
 what results from self-motion, and in this [soul an involvement with]
 providence. But in the one case, the accord with the divine is obvious
 20 because of the presence of the good, while in the second case that which
 derives from the soul is made manifest through the soul's deviation.¹⁴
 Thus, since the process of ensoulment in this text is twofold – in one
 sense from the Demiurge and in another sense from the self-moving
 capacity of the soul – Plato has naturally honoured the cause that is in

¹⁴ 108.21–2 οὐ δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὴν τῆς παρατροπῆς ἔμφασιν. Festugière argues that 'that which derives from the soul' ought to be understood as the voluntary choice of the soul. Cf. I. 378.13. There Proclus notes that an absence of goodness can come about either through the natural process of deterioration through procession (*hypthesis*) or through deviation (*paratropē*). The former is not evil and is, indeed, quite natural (*in Remp.* 34.6–16).

accordance with the divine [before the other one] as most appropriate to the [discourse concerning] wholes. For ‘placing’, ‘extending’ and ‘covering’ are words that connote Demiurgic activities. The first signifies the final level of the soul. The second term corresponds to its [stretching from the middle] pervading everything. But the final term signifies its transcendent superiority, for ‘covering’ indicates the fact that the soul encompasses the cosmos and through itself unifies it and introduces a single life. It leaves nothing [that is] outside its own proper providence or deprived of itself.

D. Interpretation of Tim. 34b4

And setting the circle to turn in a circle, he established one single, solitary¹⁵ heaven. (34b4) 109

Now philosopher Porphyry¹⁶ offers a good interpretation of **setting the circle to turn in a circle**. For, he says, it is possible that what is not itself a circle should nonetheless be *moved* in a circle, as when one whirls a stone around. It is also possible for what really is circular to fail to be moved in a circle, for example when a wheel goes end over end.¹⁷ But it is the distinguishing property of the cosmos that it is a circle that is moved in a circle in virtue of its dancing around the centre. In an even grander manner, however, the divine Iamblichus¹⁸ says that the circle in question is twofold, the one psychic, the other corporeal and that the one is moved by the other. Which one is which is obvious, for this follows from what has already been said and is consistent with what will be said. In a short while, the philosopher himself will say that the corporeal circle is moved in accordance with the psychic circle (36d) and takes the two revolutions to be analogous to the cyclical movements within the soul. This, then, is how Porphyry and Iamblichus interpret these words.

Moreover, to encompass the whole blessedness (*makariotês*) of heaven in three terms [i.e. **one, single, solitary**] is most appropriate to something that has been established from three causes: the final, the paradigmatic and the demiurgic cause. Now, of these three words, the first has been derived from the final cause, namely the ‘One’ – for this is the same

¹⁵ καὶ κύκλῳ δὴ κύκλον στρεφόμενον οὐρανὸν ἓνα μόνον ἔρημον κατέστησεν. The lemma is translated as Proclus understands it, though a more natural translation of ἓνα μόνον ἔρημον might be ‘a single solitary heaven’ (Zeyl) or ‘one world alone’ (Cornford). Proclus characteristically takes the three words as signifying a triad of causes.

¹⁶ 109.3–7 = Porphyry, *in Tim.* fr. 62, Sodano.

¹⁷ Reading περικυλίόμενον with P for κυλιόμενον. The example requires that the wheel should do something other than simply rolling.

¹⁸ *in Tim.* II. 109.7–14 = Iamblichus, *in Tim.* fr. 51 (Dillon).

thing as the Good. But the second one comes from the paradigmatic cause as ‘the only’ (*to monon*), for being one of a kind (*monogenês*) and onliness (*monôsis*) were in the All Perfect Animal [which is the paradigm of the cosmos] prior to being in the universe. Finally, the last term comes from the demiurgic cause as something all by itself. For the fact that the cosmos should utilise itself¹⁹ and should rule itself are things that has
 25 in as much as it is unified into a single thing and has reverted upon the One. But it is **single** in as much as it participates in the intelligible and has encompassed all things. And is **solitary** in as much as it closely resembles the Father enabling it to preserve itself. As a result of these three factors it is revealed to be a god, for being one is an element of divinity
 30 and so is being perfect and self-sufficient. Since the world is receptive of these things, it too is itself a god – being ‘one’ in respect of its existence (*hyparxis*), but ‘single’ through the completeness it has as a result of having been filled up with all the sensibles, and ‘solitary’ in virtue of its self-sufficiency. People who are ‘solitary’ are those who revert upon themselves and have the hope of salvation in themselves. That this is
 110 what Plato means by ‘solitary’ will be obvious from an examination of what comes next.

E. The virtue and happiness of the cosmos

5 **Through its own excellence it is enabled to keep company with itself and is in need of nothing other [than itself], its familiarity and friendship with itself being sufficient. In virtue of all these facts, he engendered it a blessed god.** (34b6–9)

10 He has now made it sufficiently clear what sort of solitude he intends in these words and that he has called a thing ‘solitary’ when it looks to itself, its own means and its own appropriate measure. For in the case of those who live in solitary places, they are their own saviours – at least with respect to those things for which humans are responsible. So, therefore, the universe too is all by itself in as much as it is enough for itself and is able to preserve itself, not on account of a decline in its power,²⁰ but
 15 rather through its superabundance (for the fact that the word connotes self-sufficiency has already been indicated) <***>²¹

¹⁹ τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ χρῆσθαι seems to be an allusion to the cosmos’ self-sufficiency (*Tim.* 33c3–d3) which Proclus equates with the fifth Demiurgic gift to it. Cf. *in Tim.* II. 86.10–87.1.

²⁰ *Erêmia* can connote a lack or absence as well as the condition of being all alone. It is this connotation that Proclus intends to emphatically reject.

²¹ Kroll marks a lacuna at 110.16.

...but **through its own excellence** as [Plato] says, for the person who possesses excellence or virtue alone among the partial living things is able to keep company with himself and be content with himself. All those who are morally wicked, however, shrink back from themselves and their own company when they look into their own deformity. Having been excited by externals,²² they pursue the company of others since they are unable to look into themselves. But the blessed person (*ho spoudaios*), when he sees the fine things within himself, is delighted and gladdened. When he gives birth to fine thoughts within himself, he delights in his own company since it is in our nature to be assimilated to what is fine and noble, but to shun depravity and what is shameful.²³ Now then, if the cosmos possesses a virtue that is appropriate to it within its intellectual essence and in its psychic essence and in the perfection of its life, then when it looks upon itself, it loves itself and is its own company and is self-sufficient.

So it is worthwhile to say these things to those who place the Intelligibles outside the Intellect.²⁴ For how can something be blessed if, requiring something external to itself and being referred to something other than itself, it is needy? If, therefore, it belongs to the cosmos to be such as to revert upon itself **through its own excellence**, must not the same thing be true of the Intellect to an even greater degree? Therefore Intellect thinks itself.

And this is among the things that can be known immediately, though it is worthwhile to reflect on this too: that in filling the world with soul, Plato also gives it a share in virtue straight away. For participation in soul and being filled with virtue are accomplished at the same time for what accords with nature.²⁵ Because of this the single cause of the [various

²² τὰ ἔκτος comes to refer to (purported) goods external to the soul that the Stoics and Peripatetics claimed are, or are not, necessary for *eudaimonia*. The Neoplatonists adapt it to their own, similar purposes in discussing the purificatory virtues through which the soul draws within itself and has its activities unaffected by such externals; cf. Proclus in *Alc.* 83.8. This idea finds its Platonic antecedents in *Phaedo* 68c and 108b. Cf. Baltzly (2006).

²³ The language of this passage strongly echoes *Symp.* 192a and 205e, save that here the blessed person gives birth to beautiful things within his *own* soul rather than begetting upon a beautiful boy. See also Plotinus I.6.5.

²⁴ Festugière argues that we should read ἀξίον <μὲν> οὖν at 110.29 on the grounds that this marks a transition to a distinct but related point, just as τοῦτο μὲν . . . γνωριμῶν at 111.2 does. This seems to have much to recommend it. The connection seems to be that the universe's felicity has just been revealed to follow from its virtue and the fact that it gazes within upon its own virtue. Those who place the intelligibles outside the Intellect (cf. *Vit. Plot.* 19; *Enn.* V.9) would deprive Intellect of the same possibility of self-sufficient felicity.

²⁵ On the basis of *Oracles* 51, Proclus locates the intelligible source of soul and of virtue in the same place – the goddess Rhea-Hecate. Cf. Brisson (2000) and Brisson (2003).

gradations of] virtues has been arranged alongside the source of souls, and the procession of virtue has been yoked together with the procession of souls. For in the case of virtue, there is one sort corresponding to the kind of soul which is unified, primary (*prôtourgos*) and perfect, but there is another sort of virtue in the leading gods and yet another among the liberated gods. There is a still different kind that pertains to the case of encosmic [gods],²⁶ through which the entire cosmos has pure thought, unceasing life, an activity which consists in reversion upon itself and a purity that is unmixed with the lives contained within it.

As a result of this sort of virtue, the cosmos becomes **familiar with itself** and enjoys **friendship with itself**. For familiarity precedes assimilation.²⁷ But since the universe is both a living thing endowed with intellect and a god, then in as much as it is endowed with intellect, it becomes known to itself. But in so far as it is a god, it becomes beloved to itself, for unification is more perfect than familiarity. Therefore, if the universe is familiar with itself, then it is intellectual since that which is familiar with itself in the primary manner (*prôtôs*) is intellect.²⁸ And if it is something that loves itself, then it is unified, and what is unified is made a god, for the one prior to intellect is a god.²⁹ So here again you have virtue, familiarity with itself, and friendship in the cosmos – the virtue coming to the universe from the soul, its familiarity deriving from intellect, and friendship as a result of the gods. As a result, Plato very reasonably concludes that **in virtue of all these facts, he created it a blessed god** when he ensouled it and made it familiar to itself and devised its friendship with itself. For the presence of soul and the participation of intellect and its reception of unity bring it about that the universe is a god. The god that is thus completed at this point in the dialogue is the one that was referred to earlier with the words **the god**

For reflections on the ethical significance of this fact, see van den Berg (2003), 193–6 and Baltzly (2004), 310–11.

²⁶ The enumeration of kinds of gods – leading, liberated, encosmic – is common to *in Tim.* I. 269.29.

²⁷ In order to appreciate the ethical import of the passage, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Neoplatonists define the goal of living or *eudaimonia* with assimilation to god, or becoming like god.

²⁸ The argument relies on the Neoplatonic adaptation of Aristotle's account of intellect's knowledge of itself. *Nous'* characteristic mode of being is the intellectual act in which knower and object known are one and the same. Cf. *ET* prop. 167.

²⁹ Festugière refers this passage to *ET* 20, but *in Prm* 641.7 is more apposite: 'each thing, even the lowest grade of being you could mention becomes god by participating in unity according to its rank . . . So as Timaeus does not simply inquire about nature in the usual manner of the natural scientist, but in so far as all things get their cosmic ordering from the Demiurge, so also Parmenides, we may say, in conducting an inquiry about beings, is himself examining these beings in so far as they are derived from the One.'

which would at some time be, [the universe now] having been totally ensouled, endowed with intellect and unified. For unity was present to it also in virtue of the bond of proportion, but it is unified to an even greater degree as a result of its single soul and one intellect. For through these things the bonds are made greater and stronger unity has been introduced into the universe. But over and above even these bonds of unity, the divine friendship and bountiful provision of the good hold together the whole cosmos. For though the bond which derives from intellect and soul is strong, as Orpheus also says,³⁰ nonetheless *'the golden chain'* is an even greater source of unity and a greater cause of goodness to all things.

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Now, happiness must be understood in a manner that is appropriate to the universe. For since it is dependent upon the Paternal Intellect and the creation of wholes, it follows not only that it *lives* in virtue of these causes, but also that it is *happy* (*eudaimôn*). For the Demiurge has been called a daemon by Plato in the *Statesman* (272e) and a great daemon by Orpheus in this passage:

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He was one authority, a single daemon, great ruler of all things. (fr. 168 v. 6)

Therefore whoever lives according to the will of the Father and preserves those immutable intellectual [powers] he has received from on high is happy. The first and most perfect species of happiness is that which the cosmos enjoys. The second sort is that found among the encosmic gods whom Plato called 'those happy gods' (*Phdr.* 247a, 250b) following the great Zeus. The third kind of happiness is found among the genera that are better than us. For there is one kind of virtue that belongs to angels, another to daemons and yet a third kind of virtue in the case of the genus of heroes.³¹ There are correspondingly three forms of happiness differentiated according to the individual genus. There is a fourth kind of happiness in the case of pure souls who have made a safe descent and propose to live an unceasing and unbroken life.³² The fifth kind of happiness is found among partial souls and this kind comes in a variety of forms, for the soul that follows on the lunar order doesn't have the same form of happy life as the soul that depends upon the solar order, but in as much as the form of each life is different, so their respective perfections are defined by different measures. Finally, there is the form of happiness that we see among the irrational animals. In this case all

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³⁰ *Orph. fr.* 166, cf. in *Tim.* II. 24.23.

³¹ It is not easy to place this taxonomy of souls in relation to Proclus' taxonomy in *ET* 185. Nor does it appear to exactly match Iamblichus' division of angels, daemons and heroes in *Myst.* II.3. 70-1.

³² A life like that which the soul of the universe enjoys. Cf. above 111.11.

things that happen to realise the perfections appropriate to their natures are happy, for through their appropriate perfections, they are connected to their appropriate daemons and benefit from their providence. Since there exist this many forms of happiness, it is necessary to place the first and highest form in the cosmos and it is this form of happiness that Plato is talking about in this portion of the dialogue. This much, then, is already clear.

We should not be amazed at the fact that, because of its soul, the cosmos is immediately said to be a god by participating in soul. Each thing is made divine in virtue of the thing immediately prior to it.³³ The corporeal cosmos is so through soul, but the soul, in turn, through intellect, as when the Athenian Stranger says (*Laws* X, 897b1–2) it [sc. soul] becomes ‘a god when clinging to the divine intellect’,³⁴ while Intellect, in turn, is [made divine] through the One. On account of this fact, Intellect is divine (*theios*) but not a god (*theos*). The One, however, is not a god in virtue of anything else, but is god in a primary way (*prôtôs*), as Intellect is in a primary manner knowable, and soul is primarily self-moving and, finally, as body is in place in a primary way. These things being wholly true and peculiar to Plato, it is necessary to consider in what follows how Intellect is placed in Soul, just as in the previous passages Soul has been placed in the body.

³³ Cf. in *Parm.* 1221.35 and *ET* 129.

³⁴ Proclus quotes the *Laws* at a famous textual crux. He says: ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ διὰ νοῦν, ὧς φησιν ὁ Ἀθηναῖος Ξένος νοῦν αὐτὴν προσλαβοῦσαν θεῖον γίνεσθαι θεόν, νοῦς δὲ διὰ τὸ ἔν. Burnet’s OCT prints: νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα αἰεὶ θεὸν ὁρθῶς θεοῖς, which Saunders translates as: soul ‘cleaves to divine reason (soul itself being, if the truth were told, a divinity) . . .’ Diès, however, gives θεῖον ὁρθῶς θεὸς οὔσα, which he renders as ‘l’âme, qui, toutes les fois qu’elle s’adjoit l’intellect divin, est elle-même vraiment divine’. Herman read θεῖον ὁρθῶς θέουσα and Stallbaum θεῖον ὁρθῶς ὡς θεός. Thus it is unclear what text Proclus was looking at or attempting to recall from memory. Moreover, it is unclear in his text whether θεῖον should go with νοῦν, as I have translated it, or whether it is the other way round – clinging to the god Intellect, the soul becomes (merely) divine. On the one hand, we’ve just been told that the cosmos becomes a god (*theos*) – not merely something divine (*theios*) – through being ensouled by the World Soul (113.4 – διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν θεὸν τὸν κόσμον εὐθύς). However, Proclus next distinguishes between the One which is a god in its own right and the Intellect which is divine. So is Soul a god, but intellect merely divine? This seems unlikely in the extreme! By the reasoning that follows, both are merely divine – not gods. The fact that Proclus immediately moves to distinguish the mere divinity of things other than the One from the One’s status as god suggests the possibility that he saw the *Laws* text as making a similar point. Perhaps he took Plato’s text as something like: καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ψυχὴ χρωμένη, νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα αἰεὶ θεὸν ὁρθῶς θεῖον, ὁρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ which has the sense ‘when the soul uses all these things, then clinging always to the god, Intellect, which is correctly rather called “divine” [than a god], it directs things to correct and happy outcomes’.

F. The seniority of Soul over body

1. General interpretation of Tim. 34b10-c2

As for the soul, though we are now attempting to talk about it as posterior, God did not thus contrive to make it younger [than the body], for having put them together, he would not have allowed the younger to be ruled by the senior one. (34b10-c2)

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Plato knew that in all cases the way that goes via reversion delivers an account of the things that come second in order first, for the things that are participated in proximately are actually secondary to the things that are transcendent [and unparticipated], and the things that are more familiar to the listener are lesser than invisible things. The reason for this is that we are already fallen souls when we contemplate the things that are (*ta onta*). For when we are up above and contemplate these things from 'on high' (*Rep.* IV, 445c), we are able to see the deficiency of the things here by virtue of the fact that we are communing with the intelligibles themselves and have them before our eyes. But when we have fallen into the realm of generation³⁵ and are looking up at things (*ta pragmata*) as if we were 'lying on our backs' (*Rep.* VII, 529c) we catch sight of these [deficient] things first in as much as they are nearer to us and akin to our senses. Beginning from these we work our way back to the beings themselves and to true Being (*ousia*) through recollection. The contemplation from on high will therefore be for those souls that remain up there, while the view from below belongs to those souls that have been removed [from the intelligible realm]. The judgement that springs from what is senior in being (*kat' ousian*) is that of souls still living in accordance with Intellect, while the judgement that seeks after the primary things by starting from those that are secondary is that of souls who have fallen. Since real Being (*to ontôs on*) is near to that which remains above, while Not-being (*to mê on*) is near to what has fallen, and since what remains above remains in Being, while that which descends is embedded in Not-being, [the judgement from each perspective] is closer to that in which each one is.

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Now, since Plato knows these things, he has gone back up in this fashion, starting from those things that have fallen and going toward the things that are greater according to a well-ordered procession. He thinks it worthwhile to remind you of the natural order of things, according to which the things that are senior (*presbyteron*) are superior to what is younger and, through this common conception (*koinê ennoias*), to place the soul before the body. For the former is senior and the latter is

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³⁵ Cf. *Phdr.* 248c and in *Tim.* I. 113.30 for the descent into generation.

15 younger. He has reminded us of this through hypothetical reasoning (*hypothetikê agôgê*): for if the soul rules over the body, then the soul is senior to the body. But the soul *does* rule the body, for 'it leads all things in the heavens by its own motions' (*Laws* X, 896e) and the body is the kind of thing which is moved by something else, but the soul's nature is to move itself as well as moving all other things. Therefore the soul is senior to the body. But if this is so, then it is necessary that we not
20 conceive of the soul as something which has come to be *after* the body – something that we continued to do – but rather we must conceive it as something existing from the very start (*anôthen*) and consider the corporeal extension as manifested from it. For the universe was established in virtue of the Soul, imitating, on the one hand, the Soul's *procession* through its extension, but, on the other, imitating its *reversion* through its shape.³⁶ But we will return to these matters.

2. *Lexis for Tim. 34b10–c2*

Right now, however, if you are willing, let us consider each of the words in Plato's text. First then, Plato has immediately made it plain that he speaks about all soul by adding the article in the phrase '**as for the soul**'. For he does not write as he did earlier when he said 'he placed soul in the middle' but instead uses the words *the* soul. For at that earlier point it was the power of the whole soul around the middle, but here all soul is said to be senior to the body. But in addition to this, the words **senior**
30 and **younger** must not be taken in a temporal sense, as Atticus³⁷ took them – for the Father established the soul and covered the body with it at the same time (*Tim.* 34b) – but rather [we should understand 'senior' and 'younger'] with reference to the order of their essence (*ousia*). So what is closer to the Demiurge is 'senior', but what is further away is
5 'younger'. But if you like, one can also understand these 'senior' and 'younger' with reference to time. The time which exists in the soul is senior and more divine, while the time that relates to body is younger. The corporeal does not relate to the time that the soul relates to, but instead relates to another which is secondary to that one, for as the form of motion is different in each case, so too the time is different.³⁸

10 In the third place, it is most exacting that Plato used the word '**contrived**' in the case of soul indicating that it is the thing that is

³⁶ For the connection between the shape of the universe and its reversion, see II. 72.6–19.

³⁷ in *Tim.* II. 114.33–115.5 = Atticus, fr. 30 (Des Places).

³⁸ Proclus here alludes to views about time that will be developed in more detail in Book IV.

self-moving, full of *logoi*, and such as to discover various things that may be attempted.³⁹

Moreover, the principle that what is senior rules over what is younger goes down from the intelligibles themselves to the universe. For there [in the intellectual realm] the First Born (or Protogonos)⁴⁰ is ‘king of all’, the one acknowledged [to be first born] by all, and among the intellectual beings <the>⁴¹ eldest of all the sons of Kronos is called ‘Father’ of all the children of Kronos.

But Zeus had come into being first and knew more. (*Iliad* 13, 355)

For in all cases, that which is senior is a symbol of a life which is more intellectual, more like a whole (*holikôteros*) and more monadic. But what is younger symbolises a life that is partial, proceeds toward things that are secondary, and which has been multiplied. For these reasons, they call the life of the life-giving gods in some cases senior, and in other cases younger. And among the acts of creation, one is prior and while the other is posterior – the latter is also called ‘young’.⁴²

Finally, there is the phrase **having put them together** which expressly makes the soul discussed in the present text *encosmic*, but not liberated nor the single soul prior to the many souls. For the latter transcends all souls, and all the other souls have proceeded from it as if from a centre.⁴³ But the encosmic soul is receptive to a connection to the body which has been brought about in accordance with the will of the Father.

But we both participate to a large degree in what just happens (to *prostychontos*) and we also speak in a way [afflicted] by this sort of randomness. (34c2–4)

3. *Lexis* for Tim. 34c2–4

What explanation can be given of the fact that we want to transfer our intellect from things that are younger as if older to the things that are

³⁹ Proclus’ point here relies on the various senses of the verb μηχανάσθαι and the words derived from it. It is self-propelled, like a machine; full of *logoi*, and so well resourced; and resourceful. I can think of no English term that can convey all these associations.

⁴⁰ The name ‘Protogonos’ or ‘First-Born’ is associated with the Orphics (see in *Tim.* I. 324.20 and fr. 167, Kern), but identified by Proclus with the Living-Being Itself.

⁴¹ Reading ὁ with § at 115.17 and excluding τῶν νοερῶν in line 16 as an erroneous gloss on πάντων. I am grateful to Harold Tarrant for recommending this emendation.

⁴² Cf. in *Tim.* II. 2.9–3.13.

⁴³ Earlier Proclus disputed Iamblichus’ reading of *Tim.* 34b according to which it discussed a liberated soul that stands to all souls as the unparticipated monad stands to the participated universal and its participants. This passage suggests that Proclus does not reject Iamblichus’ notion that there is such a soul – only that it is this soul that is under discussion in 34b.

superior in essence? Is it because our intellect is like someone who is asleep and has been ‘infected with an irrational and errant nature’ (*Phd.* 67a5), for **what just happens** and the **random** are such as to signify these things? For since we have sense perception and are subject to the impact⁴⁴ of sense objects – things to which we are connate – those things which are actually subordinate are first taken by us as something more familiar. And because of sense perception, we are carried to what is random, while it is on account of having sense objects impact us that we live in accordance with what just happens.⁴⁵

But if we had perception and sense objects were not present, would we not still live randomly?⁴⁶ For the random (*to eikaion*) is in us, though what just happens (*to prostychon*) is in that which is external to us, since even those [souls] who remain above have perception that is stable. Now were the sense objects present but sense perception absent, we would have nothing of the nature of what just happens. However since we have sense perception and the sense objects are in fact before our eyes, we live both randomly and in accordance with what just happens – as he said, we make our judgements about things with our ‘heads down’ (*katô kara*).⁴⁷ And Empedocles deploring our lot says:

Many are the miseries that burst in, blunting thought (DK B2 = Sextus, *M.* VII, 123 = KRS 342)

For many things impinge upon us – we who are really miserable in as much as we have become exiles from god⁴⁸ – and they blunt our contemplation of Being. But since, just as this very philosopher also said,

⁴⁴ Reading προσβέβληται for προβέβληται at line 10 in light of διὰ δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ προσβάλλοντα ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ προστυχὸν ζῶμεν at lines 13–14.

⁴⁵ Perhaps because of the τε καί in the lemma (ἀλλά πῶς ἡμεῖς πολὺ μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος τε καὶ εἰκῇ ταύτη πη καὶ λέγομεν), Proclus identifies two ways in which the accidental enters our lives. The correlation of sense objects with τὸ προστυχὸν and the sense with εἰκῇ is facilitated by the similarity between τὸ προστυχὸν with the verb he uses for describing the impact that sense objects make on us: προσβάλλειν.

⁴⁶ Repunctuating with ; after εἰκαίως at 15. Q provides οἰκείως rather than εἰκαίως and this achieves much the same effect, though it requires that we give it a quite different sense from οἰκειότερων a mere four lines above. Proclus’ point is that those souls that have not yet fallen into generation and so have perception. Proclus thinks that such souls have perception as a result of their psychic vehicles (*in Tim.* III. 237.15–31; *in Remp.* II. 164.21–8), though they do not perceive things in the realm of generation. Hence the claim that the objects of perception in their case are ‘stable’.

⁴⁷ Contrast the head of the soul remaining ‘above’ in Plotinus’ reading of the story of Dionysius’ mirror in IV.3.12. Cf. Proclus, *in Remp.* II. 160.5; *Plat. Theol.* I. 95.11.

⁴⁸ Festugière thinks that Proclus wishes to remind us here of Empedocles’ ‘an exile from the gods and a wanderer’ (fr. 115 = Plutarch *De Exilio* 607c = KRS 401). However, he also supposes that ὡς φυγάσι θεῶθεν γενομένοις at 24 should be read as ‘exiled by the will of the divine’. I think this suggests too much agency or responsibility on the part of the

god sends the things that just happen externally and the random to us, for this reason Plato also said that we **participate** in these things, but he does not say that these things are roused up from our very being (*ousia*), since we are essentially intellectual. But since participation also comes from what is more divine, he has added the term **to a large degree** in order to indicate the indefinite and commingled [character] of this sort of participation. For participation in the more divine beings brings unity, limit and order to the participants.

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But the demiurge gave the soul priority and seniority over the body both with respect to birth and virtue, as soul was the master and future ruler while body is the one to be ruled. He made it out of such things and in such manner [as I shall now describe]. (34c4–35a1)

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4. *Lexis for Tim. 34c4–35a1*

Porphry⁴⁹ divides the phrase and interprets it to mean that the soul is **senior** to the body with respect to generation, but **prior** to the body with respect to virtue. But it is possible to interpret both as applying to each term and to connect both priority and seniority to birth, and then connect each again in terms of virtue. After all, the **birth** of the soul is not a temporal one (for the soul was shown to be ungenerated and indestructible in the *Phaedrus* [246a1]),⁵⁰ but rather it proceeds in respect of its essence from intelligible causes. For among the beings, some are intelligible and ungenerated, others are sensible and generated, and yet others are between these in being both intelligible and generated. While the first are entirely incomposite and indivisible and for this reason count as ungenerated, the second are composite and divisible and for this reason count as generated. In between these two we find the intelligible and generated class, being both indivisible and yet divisible in nature, and being simple, yet composite in a different manner. Therefore there is one kind of generation in the case of soul, but another kind in the case of body. One is prior and senior because it is more proximate to the maker of all things, while the other is secondary and more junior because it is further from the single cause.

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divine. We are exiled from the divine when embodied, but this is in accordance with the laws of fate (*Tim.* 41e) – not merely at the behest of the gods.

⁴⁹ Proclus *in Tim.* II. 117.7–9 = Porphyry *in Tim.* fr. 63 (Sodano).

⁵⁰ Proclus does not recall the passage exactly here. He writes ἀγένητον γὰρ καὶ ἀνώλεθρον while *Phdr.* 246a1 has ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον. We do, however, find ἀγένητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον at *Timaeus* 52a1–2. The copyist for P corrects Proclus' citation to the *Phaedo*, presumably on the basis of 95c1: ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον.

Furthermore, though **virtue** is present to the soul and it is also present to the body and to the whole living being, the virtue of the soul is more divine, while the virtue of the body is subordinate. The soul's virtue is more commanding and closer to the unified causes of intelligible virtue, while the body's virtue is something derivative and further from those things. **Birth** manifests procession, while **virtue** indicates completion and reversion. Of these two things, the first one comes to souls from the Fontal Soul, while the other belongs to them from the Fontal Virtue.⁵¹

Now, as regards **the prior** itself and what is **senior**, these things have some sort of difference in relation to one another. 'The prior' carries the connotation of order only, while 'the senior' is significant of the fact that causes are superior to their effects. Therefore the phrase 'the prior and superior' would not always be said, but [only] where the thing in question determines the essence of what is secondary to it. But both of these things are true in the case of the soul. For though soul is a sister to the body due to their procession together from the single creation, soul has been allotted an order prior to body and engenders the body together with the Father and jointly sets it in order. The reason is that the things that proceed first bring forth the things that come later in conjunction with the first things' own causes.

What about the words **master** and **future ruler**? Does [Plato] indicate both that the soul provides good things to all and exercises care over the body in every way, but also that it preserves its own innate good unmixed? Well, how could he not be showing this through these words? For the [word] **master** always refers the affairs of the things that he governs to his own good, while the **ruler** sees the good of the subjects and orders all things in relation to this. The property of masterhood extends to the soul because it does all things for the sake of its own good, but the property of being a ruler belongs to it because of the fact that it fills all things with what is good. Its providential character (*to pronoêtikon*) is not diminished through its referring everything to its own good, and its own good remains untransferred (*anexallaktos*) even though it has brought about what is providential.

The soul is master and ruler in another way too, since it proceeds from the ruling soul and from the Fontal Soul. In another way, it is because the soul's dwelling is the universe it is called master. But it is because it leads all things by its own motions, that it has a ruling power. By virtue of the fact that soul exercises authority over the wholes, it is master, while it is in virtue of making all things similar to the intelligible, that soul rules over all. Now, if the origin is thus constituted as master and ruler, these

⁵¹ Cf. *Plat. Theol.* V. 115.16–26 for πηγαία ψυχή. At *in Crat.* §179.27 it is Artemis who ὑφίστησι τὴν πηγαίαν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν ἀρχικὴν.

properties belong to it essentially – I mean masterhood and the property of being a ruler. But if they are essential properties, then they are always present to soul. If they were only potential, soul would be imperfect – something which it would not be lawful to say. But if soul possessed these properties in actuality, then what the soul rules would always exist and would always be arranged by it. He engendered the universe itself as something ruled by the soul. It has been co-established with the soul, for that which is ruled is yoked together simultaneously with what rules it. Through both of these facts, then, we discover, on the one hand, the everlastingness of the universe and, on the other, that it is not accidental for soul to rule or for body to be ruled, but by its very being the soul has been produced to be master of the body, and the body is the obedient subject of the soul. Because they are innately connected to one another, it is the case both that the body is aroused toward the participation of soul, and also that the soul is stimulated to care for the body.

Further, through the words [he made it] **out of such things and such manner**, Plato wishes to bring to light the kinds that constitute the soul, as well as the manner of their composition and the ratios according to which the mixture has been divided. For [God] established the corporeal from certain elements and in a certain manner, contriving a certain proportion among them and a natural bond. But if God produced the soul ‘out of such things’ and ‘in such manner’, then God established a substrate, as it were, and a form of soul. So it is absurd to say that the *essence* of the soul is ungenerated on the grounds that it was established from these sorts of elements, but say that its *form* is generated. For he says that God produced *both* the matter (so to speak) of the soul and the ratio (*logos*) according to which it has been formed when it was conjoined by means. If the so-called elements of it – the Being, Sameness and Difference from which the whole is composed – are generated, so too is the entire substantial character (*to ousiôdês*) of the soul.

II. Initial discussion of Tim. 35a1–4 on the soul's composition

Between the indivisible Being that is always the same and the divisible Being that comes to be in the case of bodies he compounded a third form of Being from both. (35a1–4)

A. Introduction

First, it is necessary to (1) state the reason why Plato provides a genesis of the soul when its origins are ungenerated according to him.⁵² Next, it is

⁵² Cf. the reference to the *Phaedrus* – or perhaps *Phaedo* or *Timaeus* – above at II. 117.12.

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120 requisite to (2) divide the whole psychogenesis in respect of the manner in which it takes place; (3) to indicate the sense in which the soul is an intermediate; (4) to speak about these genera from which both the soul and other things have been established; (5) we must undertake to say how mixing of these kinds takes place in the case of soul; (6) to explain what sort of thing the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being are; (7) to make the individual words of Plato's text understandable and show that they are entirely consistent with what was said before. Should we come
5 to be able to apprehend these things in words (*tôî logôî*), then we will have realised the goal of the present inquiry in the manner that is consonant with our abilities.

*B. Why Plato speaks as if the soul was generated
when its origins are ungenerated*

1. Theophrastus' objection

Let us therefore begin from the first point because some of the ancient philosophers rebuke Plato and say: 'he incorrectly searches for a principle of a principle and a genesis of an ungenerated thing. For if we look
10 for the causes of the things that are primary and set our minds on the genesis of things that are self-subsistent (*authypostatatos*), we shall fail to see that we shall be going on to infinity and have no end of our inquiries. For just as the person who thinks that all things are capable of demonstration actually does away with demonstration itself, so too the person
15 who seeks after causes in this manner entirely overturns all the existent things and the order in which they they proceed from some definite principle' (Fortenbaugh (1992), fr. 159). This is the way that Theophrastus censures Plato on the issue of such a psychogenesis, saying that there is
20 no need to look for the reason why (*to dia ti*) in all physical questions. 'For it is absurd', he says, 'to wonder why it is that fire burns or why snow makes things cold.'⁵³

Those who have written against Theophrastus in defence of Plato say that to be aware (*gignôskein*) only of the fact (*to hoti*) in the case of physical questions is an awareness (*gnôsis*) without reason and a sort of doxastic or perceptual apprehension (*antilêpsis*) of these things. But to
25 add to this the reason why (*to dioti*) and to pursue the cause of these things is really a function of intellect and scientific reason. It is by this that correct opinion differs from a scientific account.

⁵³ On Theophrastus' criticisms of Plato and the responses these provoked from Platonists, see Baltussen (2003).

Though we acknowledge both points, we think that the second group speak well, and we would gladly ask the aforementioned Theophrastus himself whether one must provide the cause in some particular case or not at all. If the latter, then, in addition to destroying science – science being that which makes us particularly familiar with causes – Theophrastus will also indict himself when he investigates from whence thunder occurs, or from whence the winds come, and what sort of cause brings about thunderbolts, lightning, hurricanes, rain, snow and hail – all topics which he investigated very well in his *Explanation of Meteorological Matters* and he himself deemed these matters worthy of appropriately probabilistic explanations. But if, on the other hand, one must provide the cause in some cases, why is it that some of the matters of physics are to be considered in accordance with causes while others are to be accepted irrationally without causes? After all, it is not as if in all cases where the fact (*to hoti*) is entirely clear that the explanation (*to dioti*) of these things is also known.

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Now, after dealing with Theophrastus, we shall ask the lovers (*erastês*)⁵⁴ of Plato whether we are to investigate the causes of all things whatsoever or whether we are not to seek causes in all cases. But surely if in all cases, will it therefore be so in the case of the One itself – something which we say is greater than cause? For that ‘the One is’ is an observation that is drawn from what is evident. (For if there is not one, but there is multitude, what is the unifying factor? That which is unified results from the One as that which is made substantial (*ousiômenos*)⁵⁵ results from Being (*ousia*) and as that which is ensouled results from the soul. But ‘why is the One one?’ is something that it is not possible to say, for the One is superior to all causes.) So, if we are not to investigate all things, for what reason shall we investigate the cause of the soul and its generation from its cause, but in the case of other things we shall never make this same inquiry?

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Having questioned each of them individually, we will be ourselves at a loss with regard to both of them. Through what sort of cause, on the one hand, does Plato contrive the genesis of the soul and its procession from a cause? On the other, Theophrastus rules out all teachings of this sort. And being thus puzzled, we will say to Theophrastus and to everyone from the Peripatos that the upward journey (*anodos*)⁵⁶ of their contemplation has gone [only] as far as the kinds of movers of the

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⁵⁴ A curious phrase. Cf. *Plat. Theol.* I. 32.2 and Tarrant (2005).

⁵⁵ Possibly a Neopythagorean neologism, cf. Themistius in *Aristotelis physica paraphrasis* 79.19–23. It is found relatively frequently and almost exclusively in Neoplatonic texts.

⁵⁶ Proclus is punning here: *anodos* can mean both upward journey and also what is impassable – when the way is *anodos* in this sense, one is in *aporía*.

122 universe – whether it be necessary to call these souls or intellects. But for Plato such things, in as much as they are participants, have been deprived of the status of being first among the class of things that are and instead have a position far removed from that of the principles. For prior to these [kinds of movers] are the intellectual and intelligible orders of beings, from which a procession [takes place] to these. And prior to these is the number of the gods, unifying and connecting the beings and illuminating them by the divine light. And prior to this number, in
5 turn, is the henad that is unparticipated from which the former number has manifested itself on account of what has been illuminated. For it is necessary that unparticipated things are prior to participated forms, and prior to these, their henad. After all, the unit is one thing, but that which is unified is another. And finally prior to all of the many henads is their single source.

10 Such then are the opinions of both of these men. Since Theophrastus plausibly says that the soul is the principle (*archê*) of motion and does not posit any other thing prior to it, he does not think it necessary to look around for a principle of the principle (120.9). For even he admits that the heavens are ensouled and for this reason divine. ‘For if it is divine’,
15 he says, ‘and if it has the best way of life, then it is ensouled, since nothing without soul is valued,’⁵⁷ as he has written in his treatise *On the Heavens*. But Plato, on the other hand, posits the encosmic intellects prior to souls of the heavenly bodies. And prior to the encosmic intellects, there are those that stand in no relation (*aschetos*), and before these we have the divine order. Plato plausibly gives us a psychic procession and
20 engendering of soul from another source (though Plato is aware that generation occurs in various ways not only in the case of bodies, but also in the case of souls which have place to the extent that these souls participate in time). Even in the case of divine souls there is time, just as in the *Phaedrus* where Plato says ‘they themselves survey Being for
25 a time’,⁵⁸ for all motion from one place to another carries with it the implication of time.

2. Source of the mistake: the soul is not a first principle

Let this be enough for the first of the aforementioned problems. For it has been sufficiently demonstrated how it is that Plato at the same time correctly gives an account of the genesis of the soul and correctly

⁵⁷ This quotation is again attributed to Theophrastus at *in Tim.* III. 136.1.

⁵⁸ When the passage is considered in context, it seems implausible to read it as a Platonic endorsement of the Neoplatonist view that every soul possesses an activity that is essentially temporal. Proclus will invoke this as proof again at 243.24.

regards it as being essentially ungenerated. We have also shown how the argument that has been set up against Plato's position is in one sense correctly rejected and in another not correctly rejected. For in the case of the person who posits the soul as the first thing, it *is* requisite for him to deny it generation. For from where is there to be a generation of it since there is nothing prior to it? But this [premise] is itself false – that the soul is the first [principle] of the universe. For what Aristotle⁵⁹ says is necessary in the case of body – that being limited it always receives the power to be moved at all times, but that it does not receive an unlimited power at the same time – it is necessary to say the same thing in the case of the soul: that not being active in relation to all things simultaneously (as is the infinite power from which it derives the ability to be always active [in relation to some thing]), it is not the case that it simultaneously possesses all powers and is active with respect to all of them, but [instead] it always has a single activity, for in the case of all powers, the activity of a single one is single. Therefore it always receives the power of being active always and for this reason is not always active in the same way, but acts in different ways at different times. So it turns out that, in short, the truth is this: that all things that are active in a temporal sense always receive the power of being active, but they do not receive the entirety of this power at once, and in virtue of this fact these things are generated.

That the soul is not the first thing is obvious. For the first thing is present to all things and it is necessary that all things participate in the principle of all or else by failing to participate in any way at all, they are destroyed – for being (*ousia*) and existence (*hyparxis*) are present to all from the first principle. Now, soul is not present to all things, nor is it necessary for all things to participate in soul. Rather, some of the bodies are ensouled while others are without soul.

Moreover, it is requisite for the first thing to be one, for what is multiple will have prior to it that which makes things one, since otherwise the plurality will not be dispersed. But the soul is a plurality.

The first thing must be beyond all Being⁶⁰ since all Being has plurality along with itself. For in Being are difference and sameness, life and eternal activity. But soul is Being [so soul is not the first thing].

⁵⁹ Aristotle, *Phys.* 8.10, 266b25–7. Proclus has already used this Aristotelian premise to argue for the rather un-Aristotelian conclusion that the cosmos derives not only power to *move* eternally from some external source, but also its infinite power of *existing*. Cf. Steel (1987) and Sorabji (1988), 249–54. The present line of arguments shows that a temporal World Soul cannot be the origin of that power. It must be an eternal intelligible.

⁶⁰ Cf. *Rep.* VI, 509b9.

Finally, that which is first is a genus totally devoid of evil. But the
 25 genus of soul is by its nature able to be harmed in some fashion.⁶¹
 In general, this conclusion can be shown through many arguments.

3. *Plato's method of inquiry*

Since this is Plato's purpose (*skopos*), for the reason previously given, he
 reveals to us the psychic essence itself, teaching us in what manner it is
 established, from what kind of elements, and according to what manner
 30 of ratios. Just as in the case of our own body, it is easy to know that
 124 included in it are the face, the hands, the legs, the feet and all other
 such things as are there in front of everyone, but it takes a doctor or an
 anatomist to know how it is composed of internal parts, and of what sort,
 and in what ratio we have them. In the same manner, it is not difficult
 5 to state the general properties of the soul, but to reveal its very essence
 and go as far as the elements from which it has been established and
 to observe all the various ratios in it – this would be the work of most
 accurate contemplation concerning the soul. And it is surely this which
 Plato attempts to provide – cutting open, as it were, the psychic essence
 10 and stripping it bare for all who are able to follow him.

So to the first question (119.29–30), as we said, we make our reply:
 we may learn that Plato quite plausibly says that the essence of the soul
 is generated too by considering the fact that, when he discussed the
 case of that which has corporeal form and what it means to say that *it*
 was generated, it was because it was always coming to be and always
 15 receives the infinite power of being. Now the soul is also this sort of
 thing, since it was incapable of receiving the whole infinitude of being at
 the same time. It is clear then that it lives discursively (*kata metabasin*) and
 projects different *logoi* at different times, since it does not have an infinite
 life where all things are simultaneously present. Therefore, because it
 is always drawing out (*anelittein*) its own life, it is clear that it has an
 20 essence that is always in the process of becoming and, as it were, *being*
carried toward infinity, but without *being* infinite.⁶² On account of this, it
 always receives a life itself substantial (*ousiôdês*) and is itself also entirely
 in accord with its nature, for that which is such as to complete and perfect
 each thing is entirely natural to it.

In addition, if it is such as to move itself, as Timaeus will say later
 25 on (37a), it is the cause of its own substantial life; and if the life it has is
 substantial life, then in giving it to itself it has the whole simultaneously.

⁶¹ Cf. *Rep.* X, 608e ff.

⁶² οἷον ἀπειρουμένην, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὔσαν ἀπειρον. Perhaps another Proclean neologism,
 cf. below 164.10 and Damascius, *Princ.* 1.43.2

By this means it is generated and ungenerated at the same time, a fact by virtue of which it always *has* being and life (*being* always living and always existent); but on the other hand, it is also by virtue of this fact that it always *receives* them (perpetually *coming to be* Being and life). It thus exists from two sources – being both from itself and also from the things which are prior to it. And in virtue of itself, it always is. But in virtue of the things prior to it, it is always coming to be. Or rather because of the things prior to it, it has both [properties] – to be that which it is and to become – but in virtue of itself only the former, for it alone has the characteristic of always receiving something from the things prior to it. Aristotle correctly remarked that nothing is a cause of itself if it exists temporally but not eternally, lest one be required to say that the cause which is prior to what it causes is also simultaneous with what it causes.⁶³ Therefore time and eternity pertain to the soul simultaneously. In as much as it is ungenerated, it is eternal. But as something generated, time applies. As a result it is, in a certain sense, eternal in so far as it is indestructible, but it is not eternal *simpliciter*, as was said in the *Laws*.⁶⁴

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C. Steps in the creation of the soul

The second point (above 119.31) was to divide properly the universal psychogenesis. Let us take care of this after these matters, taking the facts of the case (*ta pragmata*) as our starting point.

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Now, by nature there is in each thing the being or essence (*ousia*), the power (*dynamis*), and the activity (*energeia*). The essence of fire is one thing and it is through this that ‘being fire’ belongs to fire. But the power of fire is another thing and the activity of fire yet another (for some things it dries, others it heats, others it changes in some different way; and in the case of other things, they behave in a similar way). Therefore it is surely necessary in the case of soul too – the essence is one thing, the power another and the activity yet another – and the person who attempts to take up and survey all aspects of it will be required to say

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⁶³ The reference to Aristotle is obscure. Certainly Aristotle seems to accept that *some* causes are simultaneous with their effects (*Phys.* II.4, 195b16), but perhaps it is not the case that those that are prior are also simultaneous.

⁶⁴ Diehl is probably right that X, 904a6–b1 is the passage in *Laws* that Proclus has in mind, but it is not entirely clear that it makes exactly the point he wants to draw here: ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδεν ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐμψύχους οὐσας τὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐν αὐταῖς οὖσαν, πολλὴν δὲ κακίαν, ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὄν γενόμενον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί. It seems likely that it is the *composite* of World Soul and World Body that is here said to be ἀνώλεθρον ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰώνιον. Proclus invokes the passage to suggest a difference between Soul’s qualified eternity and non-temporal Being that is ἀπλῶς αἰώνιος.

20 something about all of them. So there will be three principal headings on the topic of the generation of soul: about its essence, and then about its power and finally about its activity.⁶⁵ This will provide a complete overview of the things before us.

But we see that the soul's essence [in turn] also has a sort of triple nature. Its (1) *substance* (*hyparxis*)⁶⁶ is one thing, but the (2) *harmony* in it
25 through which its substantial plurality is connected is another – it being neither one sort of Being (as is the case with intellect) nor infinitely divisible (as is the case with the body that comes after it). Rather, there is more than one substantial part out of which it is composed, but these are limited in number in such a way that it is not possible for these parts
126 of the soul to be divided into further parts of it, as will be clear as we go along. Finally (3) there is the *form*⁶⁷ which has been brought about as a result of these things which is yet another thing. So it turns out that soul's essence is both single and triune in nature (*triphuês*), for the monad and the triad are proper to it since we divide the entire soul into three.
5 Therefore its essence is single and triple, for there is substance (*hyparxis*), harmony and the form. The first only delineates essence (*to einaî*), while the second harmonises the substantial plurality, and the third maintains the whole composition in its proper character.

All these things are also in one another. In the first instance, the essence of the soul has the harmonised plurality together with itself. For
10 it is not without plurality, nor does it have only plurality that is, however, unharmonised. The substantial harmony is also substantial (*ousiôdês*), since it is connective and formative (*eidopoios*) of [the psychic] essence. (From this fact it is also shown in what sense the soul is a harmony and in what sense it is not, and that Plato is consistent with himself when in this work he establishes that the soul *is* a harmony, while in the *Phaedo*
15 (92a–95a) he *refutes* those who say this. For it is one thing to say that it is a harmony both of itself and of some other things and another to say that it is merely an attunement of some other thing. The latter puts the attunement in a subject, makes it inseparable from that which has been so attuned, and situates it in an alien position. But the former view makes
20 the soul separate, existing in and of itself and reverting upon itself.)⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Proclus will indeed structure his commentary on this portion of Plato's text around these categories. On the origins of this triad in terms of which to organise one's psychological theory, see Introduction pp. 21–2.

⁶⁶ Festugière is right that here *hyparxis* should bear the sense of 'substance', not existence. Cf. II. 239.26 and 316.2.

⁶⁷ Festugière correctly notes that *eidos* here must refer to shape (*schêma*) of the soul. Cf. II. 316.3 where Proclus reviews what he has done in these terms.

⁶⁸ Here too Proclus' reasoning makes clear the intermediate character of the soul. In effect, he locates the sense in which Soul is a harmony between the Academic

Now to return to the point, the form is inclusive of the harmonic ratios and also includes the essence of the soul, for it is especially in respect of this that the defining characteristic of the soul is delineated and there is one definition according to which it is just what it is. Therefore all these things are in one another – the substance (*huparxis*), the harmony and the form – and the essence (*ousia*) of soul is both single and triune in nature, since it has been established from the three kinds: Being (*ousia*),⁶⁹ Sameness and Difference. Once more, the essence has been especially delineated with reference to Being, but the harmony in relation to the Sameness, and the form in relation to Difference through which it has been separated from everything else.

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Now, since we discover the soul is triple from the start (having essence (*ousia*), power and activity) and that this essence is itself triple (in respect of Being (*ousia*), harmony and form), from these we shall make a pentad arranging them like this: Being is first, harmony second, form third, power fourth, and activity fifth. The pentad is fitting for the soul as an intermediate, connecting the bond of the unit and the number nine,⁷⁰ just as the soul itself connects the intelligible and sensible realms. Arranging things in this manner, we shall divide the entire theory of the soul into five headings: in the first instance, speaking about the essence of the soul; in the second about the ratios and harmonies in it; third about

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categories of *kath' auto* and *pros ti* (cf. Hermodorus ap. Simpl. in *Phys.* 248.2–5; Xenocrates ap. Simpl. in *Cat.* 63.21–64.12; Diogenes Laertius III.108–9 and Sextus *M.* 10.263–6). If soul were merely a harmony among the parts of the body, it would be 'of another' and so among *ta pros ti*. This would make soul depend upon body rather than the other way around – an outcome unacceptable to a Platonist. But Proclus does not say that the World Soul in the *Timaeus* is a harmony *kath' auto*. This would be to conflate it with the intellectual harmony or *autoarmonia* (in *Tim.* II. 295.3). Rather, Proclus says that the World Soul is a τὸ ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ ἄλλων ἁρμονίαν – a harmony both of itself and of other things. In view of the former, it is separate and *kath' auto*. But in view of the second, it is also in a certain sense *pros ti* – or at least *pros ti* relative to the intelligibles which are only in themselves.

⁶⁹ This passage nicely illustrates the contextual sensitivity of 'ousia' in this part of Proclus' *Timaeus* commentary. On the one hand, the *ousia* of thing can be its essence – the ontological correlate of an account or definition that says what it is. In this usage, it is contrasted power and activity. On the other hand, Proclus will use *ousia* to refer to the Being – whether divisible or indivisible – from which the World Soul is composed. Here it is contrasted with Sameness and Difference that also make up the psychic stuff. Finally, he also uses *ousia* as he here uses *huparxis*, to refer to the mixture of the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being, Sameness and Difference from which the World Soul is composed and within which the psychic harmonies are established. In such cases 'substance' conveys the idea of underlying substrate, while retaining the link with substance considered as essential character.

⁷⁰ 5, of course, forms the arithmetic mean between 1 and 9. 9 is significant because, taken in conjunction with the monad, it constitutes the Pythagorean decad.

10 its shape (*idea*); fourth about the many powers in it; and fifth about its activities.

When, having considered the corporeal [aspect] of the cosmos in and of itself, Plato produced the account of the [World's] body, he first provided body with its very underlying nature when he introduced the elements [water and air] as intermediates [between earth and fire]. Next
 15 he provided their harmony – for the proportion and the bond [that arises] through proportion was an image of psychic harmony. In the third place he provided its shape (*idea*), exhibiting the cosmos as spherical in form (*sphairoeidês*) and a whole composed out of wholes. Fourth he conferred powers upon it, leaving aside the particular [powers] completed through the possession of particular organs, and instead giving universal and perfect [powers] to the Living Being that is the universe.⁷¹ Fifth come the
 20 activities, when he bestows the World's body the motion characteristic of wisdom and intellect.⁷² In the same manner then⁷³ Plato has divided the consideration of the soul into five headings [parallel to those in the case of the World's body]. Therefore that the generation of the soul has been considered very properly by Plato, and the number and nature of the headings into which it has been divided are made clear from these
 25 facts.

D. *The status of the soul as an intermediate*

Third after this topic, we must inquire into what we earlier proposed (119.32) to treat as the third question: how and on account of what is the soul said to be an intermediate, for it is necessary to have understood this prior to understanding the ratios that pertain to it.⁷⁴

Now since there are many beings that proceed from the One-Being⁷⁵ which exists in the primary way down to the level of formless and final

⁷¹ Proclus here refers to the view that the cosmos lacks the individual senses, but instead has the first and highest form of sensation which is not divided into different sense modalities. Cf. II. 83.16–85.7.

⁷² The motion of the sphere around its axis is said to be characteristic of intellectual thought, cf. *Laws* X, 898a8 and Proclus in *Tim.* II. 94.17–19.

⁷³ Following Festugière's reading of δὴ with Q rather than Diehl's δὲ with P.

⁷⁴ πρὸ τῶν περὶ αὐτῆς λόγων. It seems likely that Proclus is not here following exactly the order of topics outlined at 119.29–120.5. The fifth task there is to speak about the genera from which the soul and other things have been established. But there is no obvious connection between that task and something that one might call an account or a *logos*. I suspect Proclus' thought is that before one can understand the sense in which the soul is bound by the middle terms of the ratios established within it, one must first understand the sense in which the soul itself is an intermediate or a middle term between intelligible and sensible reality.

⁷⁵ Proclus begins here from the One-Being of the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, not the One itself. The latter, of course, will not have any distinctive characteristics.

matter, we need to consider the distinctive properties (*idiôma*) of the beings that exist in the primary way, the distinctive properties of the beings that come last, and what kind [of properties] have been allotted to the middle order, and what properties it is necessary to apply to the essence of the soul. Now surely these are the distinctive properties of the intelligibles: (1) real being, (2) eternity, (3) indivisibility, (4) changelessness, (5) being entirely complete (*to holoteles*), (6) perfection (*teleion*), (7) the hyperfulness of being, (8) a life tireless and unconstrained, (9) being such as to move all things, (10) similarity, (11) being present to all things while transcending all things – all these things are manifested among the intelligibles in accordance with the procession of being. 30 128

Now in the case of sensible things, there are certain other distinctive properties such as these: (1) that which is not really not-being,⁷⁶ (2) that which is temporal with respect to its essence, (3) divisibility, (4) mobility, (5) the partial or particular (*to merikon*), (6) that which is in need of something else, (7) that which is always in the process of being filled with existence, (8) that which lives through participation, (9) that which is moved by something else, (10) dissimilarity, (11) that which is divisible into parts thanks to the fact that it occupies a place. 5 10

Between these things which have been arranged in opposition to one another as first to last, there exist⁷⁷ intermediates through which it is necessary that the procession from first things to final things should pass. For the things that are similar to their causes proceed prior to things that are dissimilar to them⁷⁸ because similarity is related to the One and all things strive for the One. The intermediates between these extremes therefore are: (1) that which is not really being – something superior to not-being, but inferior to real being, (2) that which is in a way eternal with respect to its essence, but whose activities take place in time, (3) that which is indivisible with respect to what is most divine in it, but divisible with respect to the variable procession of *logoi*, (4) self motion itself – being, on the one hand, master of those things which are moved by something apart from themselves, but inferior to those things that do not change at all, (5) that which manifests particularity in conjunction with wholeness – on the one hand it is somehow a whole in respect 15 20

⁷⁶ Cf. I. 233.2 where we find the following division: the intelligible = that which is really being (*to ontôs on*); the psychical = that which is not really being (*to ouk ontôs on*); the sensible = that which is not really not-being (*to ouk ontôs ouk on*); matter = that which is really not-being (*to ontôs ouk on*).

⁷⁷ Reading ἔστιν for ἐστίν at 128.11 with Festugière.

⁷⁸ Cf. ET 36. Though the similar things may proceed from the cause *prior* to those that are dissimilar, this does not mean that the similar effects are located at a greater “distance” from their causes. Quite the opposite: the similar effects are more proximate to the cause or principle from which they proceed.

of having all the *logoi*, but it also appears to be partial or particular in respect of its diminished character, its divisibility and the fact that there are transitions between its activities – (6) that which both perfects itself and is *also* perfected by the things that are prior to it since [such a thing] is more perfect than those things [sc. sensibles] which are naturally such as to be perfected *only* by something other than themselves; (7) that which both fills itself with power and is filled with power by other things; (8) that which is both life itself (*to autozôn*) and is also receptive of life from another source – being more divine than those things that live only through participation, but inferior to those things that have life in a primary manner (*prôtês*); (9) being such as to move other things, but also such as to be moved by the first things; (10) that which is simultaneously similar and dissimilar; (11) that which is such as to transcend the final things and also arranged along with them.

Since these are the defining properties among the things that are, let us consider now where the soul should be placed – whether it is among the first beings, or among the things that come last. But if it is among the first things, then it will be real being, entirely eternal, changeless and all the other things that follow. Moreover, we will not preserve either the divisible [character] of psychic *logoi* nor will we preserve psychic time nor soul's self-moving [character] and the fact that it is such as to be in transition (*to metabatikon*) nor any other such property. But surely we clearly see these features in the case of all of *our* souls. But we now seek all those things which are common to *all* souls and are present in them essentially – which these things doubtless are. So consequently if these properties belong to all souls because they are common, then souls *qua* souls could not belong among the first things that always are.

But neither can souls be ranked among the final things. If they were among the last, then we will make the soul such as to be moved by something else, divisible, composite and the kind of thing which is only made perfect by something else. But all these features are the opposites to what we see in the case of our own souls, for our souls move themselves, perfect themselves and proceed where they wish. Therefore to a much greater extent must divine souls themselves possess the cause of their own appropriate perfection, lead all things by their own motions, and revert upon and know themselves. (Of course, it is impossible for this last property to belong to something which is moved by another.)⁷⁹

Now then,⁸⁰ if it is not possible to put soul among the first beings nor among the last, we must give it some place in the middle. And this

⁷⁹ Cf. *ET* 15 and 20. The latter claims that body is essentially moved by another while soul is moved by itself. 15 argues that all that is capable of reversion upon itself is incorporeal.

⁸⁰ Again reading δῆ with Festugière and M rather than δέ with Diehl and P, Q.

has to done in a likely manner (*eikotôs*)⁸¹ in order that it may imitate its own most primary causes, for the goddess who is the cause of the soul also has a middle position among the gods – a rank she also appeared to have to the Theologians since she provides the link between the two Fathers and projects from her flanks the life of the Soul.⁸² So as we see the first principle of the soul prefigured (*prophainein*) among the Fontal Gods (*pêgaios theos*) and among the gods who are Leaders (*bêgemonikos*) in the middle triad, so too in a corresponding manner (*eikotôs*) the soul similarly has proceeded to the middle position between what is intelligible *simpliciter* and the sensibles, and between the beings which only are always (*ta aei monôs onta*) and those that are generated *simpliciter*. 130

One must not take the soul to be a middle between these terms in the sense that it is something that brings the two extremes together yet transcends the terms that it unites.⁸³ For the soul is not superior to the intelligibles, but is rather a limiting term (*peras*) of them. Neither is it the sort of intermediary which is inferior to both of the things that it combines, for it is superior to the sensible things which are moved by it. Now, even though it is, on the one hand, the limit of the intelligibles and, on the other, the first principle [or starting point] (*archê*) of the sensibles, one must in no way say that it is the sort of starting point or limit that the point is in the line. For the soul is not *in* the things that are limited [i.e. the intelligibles] in the way that the point is *in* both the line segments it divides. The soul, however, is a limit of the intelligibles in one manner, by being manifested *after* the intelligible hypostasis. But it is the first principle of the sensible things in a different way, in as much as it is transcendent and such as to move them. So understood, it will preserve a certain sort of analogy for us: as the things which are moved by another are to those which are moved by themselves, so the 10

⁸¹ One is tempted to translate this as something like ‘imaginatively’ or ‘imagistically’ in order to convey the connection between *eikotôs* and *mimêtai*, as well as the next use of *eikotôs* below in at 129.31 and 130.29. Throughout this passage Proclus plays with the similarities between what is said in the Oracles about Hecate and what is true of Soul. These divine revelations present an image of the correct “physiology” in the *Timaeus*. Moreover, while Soul is the first principle of sensible things, it is also an imitation or image of intellect. For both these reasons, Proclus makes much use of terms relating to *eikôn* in what follows.

⁸² The goddess in question is Hecate. Cf. *Or. Chald.* 50 and 52 (Majercik) with Lewy (1956), 88, n. 83 and 142, n. 283. For the role of Hecate in Proclus’ synthesis of the Oracles and the *Timaeus*, see Brisson (2003), 118–20.

⁸³ Cf. II. 15.14–25 on the various kinds of bond: those that transcend the things that are linked by them; those that are immanent in the things linked; and the kind that are intermediate. Though soul is a middle term – and so a bond – between intelligibles and sensibles, it is not the kind of bond that transcends that which it binds, for this would make it superior to the intelligibles.

things which are self-moved are to those which are without motion. It will also conjoin the conjunction because of its natural middle position – on the one hand *drawing out* the unified causes [in the intelligibles prior to it] and on the other hand *drawing together* the dispersed powers of the sensible things [subsequent to it].⁸⁴ While it is, on the one hand, *included within* Being that is immovable and always the same, on the other hand it *includes* the genesis that is moved by another and takes place in a variety of ways. And while it is intelligible in relation to what is generated, it is generated in relation to what is intelligible. Being thus in the middle the soul demonstrates both extremes, and by this fact imitates its cause [the goddess Hecate] who is ‘visible on both sides’ (*amphiphaês*) and has ‘faces on both sides’ (*amphiprosôpos*).⁸⁵ Soul both holds the guidance of the universe,⁸⁶ and ‘also receiving in her own womb the procession from the intelligibles’⁸⁷ and being filled up with intellectual life, ‘soul sends forth the channels of corporeal life and contains within herself the centre of the procession of all beings’ (*Or. Chald.*, 189). Hence it is reasonable that the soul is both generated and ungenerated.

This [conclusion] has also been shown earlier (II. 124.12) on the basis of the two-fold life found in the soul – that is, the substantial kind of life in it and the life that consists in transition. I will now show that it also follows from soul’s wholeness and its parts. For how is a being ungenerated except by having present to it at the same time the whole infinite power of being?² And how is body generated except by having the whole infinite power of being always flowing into it, though it is unable to receive it [all] at the same time?⁸⁸ Now the soul, in as much as it is incorporeal has in its own right the infinite power of being: with respect to the whole of it, it does not come to be, but is immortal; however with

⁸⁴ I here deviate slightly from our standard translations for various terms (e.g. ‘conjunction’ for *syndesmos* rather than more usual ‘bond’) in order to try to bring out the alliterative and semantic play of Proclus’ Greek. συνέξει τὸν τῶν ὄντων σύνδεσμον διὰ τῆς οἰκείας μεσότητος ἀνελίττουσα μὲν τὰς ἡνωμένας αἰτίας, συνάγουσα δὲ τὰς διαπεφορημένας τῶν αἰσθητῶν δυνάμεις. ‘Conjoining the conjunction’ is a turn of phrase Proclus likes and one he returns to at 132.5.

⁸⁵ *Chaldean Oracles* 189, cf. Lewy (1956), 135 and Majercik’s commentary. The World Soul is equated with Hecate because its position ‘facing’ both the intelligibles and the sensibles is thought to correspond to the Janus-like character of Hecate. In addition, she is depicted as holding torches in both hands.

⁸⁶ Cf. *Statesman* 272e. Lewy (1956), 93 n. 11 seems to take καὶ τοῦ μὲν παντὸς ἔχουσα τοὺς οἴκας as part of a fragment from the Oracles, but Majercik does not include it in her text of fr. 189. Lewy adds (p. 97) ‘It seems certain that a . . . fragment, which describes Hecate as ‘holding the helm of the All’, also alludes to her function as Physis.’

⁸⁷ Omitting εἰς αὐτὴν in line 25.

⁸⁸ II. 123.2–13. Cf. the remarks on ‘the god who will at some time be’ (i.e. the cosmos) in relation to the god who always is (i.e. intellect) at II.100.1 ff.

respect to the parts it is always coming to be to infinity. For if it were the case that the entire infinite power were present to it in respect of its parts, then the same infinity will be there in the parts and in the whole, and so this infinity will be in what is incomplete as well as what is complete, and in what gets encompassed as well as in what does the encompassing. But this is impossible. But neither can it be that the whole of the soul is able *to be coming to be always* while the part *exists always*, lest it turn out that the part is greater than the whole. So it is the converse of this then – that the [whole of the soul] has unlimited being, while the parts have [unlimited] coming into being. Thus soul's hypostasis is infinite in power (*apeiroadynamis*) and comes to be to infinity. Consequently soul simultaneously participates in being and also is the first of the things that come to be – by contrast body consists in generation both in its parts and in the whole of it.

It is not sufficient, then, to say that the soul is generated in virtue of the activity of its parts, but one must see how this character pre-exists in the essence of the soul. For every activity naturally depends upon an essence that contains in advance the cause of this activity.⁸⁹ So in its essence soul contains in advance the seeds of the temporal kind of life that is common to all sorts of soul. For it is necessary for this too to *come to be*, and not just to *be*. But if this is the case, then since it has its essence (*to einaî*) in virtue of the whole, the coming to be will be in the parts. And in what manner this is true has now been shown.⁹⁰

Therefore, concerning the intermediate character of the soul let such a discussion be enough. And surely it should be assumed that the intelligible realm is separate from the psychic plurality and this is also separate from the sensible nature. It is assumed that the last beings are dependent upon the middle level and the middle upon the first and that there will be some one thing in them which is the conjunction of these beings – the soul. For the One also binds all things but in a transcendent manner (for all things are unified with one another in as much as they are akin, result from a single cause, and have been brought back up to one object of desire). The soul, however, binds things in virtue of being present in them – in the same way in which in a proportion, the mean is one of the things that is itself bound. So too the soul is posited as an intermediary among the beings. It is at the same time a bond and one of the things that is bound in so far as it possesses self-motion.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Cf. *ET* 18. ⁹⁰ On this passage, see Steel (1978), 72.

⁹¹ Cf. 130.1–4 and note. Considered as that which unifies sensible things, the soul is the kind of bond that is immanent in that which it binds (*in Tim.* II. 15.14–25). This is presumably shown by the fact that it is a self mover, and thus motive, in contrast to the intelligibles. Hence it is among the generated things that it binds.

E. On the genera that make up the soul

Once these things had been discussed, we saw above that it was necessary to take up the fourth heading (119.29): how and from what kinds has the soul – this soul which conjoins the conjunctions of beings (130.15) – been established? And it is even more necessary in the first place to say concerning the genera themselves what they are, whence they have come and how, for it is necessary to know the wholes prior to the parts. This, then, is the fourth of the subjects discussed earlier and we shall speak about it as far as possible.

That the intelligible cosmos includes the causes of the things that are secondary and that all the forms up there exist in an intelligible (*noêtôs*) or intellective manner (*noerôs*) – or however one wishes to say it, for they actually exist in *both* ways – has been demonstrated by many arguments and will be shown again by Plato in what follows.⁹² But among the Forms themselves, some are maximally universal (*holikôtatos*) and extended to all cases, while others are maximally particular (*merikôtatos*) and like *infimae species* (*atoma eidê*). Still others are between these two sorts, being extended over a great many, but not over all cases. Surely this is just what the Eleatic Stranger says in the *Sophist* (253d5–e2). Man, for example, results from Man Itself and horse from Horse Itself. But the likeness that is present in both men and horses and in many other things results from Likeness Itself, and similarly for unlikeness. Then there is sameness or difference present in all things as a result of the Sameness or Difference up there. So some things result from the *infimae species*, others from the middle [sort of Forms] and still others from those Forms that are maximally universal. Now, since in the case of the knowledge that we possess, some kinds look only to a *single* object of knowledge (as medicine looks to health), while others extend to include *several* objects of knowledge (as is the case with arithmetic which extends to philosophy, to politics, architecture and other things as well – and not only that, but also measuring and weighing, for Plato says that the productive crafts stand in need of some or *all* of these and possess no accuracy in their absence (*Phlb.* 55d–e)). Other [kinds of knowledge] contribute to all arts, not only to the productive ones, but also such as are theoretical, just as Socrates says of [the method of] division in the *Philebus* (16c–d). Therefore, just as in the case of kinds of knowledge,

⁹² Diehl and Festugière suppose that Proclus intends to point to 48e5 ff. But it is not clear that this is so. Proclus' discussion of *Tim.* 48e5–6 (ἐν μὲν ὡς παραδείγματος εἶδος ὑποτεθέν, νοητὸν καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὄν), in *Plat. Theol.* III. 53.24 seems to separate the *intelligible* paradigm, the Living Being Itself, from the *intellectual* forms found in the Demiurge. Perhaps Proclus changed his mind from the earlier *Timaeus* commentary. Or perhaps the 'up there' in line 11 includes both the paradigm and the Demiurge.

some are maximally universal, [while others are not as general, and still others are focused only on one object of knowledge], so too in the case of intelligible causes, some are maximally particular (in as much as particularity is found among the intelligibles) and lead an appropriate plurality of things that are similar in form. Other intelligible causes extend over a greater number of cases [but not to all]; for example, the Equal, the Similar, the Whole. (For the whole *qua* whole is not common to everything, for surely the part *qua* part is not a whole.) Still other intelligible causes extend to all things and every being participates in them considered just in so far as they are beings – not in so far as they are living things or ensouled or possess any other defining property, but just by virtue of being denominated by the term ‘being’. Now, since being is the very first, the causes of being will also possess the status of being maximally universal among the genera. These [causes of being] are five in number: Being, Sameness, Difference, Motion and Rest. For each of the beings is substantialised and unified [in relation] to itself.⁹³ Each is also differentiated within itself⁹⁴ and from other things. Each proceeds from itself as well as from the appropriate first principle. Each participates in a sort of rest or permanence in so far as it preserves the appropriate form. Every being – whether intelligible, sensible or of a middle nature – results from these factors, for all things are composed of these. Though not everything is a living thing or a whole or a part or something ensouled, all things do participate in these [five] genera. If some particular thing were not to participate in Being, it will not have the other [genera] either, for these have been grounded in Being. And if this thing did not possess Sameness, the whole would be dissipated. And supposing that Difference were taken away, the thing would be solely one without multiplicity (*aplêthyntos*). In the absence of Motion, it would be inactive and a dead thing. Lacking Rest, it will be unstable (*anidrytos*) and carried off straight away into non-being. Therefore it is necessary that each of these genera be in all things, and that Being is the most primary one to be established in them since it is like the very hearth⁹⁵ of these things, a monad and analogous in rank to the One. After it come Sameness and Difference, which are analogous to Limit

⁹³ Diehl refers us to *Sophist* 250a, 254b and to Plotinus V.1.4, 34. However, Plotinus there gives Intellect, Being, Sameness and Difference as the primary genera. Motion and Rest are encompassed with Intellect, since in order for there to be thought, there must be motion or change, as well as rest in order that the same thing may be thought about.

⁹⁴ In all beings we can distinguish between the thing and the properties that make it that thing. If we could not, then the thing would be ‘simply one without multiplicity’ (133.23–4). The only thing to be beyond Difference in this sense will be the One, cf. *in Parm.* 1104.13 ff.

⁹⁵ Cf. Philolaus DK B7.2. Proclus returns to this image below at 155.4.

30 and Unlimit respectively. And similarly in the case of Rest and Motion –
 Rest is seen in various ways in relation to the powers of things, while
 134 Motion is seen in various ways in relation to the activities of things.⁹⁶
 For every being *qua* being has participated in some sort of Being (*ousia*),
 as has been written in the *Sophist* and the *Parmenides*. And every substan-
 tial power (*dynamis ousiôdês*) depends on Sameness or Difference or both.
 Heat, for instance, and every power that separates things come by way of
 5 the Different, while coldness and all powers that bring things together
 come by way of the Same. And if something is in between these, it falls
 under both. Likewise, every activity is either motion or rest or both. The
 activity of intellect in particular is rest, and so too is every activity that
 preserves the active thing in the same condition or preserves the thing
 upon which it acts. But the activity of bodies in relation to one another
 10 is motion since it does not permit them to remain in the same condi-
 tion, but rather completely alters that in which the activity takes place.
 The activity which moves the object of the activity in the same way and
 around the same point is a case of ‘stable motion’ (*kinêsis stasimos*).⁹⁷ Each
 of the things that exist, therefore, participates by virtue of its existence
 in this triad – being, power and activity – on account of the five genera
 15 it is, and is capable and active.

In general, since any thing that exists in any way at all results from
 Limit and Unlimit, it has been made substantial (*ousioun*) and established
 from both of these. [Any existent] also possesses Sameness in relation to
 itself in virtue of the association of these two, but has Difference in
 virtue of the fact that Limit and Unlimit are separate. But since [such
 20 an existent] is not the first thing (*to prôton*), it both proceeds from a first
 principle and remains in it, so that it turns out that it has both moved
 and remained stationary. Therefore in each existing thing *qua* existent
 there are these [five greatest kinds from the *Sophist*], even if they are in
 them a different manner in different things. For intelligible beings have
 all of them in a substantial manner (*ousiôdês*), but those beings which are
 both intelligible and intellectual have them in the manner of (*kata*) the
 Same, while those that are intellectual [only] have them in the manner of
 the Different.⁹⁸ Psychic things have them in the manner of Rest, while

⁹⁶ The role of *peras* and *apeiron* in Proclus’ metaphysics is a vexed one. They sometimes appear to be entities posterior to the One but prior to the henads. This, however, would raise certain problems about the unity of the henads. See Sheppard (1982).

⁹⁷ Proclus here shows the sense in which intelligibles too participate in Motion. The motion around a fixed point is characteristic of thought. Elsewhere (II. 94.23) he describes it as ‘motion in which rest predominates’. In general, see Gersh (1973).

⁹⁸ Given the role of the adverb *ousiôdês* in the first clause, I have chosen to treat subsequent uses of the preposition *kata* in *kata to tauton* and *kata to heteron* as referring to modes or ways of being. An alternative would be to translate this as ‘in virtue of’, thus crediting

those that are bodily possess them in the manner of Motion. And vice versa too, if life is motion and inertia rest, for souls possess substantial lives, but bodies are moved by something other than themselves.

On the other hand, if Motion and Rest are prior to Sameness and Difference, as we show on other grounds (137.10) – regarding the procession from the cause of each thing as a motion prior to its activity⁹⁹ and regarding its remaining in the cause as a rest prior to the inactivity that is counterbalanced with the activity – then, after [the order of] intelligibles, it will turn out that those things that [belong to the order of things] both intelligible and intellectual will exhibit the five kinds in the manner of Rest, while those that are merely intellectual do so in the mode of Motion. Souls will have these five kinds in the manner of the Same, while bodies are in the manner of the Different.

Alternatively, if life were said to be Motion and immutable Intellect was Rest, then once again the intelligibles would be characterised [by the five greatest kinds] in a substantial manner.¹⁰⁰ But since the things at the level that is both intelligible and intellectual are living beings,

the presence of the five genera among (e.g.) intellectual beings to Different and their presence among psychic things to Rest. Proclus regularly uses adverbs such as *holikōs*, *merikōs* or *noerōs* to express the idea of a way or mode of being. But he also uses *kata*, as in things that exist *kat' aitian* or *kata methexin*. Here I think Proclus' point is that all five genera exist in each of the orders of being that he identifies. In the order that is both intelligible and intellectual, they exist in a manner or mode that is characteristic of Sameness. That is, they exist in a manner that is more unified. This is contrasted with the manner in which they exist among those things that are intelligible alone. Here they exist in the manner in which Difference does – involving a greater plurality and articulation. On the modes of being, see Baltzly (2008).

⁹⁹ The text here is problematic. 134.29–34 ὡς ἐξ ἄλλων δεικνυμεν τὴν πρόοδον[,] λέγοντες τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας ἐκάστου [κίνησιν] πρὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας κίνησιν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ αἰτίᾳ μονὴν πρὸ τῆς ἀντικειμένης τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀνενεργησίας στάσιν. I follow Festugière and Praechter (Praechter (1905), 517) in bracketing κίνησιν and removing the comma after πρόοδον. Alternatively one could bracket τὴν πρόοδον and translate 'regarding the motion from the cause of each thing as a motion prior to activity'. In any event, Proclus' intention is clear enough. He wants to find a justification for reordering the original assignment of genera to levels so that we have Being, Rest, Motion, Same and Different rather than Being, Same, Different, Rest and Motion. It is unclear to me why this order of precedence among the *megista genē* has the implications that Proclus here claims for his ordered triad: intelligible, intelligible and intellectual, merely intellectual.

¹⁰⁰ εἰ δὲ τὴν ζῶν κίνησιν λέγοιμεν, τὴν δὲ νόησιν τὴν ἀμετάβλητον στάσιν, τὰ μὲν νοητὰ πάλιν χαρακτηρίζεται κατὰ τὸ οὐσιώδες: Festugière translates 'Si enfin nous appelons la vie Mouvement, l'intellection immuable Repos, les Intelligibles sont, cette fois, caractérisés par ce qui est de l'ordre de l'Essence...' The question throughout is in what manner the five genera are exhibited in all things (cf. 134.21–3 ἐν ἐκάστω ἅρα τῶν ὄντων ἧ ὄν ταῦτά ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ ἄλλως ἐν ἄλλοις). Proclus denotes manner here either with an adverb or *equivalently* with the preposition *kata* where there can be no question of a corresponding adverb; cf. 134.23–5 τὰ μὲν γὰρ νοητὰ οὐσιωδῶς ἔχει πάντα, τὰ δὲ νοητὰ καὶ νοερά κατὰ τὸ ταυτόν, τὰ δὲ νοερά κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον, κτλ. He is not simply

5 they will have these kinds in the manner of Motion. Then the intellectual beings substantialised by Intellect will have them in the manner of Rest, (for Rest is also present to the things within the cosmos in virtue of Intellect).¹⁰¹ But now psychic things [will manifest the genera] in the manner of Sameness because it holds fast the bonding together of divisible and indivisible things. But corporeal things have the genera in the manner of the Different for among things of this nature, Strife is present
10 to what is divided. These things which follow one another – Being, Life, Intellect, Soul and Body – were five because the universal genera prior to the forms were also five.

Such then are the general points that need to be made about genera, though one may just add this: the same things are called ‘genera’ and ‘elements’. The primary things are called genera of the secondary
15 ones (for they remain undiminished and transcendent from the particulars when they establish them). But each of the things from which the whole is composed is called an element individually, for the genera in the Demiurge are essential parts of Demiurgic being and are the elements of it, but on the other hand, they are the genera of all of those genera that are in intellects that result from the Demiurge, as well of those genera
20 in souls and in bodies.

F. The combination of the genera in soul

Let us then move on, if you please, to the fifth topic and consider how these genera are in the souls and why Plato has adopted them. Now, since it has been shown that the soul is an intermediary between Being and non-Being, and since it knows all existing things, both the
25 intelligibles and the sensibles (whether in accordance with the same or in accordance with different *logoi* as some have said), it was necessary that its essence should have proceeded from the genera of being. For if it had not proceeded from these genera but from some other ones instead, it would not be able to know all things nor attend to all things. Thus, just
30 as the soul knows man according to the *logos* of man in the soul itself and knows *daemon* according to the form of daemon, so too it knows Being Itself in accordance with participation in the being that is in it, and knows Sameness through participation in the sameness in it¹⁰² and Difference

saying that the intelligibles are Being. Rather, he is saying that they exhibit all five of the genera *in the mode of Being* or substantially.

¹⁰¹ I bracket ἐν at line 6 (τὰ δὲ νοερά [ἐν] νῶ οὐσιωμένα κατὰ τὴν στάσιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἐγκοσμίοις τὸ ἐστάναι παρὰ νοῦ). The argument depends on Intellect having similar agency in relation to τὰ νοερά as it does in the case of encosmic things. παρὰ νοῦ should thus find a parallel dative of agency in line 6 and ἐν must go.

¹⁰² In the lacuna in 135.33 I read καὶ ταυτότητα κατὰ τὴν ταυτότητα with Diehl.

through the difference [in it]. As a result, it would have all the genera, but it would possess them in a manner that is appropriate to itself. For it seems to me that on account of these things he has established the soul from the primary genera and from numbers and from harmonic ratios¹⁰³ – the origins of divine motions and shapes having been stowed away in it in order that, having received the *logoi* of all mathematics and dialectic, it would thus know all the things from which the universe has been established: the substances, numbers, harmonies, figures and motions. It also seems that, in so far as it is akin to the intelligibles, he has established the soul from the genera of Being that were in it in a primary way. But it was in so far as it is akin to sensible things, that it was given shape (for these [sensible things] are that which is really such as to have a shape). But it was in so far as soul is a mean to bind the two [i.e. sensibles and intelligibles], that it was established by harmonic ratios. Now, of course, the Form of Harmony and the Form of Shape are among the intelligible Forms, but Harmony itself is not a thing that is harmonised, nor is Shape Itself something that possesses a shape (for it is not the same for something to be [some property] in a primary manner (*prôtôs*) and for a thing to be [that property] through participation (*kata methexin*)).¹⁰⁴ We find harmony and the genera among the sensibles, but in a divisible manner (*meristôs*), while in souls all things exist simultaneously *both* through participation and also in an incorporeal manner (*asômatôs*). From this fact it is evident that the soul is simultaneously both simple and composite for the defining feature of participation is that it pertains to composites, while the incorporeal is distinctive of what is simple. Moreover, it is necessary that what participates in these things in a primary manner should be this sort of thing.

Therefore, Plato established the essence of the soul from these kinds, initially of course producing its very substrate (*hypokeimenon*) from the intermediate [forms of the five primary] genera.¹⁰⁵ For it is just as we

¹⁰³ The argument of the next few lines is not easy to follow. On the one hand, the soul is established from (*ek*) all three things: the primary genera, numbers and harmonic ratios. However, Proclus goes on to explain that it is in as much as (*bôs*, lines 8, 10, 11) it is X that it is established from A; and in as much as it is Y that it is established from B, etc.

¹⁰⁴ This claim amply illustrates the importance of modes of being for Proclus. Certainly there is a sense in which a Form like Shape is shape. The self-predicative statement is true, but Shape Itself is shape *prôtôs* – that is to say, it is shape existing in the manner of a cause by which other things have shape. Hence being *prôtôs* is convertible with being *kat' aitian*. But it is quite another for some sensible thing to have shape *kata methexin*.

¹⁰⁵ ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων . . . γενῶν, 136.23. Cf. 137.2–4 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ψυχικὴ οὐσία μέση δέδεικται τῶν ὄντων, ἐκ τῶν μέσων εἰκότως ἐστὶ γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος, οὐσίας, ταύτου, θατέρου. Festugière is right to point out that this should not be translated simply as the middle genera. First, all five of the genera figure in the composition of the soul's essence – not

said in the case of the elements: all things in the heavens, as well as those
 25 in the sublunary realm and even those beneath the earth are composed
 from the four elements. But the elements in question are not of the
 same [gradation], for the heaven is composed of the highest gradation of
 the elements, while the realm of generation is made out of a secondary
 sort, and the things below the earth are composed out of the lowest
 [gradation]. Likewise in the case at hand, then, all things are made out
 of these genera [i.e. Being, Sameness, Difference, Motion and Rest], but
 the intelligibles are composed of the first, indivisible, changeless and
 30 perfectly complete [gradation of them]. The things that are self-moving
 [i.e. souls], on the other hand, are composed from [a gradation of these
 genera] that is divisible and indivisible, while corporeal things are com-
 posed out the divisible [gradations of these genera]. For as the genera
 are, so too are the beings [composed from them]. Things that are [solely]
 137 indivisible come before those that are simultaneously divisible and indi-
 visible, and these in turn come before those that are [solely] divisible –
 for that which is indivisible is closer to the One in virtue of the fact that
 what is unified is indivisible. Therefore, since the psychic Being has been
 shown to be an intermediate among the [kinds of] Being, then it is plau-
 sible that it will itself be composed out of the intermediate [gradations
 of the] genera of Being – that is, Being, Sameness and Difference. In the
 5 *Phaedrus* [246a], when he composed the powers of the soul from these
 [genera], he called them ‘the horses’ and ‘the charioteer’ for the essence
 of the soul is defined by these three,¹⁰⁶ and we may also see Rest and
 Motion in the activities of the soul. But Rest and Motion also exists in its
 essence, since the soul constitutes itself and is eternal and both remains
 10 within itself and proceeds – cases where each of the former predominate
 over Sameness and Difference, for the soul remains in its causes in virtue
 of Rest and proceeds when moved.¹⁰⁷ By virtue of its unified procession
 into plurality, it has been divided. Nonetheless, Rest and Motion will be
 seen even more clearly in the activities of soul than in its essence.

One might also say that when Timaeus establishes the Being, Motion
 15 and Rest of the soul, he also assumes in another manner that these are

merely those in the middle. Moreover, which of the five would count as middle is
 unclear, since Proclus considers various ways in which Being, Sameness, Difference,
 Motion and Rest might be ordered. Rather, Proclus’ point is that the Demiurge uses
 the middling forms of all these genera – those forms that are intermediate between the
 divisible kind that pertain to bodies and the indivisible kind that pertain to intelligibles.
 106 Cf. Hermias, *in Phdr.* 123.4–16 for an account of the parallels between the composition
 of the soul from Being, Sameness and Difference in the *Timaeus* and the account of
 soul in the *Phaedrus*.

107 Cf. above 134.28–135.2 where Proclus similarly gives priority to Motion and Rest over
 Sameness and Difference in the mechanics of procession.

prior to Sameness and Difference. For if the soul is an intermediate, not only between what is indivisible and what is divisible, but also between what is unchanging and what is coming to be, then by virtue of the fact that it is unchanging, it *already* participates in Rest in respect of its own substantiality. And, on the other hand, through coming to be, it participates in Motion.¹⁰⁸ Unless, perhaps, because these things – Sameness and Difference – are appropriate to the Demiurge, Timaeus has given precedent generation to them.¹⁰⁹

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So, what then is characteristic of each of the intermediate genera? Or is it as follows: whenever Being is the result of Limit and Unlimit, then when the Limit predominates over the other, it makes the indivisible Being. But when the Unlimited predominates, it makes the divisible Being. And when there is an equal composition of Limit and Unlimit, the result is the intermediate [kind of Being]. Correspondingly, whenever Sameness predominates over Difference, it makes the indivisible Sameness and Difference, but when Difference predominates over Sameness, then we get the divisible [kind of Sameness and Difference]. And when the composition is equivalent, then we get the intermediate kind. And whenever Rest predominates over Motion, then there is the indivisible kind [of Motion and Rest], but when Motion rules over Rest, then we have the divisible kind. When there is equal composition, then there is the intermediate sort. Now since Sameness and Difference also result from both of these [sc. the Limited and the Unlimited], it is also necessary that in these cases either Limit predominates, or the Unlimited does, or they are there in equal measure. In this way, either the indivisible Sameness and Difference are produced or the divisible kinds or the intermediate sort. So too in the case of Rest and Motion – each one being the result of both – it is necessary for there to be either the indivisible kind or the divisible kind or the intermediate sort, for every substance (*hyparxis*),

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¹⁰⁸ Proclus here again wrestles with the question of priority among the five greatest kinds. The argument for giving Motion and Rest precedence is built around soul's middle nature. If it really is a middle term between what is always the same and what is always coming to be, then it must have something of the nature of both. That is to say, it must be what each of the things that it links is in some mode – a mode deficient to the mode in which the superior term is F and in a superior mode to the mode in which the lesser term is G. So in virtue of being *aei kata ta auta* in some mode, it will participate in Rest. And in virtue of having something of *ta aei gignomena*, it will participate in Motion.

¹⁰⁹ 137.21–3, εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ διότι τῷ δημιουργῶ ταῦτα οἰκεῖα, τὸ ταυτὸ καὶ ἕτερον, προηγούμενην τούτων παραδέδωκε γένεσιν. Festugière proposes to amend the text to προηγούμενων because he thinks that there is no question of a generation of Sameness and Difference in the *Timaeus*. I think this is unnecessary. As Proclus repeatedly says in relation to the Soul, it had no real generation in time. But when we speak of one thing as prior to another in non-temporal order of precedence from higher causes, it is very natural to speak in terms of priority in generation as a way of expressing this.

power and activity result from both and are ‘finito-form’ (*peratoeidês*) or ‘infinito-form’ (*apeiroeidês*)¹¹⁰ or such as to have no more of the one than the other. Because of this, the whole intellectual realm is said to be Limit and thus to be the Same in such a way as to make us ask ourselves if there is Difference in it. And it will also be at Rest so that one is puzzled about whether [to say that] there is intellectual motion in it. But the corporeal is [said to be] akin (*philos*) to the Unlimited, to Difference and to Motion. And souls [are said to] exhibit at the same time both plurality and unity, and to be both stationary and moved. For the Being (*ousia*) up there (*ekei*) is single in the case of each intellect, but the Being in the soul is both single and not single for each one. For, there are many Beings (*ousiai*) in the case of every soul – as many as the parts into which the soul may be divided.¹¹¹ Thus, just as bodies can be divided to *infinity* since they are divisible, when souls are divided it is into that which has been *limited*. So the case is like the division of number into units; and from this fact some have thought it worthwhile to call the soul a number.¹¹² [Soul is like a number] in as much as it is divisible, yes, but divisible into things that are indivisible [like units] and not into things which can always be further divided [like the parts of bodies]. Because of this, the indivisible [character] of the soul is two-fold: first, in virtue of its being a whole of sorts and, second, in virtue of the last of its parts. Now, each number too is – in respect of its appropriate form – one and indivisible, but in respect of its “matter” (as it were) it is divisible. And this is not even the case throughout, but in the case of the final unit found in this matter – the one in which the division terminates – it is indivisible.

If you like, it is possible to look at this in another way too. Since there are three of these intermediate genera, when Being predominates over Sameness and Difference, then the corresponding mixture of the intermediate forms of the genera brings about divine soul, and the greater or lesser amount in the mixing bowl¹¹³ determines the level of divine soul. But when Sameness and Being simultaneously predominate over the remaining [ingredient], then we get angelic soul. And when only the

¹¹⁰ For both the doctrine and the technical terminology, see *ET* 159. Plato once uses the term *peratoeidous* (*Phlb.* 25d6), but it seems to be Proclus who introduces it as a regular term of art in Neoplatonic metaphysics. There are fairly frequent subsequent occurrences in Damascius and Simplicius.

¹¹¹ Cf. 143.1–3. Since the soul is composed from Being, Sameness and Difference and, in addition, is divided into the ‘psychic portions’ (*Tim.* 35b3–c2), there are a plurality of instances of Being, Sameness and Difference in it – as many as there are portions.

¹¹² Cf. Proclus’ remarks on the meaning of Xenocrates’ definition of soul at 165.8–12 below.

¹¹³ The *kratêr* is the mixing bowl in which the Demiurge combines the Being, Sameness and Difference that comprise the World Soul. Cf. *Tim.* 41d4.

Same predominates [over Being and Difference], then the daemonic soul comes to be. When Sameness and Difference predominate over Being, then we get the heroic soul. But when Difference alone predominates, we have the human soul, for it is impossible for the extreme ends of the spectrum to dominate over the one in the middle because unless the extremes are connected through the middle ones, they would be separate from one another.¹¹⁴ So in accord with each of these mixtures, the greater and lesser in the mixture make the level of souls. But these matters have been examined in detail at greater length elsewhere.¹¹⁵

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G. What are the divisible and indivisible gradations of the genera?

After these matters, it remains therefore to go through what the divisible form of Being is and what the indivisible form of Being is. Now, among the more ancient interpreters, some have gone one way, some another way. Concerning these things, then, it is requisite first to speak in a general way in order to provide an outline, but then in a way that is closer to the subject matter, for it is possible to speak in both manners.

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Therefore, we say that 'indivisible Being' means all intelligible Being and intellectual Being, both universal (*olikos*) and particular (*merikos*), as well as immaterial and separate, and whether prior to eternity or in eternity. But 'divisible' includes all Being which proceeds into the realm of bodies,¹¹⁶ whether this means the living things within the cosmos, or natures which make their way through these into extended regions, or physical irradiations (*physikoi logoi*) that are divided in the realm of qualityless corporeality.¹¹⁷ For all these things are divided in the realm

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¹¹⁴ So the permutation that is ruled out is the one in which Difference and Being together predominate over Sameness. Sameness is thus the middle term that connects these three of the greatest kinds.

¹¹⁵ It is unclear what works – or even which authors – Proclus is referring to here. There is a long tradition in Platonism of ordering various kinds of souls and gods by appeal to what they are constituted from, starting from the *Epinomis*. But Proclus' account of gods, angels, daemons, heroes and human souls in terms of the admixture of Being, Sameness and Difference is – to my knowledge at least – unprecedented.

¹¹⁶ *περί τὰ σώματα προΐουσιν* picks up Plato's phrase for discussing the divisible kind of being at *Tim.* 35a2, *περί τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς*. Whatever Plato's reasons for choosing *περί* rather than *ἐν*, the phrase comes to be formulaic for the Neoplatonists (cf. Plotinus IV.2 *passim*). Perhaps this formulaic use explains why Proclus is seemingly indifferent to whether the accusative or the dative follows *περί* (cf. Festugière p. 180, n. 3). Rather than the literal 'around bodies' I'll use the looser 'in the realm of bodies' or 'in the corporeal realm' or appropriate variations on these.

¹¹⁷ *περί τὴν ἅπιοιν σωματότητα*, cf. *in Parm.* 840.7. Sextus connects the term with both Pythagoreanism and with the Stoics (*M.* 9.371). Festugière likewise supposes a connection with Stoicism and provides the following passages for comparison: II. 15.21;

20 of bodies. Some have been placed in such bodies and are in a subject,
while others possess a substantial form of life that is still inseparable from
bodies, as in the case of nature. Some which are divided nonetheless
bring themselves together into something indivisible, as is the case in
25 perception.¹¹⁸ And if you are willing to speak in these terms, say that the
indivisible being is triple: that which is indivisible with respect to being;
that which is indivisible with respect to life; and that which is indivisible
with respect to thinking. And the sort of being that is divisible in the realm
of bodies is triple too. Opposed to the kind of being [that is indivisible]
with reference to thought is the kind that is [divisible] with reference
to perception. Opposed to that [which is indivisible] with reference to
life is that [which is divisible] with reference to nature. And opposed to
30 that [which is indivisible] with respect to being is that [which is divisible]
with reference to the divisible forms in the realm of bodies' extension.
While the latter three are images of the former, they have an order [of
precedence] in relation to one another that is contrary to the [order
of precedence among] the earlier ones.¹¹⁹ The intermediates between
them – being, life and the thought in souls – preserve the order of the
things that are prior to them in virtue of their similarity [to these prior
140 things]. But [in the case of the latter triple] by having divisibility they
are kindred to those things that come after them. We must therefore
divide all things by three, and having thus divided, we must arrange the
psychic Being in the middle between the indivisible and the divisible, as
an image of what is superior, but a paradigm for that which is inferior.
[We should regard it] as simultaneously remaining and proceeding; as
5 something that transcends the corporeal composite and as something
of the same rank, for in all these aspects its appropriate intermediate
[nature] is in evidence. And thus in a general way one must say that all
Being between the One and the soul may be defined as indivisible, but
10 all between the soul and bodies as divisible.¹²⁰

193.27; III. 186.6. The Neoplatonists themselves seem to have a use for the notion of corporeality. See Plotinus II.7.3.

¹¹⁸ The presence of ἐαυτά suggests that we should read συναγόμενα at line 24 rather than συναγόντα. Cf. *in Tim.* III. 121.24 for a similar use of the middle.

¹¹⁹ Proclus' point is best brought out graphically.

Indivisible Being	Psychic Being	Divisible Being
<i>kata to einai</i>	<i>kata to einai</i>	<i>kata to eidē merizomena</i>
<i>kata to zên</i>	<i>kata to zên</i>	<i>kata physin</i>
<i>kata to noein</i>	<i>kata to noein</i>	<i>kata to aisthenesthai</i>

In the first two columns, the order of precedence is the same – top to bottom. In the third, it is reversed.

¹²⁰ Note that this leaves soul in both ranges of entities, again vindicating its claim to be both divisible and indivisible.

If, however, it is necessary to define the divisible and the indivisible in a way that is closer to the subject matter (139.13), one must speak as follows. The Demiurge established this universe as a 'living thing endowed with soul and intellect' (30b8) believing that what is ensouled is finer than what is inanimate and that what has intellect is better than what is mindless. Therefore there is in it a corporeal life through which it is a living thing – 'being bound by animate bonds' (38e5) it became a living thing. But in spite of this, the soul itself has not been mixed up together with the body, for Socrates in the *Phaedrus* rejects this view too.¹²¹ There is also a divine soul through which the universe is ensouled, and the universe possesses a life that is connate, but also separate. And surely there is also an intellect in it immaterial and divine, for it is necessary to call this intellect something substantial rather than regarding it as a disposition (*bexis*) of the soul. For the Demiurge did not establish that intellect, but rather the soul did so by its own movement around the intelligible, as Plato says later on in the dialogue (37c1).¹²² So it turns out that the universe has a three-fold life: the corporeal, the psychic and the intellectual. The intellectual life is indivisible in as much as it is eternal; in so far as it simultaneously encompasses all the intelligible realm; in being changeless; and in so far as it is unified in virtue of its highest superiority over secondary things. The corporeal life, however, is divisible in as much as it proceeds into the realm of extended things, and has been mixed together with the body, and enters into subjects. But the psychic life of the universe is intermediate between these. It is superior to the corporeal life by being separable, by **covering** the extension of **the body externally** (34b4) – as was said earlier and will be said again in what follows (36e3) – and [it is also superior to the corporeal life] because it stretches out toward intellect. However, it is correspondingly inferior to the life of intellect in as much as it involves temporal thinking, in as much as it articulates into plurality the indivisible character of the intellectual life, and in as much as it has contact of a sort with the body. In constructing the cosmic soul from these middle things, Plato makes it clear that soul is a middle between whichever things are immediately on either side of it, but that it is not an intermediary between *all* intellectual and corporeal being whatsoever. For it is surely not the case that the soul is an intermediary between particular intellects and the divisible

¹²¹ As Festugière notes, the exact reference to the *Phaedrus* is not clear. However this conclusion might be thought to be the result of the line of argument at 245c–246e.

¹²² In his discussion of 37c at 312.30–314.11, Proclus distinguishes various ways in which the term 'intellect' is used. These include the idea of a disposition of the soul that we call intellect, as well as intellect considered as an independent thing in its own right. In contrast to what is said here, Proclus takes the latter text to be discussing intellect in the dispositional sense. He opposes his view to that of Iamblichus.

forms in the particular things that belong to the parts of the universe. The following is the defining feature of the World Soul – not that it is composed out of numbers, nor that it is the result of such and such ratios, nor that it is composed of circles of such and such a sort (for all these things and others are common characteristics of all souls, whether
10 divine, daemonic or human) – rather [the defining feature of the World Soul] is that its essence (*ousia*) is an intermediary between the following extremes: the one cosmic Intellect and the entirety of the divisible Being that has come to be in the realm of bodies. Nor is it the case that soul is an intermediary between these just in so far as Intellect is such as to cognise (*gnōstikos*) or such as to be alive (*zōtikos*), nor is it just in so far
15 as Nature is the life of bodies (for the account at this point is not about knowledge or living things). Instead soul is the intermediary between these particular sorts of Being: that which is indivisible and that which is divisible in the realm of bodies. It is because of this fact that, with respect to the soul's existence (*hyparxis*) we have been concerned to take account of both Being and Becoming as well as the divisible and indivisible,
20 bidding farewell to changes and activities, and not seeking to know the activities of soul, but rather concentrating on its essence as something which is <simultaneously generated>¹²³ and ungenerated.

It is also obvious that the substantial Limit of the World Soul is more unified than the limits that are in all the other souls. And the Unlimited [within the World Soul] is more all encompassing than that of all the
25 others. For not all limits are equal, but some are more universal and others are more partial. And neither is every unlimited [thing] equal to every other unlimited, because not every power is equal to every power.¹²⁴ As a result, not every essence is equal to every other essence, but one essence is universal (*holikos*) while another is particular (*merikos*).
142 The substantiality (*to ousiôdês*) of the World Soul is more universal than all psychic essence, and the limit in it is more universal than all other psychic limits, and the unlimited is [similarly more universal than] all the unlimiteds in other souls. For the extreme terms [in the case of the World Soul] are the simple, indivisible Being and the simple divisible Being in the realm of bodies – not the being of *some particular* bodies, but rather the divisible Being that pertains to *all* body. For surely the soul of the Sun is an intermediary between some particular indivisible

¹²³ Reading οὐσίαν <ἀγένητον ἄμα> καὶ γιγνομένην with Diehl at line 23.

¹²⁴ This is almost certainly *not* an anticipation of the idea that some infinite sets have greater cardinality than others. Rather, think of the infinite or unlimited powers that the World Soul receives (albeit not all at once) from that which is prior to it (13.1–16). As some of these powers are superior to others, so too the associated “unlimiteds” are ranked in relation to one another.

being and some particular divisible being – not between indivisible Being considered indefinitely – nor is it [an intermediary between some particular indivisible being and] divisible Being in the realm of bodies in general. Assuming this first as the defining feature of the Cosmic Soul, the dialogue then takes the remaining features as things that follow given a soul of this sort, i.e. number, harmony and form. Therefore, one need not now say that all intellectual Being is indivisible, but only the Being of the cosmic intellect. And in the case of the soul of the Sun, only the solar intellect need be said to be indivisible, and similarly in the case of the Moon and all other souls. For each of the middle terms has its own distinctive extreme terms to either side of it and it is the middle between *these* – not between all extreme terms everywhere. So too those daemons who are superior to individual souls will have a middle [nature] between their appropriate intellects and the bodies that are connate with them. So if he were to describe one of these other souls, he would not say that its being is a middle between indivisible Being and the divisible Being in the realm of bodies, but rather he would describe such a soul as a middle between one indivisible thing and another divisible thing within the class of particular beings. For the definite article, ‘the’ indicates the transcendent and the universal, as Plato says when he distinguishes them elsewhere, showing that when we say ‘the beautiful’ this is one thing, but ‘beautiful’ is something else. The former indicates that which is transcendent, but the latter some one [instance] among the things that are on the same level with other beautiful things. And if you want to adopt the terminology of the noble Theodore¹²⁵ on these matters, then the intellect stands in no relation (*aschetos*), while the life that pertains to bodies does stand in a relation, and the soul is intermediate between these, being a certain sort of quasi-relation (*bêmischetos tis*).¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Theodore of Asine (mid-fourth century). For his life, writings and a summary of his views, as well as testimonia, see Deuse (1973). Proclus in *Tim.* II. 142.27–9 = Test. 20 (Deuse). Proclus is the source for the bulk of our information on Theodore’s views. In his review, O’ Meara (1974) raises the question of whether Deuse is right to suppose that Proclus was acquainted with the works of Theodore directly. It is distinctly possible that Proclus’ acquaintance with Theodore is mediated by Iamblichus’ own *Timaeus* commentary.

¹²⁶ The idea of a life that exists in relation to a body is a pervasive one in Theodore (cf. Test. 27–9). Deuse assembles the evidence that it was drawn from Porphyry and Iamblichus. The point of the vocabulary is best illustrated by Nemesius, *Nat. Hom.* 3.95–101 ἐπὶ πάντων οὖν ἐν σώματι λέγεται εἶναι, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ τῷ σώματι λέγεται εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν σχέσει, καὶ τῷ παρῆναι, ὡς λέγεται ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν. καὶ γὰρ τῇ σχέσει καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ ροπήν καὶ διαθέσει δεδέσθαι φαμέν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς λέγομεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐρωμένης δεδέσθαι τὸν ἑραστήν, οὐ σωματικῶς οὐδὲ τοπικῶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ σχέσιν. As applied to Theodore, this will mean that the particular bodies have a life that is connate with them due to the fact that the souls associated with those bodies have their

And according to the great Iamblichus,¹²⁷ the intellect is transcendent, but the life of bodies belongs to the same rank as extended things, and the soul is simultaneously transcendent and also ranked along with bodies. All intellect is surely indivisible (seeing that it has a single Being, a single Sameness and single Difference from which the whole is composed), while all soul is divisible because the mixture of each one from the elements in it has been divided into many parts, each of which is the result of all of the genera,¹²⁸ so there turn out to be many Beings in each, many Samenesses and many Differences, these being divided together with the parts in it. Plato will make clear how many parts there are using the middles [of the intervals] and cutting the sections into tones and semi-tones, as will be made clear as he proceeds (36a ff.).

In addition, the earlier point about intellect is obvious. We say that intellect *qua* intellect is indivisible, conceiving the plurality of Forms to be different from it even if we say the Forms are in it. And we also say that soul in so far as it is soul is divisible, not taking into consideration the Forms in it, but considering only the psychic or intellectual essence individually * * *.¹²⁹ Surely that is because the intellect which is participated by soul is called by Plato ‘indivisible Being’, while the corporeal life that proceeds from soul to the realm of bodies and which has the role (*logos*) of the light rays (*augê*) in relation to it is called ‘divisible Being’. For the intellect is analogous to the Sun, while the soul is analogous to the light from the Sun, and the divisible life is, in turn, analogous to the rays that come from the light. And in all likelihood we may consider this to be a more accurate way of putting the matter than what was said previously,¹³⁰ because it is necessary that the Demiurge be ruler over *all* of indivisible Being and all of divisible Being in order that the words

attentions largely absorbed by those bodies. Thus, these bodies are conserved by the soul’s relation. (Cf. Theodore, Test. 28 σῶζει γοῦν τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὸ σχέσις. The World Soul preserves the body of the universe, but does so without being so closely allied to it as to prevent it from reverting upon its cause – a point that Theodore expresses by saying that it stands in a “quasi-relation” to it.

¹²⁷ in *Tim.* II. 142.27–9 and 143.21–3 = Iamblichus, in *Tim.* fr. 52 (Dillon). Dillon notes that though Theodore is quoted first, he is in fact simply formulating in more technical language the distinctions of his predecessor Iamblichus.

¹²⁸ Reading γενῶν in line 1 with Q rather than ἐνῶν with Diehl.

¹²⁹ Kroll marks a lacuna at line 10 καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐκατέραν * * * τί ἄλλο, ἢ ὅτι...

¹³⁰ It is unclear exactly which previous discussion Proclus has in mind. Festugière suggests that it might be 141.4 where it is said that the World Soul is not an intermediate between all intellectual and corporeal beings, but only between Intellect as a whole and the world as a whole. The present image makes clear that the divisible life is *dependent upon* the intermediate as the rays are dependent upon the sunlight. It is compatible with B simply having the status of an intermediate between A and C that C should be independent of B. But this is not so in the case at hand.

'taking [the three mixtures]' (35a6) and 'he blended from both' (35a3) and all other such things as Plato subsequently relates should have a place.

Now Iamblichus, and with him Theodore,¹³¹ relate these words to the hypercosmic soul, but we hold that through these things Timaeus generates the World Soul, as the passage also make clear. Nonetheless, we think it worthwhile for these lovers of spectacles¹³² to investigate the divisible and the indivisible in the case of the hypercosmic soul too, for all soul is an intermediary between the divisible and the indivisible. Now, the indivisible is obvious in the former case too, for a hypercosmic intellect presides over all soul. But what is the divisible [that will be the other *relatum* in the case of the hypercosmic soul]? Since it is *hypercosmic* soul that we are talking about, it will not be the case that some particular sensible bodies depend upon it and it will in fact be the reverse of the case with human souls. For bodies depend upon each of these [human souls] and it is in virtue of this fact that these souls are encosmic. But an individual intellect is not set over each [human soul] and because of this they do not always cognise (*noein*). There are bodies dependent upon all the souls intermediate between the human and the hypercosmic. For this reason these are also encosmic – and while they are more numerous than hypercosmic souls by virtue of being connected with body, these intermediate souls also have a particular intellect upon which they depend and for this reason they are always in the intelligible realm (for what is unchanging is productive of an everlasting activity).¹³³ Therefore since these have extreme terms that are arranged in a contrary fashion (that is, the hypercosmic and human souls) the one having a lack in relation to the divisible, the other in relation to the indivisible, as it would seem – this being so, we ask whether in the case of hypercosmic souls, the divisible [factor] consists not in its being divided in the realm of bodies, but rather in the fact that it is divided out among these very encosmic souls. For hypercosmic souls transcend these encosmic souls proximately, just as encosmic souls proximately transcend the divisible

¹³¹ in *Tim.* II. 215.29–218.8 = Theodore, Test. 21 (Deuse).

¹³² The term is familiar to Platonists, of course, from *Republic* V, 479a. It is presently unclear whether Proclus means it sarcastically – Iamblichus and Theodore are unsystematic lovers of gratuitous and unnecessary complexity – or whether he means that they are philosophers, lovers of the spectacle of truth, as Plato says. The reproach at 144.24–6, however, seems to resolve the question. It would seem that here Iamblichus and Theodore are guilty of drawing their conclusions from their own ideas, and not from the words of Plato.

¹³³ That is, it is because each intermediate soul is connected with an unchanging intellect, each also cognises eternally, differing in this respect from human souls that cognise only at some time.

Being which comes to be in the realm of bodies. For this reason, hypercosmic souls are the intermediaries between *intellects* and *encosmic souls* – on the one hand having the property of being unmixed in relation to bodies, but on the other hand having the property of being subject to change (*to metabatikōn*) in their thought. But in the case of human souls, the indivisible [aspect] – to the extent that there is such a thing¹³⁴ – is in the souls that are *above* them, these [higher souls] which are always cognising and upon which human souls depend and in which the human souls participate when they are able. For through these intermediaries, the human souls are connected with the intellects above these [higher souls] and become intellectual in virtue of these intermediaries. Since these are the extreme terms, as we said, all the souls that come between the human and the hypercosmic have their own individual divisible and indivisible [aspects], whether they belong to the divine order or to that of daemonic rational daemons.¹³⁵ And prior to these there is the World Soul, having the whole encosmic indivisible intellect as its indivisible Being and all that which has come to be in the realm of bodies as its divisible Being – the World Soul being an intermediary between these [things considered generally] (142.2–5).

We say these things with an eye to all that has come before, through which we have demonstrated them. We have taken these views from the very words of Plato and not from our own notions. No doubt those who have taken the *Oracles* as their point of departure, will say that these souls too ride in certain hypercosmic bodies, whether aethereal or fiery (*Or. Chald.* 193). For how else will these hypercosmic bodies be moved unless it be by souls more divine than the encosmic souls? If this view prevails, perhaps some account will grant that partial souls too have above them an indivisible Being, this being a certain single intellectual power of the intellect that illuminates souls of this kind, and on account of this, they are partial and cognise sometimes, whereas transcendent [hypercosmic] souls, each with its own entire intellect, always cognise and never do anything else.

Moreover let us say this in order that these things might accord with the Orphic tradition. For he too does not predicate the indivisible of every intelligible or intellectual order, but thinks that there is something higher than even this name, just as some names are higher than

¹³⁴ Adding a comma after τοιοῦτον.

¹³⁵ δαιμονίαν δαιμόνων λογικῶν. Proclus recognises the existence of both rational and irrational daemons, cf. III. 157.20; 167.20. The passage at 157.20 ff. explores the puzzle of how irrational daemons might be *immortal* though created by the Younger Gods (cf. *Tim.* 41c) or how they might be *irrational* if created directly by the omnibenevolent Demiurge.

others. For the term 'king' and 'father' do not apply to all ranks or orders.¹³⁶ Well, where then do we first look for the indivisible according to Orpheus, in order that we might understand the conception (*epibolê*) of the divinely inspired Plato? Well, Orpheus places one Demiurge at the start of all divisible creation – this being analogous to the one Father that gives birth to universal (*holikos*) creation – he derives from this the universal, intellectual, encosmic plurality, the plurality of souls and the bodily composite. He generates all these things in a unitary manner, while the gods that surround him divide and differentiate the things that he creates. But all his other creations have been divided, says Orpheus, by the 'divisive gods', save for his heart that is indivisible thanks to the providence of Athena.¹³⁷ Since he established intellect, soul and body, but souls and bodies admit of many divisions in relation to themselves and are very fragmented, while intellect remains undivided and unified (being all things in one and encompassing the universal intelligible realm in a single thought) he says that only the intellectual Being and the intellectual number have been left behind by being preserved by Athena.

Leaving alone only the intellectual heart. (*Orph. fr.* (Kern), 210a)

Orpheus says, directly denominating it 'intellectual'. Accordingly, if the intellectual heart is indivisible, it would obviously be intellect and intellectual number – not all intellect, of course, but the encosmic one. For *this* is the indivisible heart since even of this 'the divided god' [i.e. Dionysus]¹³⁸ was the creator. He calls the intellect 'the indivisible Being of Dionysus', but the very life which is divisible about bodies he calls its productive parts, since it is physical and such as to transport seed. This life he also says is Artemis, since it is set over all generation in nature and the midwife that extends physical *logoi* from above down to the subterranean region, strengthening its reproductive power.¹³⁹ But the remainder of the god's body is the whole psychic composite since this is also divided into seven.

They divided up all seven parts of the boy. (*Orph. fr.* (Kern), 210b)

says the Theologist concerning the Titans, just as Timaeus divides the soul into seven portions (36d). Perhaps the fact that the soul is stretched through all the cosmos is meant to remind the Orphics of the Titanic dividing of parts because, not only does the soul envelop the universe, it is also stretched through all of it (34b). So it is surely with good reason that Plato has called the Being proximately above the soul indivisible

¹³⁶ *Orph. fr.* (Kern), p. 205. ¹³⁷ in *Tim.* II.145.18–146.22 = *Orph. fr.* (Kern), fr. 210.

¹³⁸ Festugière refers us to II. 197.25.

¹³⁹ For the role of Artemis, Festugière refers us to Proclus in *Remp* I. 18.12 ff.

20 and, to put it briefly, the intellect participated by soul. In doing so, he is following after the Orphic myths and wishing to be a sort of expositor of secret sayings.

H. *Objection and reply*

25 So, having come to the last phase of dealing with the particular words of Plato, it is now necessary to show that what has been said accords with his thought.¹⁴⁰ But once these matters have been spelt out by us, this might nonetheless strike us as pretty surprising – how is it that, if intellect is indivisible, Being is divided to infinity in the second¹⁴¹ hypothesis of the *Parmenides* (144a), and along with Being, the One? How is this possible when it is pretty nearly agreed by all that the subject of this hypothesis is concerned with the nature that is beyond souls?¹⁴²

147 Or is this merely an appearance due to the fact that what Plato there says about division indicates the orderly procession from the One-Being of the many one-beings when the latter proceed from their appropriate origins to proper plurality? This is not meant to imply that the One-Being Itself has been *constituted from* (*sympplêroun*) these many [one-beings], as when he says that the soul is a single essence containing the plurality [of different divisions] that contribute to it (*Tim.* 35ab). Rather
5 it is in the sense in which the One-Being precedes the many that are both one and being. The plurality of these is inferior to the One Being; and in it are included in a preliminary way (*kat' aitian*) both the unitary and substantial numbers – just as in the *Timaeus* when he calls the Living Being 'one whole' (33a), though the four kinds are parts of it.¹⁴³ These

¹⁴⁰ In fact, Proclus does not now begin on the *lexis*. Instead, he entertains a potential objection and then repeats the lemma at at 147.20. The detailed examination of each word in it then follows.

¹⁴¹ Reading δευτέρον for ἐνάτην at line 26 with Taylor. Harold Tarrant has helpfully pointed out that if in some manuscript β had been used for the second hypothesis it could easily have been mistaken for θ (for the ninth) if the tail of the beta were smudged or unclear.

¹⁴² Cf. *in Parm.* 1051.34–1064.17 on the subject matter of the various hypostases. The commentators that Proclus respects all take the first five hypostases to be discussing different things. While the first is unanimously agreed to be about the primary god, the second is about the intellect, and various answers are given for the later hypostases. Proclus and Syrianus agree with the idea of assigning different subject matters to the first five, positive hypostases. However, the last four should not be read in this way, but rather as negative reflections on the matters discussed in hypostases 2–5. This provides yet another reason to accept Taylor's emendation of 'ninth' to 'second' hypostasis. It is *not* agreed by all that the subject of the ninth hypostasis is the nature beyond souls.

¹⁴³ Festugière supposes that Proclus has in mind the four elements. I think it is more likely that he has in mind the four kinds of living creature that are included within the All Perfect Animal (39e).

four kinds don't constitute the Living Being, but are included within it (*periechein*). Likewise the monad of the One-Being has been shared out to the plurality of each thing, and each is enabled to be a part of the One-Being – but not in such a way that they are made equal to the universal monad of the One-Being. For in this way each number individually is a part of the former One-Being, and each in a unitary and substantial way. But they are not constitutive of (*sympplêrôtikos*) it – the One-Being not being composed out of them individually.¹⁴⁴ This is it then for this digression (*epistasis*). Let's move on to the following.

10

15

III. The soul's essence

A. The soul's divisible and indivisible Being

Between the divisible Being that is always the same and the divisible Being that comes to be in the case of bodies he compounded a third species (*eidos*) of Being from both. (35a1–4)

20

1. Lexis for *Tim.* 35a1–4

By the **indivisible Being** he means that which is intellectual and participates in eternity with respect to the entirety of itself. But by **divisible** he means that which is in the realm of bodies, inseparable from extension, and which has been allotted an existence (*hyparxis*) that is entirely temporal. He has made this clear by calling the first that which is **always the**

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¹⁴⁴ A passage that is obscure in its meaning and syntax. 146.30–147.18 constitutes a single sentence. Perhaps some light might be shed by Proclus' remarks on the relation between the form of Knowledge and the different kinds of knowledge or different branches of science in his *Parmenides* commentary. There he writes:

There is one Knowledge that is necessarily prior to the many, the knowledge which is of real Truth, as the many knowledges are of the many Truths (for in the case of each their object is a Truth); even so from among the many varieties of knowledge in our realm one must discern the one complete form of knowledge by itself *neither made up from the many* (*sumplêroumenon*), nor on the same level as they, but pre-existently subsisting by itself; and the many, on the other hand, *dividing among themselves* (*katanëimamēnas*) the single power of knowledge, and assigning themselves as different to different objects of knowledge, and referring back and receiving their first principles from it. (*in Parm* 947.37–948.12, trans. Morrow and Dillon)

Note the similar use of *sumplêroumenon* and the middle of *katanēmō*. The problem that motivates this digression is how it is that, while intellect is indivisible, the One Being of the second hypothesis is not, since it is divided into infinity. The general answer, I think, is that its parts are posterior to it, in rather the same way that the kinds of living being are posterior to the Living Being itself.

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Note the similar use of *sumplêroumenon* and the middle of *katanemô*. The problem that motivates this digression is how it is that, while intellect is indivisible, the One Being of the second hypothesis is not, since it is divided into infinity. The general answer, I think, is that its parts are posterior to it, in rather the same way that the kinds of living being are posterior to the Living Being itself.

same, while he calls the second that which **comes to be**. He has done this in order that the soul should not only be simultaneously indivisible and divisible, but also in order that it may be called intelligible and the first among the things that have come to be. For eternal everlastingness (*aiônios aidiotês*) is one thing, while an eternity that has its existence (*hypostasis*) in being co-extensive with an unlimited time is another.¹⁴⁵ The sort [of eternity] that is mixed from both is yet another thing, which is surely what there is in the case of soul. For soul is unchanging with respect to its essence, but it is changed with respect to its intellection (*noêsis*). It is eternal with respect to the former, but temporal with respect to the latter. And it is clear that something of this sort necessarily pertains to the soul's existence (*hyparxis*), else it would not naturally manifest in its activities the defining characteristic of genesis and temporal extension.

148 It seems to me that in a manner quite amazing Plato spotted this fact and indicated so by saying not only that the Demiurge made the soul to be a intermediate between **the indivisible Being and that which is in relation to bodies**, but by also saying that it is an intermediate between **that which is always the same and that which comes to be**. For how would it otherwise be fitting to write a *generation* of the soul (*psychogonia*) if there were in no way a genesis or composition in the soul? And how would it be possible to take portions of something (*Tim.* 35b3) which is essentially indivisible? For in the case of things that are simple in every way, there is no sort of genesis. Even in the case of such forms as are enmattered, even¹⁴⁶ these are without generation and without destruction as Aristotle says (*Metaphys* 12.3, 1070a15), for on account of their simplicity these enmattered forms preserve in the last things [in the order of emanation] the defining characteristic of the first forms. But among such things as are receptive of this in any way, it is possible to provide a composition and genesis in words.¹⁴⁷ Therefore in order to indicate that these things must be brought into the ambit of the soul, he calls the soul an intermediate between these – the eternal hypostasis and what comes to be.

But before we go any further, it would be better to make the following distinctions: it is necessary that the divisible and indivisible forms of Being are either (1) *both prior* to soul, or (2) *both posterior* to the soul, or

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *ET* 55. ¹⁴⁶ Retaining καὶ at 13 with Festugière.

¹⁴⁷ σύνθεσιν καὶ γένεσιν τῷ λόγῳ παραδοῦναι δυνατόν. Cf. Plutarch's description of those who take the creation of the soul non-literally: εἰς ὅς ἀναλύοντα θεωρίας ἕνεκα τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς λόγῳ τὸν Πλάτωνα γιγνομένην ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ συγκεραυνυμένην (*De An. Proc.* 1013a).

(3) *both* are *in* the soul, or (4) *one* is *prior* to the soul and the *other* *posterior* to it.

(1) Now, it could not be the case that *both* kinds of Being are *prior* to the soul, since the soul is greater than the divisible Being that comes to be in the realm of bodies since it has a nature separate from bodies, while the divisible sort of Being is inseparable from these very same bodies.

(2) But neither are *both* kinds of Being *posterior* to the soul, because the indivisible Being is entirely eternal and immutable. However, the soul is not entirely eternal, as Plato says in the *Laws* (X, 904a8–9),¹⁴⁸ but instead *participates* in a way in coming to be.

(3) Neither is it the case that *both* are *in* the soul because these things – that which is inseparable from bodies and that which is separable, the ungenerated and the generated – are entirely divorced from one another since it is impossible for any one thing to have them as essential parts.

(4) Therefore it remains that the one is prior to the soul and the other posterior to it. And it is obvious that the superior one is prior to the soul and the inferior one comes after it.

Now, since these things are the case with respect to the soul, it is necessary that it should not be composed from these things but from things analogous to these. And these things will surely either be separate or have been mixed with one another. But it is impossible for them to be separate, and in any case Plato says clearly that these things have been blended. Thus it is necessary that the substantiality (*to ousiôdês*) of the soul is a mixture of these. And if the soul is superior to one sort of Being, but inferior to the other, then the indivisible [aspect] of the soul¹⁴⁹ is inferior to the indivisible Being above it. But on the other hand, the divisible [aspect of the soul] is superior to the divisible kind of Being that

¹⁴⁸ For Proclus' somewhat selective reading of this passage from the *Laws* see my note on II. 99.29 in volume III of this series.

¹⁴⁹ This is Proclus' solution to the problem that arises from consideration 3 raised above – viz. that you cannot get the separable and inseparable kinds of Being to make up any one thing since they are opposed. Distinct from, but analogous to, the indivisible kind of Being found among the intelligibles is the soul's own indivisibility: τὸ ἀμέριστον αὐτῆς. The soul has a corresponding version of divisibility that is superior to that found in the realm of bodies: τὸ δὲ μεριστὸν τοῦ μετ' αὐτὴν μεριστοῦ κρείσσον (lines 10–11). When we ask what exactly the soul's own grade of indivisibility is, once again *modes of being* that are indicated by adverbs carry the metaphysical load. μέση γὰρ οὐσα τὸ μὲν κρείσσον [sc. noetic indivisible Being] ἔξει χειρόνως, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον [sc. corporeal divisible Being] κρείσσόνως. The soul is now not only a middle term between real Being and real Becoming (152.14) but in fact we will have four terms that will establish a geometric proportion, parallel to the four terms in the geometric proportion among the elements that binds together the world's body. We have this sequence – indivisible Being : the soul's indivisible Being : the soul's divisible Being : divisible Being.

comes after it. For since it is an intermediate, it will have the superior [element] in an inferior manner and the inferior [element] in a superior manner. But that the Being of the soul is not composed from these like something composed from its essential (*sympplêrôtikos*) parts is obvious. For let us consider once again the matter in itself.

First, how is it possible that the indivisible itself should be mixed with the divisible or the eternal with the generated? For these things are in a sense utter opposites to one another and maximally distant from one another in such a way that they cannot in any manner be connected with one another as we said earlier (148.31).

Second, how could one avoid making the soul dependent upon and secondary to what comes after it, and the inseparable Being superior to the separable kind, if the soul [which ranks higher than bodies] is *composed from* the kind of Being that is divisible in the realm of bodies?

Furthermore, how would the soul be properly denominated as a **third** form of Being? For a third thing is a third together with two others. And if the third is *with* two others, then these others are evidently preserved and not destroyed. Now, the things that are blended no longer are, for what comes to be from them is something other and not a third, for the ingredients no longer exist through being destroyed in the blending together.¹⁵⁰

Again, if the Demiurge established the soul by ‘*taking a portion*’ (*Tim.* 35b3, cf. above 143.18) of the indivisible Being, how will the Being [from which he took this portion] still be indivisible? For how would one take a portion of the indivisible if it is indivisible? But, on the other hand, if he allocated the entirety of indivisible Being to the soul’s Being, would [the Demiurge] still be good, supposing he were to take what is more divine, nearer to him, and more causally efficacious and dispense it into an inferior hypostasis? In addition to this, if the soul had been constituted from generated, divisible Being, not only will this Being be divisible in relation to bodies, but in relation to the soul as well.

¹⁵⁰ For the intellectual background to this claim that the ingredients in a mixture do not endure, see Sorabji (1988), 60–106. Aristotle’s doctrine of mixture, according to which the ingredients in the mixture exist in the mixture only *potentially* and not actually, will not serve here. Proclus would presumably reject as incoherent the Stoic alternative in which *strictly corporeal* ingredients in a blend (*krasis*) are both actually present throughout (cf. Plotinus, II.7.2). Proclus’ teacher Syrianus allows that *immaterial bodies* may interpenetrate one another (*in Metaphys.* 84.27–86.7) and Proclus allows that place, identified with the super-celestial light, is such an immaterial body which is everywhere present (ap. Simplic. *in Phys.* 612.24–613.1; cf. vol. III, p. 45, n. 28). Perhaps in this argument, however, Proclus is simply counting on a common-sense notion of chemical fusion (*sunkrasis*) and setting aside further complications that arise from his own views.

Therefore it is not the case, as some believe,¹⁵¹ that the indivisible itself and the divisible itself constitute the soul. But rather what is said is the case: that **with the sort of Being that is indivisible . . . and with the sort that comes to be divisible in relation to bodies, he mixed a form of Being in the middle** because the same thing is divisible in relation to the Indivisible, but also indivisible in relation to the Divisible, thus showing us the genuinely intermediate character of the soul.

Moreover, the very word **third** exhibits the nature of the proportion immanent (*enyparchein*) within the soul. For if the same thing is both a mean and third, it is so in as much as it is, on the one hand, *first*, and, on the other hand, *last*. The soul will be at the same time first and last: which surely makes 'by nature the most beautiful proportion' (*Tim.* 31c4). And if this third thing is a mean, it will obviously be a mean between two extreme terms (since it is one thing and not something together with another mean) and in this case there would be a fourth (there being four terms in the proportion).¹⁵² But if there really is a proportion with three terms, of which the soul is the mean, it will not be between Being and Becoming *simpliciter*, but between the Being that is entirely ungenerated and the divisible Being that comes to be in the realm of bodies, and the soul will be somehow [possess] a Being that is indivisible but also comes to be divisible – not coming to be divisible in relation to bodies, but something that comes to be divisible in and of itself and which in no way requires bodies in order for it to be the very thing that it is.

The phrase **from both** is used appropriately in relation to the soul. Not only, as some say, because it plays the role of a mean (*mesos*) between both, but because it *is* both – it is the indivisible things in the manner of an image (*eikonikôs*), but it is the divisible things in the manner of a

¹⁵¹ The opponents here are clearly interpreters who fail to give due weight to the distinctness of the mixture from its ingredients. But who does Proclus suppose makes this mistake? Various interpreters will soon come in for specific criticisms at 153.15–154.26, but none of them seem to fall prey to this criticism since Proclus characterises them as making the soul a distinct hypostasis or mean between the ingredients. Perhaps he, like Plutarch, takes Crantor to be someone who makes the soul a composite of intelligible and corporeal being, cf. *De An. Proc.* 1013b–c. Certainly Proclus attributes such a view to Eratosthenes at 152.24–7.

¹⁵² I think Proclus considers the matter from two perspectives. When we consider the soul as a mixture resulting from the (analogues of) the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being, then we have a three-term proportion: as utterly ungenerated is to the soul, the soul is to what is entirely generated. If this forms a geometric proportion like 2:4 :: 4:8, then we can swap the terms – 4:2 :: 8:4 and correspondingly, as that which is both generated and ungenerated is to what is entirely ungenerated, so what is entirely generated is to what is both generated and ungenerated. However, if we consider the analogues of the divisible and indivisible kinds of being that compose the soul, then we have the four-term proportion discussed above in note 149.

paradigm (*paradeigmatikôs*). For it has the *logos* of both of them, or in any case all things are in the soul in a corresponding manner (*systoichôs*). But since Intellect is all things and the sense object is all things, Plato adds the words in the **middle**, thus showing in what manner all things are to be assumed in the case of the soul; that is, in the manner of a middle (*mesôs*) and neither in the primary way (*prôtôs*) nor in the mode appropriate to the last things (*eschatôs*).

Furthermore, there is yet a different way in which the Being of the soul is **from both** – in as much as it has been produced from the whole of the Demiurgic Intellect wherein both the indivisible and the divisible things exist in the manner of paradigms (*paradeigmatikôs*) and causes (*kat'aitian*). But since the [cosmic] Intellect also proceeds as a whole, the words **in the middle** have made clear the defining characteristic of the psychic hypostasis.¹⁵³

And how could it be that the words **he mixed** should not be fitting for the Being of the soul? – not only because the Divisible and Indivisible exist in a unified way in the case of the soul and are mutually extended through one another like things that are mixed together, but in addition it is because the defining characteristic of life is to be attributed to the soul, and the soul is also established in conjunction with the Life-giving Goddess when the kinds of Being are mixed in the mixing bowl.¹⁵⁴

Furthermore, since the word itself (*synekerasato*) is grammatically in the middle voice,¹⁵⁵ it signifies that the soul is established in conjunction with itself and it doesn't come about solely as a result of the activities of

¹⁵³ Perhaps the thought is that the cosmic intellect is *in* the World Soul, though it proceeds from the Demiurgic intellect. As repository, the World Soul thus functions as a middle term that facilitates the “production” of the cosmic intellect.

¹⁵⁴ Festugière suggests that the goddess in question is Hecate not, as Diehl supposes, Rhea. Tarrant (vol. I in this series, p. 97, n. 28), however, argues that the life-giving goddess of I. 5.15 should be identified with the mixing bowl of *Timaeus* 41d, which Proclus refers to here as well. It seems to me that both this passage, and 163.21 tell in favour of Tarrant's identification. In this case – και συνυφίστησι τὴν ψυχὴν τῇ ζωογόνῳ θεῇ, και ἐν τῷ κρατῆρι τὰ γένη μινύς – what follows the second και tells us how the first is accomplished.

¹⁵⁵ ἔτι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ῥῆμα μεσότητος ὄν * * * δείκνυσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἑαυτὴν συνυφίστησιν . . . Diehl posits a lacuna here and Kroll conjectures ἐμφατικόν. But perhaps nothing is missing. It is rather striking that *Timaeus* puts several of the verbs in this passage in the middle voice (συνεστήσατο, 35a1; συνεκράσατο, a3; συνεκράσατο, a7). I assume this is an instance of the indirect reflexive use of the middle (cf. Smyth §1719), indicating that the Demiurge is busy doing things for himself or is employed using his own things. In this passage, Proclus diagnoses this use – incorrectly, since it involves a singular subject – as the reciprocal middle (cf. Smyth §1726) in order to demonstrate that the soul is a partner in its own “creation” and is not merely a passive effect, like a compound that results from the mixing of ingredients.

the Demiurge, like something that undergoes some affection when the kinds are combined with one another.

Now, the words **species** (*eidos*) of **Being** indicate to us sufficiently the inclusion of the effects in their causes. For if the Being (*ousia*) is a genus in the Demiurge, and it is a species (*eidos*) in the soul, then the one is inclusive of the other – it is clear which one is which – and would be called the genus, since it both transcends the latter and engenders it. By transcending it, on the one hand, it differs from the genera that are coordinate within the species. But, on the other hand, by engendering it, it is superior to that which comes after it, for the latter are not such as to give rise to species. These genera and the species therefore must be assumed in a different manner.¹⁵⁶ The genera are productive, full of power and such as to include the *infimae species* (*atoma eidê*) since they have a transcendent nature. Therefore, the Being in the Demiurge is a genus, while the species of this indivisible Being, and the intermediate Being is a secondary species of the indivisible Being and the Being that is divisible in relation to bodies. And there is a third that is [the Being] divisible in the realm of bodies, while the corporeal Being is last. Among these forms there are relations of priority and posteriority because the genera are productive of species and give existence to the first, middle and final forms. All intellectual Being is indivisible, since it is one. But that which is divisible in relation to bodies has been multiplied through being parted out among the bodies. The intermediate kind of Being between these is both one and not one, for while intellect, in so far as it is intellect, has a single Being, a single Sameness and a single Difference, the parts of the Soul of the Universe are many – those parts from which the soul is combined when they are harmonised in relation to one another – and in each case there is Being, Sameness and Difference. Thus there are as many Beings, Samenesses and Differences as there are parts.¹⁵⁷ While they have been numerically arranged, being simultaneously plural, each is more than one and not one, [and so it is not simply single] in the way in which intellect is a single Being, Sameness and Difference. Now the Being that is divisible in the realm of bodies has each of these – here one, there another – when it has been divided up along with the underlying subjects, just as body itself is not [merely] divisible into many parts, but into infinity. But while soul has been divided into many Beings, it also has unity, having been given a hypostasis separate from body, so

¹⁵⁶ This seems to illustrate what Lloyd calls a 'P-series', Lloyd (1990), 76–85.

¹⁵⁷ This claim looks forward to the eventual division of the 'psychic substance' by the Platonian sequence 1, 4/3, 3/2, 2, etc. at *Tim.* 35b4–36b5. Since it is made from the intermediate forms of Being, Sameness and Difference that have been blended together, there is a sense in which each portion contains its own Being, Sameness and Difference.

15 that again there might be *two* means between really existent Being (*ontô*
ousia) and that which is really Becoming (*ontô*s *genesis*), and between the
indivisibility of the former and the infinite divisibility of the latter – the
soul and the Being that is divisible in the realm of bodies. The soul is
not the same as the Being that comes to be [in the realm of bodies]¹⁵⁸ –
the soul being indivisible to a greater degree [than the kind of Being
in the realm of bodies] owing to the fact that the soul converges upon
itself, while the Being that is divisible in relation to bodies is divisible
20 to a greater extent [than the soul's Being] owing to the fact that it is
related to something other than itself.¹⁵⁹ In any case, it is from this [sc.
the divisible sort of Being] and from the indivisible that the soul exists,
because it is a mean between what is entirely transcendent of bodies
and what is distributed in bodies, as well as between what is in and of
itself and what has come to be in relation to something else – the soul
being itself something that is *both* in and of itself, as well as in relation
to another.

25 We must not uphold the view that the soul is an intermediate in
the sense that it possesses something both corporeal and incorporeal,
as Eratosthenes¹⁶⁰ supposed. Nor should we compare its Being (*ousia*)
to 'geometrical extension' as Severus¹⁶¹ does, for there could never be
a mixture of the extended and the unextended, nor a mixture of the
indivisible and the corporeal, any more than there could be a mixture
30 of a point and a line. But unless there could be such a mixture, how
much more impossible is it that there should be a mixture in the case
of something that is to an even greater degree extended? For what is
extended in three dimensions sits even further from the indivisible than
that which has extension in only one dimension.¹⁶² But we shall say rather

¹⁵⁸ This must, somehow, be the sense of οὐκ οὔσαν ταύτη τῇ γενέσει τὴν αὐτήν, for the very next lines seem, through the μέν...δέ clauses, to provide reasons why soul and the divisible Being are not the same: τῆς μὲν μειζόνως οὔσης ἀμερίστου διὰ τὸ συννεύειν εἰς ἑαυτήν, τῆς δὲ μεριστῆς μειζόνως διὰ τὸ ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτῆς.

¹⁵⁹ The contrast is between the soul's propensity τὸ συννεύειν εἰς ἑαυτήν and that of body τὸ ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτῆς. Among bodies, it is the sphere that most closely imitates the soul's capacity to revert upon itself, cf. II. 69.15–21.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Iamblichus, *De An.* 54.4–8 (Finamore and Dillon). There was an earlier consensus (Wachsmuth, Festugière, and Dodds in his first edition of *ET*) that this Eratosthenes was not the mathematician from Cyrene. Following Solmsen (1942), however, Finamore and Dillon see no reason to multiply Eratosthenai beyond necessity.

¹⁶¹ in *Tim.* II. 152.24–32 = Testimonium 11 of Severus in the collection of Gioè (2002). Severus was a middle Platonist, whom Dillon dates to the late second or early third century; cf. Dillon (1996), 262–4.

¹⁶² The argument seems to be the following: we know that soul is both divisible and indivisible. Severus suggests that it is geometrical extension – an extension in three dimensions. But we can see that there is no mixture of point and line – something

that the intellectual Being always remains single, while the divisible kind is composed from multiple Beings. The psychic Being, on the other hand, is both single and not single, in as much as it preserves the one among plurality and also the plurality within what is unified. For the Demiurge did not divide the soul so as to use up the whole in the division, but instead preserves its unity in making it plural, and keeps it whole in dividing it. It is surely from this fact that the Eleatic Stranger says that in the case of bodies and things that are entirely divisible, there is something which connects the parts into one (*Sophist* 245a). And Aristotle sees this when he agrees that in the case of things that are divisible, there is something indivisible.¹⁶³ Thus, it would surely be the case that the soul remains to an even greater extent one and a whole, in spite of being multiplied and divided, because it is also indivisible, as Timaeus says. But unless its unity were preserved, it would exist merely in a divisible way. For instance, even if one were to say that the soul's thinking faculty and its opining faculty were two substances (*ousia*), there will still be the single whole that is both able to think and able to opine, so you would not thereby renounce its unity since it is also directed upon itself.¹⁶⁴

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5

10

2. Examination of earlier views

Taking our impetus from the words of Plato, we have interpreted the divisible and indivisible Being in this way. But what about our predecessors?

15

(1) Some make the Being of the soul mathematical in as much as it is intermediate between the natural and the supernatural (*hyperphyês*).¹⁶⁵ Others say that it is a number, since it is a result of the monad in as much

indivisible and unextended, and something extending in only one dimension. So the fusion of what is indivisible with what has extension in *three* dimensions is even more improbable.

¹⁶³ Diehl thinks that Proclus has in mind the pseudo-Aristotelian *On Indivisible Lines* 1, 968a. Cf. *in Tim.* II. 194.26.

¹⁶⁴ εἰς ἑαυτὴν συννεύειν, cf. 152.19. Proclus will later strenuously reject the idea that, in the World Soul's internal discourse, the thinking of intelligibles associated with the Circle of the Same and the opinion associated with the Circle of the Different (*Tim.* 37b6–c3), are two *separate* activities that are not the object of a unified consciousness. The World Soul knows both what it opines and what it knows. 299.7–16.

¹⁶⁵ It is possible that this is a view somehow associated with Pythagoreanism. Simplicius seems to endorse the general idea that the soul is an intermediate between the natural and the supernatural at *in DA* 3.19. Somewhat later (40.3–4) he says: διὰ τῶν μαθημάτων συμβολικῶς εἰωθότων τῶν Πυθαγορείων τὰ τε περὶ τῶν ὑπερφυσίων καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ φιλοσοφεῖν. Note that this description of Pythagorean practice situates the soul in between the sphere of the supernatural and the natural.

20 as it is indivisible, but a product of the indefinite dyad in as much as it is divisible.

(2) Still others regard it as having a geometric hypostasis which results from the point and from extension, since the former is indivisible, but the latter divisible. Those who hold the first opinion include Aristander¹⁶⁶ and Numenius¹⁶⁷ and many other interpreters. The second view is that of Severus.¹⁶⁸

25 (3) Others who consider the soul as something physical say that the divisible Being is the irrational [soul] which pre-exists the rational [soul]. The indivisible Being is identified with the divine [soul]. From these two they make the rational soul – from the one, in as much as it is that which organises, but the other in as much as it is substrate – just as Plutarch and Atticus¹⁶⁹ do – and they say that while the soul is ungenerated in
154 virtue of its substrate, it is generated in terms of its form.

(4) Others, such as Plotinus,¹⁷⁰ who approach the words of Plato in a more philosophical manner, say that it is intermediate between intellect and sense perception, the former being indivisible and the latter that which is divisible in relation to bodies.

(5) There are still others who go yet higher and establish two Intellects prior to the soul. One of these contains the ideas of wholes, while the other contains those of particular or partial things. They say
5 that the soul is something intermediate between these, as something that has been established from both intellects. Thus says Theodore of

¹⁶⁶ Aristander is otherwise unknown to us.

¹⁶⁷ in *Tim.* II. 153.17–25 = Numenius fr. 39 (des Places). Interestingly, Iamblichus in his *De Anima* does not place Numenius in the camp of those who make the soul's essence mathematical. Rather, Iamblichus says that Numenius is unambiguously with those who make the soul's essence incorporeal (30.8–9, Finamore and Dillon). It may be possible to take both of them to be reporting some aspect of Numenius' view if we are willing to resort to the *Timaeus* commentary of Calcidius. For an extended discussion, see Phillips (2002), 235–41 and Phillips (2003). For the merits of Calcidius as a source for middle Platonic views, see Reydam-Schils (2006).

¹⁶⁸ in *Tim.* II. 153.15–25 = Severus 12 T (Gioè).

¹⁶⁹ in *Tim.* II. 153.25–154.1 = Atticus fr. 35 (des Places). For Plutarch's views on the soul, see Hershbell (1987), or for a much more succinct overview Dillon (1996), 202–6. For Atticus' views, see Baltes (1983). For the relation between Atticus and Plutarch on the soul, see Deuse (1983), chapter 3.

¹⁷⁰ The relation of this claim to Plotinus' views in the *Enneads* is rather opaque. Nothing like it is claimed in IV.1 or IV.2 which are as close to a commentary on the soul's composition from divisible and indivisible being as one finds in Plotinus. Perhaps one might glean something like the view that Proclus attributes to Plotinus from IV.8.7, 1–8. The view really resembles most closely that of Crantor (fr. 3, Mullach = Plutarch, *De An. Proc.* 1012d): οἱ δὲ Κράντορι τῷ Σολιῇ προσέθεντο μὴ γίνονται τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τε τῆς νοητῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ δοξαστῆς φύσεως. See Phillips (2002), 241–7.

Asine,¹⁷¹ who discovered that this view derives from the Persians through Porphyry. Or at least this is what Antoninus, who was the student of Ammonius, reports.¹⁷²

(1) With respect to the first of these it must be said that since Plato in no ways makes the soul a number, it is absurd to seek the numerical principles from which it is composed.

(2) In the case of the second, [it must be said] that Plato says that the soul is incorporeal and simple compared with *all* bodies and such as to move itself.¹⁷³ But nothing which involves extension is that kind of thing.

(3) With respect to the third opinion, [it must be said] that he does not wish to make the irrational soul superior to the rational one, since the god did not think it right 'that the elder should be ruled by the younger' as he says (*Tim.* 34c).

(4) In the case of the fourth view, one must note that what is under discussion is not the soul's capacity for knowing, but rather the discussion about the *essence* (*ousia*) of the soul.¹⁷⁴ Therefore it is not necessary to show that the soul is an intermediate thing between two different *powers* of knowing, the intellectual and the sense faculty.

¹⁷¹ in *Tim.* II. 154.4–9 = Theodore, Test. 19 (Deuse). For more detail, see 215.29 ff. The soul under discussion here seems to be the first of the three souls posited by Theodore (215.31–216.1). Corresponding to this, he also gives us two gods from which this soul is derived. These gods are intellects associated with the indivisible and divisible sorts of Being (275.14–16). The first god seems to be an intellect that deals in universals (*to katholou nous*), while the second has been divided into individuals (216.5–6).

¹⁷² Antonius was an associate of Ammonius Saccas who is not otherwise mentioned by Proclus, though he is mentioned briefly by Syrianus (in *Metaphys.* 105.29–30). See Sodano (1964), vi–vii.

¹⁷³ Proclus' criticism here is unclear, unless he supposes that the point and extension are geometric entities whose existence is derivative on bodies. Thus these things could not be the source of the soul since it is simpler than the bodies which are the source of the geometric concepts of the point and extension. While some Neoplatonists did accept an abstractionist account of geometric entities in agreement with Alexander, Proclus is not among them; cf. Sorabji (2005a), 293–300. Perhaps this criticism is one that derives from Porphyry's commentary. In any case, Proclus apparently feels the need to add a second criticism: unextended things cannot move. Perhaps he has in mind here Aristotle's argument that a point can only be in motion *per accidens*, by being a part of an extended body that is in motion; *Phys.* 6.10, 240b8–10.

¹⁷⁴ Here is a nice example of the way in which Proclus uses the Iamblican order of topics in a psychology – i.e., *ousia*, *dynamis*, *energeia* – to rule out a reading of Plato's text. Plotinus' reading (or what Proclus identifies as Plotinus' reading) doesn't fit the order in which any competent philosopher would provide an account of the soul. It is also a nice illustration of the way in which '*ousia*' in this part of Proclus' discussion shifts seamlessly between 'Being' (sc. of the divisible, indivisible or intermediate sort) and essence (as an account of the nature of the soul).

(5) In the case of the fifth interpretation, we must say that all intellect is ungenerated and separate from bodies. But Plato says that the Being in the case of the soul is divisible and is generated, setting it in opposition to [both] the Being that is changeless and the Being¹⁷⁵ that comes to be in the realm of bodies, separating it from the Being external to bodies and the Being that exists always.

But since these things have been adequately determined, let us consider the words that follow.

B. Psychic Sameness and Difference: Tim. 35a4–6

And again in the case of the nature of the Same and that of the Different, in the same manner he combined an intermediate between the indivisible [sorts] of them [sc. Sameness and Difference] and the kind that is divisible in relation to bodies. (Tim. 35a4–6)¹⁷⁶

Being, as we said earlier (133.26), has the primary place among generated things because it is, as it were, ‘the hearth of existence’.¹⁷⁷ Therefore Sameness has the second place, while Difference has the third. Now, while some have given the superior status to Difference, Plato earlier (33b7) expressly indicated that the Similar is superior to the Dissimilar. Now in this passage, by listing Sameness after Being, he directly shows it to be superior to Difference. Just as we earlier (151.30) said that the middle sort of Being is subordinate to the Intellectual Being, but at the

¹⁷⁵ Adding τὴν in line 24 with Festugière: ἀντιδιελών πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχουσιν καὶ <τὴν> περὶ τοῖς σώμασι μεριστήν...

¹⁷⁶ This is a famous textual crux where Proclus’ reading has now won the day. The question is whether to bracket [αὐτὰ περὶ] in lines 4–6 in spite of the fact that every manuscript and nearly all ancient citations of the line have it: τῆς τε ταύτου φύσεως αὐτὰ περὶ καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ. Doing so invites the identification of Sameness and Difference with the indivisible and divisible forms of Being – in spite of the presence of αὐτῶν. Proclus’ interpretation of this passage sees the role of αὐτὰ περὶ – the Demiurge does the same thing with Sameness and Difference that he did earlier with Being: he mixes from their divisible and indivisible forms an intermediate. These three intermediate species of Being, Sameness and Difference are then combined to make the soul’s essence. That this is Proclus’ solution is somewhat obscured by Diehl’s editorial choices. In our lemma he prints τῆς τε ταύτου φύσεως αὐτὰ περὶ καὶ τῆς θατέρου κατὰ ταῦτα συνέστησεν with M and P rather than κατὰ ταῦτα with Q. A similar choice at 156.16–20 also obscures Proclus’ point: λέγει γάρ, ὅτι καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ταύτου φύσεως καὶ τῆς θατέρου τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συνεκράσατο καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα, (MP, κατὰ ταῦτα Q) <καὶ> καθάπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίας εἶδος ἦν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τούτοις ταύτου καὶ θατέρου τὸ μέσον εἶδος ἐστὶ. Again at 156.23 – ἵν’ οὖν μὴ τοῦτο λάθῃς ὑπονοήσας, τὸ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα προσέθηκεν – where Q has ταῦτα. See Grube (1932) and Cornford (1957), 60–1.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. above 133.27.

same time is the superior to the Being that is divisible in relation to bodies, so too in this case we say that the soul's Sameness is inferior to indivisible Sameness, but nonetheless more unitary than divisible Sameness. And the same holds true in the case of Difference. Therefore in the Being of Intellect, the Sameness which is one brings itself together with substantial Difference in relation to the Being which is itself a single thing up there (*ekei*). The Different which is one differentiates itself and the things there from one another. But in the soul, the Sameness unites each of the many Differences among the many parts with Being, while the Difference distinguishes the many Samenesses.

Now, I know that *some* Platonists have ranked Sameness among the things that are indivisible and Difference among those that are divisible. Thus they make the soul from both [the divisible and the indivisible] in as much as it is in this that Sameness and Difference [consist].¹⁷⁸ But since I am attending to what Plato has himself said, namely that concerning these things too, he has given to the soul an intermediate form of the divisible and indivisible kinds of them [sc. Sameness and Difference]; and knowing furthermore that these are genera of Being and that it is everywhere necessary for them to be in each individual order in an appropriate manner – among the things that are indivisible, among the things divisible and in those things which are intermediate – correspondingly [Being, Sameness and Difference] must be located in intellectual beings, in souls, in natural things, in corporeal bodies I would be ashamed to divide these genera by putting some here and some there. For if they were to say just the following – that Sameness *predominates* in things intelligible and indivisible, while Difference predominates in sensible and divisible things – then they would speak correctly. But if they said this – that indivisible things are *separate* from Difference¹⁷⁹ – then they will be unable to grant Sameness to these things either, for the One differs from the Same.¹⁸⁰ Likewise, [if they were to say] that Sameness was separate from divisible things, they would destroy the Being of these

¹⁷⁸ in *Tim* II.155.23 η ὥς ἐν ταύτῃ καὶ ταυτότητος καὶ ἑτερότητος οὐσης is rather opaque but it makes sense if we consider Plutarch. He may be an example of someone who takes this approach, though it is not easy to see exactly what role the indivisible and divisible gradations of being play vis-à-vis Sameness and Difference: ἐνταῦθα δὲ πάλιν τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ θάτερον, ἐναντίας δυνάμει καὶ ἀκρότητας ἀντιπάλους, συνήγαγεν οὐ δι' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' οὐσίας ἑτέρας μεταξύ, τὴν μὲν ἀμέριστον πρὸ τοῦ ταύτου πρὸ δὲ τοῦ θατέρου τὴν μεριστήν, ἔστιν ἥ προσήκουσαν ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρᾳ τάξας (*De An. Proc.* 1025.b2–6). As Festugière notes, this is exactly what Taylor does after omitting αὐ πέρι; cf. Taylor (1928), 108.

¹⁷⁹ As they must be if the Indivisible is *identified* with Sameness and the Divisible with Difference.

¹⁸⁰ Presumably this is a result of the Same's participation in Difference with respect to the One – not the One's participation in Difference, or in anything else for that matter.

things, for if Being is in all things, then Sameness will be in all things too.

Looking at it this way, then, we may reconcile what is said with the facts. There is a Demiurgic genus of Sameness. But there is also a species (*eidos*) of Sameness – both the indivisible, the divisible and the intermediate that results from both. And again, there is a Demiurgic genus of Difference. But there are the species that are indivisible, divisible and intermediate. Assuming this, we must also give to the soul the intermediate species [of Sameness and Difference] and weave them together with the intermediate species of Being in order to finally bring the essence (*to einai*) of the soul to completion. By considering the matter in this way, I think, we shall be able to harmonise the words of Plato with the facts of the case. For he says that just as in the case of Being, so also in the case of **the nature of the Same and the Different** the Demiurge mixed together from both [the divisible and indivisible] a third. And **in the same manner**¹⁸¹ as in that earlier case he mixed from both a form of Being, so too in this case there is an intermediate species (*to meson eidos*) of Sameness and of Difference. For it is possible for something to be an intermediate, not in the sense of an intermediate species, but rather in the sense of a whole composed from two extreme terms, as in the case of a living thing which is composed of body and soul. Therefore, in order that you may *not* mistakenly take it this way, he added **in the same manner** in order to indicate in this case that [the intermediate Sameness and Difference] are a result of the other two as species and not just as a whole.

C. *The psychic mixture*: Tim. 35a6–7

25 **And taking these three entities, the Demiurge combined them all into a single form.** (*Tim.* 35a6–7)

1. *The relation of the ingredients to higher causes*

I think that Plato has made it sufficiently clear that the Demiurgic genera are the causes of the existence of the second and third species when he says **taking these three entities** (*onta*). For where do these entities exist? Or is it obvious that they are *in* the Demiurge, for once he receives them he too contains them? And he has taken them from higher causes. For since Sameness is the result of Limited and Unlimited (though it is rather more finito-form) and the Different is from these things as well

¹⁸¹ I follow Festugière in reading κατὰ ταῦτά here with Q and below at 156.23 rather than Diehl's κατὰ ταῦτα.

(being rather more infinito-form),¹⁸² then, as Being proceeds in accord with both equally, it is clear that we must place the Sameness and Difference of the indivisible [species] more in the Limit, but the Sameness and Difference of the intermediate [species] from these [equally], while the [Sameness and Difference] of the divisible [species] result more from the Unlimited. We thus conceive of the first species of Difference as the Unlimited having a small admixture of the Limited, and the Sameness as being only slightly less than the Limited. For this is why he said **taking these three entities** as this signifies that they are distinct from one another. And since the things in the Demiurge also hasten on to the generation of other things, on account of this too, other things are established from these things. Therefore if we understand by the term **entities** the things that come before the generation of the intermediate forms [of Being, Same and Different], we shall say that the things themselves are in the Demiurge in a preliminary manner (*kat' aitian*) (for these things were in the Demiurge prior to their being generated by him). But if, on the other hand, we were to think that the **entities** are the intermediate things, then we must think of them as things that have been established (*ta hypostanta*) (for they were already existent things because each was produced by him separately prior to the mixture), and Being, Sameness and Difference would each itself have already have come to be.

Might it not be possible to understand the words **taking these three entities** more simply as 'taking these things which were three in number'? For such is the number of things that the Demiurge has established [i.e the derived forms of Being, Sameness and Difference] from the three highest [genera] already established there together with him according to the pre-existent causes in him. He produced these genera in virtue of his Demiurgic Being, but he bestowed form upon all of them in virtue of the unity within him and the divinity which unites multiplicities. And you see that each of the three was a form and that from the three there is a single form. It is therefore necessary to say that the soul is the form of forms (*eidos eidôn*) and generally one must not think of any composite or corporeal [attribute] as applying to it.¹⁸³

Moreover, the triad is proprietary to the very essence (*ousia*) of the soul, for it was shown earlier (II. 125.21 ff.) that the soul is triadic. For the whole soul is divided into essence, power and activity. The essence,

¹⁸² Cf. 138.7 above on the relation of the finito-form to the Limited and the infinito-form to the Unlimited.

¹⁸³ Cf. Aristotle *De An.* 3.8, 432a2 where it is *nous*, not the soul, that is the 'form of forms'. Elsewhere Proclus connects the notion of the 'form of forms' with Beauty and Limit; cf. in *Alc.* 111.14, *Plat. Theol.* III. 63.2.

30 in turn, is divided into existence (*hyparxis*), harmony and form. The
 existence of the soul, in turn, is again divided into that which is strictly
 158 called Being (*ousia*), and Sameness and Difference. And there is no reason
 to be amazed if we make part of essence itself Being. For the term ‘*ousia*’
 is used in relation to the one genus (*genos*) of Being and also in relation
 to what has come to be (*gegonos*), as it were, from the combination of the
 elements.

2. *Why this particular mixture constitutes the soul of the universe*

Now, if we were to inquire what it is that makes this one single idea,
 not any old soul, but rather the cosmic soul, and moreover how it is that
 these ingredients constitute souls other than the World Soul in other
 5 instances, then we will answer that it is a matter of the universal (*holikos*)
 character of the genera that were assumed (for the Being, Sameness
 and Difference within the soul are not intermediate species between
 any old extreme terms, but of the universal Intellect and the universal
 corporeal nature, through which the cosmos is a living thing – something
 endowed with mind in virtue of indivisible kind and ensouled in virtue
 of the intermediate kind) and the predominance of Being plays a role
 10 too (for this makes the soul divine, just as the predominance of Sameness
 alone makes a soul daemonic, and the predominance of Difference alone
 makes it partial or particular).¹⁸⁴ Therefore a difference with respect to
 the extreme terms also makes for a difference in the intermediate ones
 and the mixture of the intermediates that is defined by the predominance
 15 of one of the things that have been mixed evidently brings about changes
 in the whole.

3. *The unity of the mixture: Tim. 35a7–b1*

**By force bringing into harmony the nature of the Different, which is not
 easily combined, with the Same.** (*Tim.* 35a7–9)

Why is the nature of the Different not easily combined? Because it
 has a differentiating and dividing power and is the cause of processions
 20 and multiplications. But each of the divinities¹⁸⁵ begins its activity from
 itself. Because of this, the nature of the Different differentiates itself
 from the others and from itself, for it produces plurality in it, on account
 of which it is said in the *Sophist* (259ab) that it makes the others and itself

¹⁸⁴ That is, makes it an individual human soul, cf. above 138.25 ff.

¹⁸⁵ Festugière supposes that the divinities in question are the genera of Being, Sameness
 and Different. Cf. 223.13.

not-beings when it separates them from the other beings.¹⁸⁶ Therefore the nature of the Different has the property of being difficult to combine not accidentally, nor in virtue of some deviation (*kata paratropên*), but rather essentially. It is the cause of otherness, of the unmingled existence of forms and of unmixed simplicity. Having a power such as this, Difference is in a way diametrically opposed to the Same and to Being. [It is opposed] to the Same because the latter is the cause of union, community and connection, while Difference is responsible for differentiation, the absence of mixture and otherness. [It is opposed to] Being (*ousia*) because the former is 'that which is' (*to on*), while the latter is 'that which is not' (*to mê on*), as has been shown in the *Sophist* (258d). For the nature of the Different, being broken down into smaller units,¹⁸⁷ becomes the origin of Not-being.

In order therefore that we should not be discontented through failing to see that the genera are not just thrown together, Plato first mixed the Different with the Same, saying that the god brought **into harmony the nature of the Different with the Same**, harmoniously effecting a connection with the intermediate Sameness, and then combining both with [the intermediate] Being. For having said that the nature of the Different was brought into harmony with Sameness, he then adds 'he mixed them with Being, and from the three he made one' (35b1). For because Being is such as to connect both of these genera (Sameness and Difference), and these are coordinate with one another, it was necessary to mix them with one another first, and then later to mix both of them with Being. So much, then, for the order of things in the mixture.

The force involved in the mixture is not something adventitious (*episodiôdês*) or somehow contrary to nature, but rather indicates a superiority and superabundance of power, for such is the Demiurgic power that it is able to unify Difference, divide Sameness, and make from both of these a single harmony.

¹⁸⁶ In the *Sophist*, Difference plays a role in establishing the numerical distinctness of each of the kinds from all the others. To the extent that the Different is not identical to Being, it is not-being – as are all things. The claim that the Different differentiates itself from itself (ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἑαυτὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων διακρίνει καὶ ἑαυτῆς, lines 21–2) cannot be taken this way, however. Nothing is non-identical with itself. Perhaps the thought here is that the Difference differentiates itself from itself in so far as there is a distinction between the Form and its nature, corresponding to the distinction between what is true of it simply *qua* Form and what is true of it in as much as it is this specific Form.

¹⁸⁷ ἡ γὰρ θατέρου φύσις κατακερματισθεῖσα τὸ μὴ ὄν ὑπῆρχεν. Cf. *Soph.* 258d7–e1: τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὕσαν τε καὶ κατακερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλληλα. In the commentary tradition, the term seems to often carry the sense of a division of form into parts, cf. Alexander, in *Metaphys.* 779.1; Plotinus, III.9.2; Syrianus, in *Metaphys.* 119.15.

20 **He mixed them with Being, and from the three he made one. He then divided this whole again into as many parts as was fitting.** (*Tim.* 35b1)

25 Just as the Equal and the Unequal are coordinate with quantity, and as all quantity is either equal or unequal¹⁸⁸ – or rather both equal *and* unequal (since each participates simultaneously in both) – and just as the Similar and the Dissimilar are coordinate with quality,¹⁸⁹ and all quality is [simultaneously] Similar and Dissimilar, then in the same way surely the Same and the Different exist together with Being, and all Being participates in Sameness and Difference. For it is in virtue of the very fact of being (*kat' auto to einai*) that Sameness and Difference belong to things, 30 not in virtue of quantity or quality. It is thanks to this that Sameness and Difference are substantial (*ousiôdês*) since they are intermediate between the divine genera and those things which exist in quantity or quality. 160 For Sameness is dependent upon the Limited, and Difference upon the Unlimited in the same way that Similarity and Equality are dependent upon Sameness, while Dissimilarity and Inequality are dependent upon Difference. Hence in the *Philebus* (16c, 23c), Plato produces the Limited and the Unlimited from God (for these are divine genera), but in the 5 *Sophist* (254b) he refers to the Same and the Different as the genera of Being, the latter subsisting in the realm of the One (*peri to hen*), while the former subsist in the realm of Being.

Corresponding to this, you can see how much more august Plato is than any number of the physical philosophers, and even Aristotle himself. For since some of them make opposites their first principles, they continue on with further oppositions – instrumental, enmattered and 10 particular ones – and surely even the most august among the physicists trace the opposites back to matters of excess and defect, thereby shamefully assuming an absence of measure among the first principles, for Measure is more divine than that which lacks measure.¹⁹⁰ Plato, however, traces things back to Sameness and Difference, through which he 15 includes all oppositions, those in the soul, those in nature and those in bodies. And he established these [genera of Sameness and Difference] within the Demiurge in order that he may give to them powers that are generative, worldmaking, immaterial and transcendent. Having located them there, he establishes the soul from them, deriving its substrate (*hypokeimenon*), as it were, from them, as well as the soul's being (*to on autês*) – that is, its being just in so far as it is (*katho on*), not in so far as it is such and such a kind of thing (*ouchi toionde on*) – in order that the 20 soul's being might imitate the Being that exists in the primary manner

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *Cat.* 6, 6a26. ¹⁸⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *Cat.* 8, 11a15.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Plato, *Laws* III, 690e4 and Proclus, *in Remp.* II. 63.15.

(*to prôtôs on*). For the harmony, the form, the powers and activities of the soul he will give later on when the account of it has been brought to completion. For to the extent that its station and rank within the cosmos is hegemonic, we will be able to see, if you would like, how it connects all encosmic Being by means of the genera that are in it; how it brings into harmony the whole cosmos by means of its own harmony; how it encompasses all the cosmic forms and shapes by means of its own shape; [we will also be able to consider] in what manner it is able to perfect all the physical powers, as well as those that depend upon art or calculation, by means of its own powers; and we will see how, through the activities appropriate to it, the soul activates encosmic production.

4. Questions and responses

For what reason does Plato not say that the soul is an intermediate between Intellect and sense perception?¹⁹¹ It is because he will say that Intellect and sense perception are particular *powers* of knowing. But he wishes to provide an account of its nature as an intermediate in terms of its essence, not in terms of its powers.

So for what reason does Plato not say that the soul is an intermediate between Forms and things that have been enformed? Because he has not set himself the task of teaching us what sort of Form the soul has, but rather about its essence. But it is not the same thing to speak about the essence [of a thing] as to speak of the Form of something, for the Form brings with it some specific manner of being (*toiande ousian*).

And why has the soul not been established as an intermediate between intelligible and sensible numbers?¹⁹² It is because in the words that follow he will assign the soul a harmony through which the soul will serve as an intermediary between separable numbers and the separable sort of harmony, on the one hand, and the sensible numbers and the sort of harmony that is inseparable from subjects in which it is on the other. For according to the thought of Plato, Harmony Itself is neither the soul nor that which is in things that have been harmonised. Rather Harmony Itself is uniform (*monoeidês*), separate and transcendent of such wholes as have been harmonised – this alone is that which is said to be Harmony. But the harmony that is established within things that have been harmonised is a harmony that belongs to these other things¹⁹³ and is “in another” and

¹⁹¹ Proclus here returns to the view he assigned to Plotinus above at 154.1.

¹⁹² ‘Sensible numbers’ is probably just a terminological variant for ‘physical number’; cf. Syrianus in *Metaphys.* 122.25–30. On physical numbers, see O’Meara (1989), 62.

¹⁹³ Proclus uses the genitive here to indicate that the harmony of, say, the tuned lyre is the harmony of things other than itself. It thus belongs to the order of relative (*pros ti*) being, and is not *auto kath’ auto*, as a Form must be.

multiform and naturally such as to be moved by something else. But the soul's harmony is intermediate between these harmonies, for the soul's harmony is the first thing that is harmonised. Thus it imparts harmony
 20 to other things, for that which has the power to provide harmony to other things is either the form itself or that which has participated in the form in the primary manner.¹⁹⁴ Since the soul's harmony is set beneath intelligible harmony, it is also subordinate to the intelligible numbers. However, since it is superior to sensible harmony, it is also superior to sensible number. So if it is necessary to say something generally about
 25 each of these things, each one of them exists in a four-fold manner. In the case of number, the first is divine, the second is substantial, the third is psychic, while the last is physical.¹⁹⁵ Of these four, the first is uni-form (*henoeidês*); while the second is changeless; the third is self-moving; and the final sort of number is such as to be moved by something else. In the case of harmony, the first harmony is in god, the second in the Being that really is, the third is in the soul, and the final case is the harmony that is
 30 in the things that have been harmonised by something else. If, therefore, it had been Plato's intention to discuss the soul's *harmony* now, he would have said that it is an intermediate between the indivisible and divisible harmony. But since he instead proposes to discuss *essence* of the soul in the text that is before us, he said that it occupies an intermediate [position] with respect to [the gradations of] Being, Sameness and Difference.

It is necessary to observe this fact: that in the case of these things, a
 5 reversion of the processions of the soul's essence back to its origins has been brought about. For since the form of the mixture is two-fold – the one that takes place in virtue of the mixture of the extreme terms, as we have in the case of Being, Sameness and Difference, the other one being that which takes place in virtue of the intermediate [gradations] being mixed into a single whole – in the first case, he started from Being and finished up with Difference, while in the second case, it was the other way
 10 around. For the Different was harmonised with the Same earlier, and then both were harmonised with Being, and it then wound up in Being which was the initial impetus for the procession.¹⁹⁶ Again, everywhere

¹⁹⁴ Cf. *ET* 18.

¹⁹⁵ For a similar, but not exactly matching, progression in the types of number, see Iamblichus, *On Pythagoreanism* in O' Meara (1989), 219.

¹⁹⁶ Proclus' argument here depends on seeing two phases in the blending of the essence or fundamental psychic stuff from which the soul is composed. First we have a blending together of the indivisible and divisible forms of the greatest kinds. Here Plato starts with Being (τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ αἰ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἐχούσης οὐσίας, 35a2). Next is the blending of these intermediate forms of the genera to form the essence of the soul. Here it is Proclus' contention that Plato begins from the Different – presumably counting on the order of words in a7 (τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτον συναρμόττων

Plato follows up the two principles that come after the One, for when he made the soul from the indivisible and the divisible [sorts of Being, Sameness and Difference], he positioned the indivisible as analogous to the Limited and the divisible as analogous to the Unlimited (for the Unlimited is the cause of plurality, while the Limited is responsible for unification). And [he did this again] when he harmonised the Different with the Same (for Different, in as much as it is included among the genera of Being, ranks with the Unlimited,¹⁹⁷ while the Same corresponds to the Limited). And [he referred to the two principles after the One again] when he mixed these two [i.e. Sameness and Difference] with Being (for Being is uni-form (*monoeidês*) but these two are dyadic and opposed to one another).¹⁹⁸ And he did not cease from bringing together the multiplicity before he had shown the whole to be one, for the One of the soul is superior to Being and to bi-formed (*dyoeidês*) principles [i.e. Sameness and Difference].

Now since the mixture is two-fold, as we said, the first being constituted of the very elements [i.e. the divisible and indivisible forms of Being, Sameness and Difference], but the other being what results from the mixing of the elements, Porphyry correctly inquires whether both of these mixtures were made in the mixing bowl, or one outside the bowl and the other in it.¹⁹⁹ Porphyry decided that when he combines the elements, the Demiurge acts without the mixing bowl since the genesis of the intermediate forms is *not* brought about by bringing together the extreme terms, nor is it generally possible to bring terms maximally opposed together in the same thing. But [the combination] that results from all the intermediate [forms of] the elements *is* accomplished by

βίος), rather than the earlier α4 (τῆς τε ταύτου φύσεως αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου...). Because the result of the second mixing is the essence or psychic material of the soul, he can then claim that there has been a reversion to the starting point in the first mixing – Being.

¹⁹⁷ Without reference to the *Sophist*, the argument here is utterly mysterious. But once we remember that, in that dialogue, Difference is equated with Not-Being, it is clear why we have the qualifying phrase ὡς ἐν τοῖς γένεσι τοῦ ὄντος. Cf. also *Soph.* 256e5–6: περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μὲν ἔστι τὸ ὄν, ἀπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν.

¹⁹⁸ Presumably Sameness and Difference are dyadic in virtue of being *pros ti* or relational terms. What is the same or different is always the same or different to something else. Cf. *Sophist* 255c12.

¹⁹⁹ in *Tim.* II. 162.25–163.10 = Porphyry in *Tim.* fr. 64 (Sodano). The significance of the mixing bowl or *kratêr* in which the Demiurge combines the soul (41d) becomes a matter of concern within the Neoplatonic school starting with Porphyry. Plotinus makes very little of the *kratêr*, but Porphyry's *Timaeus* commentary addresses the question of its identity. By the time of Proclus' *Platonic Theology*, he can refer to it as the 'much celebrated mixing bowl' (*polygymnêtos kratêr*, *Plat.Theol.* V. 109.11. For Proclus' own views on the nature of the mixing bowl, see in *Tim* III. 246.29 ff. and *Plat.Theol.* V. 114.22 ff.

means of the mixing bowl. He pitched the elements into it and mixed them so that the soul that came to be as a result of all these elements might be entirely single, consubstantial with itself (*homochrous beautêi*), and homoiomerous, with all of the genera pervading through all. He did this, in addition, in order that the soul may take its form and essence (*bo estin*) from the mixing bowl, for the form of each thing is in accordance with the whole. As a result, since it is plausibly regarded as ‘soulmaking’ (*psychopoios*), the mixing bowl makes the wholeness of the soul in itself, and on account of this fact only the second mixing takes place within the mixing bowl.²⁰⁰

Our teacher, [Syrianus] also adopted this determination of the matter since Plato, in the part of the dialogue concerning partial souls, indicates this when he says, ‘And once more into the mixing bowl in which he had earlier mixed and blended the Soul of the Universe, he poured the remains of the previous mixture’ (41d4–6). Therefore if Plato says that the Demiurge there mixed the World Soul – but not the elements of the soul – and if in the case of our souls, the remains of the earlier mixture were mixed in the bowl, and if these remains were intermediate mixtures, then this evidently testifies that the second mixture came about in the bowl. The first mixing takes place only in virtue of the Demiurgic cause, while the second one that makes it from the intermediate genera takes place additionally in virtue of the Life-giving Soul.²⁰¹ For it is necessary for the Demiurge to be active both *prior* to the mixing bowl, and also *together* with it, just as He is active *after* the mixing bowl by virtue of the Demiurgic divisions in the soul and by the other activities he engages in with respect to the soul. For after the wholeness of the soul, the divisions according to numbers are assumed, and then the bindings of the divided parts in accordance with harmonic ratios. For since the soul is both one and a plurality, both whole and part, both uni-form and multi-form in essence, it is necessary to consider its pluralised (*peplêthusmenên*) procession from its causes after considering its unified existence (*hyparxis*). Every multiplicity requires a harmony when it departs from the One if it is not to be disordered in relation to itself and indefinite. Therefore the multiplicity in the soul shows, on the one hand, the ‘portions’ (35b2) that introduce differentiation into the single psychic essence (*ousia*), and, on the other hand, shows the powers of the harmonic ratios that

²⁰⁰ κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἐκάστου τὸ εἶδος. ὥστ’ εἰκότως ψυχοποιὸς ὢν ὁ κρατῆρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν ὁλότητα ποιεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς. I suspect that the reasoning here may be something like the following. There is a kind of analytical linkage of κατὰ τὸ ὅλον with εἶδος that is hinted at by the term for universal, τὸ καθόλου. One sense of form is shape. So there psychic “shape that is not really a shape” of the double circle is in some way an image of the curved interior of the mixing bowl.

²⁰¹ Cf. above note 154.

introduce the essential binding of the portions.²⁰² And if it is necessary to say how it seems to me, then it is obvious from these facts how the Being (*ousia*) of the soul becomes an intermediary between the Divisible and the Indivisible. For the soul's Being is not single in the way in which Intellect's essence is single (for in the Intellect there is a single Being, a single life and a single intellection to the extent that Intellect is one). But on the other hand, neither is the soul's Being divided into infinity, as is the case with the Being that is divisible in the realm of bodies (for since this Being belongs to another thing, it is divided along with that in which it is, and becomes infinite together with that other thing). But while the soul is not single on account of the plurality of its parts, it is still made numerically determinate, for the 'single portion' (*Tim.* 35b4) that the god constituted, being single, must remain undivided, and the whole plurality of portions which was initiated from something of this sort must entirely reject an infinity of divisions.²⁰³ So as a result, the Being of the soul is both single and not single, having been established within limits that are numerically definite and stable in order that by this fact it may be shown that the soul is number, having the indivisible and genuinely single root – so to speak – of its own parts .

But if these things are true, then it is clear that whatever number of portions one takes to be synthesised into the same thing, such will be the plurality of monads from which the soul is composed. And each of the monads will be neither mathematical (for such monads are insubstantial (*anousios*)), nor physical (for monads of this sort are present in a subject).²⁰⁴ Instead, by possessing Being that is in itself incorporeal, and

²⁰² Reading συνάγουσαι for συναγωγοί at 164.2. It seems to me that some parallel is needed to συνεισάγουσαι in line 1: τὰ μὲν οὖν πλήθη τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ δηλοῦσιν αἱ μοῖραι, διάκρισιν συνεισάγουσαι τῆς μιᾶς οὐσίας, αἱ δὲ συναγωγοὶ τῶν ἁρμονικῶν λόγων δυνάμεις τὰς κατ' οὐσίαν αὐτῶν συνδέσεις. I do not fully understand how Festugière arrives at his translation since it seems to me that the masculine συναγωγοί cannot modify δυνάμεις: 'Eh bien donc, les "portions", en introduisant une division de l'essence une, désignent les parties multiples qui sont dans l'Âme, et les forces unifiantes des rapports harmoniques manifestent les liaisons essentielles qui se font entre ces parties.'

²⁰³ The role of the indivisible sort of Being seems to be this: the Demiurge established just as many demarcations as there are divisions introduced in the portions of psychic essence and the ratios introduced in it. That is, there are just the divisions that fall at the points determined by the measure of the single undivided portion – 1, $\frac{4}{3}$, $\frac{3}{2}$, 2, etc. This is unlike the sensible world where the divisible sort of Being that belongs to bodies, and so is potentially infinitely divisible. There is no question of the possibility of further divisions intermediate between these demarcations within the soul.

²⁰⁴ Cf. Syrianus in *Metaphys.* 12.29–36; 87.12–13 and 123.19–25 for the contrast between substantial psychic numbers and insubstantial mathematical or monadic numbers. Syrianus also distinguishes between mathematical numbers and Form numbers. The

25 being constituted out of the intermediate genera, [each monad] will, by virtue of these facts, be not one *simpliciter* but will rather participate in some one. Furthermore [each one] will be indivisible into similar parts, and by virtue of this fact will differ from the unit in bodies which *is* susceptible to infinite division into further similar parts. But if each monad is like this and if the entire number of the soul is made up of such substantial monads – each of which is indivisible into other monads – then 165 on account of this fact, the soul would be, on the one hand, a plurality, but, on the other hand, it would also be single by virtue of the soul's own wholeness – taking in the plurality of these monads in a uni-form manner (*henoeidôs*), the soul would be one <and not one>. ²⁰⁵ For, generally speaking, if there is not only the Divisible in the soul, but also at the same time the Indivisible, then from this fact it is surely necessary that each somehow remains. The Indivisible remains within the soul in 5 virtue of the uni-formity in it, while the Divisible remains in virtue of its pluralisation. Neither must the division obscure the unity, nor must the unity hide from view the Divisible. And it seems that it was this which Xenocrates heard from his teacher and put in a riddling manner when he said that the psychic essence (*ousia*) is numerical, it being evident that it exists as a single thing composed from many substances (*ousia*), essentially a number that remains through the whole of itself, simultaneously 10 single and divided into a plurality of substantial parts. ²⁰⁶

Since there is a division among souls that is substantial and also one that results from the way the soul lives its life – for it is said that sometimes our own souls live in the manner of Titans, dividing themselves

former involve a plurality of units and can be subject to arithmetic operations like addition, while the latter are 'what it is to be (e.g.) seven' and are not able to be added. The substantial psychic numbers seem to be some sort of intermediate between Form numbers and mathematical numbers. They will be differentiated from the latter by being indivisible, but Proclus tells us that they are nonetheless *participated* and this presumably differentiates them from Form numbers. For Syrianus' view of number, see Mueller (2000).

²⁰⁵ Adding καὶ οὐχ ἓν in 165.2–3 with Kroll.

²⁰⁶ = Xenocrates fr. 189 (Parente), cf. fr. 188 = Plutarch, *De An. Proc.* 1012a. It is unclear just what view Proclus is attributing to Xenocrates – much depends on how one chooses to translate κατ' ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν at line 9 and κατ' οὐσίαν οὖσαν ἀριθμὸν in 10–11. Festugière translates: 'que l'Âme est une essence à la ressemblance du nombre, montrant que, comme elle est essentiellement un nombre, elle est une à partir d'essences multiples, demeurant tout entière, par tout elle-même, stable, à la fois une et divisée en une pluralité de parties essentielles'. In any case, this is not a version of Xenocrates' definition of the soul that seems particularly close to Aristotle's celebrated report of 'self-moving number', since Proclus' claim makes no reference to motion. See Tarán (1987), 250–2 who finds Proclus' reading of Xenocrates plausible, as far as it goes.

in relation to bodies²⁰⁷ – in order that we should not conceive that any such thing happens in the case of the Universal Soul (for it is not fitting and proper to carry back to that divine soul the deteriorations that occur in the case of partial souls) Plato adds the following – he says: the god then divided this whole again into as many parts as was fitting, for that intellectual being which does the dividing does so in accordance with an intellectual cause, while that which gets divided is divided in a substantial manner (*ousiôdôs*). Therefore the manner of this division is proper to both that which does the dividing and that which gets divided, since it is good in form (*agathoeidês*) and such as to complete (*teleiôtikos*) the psychic essence, introducing into it intellectual diversity, and making it utterly complete by placing within it the *logoi* of all beings.

But surely if we speak correctly in these matters, there is no need to remove the unity [of the soul] in virtue of the division, nor is it necessary to expend its wholeness amid the generation of the parts, as it might seem by the words Timaeus uses when he says that ‘he used up the mixture in these portions that were cut’ (36b6).²⁰⁸ Nor must we imagine this like the cutting up of some particular yardstick, for all these modes of imagining things pertain to corporeal nature. Nothing like this pertains to immaterial essences, since everything that has been generated by the Demiurge necessarily remains the same, if indeed he always creates in the same manner, being changeless and eternal in his activities. It is therefore necessary that the whole always remains a whole and that the generation of the portions is brought about while the wholeness yet remains, and that this is not spent or used up in the division of the portions. Hence we must think that the soul’s essence is simultaneously one and many, that it remains a whole and is also divided into parts, and that it is both continuous and also divided. We must not imagine its continuity in an extended manner (for it is continuity without magnitude, in the same fashion as time). Nor must we imagine its division is in virtue of monadic numbers, for that sort of quantity is incompatible with what is continuous.²⁰⁹ But rather in the case of the soul we must bring these things together into one, as is proper with incorporeal things, and must consider the whole together with the parts. And Plato too makes it clear that it is not necessary to obscure the unity within the division of the soul through the following words:

²⁰⁷ Cf. *in Alc.* 43.21–44.4.

²⁰⁸ Proclus does not quote the passage exactly: ὅτι κατανάλωτο τὸ μίχθην εἰς ταῦτα τὰ τμήματα where Plato has κατανηλώκει (36b6).

²⁰⁹ Monadic numbers are a mental aggregation of units by means of which we count. See O’ Meara (1989), 133.

IV. *The soul's harmony*

15 With each of them remaining a mixture of Sameness, Difference and Being,²¹⁰ the Demiurge began to divide them as follows: (*Tim.* 35b2–3)

A. *Interpretation of Tim.* 35b2–3

For²¹¹ if all [the genera that constitute the soul] are in all, and the whole is homoiomerous with itself, then there would be no segregation of the unity from the continuity. After all, if in the case of bodies those that are
20 similar are naturally conjoined without an intermediary, then surely to an even greater degree this will be so in the case of incorporeal natures. All the “parts”, as it were, are unified and the whole has been subordinated to the one. Nor will the parts be mixed up through the disposition of the whole, nor will the wholeness be removed because of the differentiation of the parts. One may also infer from these things that, with
25 respect to all of its own parts, the soul is both divisible and indivisible; for if all of its parts participate in *all* the intermediate genera, then there is nothing one might take from it that is not constituted out of these genera.

With an eye to these facts, the ancient philosophers drew various inferences about the soul – that it is wholly Being, and Life and
30 Intellect,²¹² and that whichever one of these three you assume, the remaining ones follow, since all the things in it run through all the others, and the soul is entirely single and its unity is completely perfect, and the part is consubstantial (*homochrous*, cf. 163.4) with the whole in
167 its case. If each of the many parts of the soul is a certain substance (*ousia tis*), and if the parts are so many in number, then the soul's Being (*ousia*) will be equal in number to the parts, and likewise for the Sameness and the Difference. Each [of the three genera] is a single thing in Intellect (this is because Intellect is indivisible, for it is not the case that one part
5 of Intellect is Sameness, while another part is Difference). But in the case of the soul, each [of the genera] <is many>,²¹³ for the soul has been divided in accordance with substantial number and its parts have been

²¹⁰ Proclus' lemma has οὐσίας while Plato's text has τῆς οὐσίας.

²¹¹ Continuing the line of argument begun just before the lemma.

²¹² This triad features prominently in later Neoplatonism and has often been supposed to have been formalised as a triad by Porphyry. Plotinus does not doubt that there is Life amid the intelligibles and that these are both Intellects and Being (V.4.2, 43), but he does not treat this as a triad in the same way that later writers do. For the debate on Porphyry's role, see Edwards (1990).

²¹³ In the lacuna at line 11, I follow Diehl's conjecture of πολλὰί.

harmonised with one another, making the soul one from many and a 'whole from the parts'.²¹⁴

Moreover, it may be worthwhile considering this: that with respect to the generation of the elements, Plato began from *Being*, just as we said earlier [162.4], but with respect to the composition of the whole he began from *Difference* – 'by force bringing into harmony the nature of the Different, which is not easily combined, with the Same (35a7)'. But when the division of the whole into harmonic ratios is at issue, he begins from Sameness. For, he says, **with each of them remaining a mixture of Sameness, Difference and Being, the Demiurge began to divide them as follows** (35b2). For an origin from Being is entirely appropriate to the generation of simple things (since Being is simpler than the others [sc. Sameness or Difference]). But an origin from Difference is more appropriate to the composition of the whole (for the genesis of the whole from the parts begins from what is inferior). Finally, an origin in Sameness is appropriate to the foundation of harmony (for harmony aims to bring things into a condition of sameness and to engender an association among things that have been divided, and in general, harmony tries to make the things that have been harmonised the same).

B. Preface on harmonic theory

These matters having been articulated to the extent that it is possible, it is necessary to have a prior grasp on such matters concerning numbers and the harmonies of the soul as is necessary for those who intend to understand must have at hand, lest we attempt the exegesis of the following section of the text in vain.²¹⁵ It is surely necessary, then, if we wish

²¹⁴ Proclus here invokes a distinction among three ways in which a thing may be a whole that is familiar from *ET* 67 and *Plat. Theol.* III. 87.26–88.8. Cf. Baltzly (2008). A fuller treatment of the sense in which the soul is a 'whole prior to the parts', 'a whole from the parts', and 'a whole in the parts' is given at 195.25–196.20 below.

²¹⁵ This preface to the exegesis of *Timaeus* 35b4–36b5 may be usefully compared with Theon of Smyrna's *Mathematics Useful for the Understanding of Plato*. Already by the time of Plutarch there was a considerable body of opinion on the correct interpretation of Plato's division of the psychic essence and the harmonies within it, as can be seen from Plutarch's *De An. Proc.* 1027a, ff. Here we find the hallmarks of a technical, scholastic tradition – for instance, Plutarch's categorisation of the questions that the text poses (1027c–d), as well as details on earlier interpretations of the mathematics and harmonics in Plato's text. Hence it would be essential for those who hope to follow Proclus' lecture on this text to have the requisite background knowledge. By the time of Proclus, there were several handbooks or commentaries that a Neoplatonic student might encounter: Theon's work draws on works of Thrasyllus and Adrastus now lost to us, Porphyry's *Notes on Ptolemy's Harmonics*, and the *Manual of Harmonics* by Nicomachus of Gerasa. Proclus' own treatment seems to draw on that of Theon,

to speak about this part of the dialogue, to have grasped beforehand the things that are typically discussed in works on harmonics:²¹⁶ what a note (30 *phthongos*)²¹⁷ is; what an interval (*diastêma*) is; what a system (*systema*) is; and that the Pythagoreans did not assume that the concord (*symphonia*) in 168 harmony results from anything other than number;²¹⁸ and they did not assume that a concord arises from all of these, but only from multiples (*pollaplasia*)²¹⁹ and from super-particulars (*epimoria*).²²⁰ They say that the musical fourth (*dia tessarôn*) is in 4:3 (*epitritos*), while the fifth (*dia pente*) is in 3:2 (*hêmiolios*), the octave (*diapasôn*) in 2:1 (*diplasion*). The combination of an octave and a fifth is in 3:1 (*triphasion*), while that which is two octaves is in 4:1. However, the combination of an octave and a fourth did not seem to them to be a concord²²¹ because it has been composed in a ratio – that is, 8:3 – where the larger number contains the smaller number two or more times, but along with two or more parts of the smaller number,

as well as Nicomachus. I think he may have had more Adrastus than is contained in Theon. His preface could, I think, hardly be sufficient on its own. Perhaps Proclus means merely to remind his auditors of certain key facts that they will have become acquainted with through previous study.

²¹⁶ Theon of Smyrna gives much the same order, first defining a note, then interval, then system, and then moving on to a discussion of concord (47.18–48.16, Hiller).

²¹⁷ The mathematical conception of a note common to Proclus' Neopythagorean orientation is given by Nicomachus (*Harm.* 12.1.6–8 ed. Jan) 'a note is an indivisible vocal sound resembling the unit with respect to hearing'.

²¹⁸ Cf. Theon 46.20–47.8 for the priority of concordant numbers over sounds. The Pythagoreans limited the intervals that count as concordant to just those that express simple ratios: the octave (2:1), the fifth (3:2), the fourth (4:3). They also recognise concords composed from these: the twelfth (3:1, octave plus a fifth), the double octave (4:1).

The Platonist Aelianus in his work on the *Timaeus* (ap. Porphyry, *Comm.* 96.8–10) identifies six harmonies by including the eleventh (8:3, octave plus a fourth). A deeply committed Pythagorean ought to reject this one, since its ratio is neither a multiple nor a super-particular. Proclus later distinguishes the Pythagoreans and Ptolemy on one side, because they reject the Aristoxenian half-tone. But on the other hand, those who follow Ptolemy accept the concord of the octave and the fourth. Cf. below 183.20–30.

²¹⁹ Cf. Theon 76.8–11 (Hiller): 'The ratio is multiple when the larger term contains the smaller one several times, that is, when the smaller one measures the larger one exactly with nothing left over.' Among the six Pythagorean concords, the octave, the twelfth and the double octave are multiples.

²²⁰ Cf. Theon 76.21–77.5 (Hiller): 'The ratio between two numbers is superparticular when the larger one contains the smaller one plus a part of the smaller number one time – that is, when the larger term is greater than the smaller term by a certain quantity that is a part of it. So, for example, the number 4 is a superparticular in relation to 3, because 4 is greater than 3 by 1 unit, which is itself a third of 3.' In modern terminology, the ratio may be expressed as $n + 1 : n$. Theon's example is, of course, the musical fourth. Among the other concords accepted by the Pythagoreans, the fifth (3:2) and the tone (9:8) are super-particulars as well.

²²¹ Cf. Ptolemy, *Harm.* chs. 5–6 on the reason why the eleventh is excluded.

whether the same ones or different.²²² In this case the mean, 6, stands in a 2:1 ratio with the smaller number, but in a 4:3 ratio with the larger one. These things, therefore, must be assumed, along with the fact that the tonal ratio is 9:8 (*epogdoos*), and that 4:3 results from two tones and a semi-tone; while 3:2 results from three tones and a semi-tone. We will learn later what the ratio of the semi-tone is.

Moreover, [the Pythagoreans said] that there are three kinds of *harmonia* – the diatonic, the enharmonic and the chromatic.²²³ The diatonic results from the half-tone (well, this is said to be a half-tone, but it is not strictly a half-tone, but rather a semi-tone)²²⁴ and from one tone and then a second tone.²²⁵ The enharmonic is composed from a quarter-tone (*diesis*),²²⁶ another quarter-tone, and the major third (*to diatonton*). The chromatic results from one half-tone, another half-tone, and then the minor third (*to triêmitonion*). (The quarter-tone is like a quarter of a tone, but it is not truly a quarter, just as the semi-tone is not strictly speaking half of a tone. But we will demonstrate these things as we go along.)

Though there are these three kinds, each of which is a division of the tetrachord, Plato seems to have worked only with the diatonic scale. He thinks it worthwhile to divide the *epitritos* [4:3] ratios into the *epogdoos* [9:8] and the semi-tone, but he doesn't bother with the enharmonic's quarter-tones, nor with the major or minor thirds [that we find in the enharmonic and the chromatic scale respectively]. But let us add the qualification that he rejects the *enharmonic diesis* (i.e. the quarter-tone), since some of the ancients called the half-tone the '*diesis*'.²²⁷ It seems

²²² I have filled out the translation from Theon's description of the *pollaiplasi-epimerês* (79.15, Hiller). 8 contains 3 twice, but with 2 left over. Each of these is a third of 3. This is, in fact, Theon's example and he tells us that such a ratio has a particular name, διπλάσιος καὶ δις ἐπίτριτος – 'the double and twice a third'.

²²³ Cf. Archytas DK 47 A16.

²²⁴ We will hear much more about this as Proclus' commentary proceeds. I use the term 'semi-tone' for *to leimma* and reserve 'half-tone' for the putative *bêmitonion* whose mathematical *bona fides* Proclus doubts. The root of all this is the fact that the tone, which corresponds to the ratio 9:8, is such that its square root is irrational, being $\sqrt[3]{4}$; $\times \sqrt{2}$. The Pythagorean-Platonic alternative is explained by Plutarch (*De An. Proc.* 1020e–f): 'The harmonists (i.e. the Aristoxenians, cf. Theon 53.8–10) think that the division of the tone makes two intervals each of which they call a "half-tone", but the Pythagoreans denied that it is divisible into equal parts and, since the divisions are unequal, call the smaller one the "semi-tone" because it falls short of being half.'

²²⁵ Cf. the diagram at Theon 56.4.

²²⁶ Generally speaking, this term is used to denote the smallest interval in a scale. In the diatonic scale, this will be the semi-tone, but in the enharmonic scale it is the quarter-tone (Aristoxenus, *Harm.* 21).

²²⁷ Theon reports such a difference of vocabulary between the followers of Aristoxenus and Pythagoreans (55.11–15).

169 that Plato adopts this kind – I mean, of course, the diatonic one – as stronger, simpler, and more noble than the others, though the enharmonic seems better for education. But if it is necessary to state my own prophetic vision in these matters,²²⁸ it is that the enharmonic kind is coordinate with the entire partial life that has come to be in the realm of bodies, just as the diatonic kind is coordinate with the rational life because it is such as to educate the former. It remains for the chromatic one to correspond to the very idea of corporeal life, and because of this it is trivial and ignoble. Therefore the enharmonic²²⁹ [genus] is plausibly said to be educative, which is surely why in the *Republic* (III, 399a ff.) Socrates thinks it worthwhile to mention it in particular in his discourse on harmony, as we have already established. Since Timaeus knows this and he has heard Socrates talking about it on the previous day, he has likewise provided a composition for the essence of the soul through the diatonic scale, but not through the enharmonic scale which is better suited to education, as we said. It is for this reason that the teachers of these subjects were called ‘harmonicists’. At any rate, Aristoxenus says in the first book of his *Elements of Harmony* that ‘those who have previously taken up the study of harmonics were concerned to be truly “harmonicists” and no more, since they dealt only with the enharmonic, and never gave any thought to the other genera [such as the diatonic and chromatic]’.²³⁰ In the same book, Aristoxenus also says something quite surprising – that the diatonic scale (*diagramma*) was not known to the ancients. For he writes thus: ‘there is evidence of this – their diagrams are of the enharmonic system only, and no one has yet seen any for those in the diatonic or chromatic’.²³¹ But how in the world he can say these things when Plato has set out the diatonic kind of scale along with Timaeus – well this is something worthy of amazement.²³² Or perhaps

²²⁸ Proclus has been following Theon very closely up to this point. First in his exegesis of the different harmonic scales, then in noting the qualification about vocabulary, and finally in his comments on Plato’s use of the diatonic scale. Compare in *Tim* II. 168.30–169.2 ὁ Πλάτων τοῦτο παραλαβεῖν τὸ γένος, λέγω δὴ τὸ διατονικόν, ὡς ἀδρότερον καὶ ἀπλούστερον καὶ γενναιότερον τῶν ἄλλων with Theon 56.3–5 τὸ δὲ διάτονον γένος ἀπλοῦν τι καὶ γενναῖον καὶ μᾶλλον κατὰ φύσιν· διὸ μᾶλλον τοῦτο παραλαμβάνει Πλάτων. This perhaps explains the next lines that deviate utterly from what one finds in Theon, and which Proclus announces as his own ‘prophetic vision’ – καὶ εἰ με δεῖ τὴν ἐμὴν λέγειν μαντείαν κτλ.

²²⁹ Here and below at line 14 Proclus writes merely ἁρμονικόν, but the context makes it clear that we must understand the enharmonic scale. The motive for this lack of precision is revealed with the quotation from Aristoxenus.

²³⁰ *Harm.* 2.8–10, translation Barker. ²³¹ *Harm.* 2.10–13, translation Barker.

²³² Barker thinks that Aristoxenus’ remarks both on the preoccupation with the enharmonic scale and neglect of the others in their diagrams is not directed at Platonists or Pythagoreans, but rather at the empirical school of *harmonikoi*.

the disparaging words that Adrastus offered about Aristoxenus are true – that his character is not entirely that of the sort of aforementioned musician [sc. the kind that are entirely absorbed in their harmonies], but he is the sort of person who is concerned with being seen to speak wisely.²³³

Therefore, Plato makes the division of tetrachords in the diatonic genus, and proceeds not only as far as the octave, but in fact goes as far as [to provide a system] whose range is composed of four octaves, the fifth and a tone.²³⁴ Or, as Severus has put it, he did not make it either with the tone or without the tone, but finished it with the semi-tone, rather than the tone.²³⁵ But if one were puzzled about how Plato can extend the scale to such a great extent, Adrastus says²³⁶ – for Aristoxenus had restricted the extent of his variable scale to an octave and a fourth, and the consonances that result from this, ‘giving the ear authority over the intellect’ (*Rep.* VII, 531b), while people nowadays extend it to two octaves with an additional tone in order to give fifteen notes – well, in reply to this puzzle it is necessary to say that the people who constructed these smaller scales did so with reference to *our use* of them, assuming that a range larger than this would make it impossible for the contestants to sing, or for the audience to discriminate reliably. But Plato, looking instead to *nature* established the soul out of all of [the notes in

Aristoxenus’ complaint with the Pythagoreans and Platonists is that their work is *irrelevant*:

We try to give these matters [sc. those that fall within the study of harmonics] demonstrations which conform to the appearances, not in the manner of our predecessors, some of whom used arguments quite extraneous to the subject, dismissing perception as inaccurate and inventing theoretical explanations, and saying that it is in ratios of numbers and relative speeds that the high and the low come about. Their accounts are altogether extraneous, and totally in conflict with appearances. (32.19–28, trans. Barker)

²³³ We find no such passage in Theon, and it is this that leads me to believe that Proclus had access to Adrastus either directly or via some source other than Theon.

²³⁴ The point here is that the scale that is determined by the numbers that are inscribed in the soul is huge, encompassing a range that – as Cornford notes – can be illustrated by the consecutive white notes on a piano ranging across four octaves and a major sixth. The choice is certainly not determined by the needs of the practising musician. See Cornford (1957), 67–71.

²³⁵ in *Tim.* II. 169.32–170.5 = Severus, 14 T (Gioè). See below 191.1–193.6 for Severus’ concern with the final interval in the Platonic scale.

²³⁶ Proclus here gives a close paraphrase of the text of Theon where the latter quotes Adrastus (64.7 (Hiller)). However, the last sentence differs between the two authors. While Theon reports Adrastus as similarly saying that the sequences go as far as 8 and 27 in order to reach solid numbers, he does not say that this is so in order that the soul can be the ruler of bodies. Rather, in Theon’s version Adrastus points out that it can, in principle, go on to infinity.

this extended scale] in order that the sequence should go as far as solid numbers²³⁷ seeing that the soul is to be the ruler of bodies. For if the extent of the scale necessarily corresponds to the terms [1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27], then it will encompass four octaves and a fifth. And it is obvious what
 20 the greatest of these terms is: 27. This then will be the answer to the puzzle.

To put it briefly, the topic of the harmony in the soul has three parts into which it may be divided: first, the setting out of the seven portions; second, the insertion of the two means [i.e. the arithmetic and harmonic ones] between them; and third, the division of the *epitritos* [4:3
 25 ratios] and the *hēmiolios* [3:2 ratios] into the *epogdoos* [9:8 ratios] and the semi-tones. Because of this fact, some people are in the habit of making three [nested] triangles. In the smallest of these, they write the seven portions, putting one number at the top of the triangle and arranging
 30 the double sequence down one side and the triple down the other. In the next, bigger triangle, drawn around the previous one, they increase the numbers²³⁸ and interpolate the two means between them in a similar manner, separating the double and triple sequences on different sides
 171 of the triangle, and keeping the single portion at the top. In the third, largest triangle that includes both the previous ones in their entirety, they inscribe the scale in the same manner. This is how Adrastus has done it.²³⁹ Others have sought leave to draw it in the form of the letter
 5 Λ,²⁴⁰ arranging the numbers sequentially along it like the divisions on a monochord,²⁴¹ assuming these numbers in accordance with the three

²³⁷ That is, cubic numbers. Cf. Euclid 7, def. 19.

²³⁸ As is standard, and as Proclus himself will do, these philosophers eliminate the fractions by increasing all the numbers to a common base. At this stage, the original seven numbers will be multiplied by 6 so that the inserted arithmetic and harmonic means will correspond to whole numbers. Thus instead of the sequence 1, $\frac{4}{3}$, $\frac{3}{2}$, 2 etc. it will become 6, 8, 9, 12, etc. It is unclear where this practice began. Plutarch adopts it (*An. Proc.* 1019b, ff.), and Theon seems to attribute the values of 384 for the unit and 10,368 for the Platonic 27 to Thrasyllus (93.8 (Hiller)). The question of whether it is to be found in the *Timaeus* of Locris is complicated by the fact that not all manuscripts include the table of numbers. Whether such a table figured in the version of the text that Proclus had to hand is thus not easy to determine. Cf. Tobin (1985), 20–2. On the early interpreters of the mathematics of Plato, see Tarrant (2000), 61–2.

²³⁹ Based on what Proclus has told us, it is hard to see how Adrastus' nested triangles differ from nested sequential versions of the lambda representation described below. There is no obvious need for the base of the triangle. This view is not attested elsewhere for Adrastus.

²⁴⁰ This method is attributed in Crantor by Plutarch (*De An. Proc.* 1027d).

²⁴¹ ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κανόνος κατατομῆς. The Greek title of the Euclidean *Sectio Canonis* is κατατομή κανόνος.

steps outlined above, just as we will also do.²⁴² This arrangement is the one endorsed by Porphyry and Severus.²⁴³

These matters having been foreshadowed, the following things need to be said: that [Plato] divided the whole topic of the soul's harmony into three sub-headings. First, there is the arranging of the seven portions into double and triple intervals that form a geometric progression. Second is the insertion of the other means – the arithmetic and harmonic means – into each interval in the double and triple series. Third is dividing of the *epitritos* [4:3 ratios] and *hēmiolios* [3:2 ratios] into the *epogdoos* [9:8 ratios] and the semi-tones. The account of the parts of the soul has been limited to just these matters.

It is necessary to have at hand such things as are said about the three means [that are found in the soul] – some ways in which they differ from one another, and what are some of the methods through which they may be discovered.²⁴⁴ There is, therefore, the *arithmetic* mean in which the mean term differs from the term that exceeds it and the term that it exceeds by an *equal quantity*. This happens in the case of all successive numbers, and Timaeus himself has defined these things in this way (36a). Then there is the harmonic mean in which the middle term is exceeded by the *same part* of the larger term as the middle term exceeds the smaller one. For example, in the case of 6, 4 and 3, the 4 is exceeded by the 6 by 2, which is a one-third part of 6, and the 4 exceeds the 3 by 1, which is also a one-third part of 3. And then there is the *geometric* mean in which there is the *same ratio* between the larger term and the middle term as between the middle term and the smaller one.

The next things that must be addressed are the methods of discovering the means. Assume two terms as given in order to discover the harmonic and arithmetic means, and let these be in a 2:1 ratio, for example 12 and 6. I then take the difference by which the larger exceeds the smaller, and it is obvious that this is 6. Dividing this result by 2, I add it to the smaller of the original two terms and I get the arithmetic mean, for sure enough 6, 9, 12 is in *arithmetic* proportion since, among the three terms, the larger one exceeds the middle by the same amount by which the middle exceeds the smallest. Once again, taking the difference between the two

²⁴² 171.7–8 κατὰ τὰ τρία κεφάλαια, πρώτους καὶ δευτέρους καὶ τρίτους λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς ποιήσομεν. Proclus must mean that they fill in the numbers along the lambda shape in the three stages outlined above at 170.22–6. He most surely does not mean that he too will arrange the numbers in a lambda shape, for Proclus criticises this arrangement at 187.17–188.1.

²⁴³ in *Tim.* II. 171.4–9 = Severus 15 T (Gioè). For Porphyry, cf. in *Tim.* fr. 67, p. 58.9–24 (Sodano).

²⁴⁴ The exposition here is pretty standard. Cf. Nicomachus, *Arith.* II.23–5 (D'Ooge); Theon 113.18–115.5 (Hiller).

extreme terms in the proportion, which is 6, I multiply this by the smaller term, which gives us 36. Now divide this by the sum of the two extreme terms, which is 18, and we get the result 2. I add this to the 6 and I have the *harmonic* mean, 8.²⁴⁵ For by that part of the greater number by which the middle number gets exceeded, by this same part of the lesser term does the middle exceed it. For 8 is exceeded by 12 by 4, which is a third part of 12, and 8 exceeds 6 by 2, which is a third part of 6. Again, let us consider two numbers where the larger one is three times the smaller, for instance 18 and 6. I add these together, which is 24. Taking half of this number, I get the arithmetic mean, 12. Now let's take the difference between 18 and 6, which is 12. I multiply this by the smaller term, 6, to get 72. I divide this by 24, since this is the sum of the extreme terms. The result of this is 3. I add this to 6 and I have the harmonic mean, 9 [which is the harmonic mean between 18 and 6] since by the same part of the extremes it both exceeds and gets exceeded.²⁴⁶ Thus if the extreme terms were 1 and 2, then taking the sum and taking half of what results from both, I will have the middle term $1\frac{1}{2}$ which is the arithmetic mean. But, taking the difference between them which is 1, and multiplying it by the smaller of the terms I'll have 1×1 which is 1. Dividing this 1 by the 3 that results from adding together the extreme terms I have $\frac{1}{3}$, so that when you apply 3 to the $\frac{1}{3}$ you get the 1 back. Adding the $\frac{1}{3}$ to the 1, I get the harmonic mean between 1 and 2, as we saw before (172.11-18). So by using these methods we may methodically fill up all the double and triple intervals with arithmetic and harmonic means – means which the *Timaeus* will employ within the geometric means and will amplify in a way by the insertion of the other means.

Generally speaking then, since Plato mentions the three kinds of mean, and the geometric one is such as to include the others, let the following theorem be added to what has been said: if there is a proportion consisting of four terms and one of the terms establishes an arithmetic mean between the extremes, the other one will be the harmonic mean and vice versa.

Suppose that there are four terms where $A : B :: C : D$, and suppose that B is the arithmetic mean. I say that C will be the harmonic mean. For since the product of $A \times D$ is equal to the product of $B \times C$, and since B is the arithmetic mean between A and D, the result of multiplying the sum $A + D$ by C will be equal to twice the product of $B \times C$. This is so because, in so far as B is an arithmetic mean, the sum $A + D$ is equal to twice B. The result of multiplying C by sum of $A + D$ will be thus

²⁴⁵ The same method is given by Theon in very similar terms, cf. 118.4-119.17.

²⁴⁶ I.e. 18 exceeds 9 by 9, which is one half of 18. And 9 exceeds 6 by 3 which is one half of 6.

equal to twice the product of $A \times D$. But this was the defining feature of the harmonic proportion – that the result of multiplying the sum of the extreme terms by the middle term is equal to twice the product of the extreme terms.

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Now for the other case. Let C be a harmonic mean. I say that B is the arithmetic mean. For since the product of multiplying the sum of $A + D$ by C is equal to twice $A \times D$ and since, in addition, $A \times D$ and $B \times C$ are equal, the product of multiplying the sum $A + D$ by C is equal to twice $B \times C$, and the sum $A + D$ is thus equal to twice B . But this is the arithmetic mean, when the sum of the extreme terms is equal to twice the middle term.

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Once again, let there be four terms where the middle, B , is an arithmetic mean and C is a harmonic mean. I say that $A : B :: C : D$. For since the result of multiplying the sum of $A + D$ by C is equal to twice $A \times D$ (because C is the harmonic mean) and since, in addition, the result of multiplying C by the sum $A + D$ is equal to twice $B \times C$ ²⁴⁷ (because B is the arithmetic mean) $A \times D$ and $B \times C$ are equal. Hence, $A : B :: C : D$, for this is the distinguishing feature of the geometric proportion. Therefore the geometric proportion includes the other two and they are reciprocal with one another. But since we have given this by way of introduction, let us get back to what has been written.

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C. Initial discussion of Tim. 35b4–6

He took a first single portion from all of it. And after this he took [a second] that was twice the first, then once again [he took a third] which was three halves of the second, but three times that of the first. (*Tim.* 35b4–6)

1. Mathematical explanation

Mathematical theory ought neither be entirely scorned, nor sought after only for its own sake. The first option means that Plato will not be able to indicate to us, as he wishes to (29b), the things in their images, while the second option makes the whole exegesis of the text as unstable as a ship without ballast, for it is necessary to be firmly anchored, as it were, when one is heading off after the essence of those realities with which the dialogue is concerned.²⁴⁸ We, however, will steer a middle course, as we said before, having first set out the text mathematically, then, after this, we will provide an exegesis of the proposed division [of the psychic

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²⁴⁷ Reading either $\delta \delta \epsilon \dot{\upsilon} \pi \acute{o} < \tau \acute{o} \upsilon \Gamma > \sigma \upsilon \nu \alpha \mu \phi \acute{o} \tau \acute{\epsilon} \rho \upsilon \tau \circ \upsilon \Lambda \Delta$ διπλάσιος τοῦ ὑπὸ βΓ κτλ. or $\delta \delta \epsilon \dot{\upsilon} \pi \acute{o} \sigma \upsilon \nu \alpha \mu \phi \acute{o} \tau \acute{\epsilon} \rho \upsilon \tau \circ \upsilon \Lambda \Delta$ <καὶ τοῦ Γ> διπλάσιος τοῦ ὑπὸ βΓ κτλ. with Festugière.

²⁴⁸ $\delta \epsilon \dot{\iota} \gamma \acute{\alpha} \rho \acute{\omega} \varsigma \acute{\epsilon} \pi' \acute{\alpha} \sigma \phi \alpha \lambda \acute{o} \upsilon \varsigma \pi \acute{\epsilon} \iota \sigma \mu \alpha \tau \circ \varsigma \acute{\omicron} \rho \mu \acute{\epsilon} \iota \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \tau \acute{\omega} \nu \pi \rho \alpha \gamma \mu \acute{\alpha} \tau \omega \nu \pi \epsilon \rho \acute{\iota} \acute{\omega} \nu \acute{\omicron} \lambda \acute{o} \gamma \omicron \varsigma \acute{\epsilon} \sigma \tau \acute{\iota} \nu \omicron \upsilon \sigma \acute{\iota} \alpha \varsigma$. Because it invokes a similar nautical metaphor, Diehl refers us to *Laws* X, 893b4.

essence] that is appropriate to the subject. Now the Pythagoreans were doubtless very wise in as much as they discovered the division of the monochord,²⁴⁹ but it was *Plato* who imparted the division of the soul in these terms – disclosing the substantial causes and the generative *logoi* of mathematical theorems. Let's press on then, as I said, first exercising the reasoning capacity (*dianoia*) of those who are listening,²⁵⁰ and then summarising what has been said by many others, while nonetheless eschewing the disagreements among them, and inquiring into the truth itself. Our account of the following five matters will be brief: about the ratios of the multiples; about the means between these; about the *epitritos* [4:3] and *bêmiolios* [3:2] ratios that appear among these means; about the *epogdoos* [9:8] ratios that fill out these intervals; and about the semi-tone. For it is also necessary that the scale be such as to encompass all of them and to be filled up by all these ratios. Therefore, so that we can proceed in order, let us first take up those things that are said first by Plato's account in the case of the numbers that result from the monad.

a. Numbers of the multiples

Let us posit, then, the unit, and the 2 that is twice this. Next, there is the 3 that is, on the one hand, one and a half times the 2, but on the other three times the unit. Then there is the 4 which is twice the 2. Next is the 9 which is three times the 3. Next is the 8 which is the [initial] portion taken 8 times. Over all these, there is the seventh term which is 27 times the unit. Now, these numbers, as we said earlier (170.26), are arranged by some people in the shape of a Λ , making the unit at the top and arranging the double series down one leg, and the triple series down the other. Other people arrange them in one row, in a way that is more obedient to [the words of] Plato. For he did not say to separate the double series and the triple series, but rather he mixes the two series up, going from doubles to triples²⁵¹ and proceeding in a straight line.

b. Numbers of the harmonic and arithmetic means

If Plato's [series] had stopped at that point, there would be nothing more to be concerned about. But since he orders us to bind the double and

²⁴⁹ Nicomachus, *Harm.* ch. 6 and Iamblichus, *VP* ch. 26 provide descriptions of Pythagoras' discovery of the numerical ratios between lengths on the monochord that correspond to the concords.

²⁵⁰ πρῶτον γυμνάσωμεν τὴν τῶν ἀκούντων διάνοιαν, cf. in *Prm.* 1013.2–4: Παρμενίδου διεξόδου γυμνάσαι τὴν διάνοιαν ἡμῶν...

²⁵¹ ἀλλ' ἐναλλάξ μίξας αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις. Proclus' argument is that Plato's text does not name the numbers in two series – 1, 3, 9, 27 and then 1, 2, 4, 8. This tells against the lambda shaped arrangement.

triple intervals with the arithmetic and harmonic means, and since in the case of the 1 and the 2, there are no such [whole number] means to be found, it remains to find some number for the unit that has a half and a third part.²⁵² All numbers are able to multiplied and this, therefore, is what we need to discover. Let us assume 6 as the unit and the double of this 12 as having the same ratio as 1 has to 2. Now, we can place the middle terms alongside these multiples of 1 and 2, yielding 8 and 9 as the aforementioned means, for by the same part [i.e. one third] of the extreme terms 8 both exceeds 6 and is exceeded by 12. On the other hand, 9 exceeds 6 by the same amount as 12 exceeds it. Therefore by multiplying 1 and 2 by 6, we will discover numbers that are receptive of the aforementioned means. In a similar manner, by multiplying the remaining numbers in the previously mentioned row of the doubles and triples by 6, we will discover terms with which we may fill up with the harmonic and arithmetic means [without resorting to fractions]. We get the following result when we multiply the previous row by six: 6, 12, 18, 24, 48, 54, 126. In this case, these multiples of the earlier numbers are in the same order that Plato gives, except for 54 which we should have put before 48. It is 'the triple of three' which Plato gives before the 8.²⁵³ But we have placed it after the 8, following the sequence of numbers rather than the order of Plato's words – an order in which Plato has followed their ratios, and alternated between the double and the triple series. Therefore, the 8 and the 9 fall between the 6 and the 12, while between 12 and its double we get as the harmonic mean 16 and arithmetic mean 18. Between the third number in the double series, 24, and the 48, the harmonic mean is 32, but the arithmetic mean is 36. In the triple number series, between 6 and 18 – which is the first triple – the harmonic mean is 9, while the arithmetic mean is 12. Between the second – which is 18 – and the 54, the harmonic mean is 27, but the arithmetic mean is 36. And between the third triple – which is 54 – and 162, the harmonic mean is 81, while the arithmetic mean is 108. The double and triple intervals, therefore, have been divided by these two means just as he said, yielding

²⁵² As noted earlier, Proclus – like earlier commentators – will want to have whole number values for all the notes in the scale. This claim that there are no means between 1 and 2 is strictly inconsistent with what he said at 172.26.

²⁵³ This digression is a result of the fact that Plato's text does not name the seven numbers in the order 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27, but rather in the order 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27: *Tim.* 35.b.4–c.2 μίαν ἀφείλεν τὸ πρῶτον ἀπὸ παντὸς μοῖραν, μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἀφήρει διπλασίαν ταύτης, τὴν δ' αὖ τρίτην ἡμιολίαν μὲν τῆς δευτέρας, τριπλασίαν δὲ τῆς πρώτης, τετάρτην δὲ τῆς δευτέρας διπλῆν, πέμπτην δὲ τριπλῆν τῆς τρίτης, τὴν δ' ἕκτην τῆς πρώτης ὀκταπλασίαν, ἑβδόμην δ' ἑπτακαικεκοσιπλασίαν τῆς πρώτης. Proclus indicates that he is crossing back and forth between double and triple series. This rather undercuts the point that he made earlier against the proponents of the lamda arrangement.

25 this sequence of successive terms: 6, 8, 9, 12, 16, 18, 24, 27, 32, 36, 48,
54, 81, 108, 162.²⁵⁴

c. Numbers of the fourths, fifths and the tones

30 Now, if it were possible to divide the *epitritos* [4:3] ratios among the terms
177 that have been posited by both the *epogdoos* [9:8 ratios] and the semi-tones,
then we could stop here. But since this is not yet possible, we need an
alternative method. We set out, then, from the start to fill up the double
ratio with the previously mentioned [arithmetic and harmonic] means,
as well as the *epogdoos* [9:8 ratio of the tone]. It will therefore be necessary
to take such a base (*hypologos*) for the double series as will admit of two
epogdooi and an additional *epitritos* [4:3]. So let us then take first the third
term from the monad in the double series [i.e. 8] and multiply it by 8.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ The correspondences between our modern version of Plato's sequence and Proclus' first expanded one can be illustrated by the following. The top row specifies the role or roles that each number in the series plays, whether an Original term, a Harmonic mean, or an Arithmetic mean.

double	O	H	A	O	H	A	O	H	A	O
sequence	1	$\frac{4}{3}$	$\frac{3}{2}$	2	$\frac{8}{3}$	3	4	$\frac{16}{3}$	6	8
× 6	6	8	9	12	16	18	24	32	36	48
triple	O	H	A	O	H	A	O	H	A	O
sequence	1	$\frac{3}{2}$	2	3	$\frac{9}{2}$	6	9	$\frac{27}{2}$	18	27
× 6	6	9	12	18	27	36	48	81	108	162

Integrating the double and triple sequences and eliminating duplication yields the following single sequence, with the one or more roles of each term indicated.

O	H ₁₋₂	A ₁₋₂	O	H ₂₋₄	O	O	H ₃₋₉	H ₄₋₈	A ₄₋₆	O	O	H ₉₋₂₇	A ₉₋₂₇	O
		H ₁₋₃	A ₁₋₃		A ₂₋₄				A ₃₋₉					
1	$\frac{4}{3}$	$\frac{3}{2}$	2	$\frac{8}{3}$	3	4	$\frac{9}{2}$	$\frac{16}{3}$	6	8	9	$\frac{27}{2}$	18	27
6	8	9	12	16	18	24	27	32	36	48	54	81	108	162

²⁵⁵ Proclus now proposes to consider the following multiple of the original double series. Multiplying by 8 will permit him to derive whole number results when he multiplies by $\frac{9}{8}$ in order to insert the tones into the intervals. So, following the unit, i.e. 64, we'll have tones at the values of 72 and 81. The arithmetic means between the original terms are also whole numbers. The problem turns out to be that the harmonic means are not.

double	O	H	A	O	H	A	O	H	A	O
sequence	1	$\frac{4}{3}$	$\frac{3}{2}$	2	$\frac{8}{3}$	3	4	$\frac{16}{3}$	6	8
× 8	64		80	128		192	256		384	512

This gives 64. From this term, it is possible to derive two *epogdooi* [i.e. 9:8 ratios between each of the terms in the double series without resorting to fractions], for every multiple will stand at the head [of a column] of as many super-particulars corresponding in name with itself as it happens to be removed from the unit.²⁵⁶ But there will be no *epitritos* [4:3 ratio]. Therefore by tripling 64, I get 192 for which the *epitritos* is 256 and of this the *epogdoos* is 243.²⁵⁷ Therefore the ratio of the semi-tone (which is 256:243) is what is left after the two *epogdooi* are taken away – for, when from any two numbers that stand in the relation of 4:3, two *epogdooi* [9:8] are taken away, the remainders stand in the ratio of the semi-tone. But the *epogdoos* of 256 is 288, and 288 secures an arithmetic mean between 192 and 384 – the latter standing in the double ratio to the former, as well as standing in the *epitritos* [4:3] relation to 288. Now if it were possible to take two *epogdooi* from 288, we would be able to fill up this [next] *epitritos* with the *epogdooi* and the semi-tones. But as things stand, this is not possible. This is because the *epogdoos* of 288, viz. 324, doesn't have a $\frac{1}{8}$ [part that is a whole number], so we cannot use this to generate the next *epogdoos* given that we wish always to preserve the monad by not

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²⁵⁶ The extent to which Proclus' commentary depends on other works is nicely illustrated by this otherwise inscrutable sentence. Compare Proclus' ἅπας γὰρ πολλαπλάσιος τοσοῦτων ἐπιμορίων ἡγείται λόγων ἀντιπαρωνύμων αὐτῶ, ὁπόστος ἐστὶν ἀπὸ μονάδος' with the following sentence from Nicomachus (*Ariith.* II. 3.1.1–2.1) ἅπας πολλαπλάσιος τοσοῦτων ἐπιμορίων ἡγήσεται λόγων ἀντιπαρωνύμων αὐτῶ; ὁπόστος ἂν αὐτὸς ὦν τυγχάνῃ ἀπὸ μονάδος, οὔτε δὲ πλείονων; 2.3.2 οὔτε ἐλαττόνων οὐδεμιᾷ μηχανῇ. The idea of 'standing at the head of' is obscure without the table that follows in Nicomachus.

1	2	4	8	16	32	64
	3	6	12	24	48	96
		9	18	36	72	144
			27	54	108	216
				81	162	324
					243	486
						729

Reading across any row gives 2:1 ratios, while reading down a column gives the super-particular ratios. (Reading down the hypotenuse of the table yields 3:1 ratios.) Each multiple, such as 8, stands at the head of a column containing as many super-particular numbers as it is removed from the 1 column. In this case, 3.

²⁵⁷ Proclus now proposes to multiply the original numbers by 64 in order to get a whole-number series that will preserve the relevant ratios. The initial segment of such a sequence will look like this:

O	tone 9:8	tone 9:8	semi-tone	H 4:3	A 3:2	2O
192	216	243		256	288	384

This difficulty will crop up in the next segment of the double sequence.

dividing it, for $\frac{1}{8}$ of 324 is 40 $\frac{1}{2}$. Therefore we must double it in order to make the half a whole and we shall then have the *epogdoos* of it.

25 But we shall then be obliged to double all the other numbers along with it. Therefore, there will be before it 384, 432, 486, 512, 576 instead of 192, 216, 243, 256. In place of 288, we will have 576. The *epogdoos* of this is 648, and the *epogdoos* of this in turn is 729. Next is 768, which is the double of 384 and has the ratio of the semi-tone to 729. And thus
30 surely the double interval has been filled out with the *bêmiolios*, *epitritos*
178 and the *epogdoos* ratios through the use of these numbers, like this:²⁵⁸

O	9:8	9:8	s-tne	H 4:3	A 3:2	9:8	9:8	s-tne	2 × O
384	432	486		512	576	648	729		768

Therefore, if we wish to fill up the whole scale, we must set out the following sequence of numbers. Instead of the first portion, we must have 384, and instead of twice one, we must assume 768. Instead of three
5 times the first, but one and half times the second, we should assume 1152. Instead of four times the first, 1536. Instead of the fifth part that is three times the third, we should set down 3456. Instead of the sixth that is eight times the first, we should assume 3072. Instead of the seventh
10 part that is twenty-seven times the first, 10,368.²⁵⁹

If we then want to fill this sequence up with the harmonic and arithmetic means – which, when put in, make the *bêmiolios* [3:2] and *epitritos* [4:3] – then between 384 and its double of 768, we must put in 512 to
15 get the harmonic mean, and 576 to get the arithmetic mean. But in the triple interval – I mean the interval between 384 and 1152 – we would take the following: 576 will preserve the harmonic mean [between 384 and 1152], as well as being that which forms the arithmetic mean in the previous double series.²⁶⁰ The arithmetic mean will be 768, which was also the larger of the extreme terms in the double series. Correspondingly, if we want to establish the same means between the double of the unit and four times the unit, then between 768 and 1536, 1024 is the harmonic mean and 1152 is the arithmetic mean. If we wish to set out the numbers that fill in the second triple interval, which is bounded by
20 1152 and 3456, 1728 provides the harmonic mean between them, while
25

²⁵⁸ Proclus provides only a list of the numbers in the second row. I have provided the first row in order to make it easier to see their significance and to see what is missing.

²⁵⁹ Note that Proclus here reverts to the language and order of the original portions that Plato uses in his text at 35b4–c2. Cf. note 253 above.

²⁶⁰ Proclus does not go on to enumerate all the terms that play a double role – a task that effectively integrates the double and triple series by identifying duplicates. Cf. note 254 above.

2304 is the arithmetic mean. And if we want to fill in the third double interval between 1536 and 3072, then 2048 is the harmonic mean, while 2304 is the arithmetic. Finally, if we wish to fill in the third of the triple intervals – I mean the one between the fifth and the seventh portion – by similar middle terms, then since the extreme terms are 3456 and 10,368, the harmonic mean will be 5184 and the arithmetic mean will be 6912. Moreover, if one wanted to fill in each of the *epitritos* [4:3] and *bêmilios* [3:2 ratios] that have appeared as a result of these [harmonic and arithmetic means] with *epogdooi* and semi-tones, then when the entire exegesis is done, we'll have the whole scale presented to us in these successive terms, and it will have twenty-four *epogdooi* and nine semi-tones.

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d. The semi-tone

Since these matters have been made sufficiently clear to us, it is necessary to record such things about the semi-tone itself as need concern us, viz. that consequent upon the fact that super-particulars cannot be divided into two equal ratios, there is no half-tone to be assumed in number.²⁶¹ Rather, taking the proximate ratios of 18:17 and 17:16,²⁶² one can show that the ratio of 18:17 is greater than what is called the semi-tone, but less than what would be exactly half a tone. This necessarily carries with it the implication that the ratio of the semi-tone is less than that of the half-tone. That it is less than 18:17, and this, in turn, is less than the

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²⁶¹ Since a super-particular is a fraction of the form $n+1/n$, to take half of such a fraction would be to find the square root. But since no two sequential numbers are squares, and the numerator and the denominator will clearly be sequential numbers, it is not the case that both will have a rational square root. Cf. the Euclidean *Sectio Canonis* prop. 16 and Porphyry, in *Harm.* 131.15.

²⁶² The argument is much clearer in Aristides Quintilianus:

They [the Pythagoreans] wanted to know also the ratio of the semi-tones. Since there is no [whole] number between 8 and 9, they doubled the original terms to make 16 and 18, and found that between them lies the number 17. By this number, they said, the tone is divided into half-tones. They found, however, that this was not a division into equal parts, but into a larger and a smaller, since 18 stands to 17 in a ratio which is not equal to that of 17 to 16, but is smaller than it. (*De Musica* III.1.43–53, trans. after Barker)

Barker believes that the recognition that the semi-tone is not half the tone goes as far back as Archytas (DK 44 B6), so Proclus could be drawing on any source – he need not have had Aristides to hand. Indeed, there may be a common source: certain passages in Aristides may have been drawn from Porphyry's *Commentary on Ptolemy's Harmonics* (Barker (1989), 392). Alternatively, since these are a priori truths, it may just be that Proclus and Aristides have hit upon the same argument simply by reasoning about it.

ratio of the half-tone may be shown thus:²⁶³ Let there be 16 and its *epogdoos* [i.e. another number standing to it in the ratio of the tone, 9:8], i.e. 18.²⁶⁴ Now surely placing the number 17 between these divides the *epogdoos* into two unequal ratios proximate to the interval of the half-tone, differing from the extreme terms of the ratio by only a single unit. And it is obvious that it makes the ratio larger in the case of the smaller term, for in every arithmetic mean, the ratio is larger in the smaller term, so it turns out that 18:17 is also less than the ratio of the half-tone.²⁶⁵

Moreover, the semi-tone is smaller than 18:17, as is obvious from the terms set out by Plato. For the ratio of the semi-tone is that of 256 to 243,²⁶⁶ and – as we shall show that the ratio of the semi-tone as it is exhibited in these numbers is an irreducible fraction (*pythmenikon*) – it is less than the ratio that $18/17$ has toward 243. For 256 exceeds 243 by 13 units, but $1/17$ of 243 is greater than 13. Therefore, to an even greater extent is the ratio of the semi-tone smaller than the interval of the half-tone.²⁶⁷ In consequence, what remains when the tone has been divided, which is the ratio of the *apotomê*,²⁶⁸ is necessarily greater than the half-tone.

Furthermore, this may also be shown in the following manner: Take 256 and 243, and let there be three terms in their ratio. The square

²⁶³ From the Pythagorean perspective, if there was really such a thing as the half-tone, then there would be a rational square root of $9/8$. Hence Proclus sets out to prove that $256/243 < 18/17 < \sqrt{9/8}$.

²⁶⁴ This supposition has the effect of generating an arithmetic mean between 16 and 18. Where c is an arithmetic mean between two terms a and b the difference between them is equal. That is, $c - a = b - c$. Since c is greater than a , dividing one side of this equation by c and the other side by a will result in a similar inequality. So $c^{-a}/a > b^{-c}/c$. In the case at hand, $17^{-16}/16 > 18^{-17}/17$. Adding 1 to each side changes nothing but yields the super-particulars Proclus was interested in: $17/16 > 18/17$.

²⁶⁵ $17/16$ and $18/17$ are two *unequal* parts of $9/8$. Hence neither is *identical* to the half-tone – one must be larger, the other smaller. If $18/17$ is the smaller of these two, then it is also smaller than the half-tone, while $17/16$ is just slightly bigger.

²⁶⁶ The semi-tone is defined as what is left over when we take away two tones from a musical fourth. In effect, *fourth/tone* \times *tone* = *semitone*. Assigning the ratios associated with these intervals, we get $= (4/3)/(9/8)^2 = (4/3) \times (8/9)^2 = 4 \times 64 / 3 \times 81 = 256/243$. Proclus has no resources corresponding to the ease with which we divide one fraction by another by means of multiplying the numerator fraction by the inverted form of the denominator. Hence he will multiply up to find a common denominator and then reduce the fraction.

²⁶⁷ Cf. Adrastus, ap. Theon 69.12–70.1 together with Barker's notes on the passage ((1989), 223–4).

²⁶⁸ The *apotomê* is what is left over when we take away the semi-tone from the tone. *tone/semitone* = *apotomê* while the difference between the semi-tone and the *apotomê* is the *komma*. Boethius (*Inst. Mus.* 3.5 = DK 44 A26) assigns the terminology to Philolaus. Assigning the ratios of these, we get $9/8 \div 256/243$ which in turn yields $9/8 \times 243/256 = 2187/2048$, the ratio of the *apotomê*.

corresponding to 256 is 65,536, while the square from 243 is 59,049. 256×243 is 62,208. Now surely these numbers – 59,049, 62,208 and 65,536 – form a proportion in the ratio of the semi-tone, so that if it is a *hêmitonios* [ratio], the ratio of the extreme terms will be *toniaios*. But if the ratio of the half-tone is larger than that of the semi-tone, then the ratio of the extreme terms in the proportion will also be larger [than that of the tone]. And if it is smaller, then the ratio here will be smaller too. But in fact $1 \frac{1}{18}$ times 59,049 is 66,430 < and $\frac{1}{18}$ – a number greater than the larger of the extreme terms in this proportion.

A third argument shows in a different way that the tone is not divided into two equal parts having the ratio that 256 has to 243. For were one to take the *ogdoos* [i.e. $\frac{1}{8}$] of 243, which yields $30 + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8}$,²⁶⁹ and add this to 243, then the result will be $273 + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8}$, a number which stands in *epogdoos* [9:8] ratio to 243. But you can see that the ratio of 256 to 243 is less than that of $273 + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8}$ to 256. For 256 to 243 is a super-partient ratio²⁷⁰ in which [256] exceeds the unit [243] by $243 \times \frac{13}{243}$. But the ratio of $273 + \frac{3}{8}$ to 256 is one in which the first number exceeds the second by the unit [256] plus $256 \times 17 \frac{3}{8} / 256$. But $17 \frac{3}{8}$ is a greater part of its unit [256] than 13 is of its unit [243].

Therefore the tone is not divisible into two equal parts, but is divisible rather into the semi-tone, as Plato called it, and the *apotomê*, as musicians habitually denominate it, the latter having the greater ratio. For let us take the number $273 \frac{3}{8}$, which has the ratio of the *epogdoos* to 243 and the number $258 \frac{3}{16}$ (which stands to the same number, 243, in the 17:16 ratio), and the number 256 which stands to 243 in the ratio of the semi-tone. The last is a smaller ratio than that of 17:16. Therefore, it is obvious that $273 \frac{3}{8}$, which has the ratio of the tone to 243, will have toward 256 the ratio of what remains when a semi-tone is subtracted – that is, the ratio of the *apotomê*. This will be greater than the 17:16 ratio, just to the extent that the ratio of the semi-tone was less. If we multiply this number by 8, then we will discover the first ratio between whole numbers that expresses the ratio of the *apotomê*. For eight times 243 is 1944, and eight times 256 is 2048, and eight times $273 \frac{3}{8}$ is 2187. So it turns out that the ratio of the *apotomê* expressed as a simple fraction is $\frac{2187}{2048}$. And we will have need of these three successive terms in the scale. So let these terms be 243, 256 and $273 \frac{3}{8}$. But multiplying by eight because of the fraction,

²⁶⁹ Why does Proclus present this number and fraction as λ καὶ δ' καὶ η ? It presents the easiest way for him to think about multiplying 243 by $\frac{1}{8}$. Represent 243 as $240 + 2 + 1$ and then the task of taking an eighth of each of these numbers becomes easy.

²⁷⁰ An *epimeres* or super-partient is distinguished from an *epimorion* or super-particular. The latter has the form $\frac{n+1}{n}$, while super-partient ratios have the form $\frac{n+m}{n}$ for $m > 1$.

so that instead of having parts of the unit we have whole numbers, we get 1944, 2048 and 2187.

Furthermore, that the ratio of the semi-tone is necessarily that between the numbers 256 and 243 may be shown as follows: if we remove two *epogdooi* from the *epitritos* [4:3] interval, the terms that include the remaining interval will have the ratio to one another that 256 has to 243. Let there be an interval AB that is an *epitritos* [4:3] of E, and let there be a C taken which is the lesser term in an *epogdoois* [9:8] to AB and similarly let there be a D taken that is the lesser term in an *epogdoois* to C. I say that D has to E the proposed ratio [256:243].²⁷¹

Let there be taken from AB one [interval] FB equal to C, and also another GB equal to D. Since, then, AB is to C as C is to D (for they are *epogdooi*), AB will be to BF as BF is to BG. The AF that's left [when you subtract BF from AB] will stand to the FG that's left [when you subtract BG from BF] will stand to one another as AB stands to BF. But since AB is the *epogdoois* of BF, AF must therefore be the *epogdoois* of FG.

Let us take [an interval] FH equal to FG. AF will then also be an *epogdoois* of FH. Therefore FH will be eight times HA. But since FH and FG are equal, [their sum] HG will be equal to sixteen times HA.

Again, since FB is the *epogdoois* of BG (for C is also the *epogdoois* of D), as a result BG is eight times GF. Supposing GF is 8, GB contains 64 of

²⁷¹ There is no diagram in the text or scholia, but the following may help to represent the structure of Proclus' proof.

[243] E _____
 [324] 81 B _____ G _____ F _____ H _____ A
 [288] 72 C _____
 [256] 64 D _____

In the following demonstration, Proclus treats tones as line segments, just as in the proofs in the Euclidean *Sectio Canonis*. Indeed, one may usefully compare the proof of proposition 8 in the *Sectio*: 'if from a hemiolic [3:2 or musical fifth] an epitritic [4:3 or a fourth] is subtracted, the remainder left is epogdoic [9:8 or a tone]'. Proclus' proof proceeds in a similar fashion but aims to establish not the ratio of the tone in the lowest whole numbers, but the ratio of the semi-tone. Just as in Barker's diagrams for the *Sectio*, I have labelled each line with the quantity that Proclus will eventually assign it. Only AB is denominated in standard fashion by its end points. E, C and D are simply treated as quantities.

Proclus' conclusion can be demonstrated economically with modern notation. See note 265. However, Proclus proceeds *geometrically*, closely imitating the wording of the *Sectio Canonis* – albeit aiming at a different conclusion. The closest parallel text I can locate is Boethius *Inst. Mus.* I ch. 28. While Proclus uses lines like those in the *Sectio* to construct a musical fourth and two *epogdooi* in the numbers 243 : 256 : 288 : 324, Boethius makes no reference to the construction of lines and establishes the ratio of the semi-tone in the numbers 192 : 216 : 243 : 256.

such units, and FB 72, for 72 is the *epogdoos* of 64. The entire interval AB contains 81 units, for this is the *epogdoos* of 72.

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Now take these numbers four times over.²⁷² AB is then 324, while BG (that is, D) is 256; for 324 is in fact 4 times 81, and 256 is 4 times 64. However numbers that factored by an equivalent number of parts have the same ratio to one another as their parts have to each other. Since AB is an *epitritos* [4:3] of E, supposing AB is made up of 324, E will be 243 of such units. AB contains, in fact, the sum of 243 plus a third of 243 which is 81. But we also found that D is to AB as 256 is to 324; so D is thus to E as 256 is to 243.

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It is obvious that these are the smallest numbers in which we find the ratio of the semi-tone, for these are prime to one another.²⁷³ And this is obvious from mutual subtraction (*anthyphairesis*), for when the lesser is continuously subtracted from the greater number, they wind up in the unit.²⁷⁴ Now, if they are prime [to one another] it is clear that they are the lowest numbers that have the same ratio. Therefore, if one were to take two *epogdooi* from the *epitritos* interval, then the remaining terms have the ratio that 256 has to 243.

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This may be demonstrated if we take AB as the tonic ratio, and CB as that of the semi-tone, and AD as the so-called

²⁷² Proclus does this in order to get whole-number values for E which stands in the 4:3 ratio to AB, which in turn is in the 9:8 ratio to C and C in the 9:8 ratio to D. As Boethius' proof shows, multiplication by three would serve just as well.

²⁷³ Cf. the definition of 'prime to one another' in Euclid VII, def. 12; Theon 23.6–6 and Nicomachus I. 11.1. 256 and 243 are prime to one another because their only common factor is 1.

²⁷⁴ This is the method of mutual subtraction or ἀνθυφαίρεσις described in Euclid VII. 1 and 2. It permits one to find the greatest common measure between two numbers. When that number is 1, the numbers are said to be 'prime to one another'. Euclid describes this as follows: 'Two numbers being set out, and the less being continually subtracted in turn from the greater, if the number which is left never measures the one before it until a unit is left, then the original numbers will be prime to one another' (trans. Heath). The method of mutual subtraction is represented schematically by Heath as follows:

$$\begin{array}{rcccl}
 & a & (p & & \\
 b) & \overline{pb} & & & \\
 & c) & b & (q & \\
 & & \overline{qc} & & \\
 & & d) & c & (r \\
 & & & rd &
 \end{array}$$

By means of subtracting the product of the smaller number together with some p such that $pb < a$, we eventually arrive at a number, d , that 'numbers the one before it', i.e. such that $c = rd$. If this number is 1, then the numbers are prime to one another. The

“half-tone”.²⁷⁵ It is obvious that AC is the ratio of the *apotomê*, since it is larger than the half-tone. The ratio of D to C is that of the *komma*, for that is ratio of the excess of the *apotomê* over the true half-tone which is not able to be expressed in [rational] numbers.²⁷⁶ This, therefore, has been demonstrated.

To what has been said this must be added though: we said that the ratio of DB is the half-tone, but we did not say that the *epogdoos* can be divided into two equal ratios, for no super-particular is able to undergo such a thing as being cut into two equal ratios. But in as much as the followers of Aristoxenus have taken the half-tone after the two *epogdooi*, it was in accordance with *their position* that we have assumed the ratio of the half-tone, as we said.²⁷⁷ We did this in order that it might be discovered what ratio the *komma* and the *apotomê* have in relation to the ratio of the tone. This explains why we brought it up, for surely it is obvious from what has been shown that every super-particular is indivisible into two equal rational ratios. And something like this might be added too for the sake of completeness. The Pythagoreans deny both that a musical fourth is made up of a half-tone and two *epogdooi*, and also that there is a concord between the octave and the fourth. Both of these are accepted by the followers of Aristoxenus. Among the musicians who come after him, the followers of Ptolemy go along with the Pythagoreans on the first point – that the so-called half-tone is not genuinely a *half-tone*²⁷⁸ – but reject the second point, the proposed concord between the octave

calculations by means of which one would show that 256 and 243 are prime to one another is as follows:

$$\begin{array}{r}
 243) \quad 256 \quad (1 \\
 \underline{ - 243} \\
 13) \quad 243 \quad (18 \\
 \underline{ - 234} \\
 9) \quad 13 \quad (1 \\
 \underline{ - 9} \\
 4) \quad 9 \quad (2 \\
 \underline{ - 8} \\
 1) \quad 4 \quad (4 \\
 \underline{ - 4}
 \end{array}$$

²⁷⁵ A _____ D _____ C _____ B.

²⁷⁶ For the terminology, see Barker (1989), 38, n. 36.

²⁷⁷ Aristoxenus was, of course, a member of the Lyceum and the author of the *Elements of Harmony*. The approach of the Aristoxenians is more empirical than that of those in the Pythagorean tradition. Aristoxenus claims that the interval of the fourth is comprised of two and one half tones (24.4–10, 46.1–2). For his argument for this claim, see 56.13–58.2.

²⁷⁸ Cf. *Harm.* 21.21–23.19 for Ptolemy’s objections to Aristoxenus’ argument for the half-tone.

and the fourth.²⁷⁹ The first of these views has been shown to hold of necessity based on Plato's teaching. However, we are not now required to say anything at all about the second point, since Plato has said nothing on this matter. So we will leave this issue.

e. The apotomê and the komma

Since we have discovered the ratio in lowest terms of the semi-tone and of the *apotomê*, we must now say what the ratio of the *komma* – that by which the *apotomê* exceeds the semi-tone – is expressed in lowest terms. Expressed in whole numbers, this is, as the ancients said, the ratio of 531,441 to 524,288.²⁸⁰ If it doesn't matter whether you divide the unit, then take the ratio of the semi-tone [in the numbers] 256 to 243.²⁸¹ The *epogodoos* of the latter is $273 + \frac{3}{8}$ and another semi-tone away from 256 is $269 + \frac{13^2}{243}$ for [243 : 256] was the ratio of the semi-tone.²⁸² Now, the

²⁷⁹ Cf. *Harm.* 13.1–8 for Ptolemy's acceptance of Aristoxenus' view that the octave may be combined with any of the other concords to produce a concord. Thus the octave and a fourth is heard as a concord, but its ratio is inconvenient from a Pythagorean point of view since it is the super-partient ratio 8:3. See above 168.1–6.

²⁸⁰ The *komma* is defined as that by which the *apotomê* exceeds the semi-tone. In effect, $\text{apotomê/semitone} = \text{komma}$. Assigning the ratios associated with these, we get $\frac{2187}{2048} \div \frac{256}{243} = \frac{2187}{2048} \times \frac{243}{256} = \frac{531,441}{524,288}$. It is not clear what ancient source Proclus has in mind for this value of the *komma*.

²⁸¹ The calculations by means of which Proclus reaches the value of the *komma* look odd from our point of view. In the previous note, we used the modern expedient of dividing one fraction by another, by means of multiplying by the inverted divisor. Lacking this expedient, what Proclus does seems to us more complicated. He has the two numbers which represent the interval of the semi-tone: 243 and 256. He goes 'down a whole tone' from 243. This number is $273 + \frac{3}{8}$. He then calculates the number that is 'down a semi-tone' from 256 – that is, he calculates the number that has the ratio of the semi-tone to 256. In essence this is $256 \times \frac{256}{243}$ or $\frac{256^2}{243}$. The ratio between this number and the number that is a whole tone below 243 will be the ratio of the *komma*. The ratio of 256 to $273 + \frac{3}{8}$ is the ratio of the *apotomê* or major semi-tone. To go another (minor) semi-tone below 256 is, in effect, to divide the *apotomê* by the semi-tone. However, Proclus presents $\frac{256^2}{243}$ in a way that allows him to cancel a great many of the fractions. To square 256, he presents it as $(243 + 13) \times (243 + 13)$. So in effect we have $\frac{256^2}{243} = \frac{(243+13) \times (243+13)}{243} = \frac{243^2 + (2 \times 13 \times 243) + 13^2}{243}$ the algebraic identity $(a + b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2$ that the Greek mathematicians prove geometrically, as in Euclid II.4. Cancelling 243 yields $= 243 + (2 \times 13) + \frac{13}{243} = 269 + \frac{13^2}{243}$ or $269 + 13 \times \frac{13}{243}$.

²⁸² There are problems with the text over the next several lines. The number that stands in the ratio of the semi-tone to 256 is not σξθ και διακοσιοστοτεσσαρακοστότριτα δεκα-τρία or $269 + \frac{13}{243}$ but rather σξθ και διακοσιοστοτεσσαρακοστότριτα τρισκαιδεκάκις δεκατρία or $269 + (13 \times \frac{13}{243})$. To see that this is so, consider how one would calculate the number that has the ratio of the semi-tone to 256: $256 \times (\frac{4}{3})/(\frac{9}{8})^2 = 256 = \frac{4 \times 64}{3 \times 81} = \frac{256^2}{243} = \frac{65,536}{243}$ or $269 \frac{169}{243}$ or $269 + (13 \times \frac{13}{243})$ $269 \frac{13}{243}$ by contrast $= \frac{65380}{243}$. Festugière speculates that the copyist has left out the word τρισκαιδεκάκις or variant forms at various points. I follow his text throughout.

number just mentioned has 256 and 13 and $13 \times \frac{13}{243}$. Therefore, since
 256 is [itself] the result of 243 and 13 other units which are $\frac{13}{243}$ of 243,
 15 it is obvious that the number 269 together with the $\frac{13^2}{243}$ has the 13 by
 which it exceeds 256, which in turn has in it 243 and the 13 by which it
 exceeds 243, this being $\frac{13}{243}$ of each of the 13 units by which 256 exceeds
 243, the remaining $\frac{13}{243}$ being similarly parts.²⁸³ The whole²⁸⁴ that has
 20 been constructed, i.e. 269 and $\frac{13^2}{243}$, has in relation to the whole 256 the
 same ratio as that which 256 itself has to 243, forming a super-partient
 [ratio] to it, [a super-partient that possesses] $\frac{13^2}{243}$ parts with the unit of
 243. Therefore, the remaining $273 + \frac{3}{8}$ has to $269 + \frac{13^2}{243}$ the ratio
 25 of the *komma*. As a result it has been discovered what are the lowest
 185 fractional numbers that express <the ratio of the *komma*>²⁸⁵ when two
 semi-tones are taken from a tone.

2. The completion of the scale

It is clear from what has been said that the assignment has been com-
 pleted. The terms and the intervals have been filled out with both the
 5 harmonic and arithmetic means, and in the case of *epitritos* [4:3] and
bemiolios [3:2] the division into both the *epogdooi* [9:8s] and semi-tones
 has come about. For since there is a double interval between 384 and
 768, the number 432 has been inserted between them, since this is the
epogdooi relative to 384. And 486 is the *epogdooi* relative to 432, while 512
 makes a semi-tone with 486. And this takes us as far as the *epitritos* [3:2
 10 between 384 and 512] consisting in two tones and one semi-tone.

Again, 576 is the *epogdooi* relative to 512, and in relation to this is 648,
 and [the *epogdooi*] relative to this is 729. 768 doubtless makes the semi-
 tone relative to it. The *bemiolios* [3:2 interval] that results from them [sc.
 512 and 768] has been filled up, possessing three *epogdooi* and one semi-
 15 *epogdooi* and two semi-tones. Furthermore, between the extreme terms
 of the sequence, 384 and 768, the number 512 forms the harmonic mean,
 while 576 is the arithmetic mean.

Again, the number 864 has been placed in the *epogdooi* position in
 relation to 768, while the *epogdooi* relative to this is 972. Relative to
 20 this, 1024 has the ratio of the semi-tone, and relative to this 1152 is the

²⁸³ This very convoluted sentence seems to be intended to convey the decomposition of
 $269 + \frac{13^2}{243}$ into $243 + 13 + 13 + \frac{13^2}{243}$. This shows the reader – or at least the very
 mathematically astute reader – how Proclus arrived at the value of the number that
 falls at the interval of the semi-tone below 256.

²⁸⁴ Reading ὅλος for λόγος at line 20 with 5.

²⁸⁵ Diehl marks a lacuna at 185.2 for which ὁ τοῦ κόμματος λόγος may be supplied.

epogdoos. And now the *bêmiolios* [3:2 ratio] has come to be, after the 2:1, making a triple ratio which has 384 at one end and 1152 at the other. Within this triple interval, 576 forms the harmonic mean between the end points, while 768 makes the arithmetic mean between them, for a theorem to this effect can be shown to hold generally:²⁸⁶ if there are two numbers [2x and 3x], the one double and the other three times the same number [x], then whatever number forms the arithmetic mean between the term [x] and its double [2x], will form the harmonic mean with the triple [3x]. Also the larger term in the double ratio [2x] will form the arithmetic mean [between the initial term x] and the triple [3x]. In the case of the numbers we have been dealing with, 384 doubled is 768 and tripled is 1152. Let 576 be taken as the arithmetic mean in the double ratio. The same number is seen to form the harmonic mean within the triple ratio. But the same number that forms the double ratio with 384 – that is, 768 – now appears as the arithmetic mean in the triple ratio [between 384 and 1152].

Subsequent to this, 1296 is doubtless the *epogdoos* of 1152, while 1458 in turn is the *epogdoos* of this. In relation to this, 1536 makes the ratio of the semi-tone. So up to this point the second double interval we've assumed has been filled up from the *bêmiolios* [3:2] and *epitritos* [4:3 ratios]. Taking 768 and 1536 as the end points, the interval has been divided into five *epogdooi* [tones] and two semi-tones, and has a harmonic mean at 1024 and an arithmetic mean at 1152.

Once again, the *epogdoos* in relation to 1536 is 1728, and the *epogdoos* in relation to this in turn is 1944 {and in relation to this again the *epogdoos* is 2187}.²⁸⁷ 2048 stands to this number [i.e. 1944] in the ratio of the semi-tone. In relation to 2048 the *epogdoos* is 2304, while the *epogdoos* of the latter is 2592. The *epogdoos* of this, in turn, is 2916 and in relation to this number 3072 makes the ratio of the semi-tone. 3072 is eight times the original portion [of 384] and fills up the third double interval.

²⁸⁶ Proclus makes use of this theorem again and offers a proof of it at 190.11–31.

²⁸⁷ Since Proclus says that there are 34 terms in the Platonic sequence, or 36 including the two numbers that form the ratio of the *apotomê*, it seems that two of the numbers that are generated in this list must go. Below at 186.24–7 Diehl proposes to amend the text so as to excise the calculation of 4374. In fact, 4096 is the number that should be removed. At 236.9 Proclus tells us that the sum of the 34 numbers in the Platonic sequence is 105,947. If we omit 4096 and 2187 from the list of 36 terms given here we get exactly the right answer. So I propose πάλιν πρὸς τὸν 1536 ἐπὶ ὄγδοος ὁ 1728, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἐπὶ ὄγδοος ὁ 1944, {καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἐπὶ ὄγδοος ὁ 2187,} καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τοῦ λείμματος λόγον ὁ 2048, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν 2048 ἐπὶ ὄγδοος ὁ 2304. The question of whether Plato intends his sequence to contain 34 or 36 terms is well discussed in Taylor (1928), 141–5, though the place of the Timaeus Locris in this story is more complex than Taylor's remarks would suggest. See the references in Tobin (1985).

Furthermore, the *epogdoos* of 3072 is 3456 and with these we come as far as the second triple interval, having as its end points 1152 and 3456 with two means between them – a harmonic at 1728 and an arithmetic at 2304.

Now following these numbers, the *epogodoos* of 3456 is 3888, {and of this, once again, the *epogdoos* is 4374}, and after this in the ratio of the semi-tone is <4096, and in relation to this the *epogdoos* is > 4608.²⁸⁸ In relation to this, the *epogdoos* is 5184, while the *epogdoos* of this in turn is 5832. Following this 6144 makes the semi-tone, and in relation to this 6912 is the *epogdoos*. This is another octave along with the three mentioned before,²⁸⁹ for wholly within the series of three triples there is a certain double ratio, and another fifth subsequently. For, in relation to 6912, 7776 is the *epogdoos*, and of this another *epogdoos* is 8748. Standing in the ratio of the semi-tone to this is 9216 and in relation to this the *epogdoos* is 10368. And now we have gone as far as the third triple interval which includes as end points 3456 and 10368. This has two means, the harmonic mean at 5184 and the arithmetic at 6192.²⁹⁰

Therefore, the double and triple intervals have been filled in by both the means and with the *epogdooi* and semi-tones. The entire musical scale has 9 semi-tones and 24 tones, for the intervals are one less in number than the terms.²⁹¹ It takes in four octaves, a fifth and an additional tone.

²⁸⁸ Omitting Diehl's brackets on τούτου δὲ αὐτὴ ἐπόγδοος ὁ 4374 and removing his supplement <4096 καὶ πρὸς τούτων ἐπόγδοος ὁ> to yield: 186.24–7 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπόγδοος μὲν τοῦ 3456 ὁ 3888, τούτου δὲ αὐτὴ ἐπόγδοος ὁ 4374, καὶ πρὸς τούτων ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ λείμματος ὁ 4608, καὶ πρὸς τούτων ἐπόγδοος ὁ 5184.

$3888 \times \frac{9}{8} = 4374$. $4374 : 4608 :: 243:256$. $4608 \times \frac{9}{8} = 5184$. This repeats the pattern we had above, save that we have two tones rather than three, and Proclus does not “back up” to derive the semi-tone from the second tone as he does in the previous interval.

²⁸⁹ Proclus has already identified three double intervals in the sequence corresponding to the double intervals that have the ratio of the octave. Having just introduced 6912 (which corresponds to 18 in a version of the Platonic triple sequence that recognises fractions), he notices that this is twice 3456 (which corresponds to 9 in the original sequence of triples). Hence he says that the triple sequence contains a certain double – the one just identified – plus another fifth, and a tone (187.16–17).

²⁹⁰ The table below illustrates the sequence of numbers that Proclus has just developed. I leave the rows in the table corresponding to the two apotomes shaded to indicate that I think these are, perhaps, the results of later meddling with Proclus' text.

²⁹¹ This claim, following immediately upon Proclus' elaboration of the text, suggests that he means to exclude the apotomes at 2187 and 4374 from his discussion. It may be that his original text included them, though he meant only to show where others put these terms in so as to arrive at a total of 36 rather than 34 terms. It seems to me more likely, however, that some copyist has tried to bring Proclus' list in line with that of Timaeus Locris in *On the Nature of the World*.

The soul's harmony

1	384	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	432	I
2	432	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	486	T
3	486	: 512	::	243 : 256	T
4	512	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	576	H 1-2, L
5	576	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	648	A 1-2; H 1-3 T
6	648	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	729	T
7	729	: 768	::	243 : 256	T
8	768	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	864	2; A 1-3, L
9	864	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	972	T
10	972	: 1024	::	243 : 245	T
11	1024	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	1152	H 2-4, L
12	1152	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	1296	3 A 2-4, T
13	1296	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	1458	T
14	1458	: 1536	::	243 : 256	T
15	1536	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	1728	4, L
16	1728	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	1944	H3-9, T
17	1944	: 2048	::	243 : 256	T
		$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	2187	
18	2048	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	2304	H4-8, L
				374	
19	2187	: 2048	::	2187:2048	<i>apotomê</i>
20	2304	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	2592	A3-9; A4-8, T
21	2592	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	2916	T
22	2916	: 3072	::	243 : 256	T
23	3072	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	3456	8, L
24	3456	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	3888	9, T
25	3888	: 4096	::	243 : 2564	T
		$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	4374	
26	4096	: 4374	=	2048:2187	<i>apotomê</i>
27	4374	: 4608	::	243 : 257	T
28	4608	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	5184	L
29	5184	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	5832	H9-27, T
30	5832	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	6144	T
31	6144	: 6192	::	243 : 256	T
32	6192	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	7776	A9-27 L
33	7776	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	8748	T
34	8748	: 9216	::	243 : 256	T
35	9216	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	10368	L
36	10368				27, T

3. *Alternative constructions*

a. *Adrastus*

Adrastus, that lover of technique, arranges the double and triple series in the shape of a Λ , as we said (170.31–171.4), and exposes the terms through three [nested] triangles. The innermost one has the ratios among the monadic numbers [i.e. 1, 2, 4, 8 and 1, 3, 9, 27]. The one that is around this one has these numbers multiplied by six and the two [arithmetic and harmonic] mean terms in each of the double and triple intervals. The outermost triangle then includes this one and makes the whole scale that has just been discussed. What we are talking about becomes clear from the illustration. Between the double and triple intervals, he inscribed all the numbers we have just discussed – something which we have not thought fit to add, since we don't wish to introduce any such extraneous multiplicity, for such a way of transmitting the numbers gives some of them twice over and exposes them in a way that is lacking in method. For in many cases the same means are discovered between the double and triple intervals, since the triples themselves are composed from the double and the *bêmiolios* [3:2 ratio]. What was stated by Plato has now come about. For the two means have been assumed between all the double and triple intervals, and from these means have come to be the *bêmiolios* and *epitritos* [4:3] ratios when these [sc. the double and triple intervals] are divided by the *epogdoos*, and there is a remaining portion in both of these [3:2 and 4:3 intervals] that has the ratio of the semi-tone. When the things described were done, and the numbers that result from this were assumed in an orderly way, it was seen that the terms included in the scale are 34 in number only.

b. *Timaeus Locris*

But since Timaeus the Pythagorean (96b) says that there are 36 terms in the scale and he takes as endpoints the same numbers as Plato – 384 and 10368 – then in order that there should be no inconsistency, let's see how the remaining two terms have been inserted [into Timaeus the Pythagorean's series]. In any event, those who wish not only to have the ratio of the semi-tone in the scale but also that of the *apotomê* – which they discovered twice: once in simplest terms, and again in just a multiple of three – add in each case a single term, introducing it into the scale. But Plato did not mention the *apotomê*, for which reason we who are satisfied with the semi-tone are also satisfied with the terms that have been uncovered by us. For how is it intended to make the *apotomê* in addition [to the semi-tone], when the diatonic scale has been assumed in which the *epogdoos* is not divided, since the *apotomê* comes

about precisely when the *epogdoos* is divided?²⁹² After all, the *apotomê* is the part of the *epogdoos* along with the semi-tone. Therefore, since Plato has not mentioned the *apotomê*, nor is it possible for it to be placed in the diatonic scale, it would be absurd for us to seek out some way to insert these additional terms in order that the scale should possess the *apotomê* when we are in fact satisfied with 34 as the full complement of tones and semi-tones. It also appears that the number 34 is proprietary (*oikeios*) to the diatonic genus in which there is only the *epogdoos* ratio, for the diatonic is composed out of the *epogdoos* [ratio] which 18 has to 16.²⁹³ On the one hand, the *hêmiolios* and *epitritos* ratios and the semi-tone are found among the other kinds of musical scales, but the *epogdooi*, on the other hand, are solely in the diachronic scale. So it turns out that this ratio probably makes the number of portions that compose the scale in a manner that is just right, and this second number is also fitting to the second procession of the soul from its primary intelligible principle.²⁹⁴

If, therefore, one takes the least term in the third of the double series – that is, 1536 – the *epogdoos* of this is 1728, and of this again in turn the *epogdoos* is 1944, and of this again 2187. So the interval with 1536 and 2187 as end points takes in three tones. But since 2048 stands in the *epitritos* ratio to 1536 and also has the ratio of the semi-tone to 1944, it is necessary that 2048 has to 2187 the ratio of the *apotomê*. For, as

²⁹² Cf. above 168.14 on the construction of the diatonic, enharmonic and chromatic scales.

²⁹³ ἐν ᾧ μόνῳ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐπόγδοος λόγος, cf. 189.3–4: ἐπόγδοοι δὲ ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ τῶν τριῶν γενῶν. More precisely, Proclus must mean that it is the only one that *progresses* by tones. Cf. Nicomachus, *Harm.* 12.1.35–40: ‘for the diatonic, about which we have spoken, proceeds thus: semi-tone, then a tone, then a tone – three intervals in four numbers, which is to say notes. And surely it has been called “diatonic” as a result of this fact: that it alone among all the others progresses through tones (ἐκ τοῦ προχωρεῖν διὰ τῶν τόνων αὐτὸ μονώτατον τῶν ἄλλων)’.

Proclus’ argument for treating Plato’s sequence of numbers as containing 34 rather than 36 numbers, then, is as follows. The *epogdoos* ratio of 9:8 is proprietary to the diatonic genus. Plato’s scale is diatonic. 18 stands to 16 in the ratio of the *epogdoos*, so these numbers are proprietary to Plato’s proposed diagram. The sum of 18 and 16 is 34, not 36, so Plato’s diagram contains 34 numbers.

²⁹⁴ It is unclear just what numerological associations Proclus might have in mind here, nor whether we should be seeking associations with 16 or with 8. I suspect that the association is primarily with the number 8, which explains why Proclus stresses the appropriateness of *second* procession of the soul being symbolised by second number in the ratio 18:16. It is speculative, of course, but it may be the association between 8 and Rhea cited in *Theology of Arithmetic* 74.6–8 that Proclus has in mind here. The number 8 or the ogdoad is called ‘mother’ ‘since Rhea is the mother of the gods, because although the dyad was shown to belong to Rhea seminally, the ogdoad does in extension’ (i.e. 8 is 2 cubed). Proclus, of course, also identifies Rhea as the source of souls on the basis of *Oracles* 51.

we said earlier, the *apotomê* is the remainder you get when you divide the tone by the semi-tone.²⁹⁵ Doubtless then it turns out similarly when we
 20 take the third triple series. The interval between 4068 and 6561 is three tones. 6144 makes the *epitritos* ratio with 4068, but also has the ratio of
 190 the semi-tone to 5832. So necessarily there will be the ratio of the *apo-*
 25 *tomê* between 6144 and 6561, these numbers being three times the value of the lowest possible terms of the ratio that we previously discovered in the double series. For that the ratio of the *apotomê* is expressed by
 5 these numbers in the lowest possible terms is obvious. It can be shown that these numbers – 2048 and 2187 – are prime to one another because of the theorem from mutual subtraction, since these are of necessity the smallest primes.²⁹⁶ The plurality of terms recorded by Timaeus [the Pythagorean] had been demonstrated by Philolaus,²⁹⁷ but the Platonic
 10 scale is developed without the ratio of the *apotomê*. Let this be enough about these matters.

Since we said previously (185.27) that when you have one term and you take another term that stands in the double ratio to the first and another that stands in the triple ratio, then the term that forms the arithmetic mean between the first term and its double also forms the harmonic

²⁹⁵ First consider that the interval between 1536 and 2187 is made up by three tones. That is to say: $1536 \times (9/8)^3 = 2187$. But also consider that a musical fourth is made up of two tones and a semi-tone. So in effect $1536 \times (9/8)^2 \times {}^{256}/_{143} = 2048$. Since 2187 is three tones above 1536, while 2048 is two tones and a semi-tone, 2048 will have to 2187 the ratio of the *apotomê*. For the *apotomê* is the remainder of the tone divided by the semi-tone and it is by just such a remainder of the “divided” third tone that 2187 is greater than 2048.

²⁹⁶ See above at 182.29 on the method of mutual subtraction. In this case, Proclus' audience could work out that the numbers 2048 and 2187 are prime to one another on the basis of the following example of ἀνθυφαίρεσις:

$$\begin{array}{r}
 2048 \\
 - \\
 \hline
 2187 \\
 \hline
 139 \\
 - \\
 \hline
 102 \\
 - \\
 \hline
 37 \\
 - \\
 \hline
 74 \\
 \hline
 28 \\
 - \\
 \hline
 28 \\
 \hline
 9 \\
 - \\
 \hline
 27 \\
 \hline
 9 \\
 \hline
 9
 \end{array}
 \begin{array}{l}
 (1) \\
 (14) \\
 (102) \\
 - \\
 139 \\
 (1) \\
 102 \\
 (2) \\
 37 \\
 (1) \\
 28 \\
 (3) \\
 9 \\
 (9)
 \end{array}$$

²⁹⁷ Cf. DK 44 A26 = Boethius, *Inst.* III.5.

mean between the first term and its triple. Moreover, the double term itself forms the arithmetic mean between the initial term and its triple. Let us now briefly clarify and prove this claim.

Let B be two times A and let C be three times A. Let D be the arithmetic mean between A and B. I say that the things in the consequent [of the above conditional] result. Since B is two times A, and C is three times A, to whatever extent A is a multiple of 2, B will be a multiple of 4, and C a multiple of 6. Therefore by whatever amount C exceeds B, B will exceed A by the same amount, with the result that B is the arithmetic mean between A and C. Moreover, since to whatever extent A is a multiple of 2, B will be a multiple of 4, and since D is the arithmetic mean between them, D will be a multiple of 3 to the same extent that A is a multiple of 2 and B a multiple of 4. In addition, to whatever extent B is a multiple of 4, C is a multiple of 6. Therefore, to the degree to which A is a multiple of 2, to the same degree D will be a multiple of 3 and C a multiple of 6. But then D will make a harmonic mean with A, for by the same part of the greater number it is exceeded and it exceeds the smaller one by the same part of the smaller number.²⁹⁸ Therefore the proposition is demonstrated by means of this.

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c. Severus

Severus does not think that it is proper to conclude the scale with a tone, but would rather that it should end in a semi-tone, since Plato brought everything in the account of the divisions within the soul to a conclusion with it.²⁹⁹ In order, therefore, that the division should terminate the semi-tone, he transposes some of the terms and makes the total number of them 34. Since in the thirty-fourth term, a half of the unit intrudes, he multiplies all the terms by two and makes the first portion 768 which is twice 384. He puts next the *epogdoos* of this, i.e. 864, and then the *epogdoos* of this which is 972. He takes the ratio of the semi-tone in relation to this latter number which yields 1024.³⁰⁰

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²⁹⁸ Take the smallest multiples: 2, 3, 6. 3 is exceeded by 6 by 3, which is $\frac{1}{2}$ of 6. Similarly, 3 exceeds 2 by 1, which is $\frac{1}{2}$ of 2 – the definition of the harmonic mean.

²⁹⁹ in *Tim.* II. 191.1–192.27 = Severus τ 16 (Gioè). Severus' point seems to be that since Plato describes the semi-tone *last* (36b2–5) among the notes to be inserted in his number sequence, the diagram should *end* with a semi-tone. Severus thus begins his sequence by using 768 as the unit so that it ends with 20736. This stands in the ratio of the semi-tone to the preceding number, 19683.

³⁰⁰ The table summarises this and the rest of the text down to line 30. There are several misprints in Taylor and one in Festugière. In the latter, the two occurrences of 6776 at line 24 should be 7776.

1	768	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	864	
2	864	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	972	T
3	972	: 1024	::	243 : 256	T
4	1024	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	1152	L
5	1152	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	1296	T
6	1296	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	1458	T
7	1458	: 1536	::	243 : 256	T
8	1536	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	1728	L
9	1728	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	1944	T
10	1944	: 2048	::	243 : 256	T
11	2048	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	2304	L
12	2304	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	2592	T
13	2592	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	2916	T
14	2916	: 3072	::	243 : 256	T
15	3072	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	3456	L
16	3456	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	3888	T
17	3888	: 4096	::	243 : 256	T
18	4096	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	4608	L
19	4608	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	5184	T
20	5184	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	5832	T
21	5832	: 6144	::	243 : 256	T
22	6144	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	6912	L
23	6912	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	7776	T
24	7776	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	8748	T
25	8748	: 9216	::	243 : 256	T
26	9216	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	10,368	L
27	10,368	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	11,664	T
28	11,664	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	13,122	T
29	13,122	: 13824	::	243 : 256	T
30	13,824	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	15,552	L
31	15,552	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	17,496	T
32	17,496	$\times \frac{9}{8}$	=	19,683	T
33	19,683	: 20,736	::	243 : 256	T
34	20,736				L

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He has filled in the scale down to this point, having made the semitone the final term – except that in this way of arranging the terms we get first an *epitritos* [4:3 ratio 768 and 1024], and then a *hêmiolios* [3:2 ratio between 1024 and 1536], and subsequently an *epitritos* [between 1536 and 2048], and then a *hêmiolios* [between 2048 and 3072], and again an *epitritos* [between 3072 and 4096], then a *hêmiolios* [between 4096 and 6144], and after these three *hêmiolios* ratios in succession [6144 : 9216, 9216 : 13,824, and 13,824 : 20,736] – as it obvious from what

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has been diagrammed. But then it turns out that in the case of a scale like this, there are four octaves and a single fifth and an extraneous tone. For three *hêmiolia* make one octave, a tone and a fifth. But the ending point is not a tone, but rather a semi-tone. But this was what Severus set out to do [viz. to end the sequence in a semi-tone].³⁰¹ Therefore Severus neither eliminates the tone, nor does he end on it. So it turns out that the whole scale is composed of four octaves, a fifth, and one tone.

If we wished to assume these intervals in monadic numbers, it can be seen that a procession down to 27 has come about. For 2 is the monadic unit doubled, and this doubled is 4, and 4 doubled is 8, and 8 doubled is 16, and this takes us down to four octaves. But 24 is the *hêmiolios* of 16 and this is the fifth. But 27 stands to 24 in the ratio of the *epogdoos*. So it turns out that from a single portion taken 27 times, the concordances that have been discussed will result. This much, then, is common to all the scales, just as we said. But they do differ from one another because some are in the form of a Λ , while others form a straight line. For among the ancients, Adrastus used the Λ shape, while Severus laid them out in straight lines. This latter arrangement is better. In the Λ arrangement the same numbers are discovered twice, once here on this side, once on the other. But this is not in keeping with the facts, for the same thing [i.e. two instances of the same number] is not two parts, but rather all are parts of the soul. [The arrangements also differ] in that some end in the tone itself, while others end on a semi-tone. Some are also clearer than others, even if they take the same numbers twice, as in the arrangement where the double and triple intervals have been divided along the sides of the triangles. Others set out each number just once in all the intervals, but they make the division of the double intervals into the super-particular and super-partient ratios more difficult to calculate.

³⁰¹ Recall that an octave corresponds to the 2:1 ratio and can be composed from a musical fourth and a fifth, corresponding to the 4:3 and 3:2 ratios respectively. So beginning from the unit, there is a first octave that spans 768 to 1536, then a second from 1536 to 3072, and a third that spans 3072 to 6144. Severus' number sequence involves an alternation of fourths and fifths down to this point. But he concludes with three successive fifths and this interval is equivalent to an octave, a fifth and a tone. However, the octave from 6144 ends at 13,122. We can't insert the extraneous tone between this and the concluding fifth here, since the ratio between 13,122 and the next unit – 13,824 – is the ratio of the semi-tone. Nor can we add the extraneous tone at the end, since Severus has sought to make the interval between the penultimate and ultimate numbers in the sequence that of the semi-tone as well. Since three fifths must comprise an octave, a fifth and an additional note, it must fit somewhere. Hence Proclus complains that Severus neither eliminates it, nor does he manage to end on it since the ratio that concludes the series is that of the semi-tone.

4. *Correlations to reality*

a. *Confusions that must be avoided*

We have thus stated such things as it is possible to draw together in the consideration of the diagram that results from the generation of the soul – at least from the point of view of those who focus on it mathematically. But since now we propose to make a start on the exegesis that correlates the text with things (*pragmateiôdês*),³⁰² it is necessary that we begin from what has been said about its division – that through which the soul is divided by ratios such as these – and by refuting some things that have been said, we will remove such stumbling blocks as stand in the way of the observation of the truth concerning the soul.

1. Let no one think that this division is corporeal. (For it has been shown earlier that the intermediate [nature] of the soul transcends both bodies and the entire divisible being that has come to be simultaneously with it.)

2. Nor, having posited the soul as something superior to body, should one think that the soul is divided in the same manner as the geometric intervals and limits that we are familiar with.³⁰³ (For extended things are not present to themselves through and through and when they are

³⁰² This term occurs once in Plato, at *Parm.* 137b2. But the Neoplatonist school at Athens, beginning with Proclus and Syrianus, seems to have given it new life. The term is not found in Plotinus or Porphyry, nor even in Iamblichus. We find one occurrence in Stobaeus 4.7.62, 36 in an extract from the Pythagorean Diotogenes ‘On Kingship’.

The bulk of the uses in Proclus fall in his *Parmenides* commentary and Dillon and Morrow have chosen to translate it ‘substantive’ or ‘important’. This coincides with the sense of the contrast with ‘play’ drawn by Plato at 137b1. But it is not clear that this is quite what is at issue here. As Festugière notes, the section from *in Tim.* II. 193.7–211.30 consists largely of what certainly seems to us far-fetched correspondences between the properties of numbers and ratios under discussion and the properties of the soul. Proclus will invoke the term again shortly (213.8) to describe the views of exegetes like Amelius. Here too we find far-fetched correspondences between, say, demons and the number 2, tame animals with the number 8, and wild animals with the number 27. This leads me to suspect that *pragmateiôdês* carries something like the sense of ‘correspondences between levels’. Note that this actually comports well with the passage that LSJ cites: ‘b. concerned with facts or realities, material, opp. *logikos* (formal), Procl. *in Prm.* p.820S’ (= 1043.5). In fact, at this point Proclus is refuting an interpretation that seeks to correlate the number of hypotheses in the *Parmenides* with the number of principles. I suggest that often the term characterises a kind of interpretation and that what is distinctive about exegesis *pragmateiôdês* is that it seeks to correlate being or things with numerical features discussed within the text that is interpreted.

³⁰³ Reading μηδέ... αὐτὴν οἰέσθω διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς <τὸ> παρὸν with Festugière at 193.19.

divided are not able to preserve their unity in an unconfused way. But when the soul participates in the indivisible, it has its portions unified in relation to itself and exhibits all the same elements that have been established in all its parts.

3. Nor again must we calculate these cuts in it as one would with numbers. For there certainly is number [there in the soul] – not, however, existing in a quantitative way, but rather it is substantial (*ousiôdês*), such as to generate itself (*autogonos*), uni-form (*henoeidês*) and reverted upon itself.

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4. Nor must the presence of all the elements in all [the parts] be compared to spermatik *logoi*,³⁰⁴ (for these are incomplete, corporeal and enmattered and they are entirely in want of the immaterial and pure being of the psychic ratios).

5. Nor must anyone liken the portions that are spoken of here to the theorems of a science on the grounds that each one is inclusive of the whole of the science. [This comparison is not apt] because we are not at present considering the soul's knowledge (*gnôsis*), but rather its essence (*ousia*).³⁰⁵

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6. Neither is it necessary to regard the differentiations among states (*hexis*) as similar to the differences between essences, for the former are variously strewn about in the things that possess the states, while the latter have been established uniformly within Demiurgic boundaries.

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Therefore, it is necessary to go upward and make the primary-effective (*prôtourgos*) first principle of the psychogenic division dependent upon the Demiurgic cause and the perfect measures pre-existing eternally in the Beings toward which the Demiurge looks when he divides the soul. For just as he divided this universe by reference to intelligible paradigms, therefore in a similar manner he has demarcated the essence of the soul by means of most beautiful terms in order that it may be made similar to the causes that are elder and more originary (*archêgikos*). Doubtless then the manner of the division is immaterial, intellectual, undefiled, and such as to perfect the soul's essence. It generates the plurality in the soul and collects it into a single order

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³⁰⁴ Cf. similar remarks about the Stoic doctrine of the *spermatikos logos* at *in Parm.* 731.30, 883.29, 888.4. For a somewhat more concessive tone, see *in Tim.* I. 99.17. Perhaps, given the context of human geography in this passage, Proclus has in mind the (allegedly) more Platonically inclined Stoic Posidonius.

³⁰⁵ Here again Proclus uses the Iamblichean order of topics in a proper treatment of psychology to rule out an interpretation of Plato's account of the World Soul. The soul's knowledge is among its activities and as such must therefore be discussed by Plato *after* the soul's essence and its powers.

through harmony, making the divisions continuous. It is simultaneously
 15 the cause of the unmixed purity to the pluralities in the soul, but also
 brings about the collective communion of the ratios toward the same
 thing.

Now it seems that [the Demiurge] uses up the whole [of the psychic
 stuff] in the division into parts. And this is sort of what Timaeus says too:
 that ‘he used the entire thing from which he took these parts’ (36b5).
 20 But since he nevertheless said that the soul is not only divisible but also
 indivisible, it is necessary to hang onto both of these claims – that while
 the wholeness of the indivisible [aspect of it] remains, it also comes to
 be divided into a plurality of parts. For if we were to assume only one
 of these (I mean the cutting into parts) we would make the soul merely
 divisible [and not both divisible and indivisible]. Well then, let the whole
 be divided into parts but at the same time remain whole – being once
 25 more indivisible through participating in an equal degree in both of
 these. For surely the marvellous Aristotle speaks well when he says,
 as we noted earlier [153.8], that there is something indivisible in what
 is divisible which connects the parts [of the divisible things]. As a result
 it is true to an even greater degree in the case of things whose nature is
 not merely divisible but *also* indivisible that the indivisible [within them]
 30 remains [undivided]. Otherwise, if it did not remain undivided, then
 that which is composed of both the divisible and the indivisible would
 be solely divisible.

Now it is obvious that the whole must remain in the generation of
 the parts – if indeed the Demiurge is an everlasting creator,³⁰⁶ and if he
 created the soul as one whole prior to the division. For he does not wipe
 out one thing when he produces another, but instead produces every-
 thing always and through all eternity (*diaiônios*) and makes the product
 remain the very thing that it is (*hoper estin*). Therefore the wholeness
 5 is not destroyed when the parts have been established, but instead it
 remains and, indeed, comes before the parts. For he did not produce
 the parts prior to the whole, and then generate the whole out of these.
 Rather, it was the other way around. So, the essence of the soul is simul-
 taneously a whole and has parts, and one and a plurality.³⁰⁷ The division
 which Timaeus relates in the case of the soul is surely something of this
 10 sort.

Let the manner of exegesis of the soul’s essence be naturally consonant
 with the essence (*ousia*) of the soul itself. You must free yourself from

³⁰⁶ One would expect αἰώνιος (eternal) rather than αἰδῖος here, but perhaps Proclus is simply being a bit careless. Or perhaps we should see this in light of the ἡ αἰώνιος αἰδιότης attributed to the intelligible realm at 147.30 above.

³⁰⁷ Reading καὶ ἓν καὶ πλῆθος with 5 for καὶ ἓν πλῆθος, cf. 204.17.

the [mere] appearance of harmony, and lift yourself up to the substantive (*ousiôdês*) and immaterial harmony, and be led back from images to the paradigms [of these images]. For the concordances that flow through our ears and which consist in soundings and striking differ entirely from the concordance of what is life-giving and intellectual. Therefore, let no one stop at the point of the mathematical consideration of the subject at hand. Instead he should urge himself on to examine this subject in a manner fitting to the essence of the soul. And let us not regard it as a worthwhile endeavour to look to the intervals of sounds³⁰⁸ or the differences between motions, for these things are assumed in areas of study remote from this one and in no way fit in with the subject at hand. Rather, focus on the actual things that are said [in Plato's text] and reason about how these convey an indication of the intermediate nature of the soul and how they attempt to elucidate the Demiurgic providence.

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b. Five properties of the soul

i. Three kinds of wholeness in the soul

First, therefore, if you wish to consider it, is the fact that there exist three sorts of wholeness: (a) the wholeness before the parts, (b) the wholeness composed from the parts, and (c) the wholeness in each part, as we have frequently demonstrated in other [works].³⁰⁹ We have already been given the wholeness that exists *prior* to the parts of the soul, for [the Demiurge] made the soul one whole, prior to all the division into parts. We said that this whole remains just what it is and is not used up in the production of the parts. After all, since 'to be willing to dissolve that which is well put together is something that pertains to what is evil' (41b1–2), the Demiurge does not destroy the whole when he uses it up in the parts.

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Now the wholeness which results *from* the parts is established in this fact: when the whole mixture is used up in the cutting into parts of the soul's essence, then, thanks to the harmony of its parts, the whole itself is fashioned anew out of all of the appropriate parts with which it has been filled up.

He will teach us about the wholeness *in* each of the parts in a short while (36d) when he divides the whole into certain circles, placing in each of the circles all the ratios. And this has already been made clear, for in each of the parts Plato said that the three [genera, i.e. Being, Sameness and Difference] exist just as they do in the whole. Therefore, in a sense,

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³⁰⁸ Reading φωνῶν for φέρων at line 19 with Kroll.

³⁰⁹ Cf. *ET* prop. 67, in *Parm.* 1102.7–14, *Plat. Theol.* III, ch. 25.

10 every part is the whole, since each is triadic [i.e. containing the three general] as does the whole.

It was necessary, then, for the soul to include these three sorts of wholeness because it is supposed to animate the universe – this being ‘a whole composed of wholes’ (35a7) – each of which is like a whole in the part. So since it turns out to doubly animate the universe – as strictly a whole and then as a whole in the parts – the soul needs the two kinds of wholeness. Moreover, it transcends what it animates, being something
15 external to it, like something ‘wrapped around’ the universe as Plato said (34b4). So, by means of the wholeness prior to the part, the soul is situated above the universe. However, by means of the remaining [sort of wholeness] it contains both itself and the things in it in as much as these are also wholes.

ii. The soul is both monadic and dyadic

Next, it is necessary to conceive that Plato preserves the simultaneously monadic and dyadic character of the soul proceeding from beginning to
20 end. For he brought the soul’s existence (*hyparxis*) back to Being, Sameness and Difference, and then perceived the number that comes from the single portion, dividing this in a two-fold manner into the double and triple series. Contemplating these means, he includes the two of them
25 within one, and in the case of each of these he exhibits the two-fold ratios of the *hēmíolios* and the *epitritos*. And these he again cuts into the *epogdooi* and the semi-tones. In what follows (36b) he will divide the one length into two and the one shape of the soul into two circles, and in general, at no point does he leave out the simultaneously monadic and dyadic [nature of the soul]. And he does this in a plausible way, for while the monadic alone pertains to Intellect since it too is indivisible, the dyadic pertains
30 to body. It is for this reason that in the generation of what is corporeal, Plato began (31b) from a dyad – fire and earth – and placed the two other kinds of elements between these. But since soul is something intermediate between these [sc. Intellect and body], it is simultaneously a monad and a dyad. The explanation is that it participates, in a way, in equal measure in both the Limit and the Unlimited. Just as intellect is akin to Limit, so too the Unlimited pertains more to body on account of both
5 the underlying matter and also the fact that it is divisible into infinity. And if, by virtue of this, some people trace the Divisible and the Indivisible back to the Monad and the Indefinite Dyad, then they have spoken in a way that conforms to the facts of the matter. But if, on the other hand, they treat the soul as a number no different from monadic numbers, then

they have drawn conclusions greatly at variance with the soul's essence. Therefore, the soul is simultaneously a monad and a dyad. By its monadic character it is made into an image of the Intellectual Limit, while by its dyadic character it represents the Unlimited. (Either that or [it is simultaneously a monad and dyad] by having the status of an image in relation to the Indivisible, while playing the role of a paradigm in relation to the Divisible.)

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iii. *The Dionysian and Apollonian activity of the Demiurge*

In addition [to the dyadic character of the *soul*] it is also necessary to look at how the work of the *Demiurge* has been given in a two-fold way here. For he divides the soul by virtue of the portions, and harmonises the things that have been divided, and brings about their concord with one another. In doing these things, he is active at one and the same time in both the Dionysian and Apollonian manner. For to divide, to convey wholes into parts, and to preside over the distribution of forms is Dionysian. But to harmoniously bring all things together into something complete is Apollonian. Therefore, since the *Demiurge* simultaneously encompasses within himself the causes of both of these gods, he also divides the soul into parts and harmonises it, for the number that is common to both of these is the Hebdomad, since the theologians say that Dionysus was divided into seven parts:

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All the parts of the lad were into seven divided. (*Orph. frag.* 210)

And the Hebdomad is referred to Apollo since it is such as to connect all the concordances, for the double octave is one monad, one dyad and a tetrad, which add up to seven.³¹⁰ For this reason, the god is also called 'Hebdomagetan' or 'born on the seventh day' and they said that the seventh day was sacred to him:

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[To begin with, the first, the fourth, and the seventh] –
on which Leto bore Apollo with the blade of gold – [each is a holy day].³¹¹

³¹⁰ As Festugière and Mugler note, it is not that there are seven notes in an octave. Rather, it is the ratios that correspond to the octave and the double octave. If the first octave is expressed by the ratio 2:1, the second octave corresponds to 4:2. Thus we have the numbers 1, 2 and 4 which sum to 7.

³¹¹ Hesiod, *Works and Days* 770. Proclus quotes only a few words of the lines. I have supplied what comes before and after for sense.

Just as the sixth day is sacred to Artemis.³¹² This number is also present in the soul from higher causes, just as the number three is too. The latter derives from intelligible causes, while the former comes from intellectual ones. But it is present to the soul from them (that is, from the gods) in order that by being divided into seven portions it may be a token (5) (*synthêma*) of the Dionysian series and of the legendary ‘tearing apart’ (*sparagmos*) (for it is also necessary for the soul to participate in the Dionysian Intellect, as Orpheus says, for since it bears the god on its shoulders, the soul should be divided in accordance with this number).³¹³ 10 But by virtue of the harmony among these portions, the soul is a symbol (*symbolon*) of the Apollonian order, for [in the Orphic poems] this is the god who collects and reunites the dismembered shares of the lad Dionysius in accordance with the will of the Father.

iv. The three means and the daughters of Themis

Now in these cases the three means have been assumed.³¹⁴ They pertain 15 not only to the case of the soul, but they also apply equally well to the case of the daughters of Themis who are symbolised by them (since the means are three and so are the daughters).³¹⁵ The geometric mean is an image of Eunomia (Good Order). And for this reason Plato says in the *Laws* (VI, 757bc) that this mean arranges matters in city-states and is celebrated as ‘the judgement of Zeus’. It is said to be that which orders 20 the cosmos and genuinely includes within itself the science of politics. But the harmonic mean is an image of Dikê (Justice), since it assigns a greater ratio to the larger terms and a smaller one to the lesser terms. (This is the work of Justice.) But the arithmetic mean is the image of Eirênê (Peace), for (as was also said in the *Laws* (VI, 757d–e) it is such as to distribute what is equal in quantity to all and makes the common run of

³¹² Festugière cites *Theol. Arith.* 49.11 (de Falco). This passage connects the number 6 with Hecate, although indirectly since she is here primarily identified with the triad and with 6 only derivatively. Now, Proclus certainly matches Hecate with Artemis (cf. *in Crat.* §179.37–45). But it seems equally plausible that Proclus is pursuing a more direct numerological connection. Six is the first number in the decad to combine the even-odd principle (2×3). This makes it androgynous (*Theol. Arith.* 46.15–16), surely a fact that connects it directly to Artemis.

³¹³ See above 106.1 and note for Proclus’ use of the story of Hipta and Dionysius.

³¹⁴ Festugière repunctuates ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις αἱ τρεῖς μεσότητες παρελήφθησαν. αὗται μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς μόνον κτλ. by moving the stop to the end of μεσότητες in order to supply a finite verb for the following very long sentence. This is certainly possible, but one might also regard the verb ἦκει as understood, since it is used immediately above at lines 2 and 5.

³¹⁵ This material on the daughters of Themis is recapitulated at the end of book II (316.29–317.3), in a section that Festugière elects not to add to his translation.

people (*dêmos*) live in peace with those who do not belong to the mob.³¹⁶ So, since the solid proportion is of course prior to these and it is sacred to Themis, she is the mother of all of them, since the solid proportion includes the powers of these three proportions.³¹⁷ But enough in general about these three [means].

Let it be said, in a way that is appropriate to our previous remarks, that these three means³¹⁸ are such as to unify and connect the essence of the soul, since Timaeus earlier called these means 'bonds'. For the geometric [proportion] was said above (31c2) to be the finest of bonds, and the other [proportions] are in them. But every bond is a sort of unification. Therefore, if these means are bonds and bonds are unifications of the things that have been bound, then the conclusion is clear. So surely, then, these means permeate all [of the soul] and make it a single whole from many parts, since they are allocated the power of connecting things that have various forms. So, since there are three of these means, the geometric means binds the substantial totality (*to ousiôdes pan*) of the soul, for the essence is a single *logos* running through all things and connecting the first, middle and last – just like the case of the geometric proportion where one and the same ratio (*logos*) completely permeates all three terms. The harmonic proportion connects all the Samenesses that has been divided in the case of the soul, establishing a common ratio between the extreme terms and yoking together things that are naturally similar. It is observed more in things that are more universal and less so in things that are more particular, just as Sameness is. The arithmetic

³¹⁶ The moral and political implications of the kinds of proportional equality discussed here exercised a fascination over Platonists and there seems to be no consensus. So while Proclus' text assigns arithmetic proportionality to democracy, ps.-Archytas' *On Law and Justice* connects geometric proportion with democracy. See O' Meara (2003), 102–4 and Ausland (2006).

³¹⁷ 'Solid proportion' perhaps denotes the same thing as 'perfect proportion' (Iamblichus, in *Nic. Arith.* 118.19 ff.). In such a proportion, we have a four-term geometric proportion in which the middle terms are also arithmetic and harmonic means between the extremes. For instance, 6:8 :: 9:12. In the appendix to this book, Proclus (or the author of the appendix) tells us that ἡ μὲν στερεὰ ἀναλογία ἢ ἐκ τῶν τριῶν [sc. the geometric, arithmetic and harmonic] συγκειμένη ἰσότης τῆς Θέμιδος. Why is it called 'solid' rather than perfect? Iamblichus tells us that it was also called 'musical proportion'. It was purportedly discovered by the Babylonians and first brought to Greece by Pythagoras. He also says that it was used by Timaeus of Locris, Philolaus, Archytas and Plato in the *Timaeus*. Simplicius also uses the term 'solid proportion' and he does so in contexts where he is discussing *Timaeus* 32a7–b2 (in *Cael.* 401.13; 722.12), so it seems likely that the terminology of 'solid' derives from the fact that this is the kind of proportion that Plato uses to bind the elements.

³¹⁸ Repunctuating with Festugière to remove the comma after αἱ τρεῖς at line 29: οἰκείως δὲ λεγέσθωσαν τοῖς προειρημένοις αἱ τρεῖς ἐνωτικάι καὶ συνεκτικάι τῆς οὐσίας οὐσαι τῆς ψυχῆς.

15 mean, on the other hand, binds together the various Differences in the soul's procession. It is present to a lesser degree in that which is greater in rank but more present in what is lower, for Difference dominates among things with a greater particularity, just as Sameness dominates among those things that are more universal and superior. These things exhibit reciprocal proportionality (*antipeponthêsis*) to one another, just as Sameness and Difference do, and just as Being (*ousia*) is the monad of Sameness and Difference, so too the geometric mean is the monad of the harmonic and arithmetic ones.³¹⁹ Therefore the geometric [proportion] is the unification of the thirty-four Beings in all the terms, while the arithmetic [proportion] is the unification of a like number of Samenesses, and the arithmetic [proportion] of the Differences, all these [proportions] being
20 extended through all of the terms. How else could some whole come to be from these [constituents] unless they were united as much as possible to one another – substantially (*ousiôdôs*) by the one [sc. the geometric proportion] and in other ways by the other two? For this reason these two are surely the filling out (*plêrôma*) of the geometric proportion, just as Sameness and Difference are brought to mutual completion (*syntelein*) in Being. For in the latter case, since Sameness and Difference are anti-
25 thetical to one another, Being connects them and brings together their separation. Now the harmonic proportion allocates the greater ratio to the larger term, as we said above [198.22] and the smaller ratio to the smaller term. This illustrates the fact that what is greater and more uni-
30 versal with respect to Being is more inclusive in its powers than those things which are inferior. But the arithmetic proportion, conversely, assigns the greater [ratio] to the smaller [term] and the smaller [ratio] to the greater [term], for Difference exercises greater dominion among what is inferior, just as Sameness conversely has more authority in what
35 is superior than it does in inferior things. But the geometric [proportion] extends the same ratio over all the terms, thus projecting unification to the first, middle and last by the presence of Being to all things.

The Demiurge, therefore, endows the soul with three unifications which connect it – things which Plato has surely called 'means' (*mesos*)
10 in so far as soul belongs to an intermediate (*mesos*) [or middle] order that binds together the wholes. The geometric one brings together the plurality [of instances] of Being and makes the substantial progression (*ousiôdês proôdos*) one, for the single ratio [of the geometric proportion] is an image of unification. The harmonic mean unifies the entirety of

³¹⁹ Cf. *in Tim.* II. 52.9–15 for the priority of the geometric proportion over the other two in Proclus' reading of the *Timaeus*. For the mathematical priority of the geometric proportion, which alone is strictly a proportion, see Nicomachus, *Arith.* II.24.1 and Theon I 14.1.

Sameness and binds their existence (*huparxis*) into a single association, while the arithmetic mean yokes together the Differences – the first, the middle and the final ones – for in general, Difference is the mother of numbers, as we have learnt in the *Parmenides*.³²⁰ However, these three (that is, Being, Sameness and Difference) were individual portions and it was necessary to connect them all to one another through a mean and through connective ratios.

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v. Considerations about numbers

Now, moving on from these matters, we say that the soul is a sum of ratios (*plêrôma tôn logôn*),³²¹ simpler than sensibles, on the one hand, but more composite than the intelligibles on the other. Because of these facts, then, Timeaus assumes seven ratios in the case of the soul: that of equality, the multiple (*pollaplasios*), the sub-multiple (*hypopollaplasios*), the super-particular (*epimorios*), the super-partient (*epimerês*),³²² and the subcontraries of the latter two – the sub-super-particular (*hypepimorios*) and the sub-super-partient (*hypepimerês*).³²³ But he does not include the ratios that are compounded from these, for these pertain to corporeal *logoi* since they are composite and divisible.³²⁴ And even if the ratios in the soul do proceed into plurality and are divisible, they nonetheless

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³²⁰ Cf. *Parm.* 143b1–6 where Parmenides begins the generation of the numbers with the observation that the Being of the One must be something *different from* the One itself, given that the One is not itself Being, but rather participates in Being.

³²¹ Festugière thinks that this must be a 'perfect sum' in the technical sense of the Gnostics. But it seems more likely to me that there is an established sense in Neoplatonism in which the soul is a *plêrôma*. Cf. in *Parm.* 896.3–4, Proclus says: ἡ ψυχὴ πάντων πλήρωμά ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν. Philoponus expands this formulation in his account of what he takes to be the real content of Xenocrates' psychology: ἔλεγεν οὖν ἀριθμὸν μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὸ πλήρωμα εἰδῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λόγον ἐκ λόγων. For an epistemological sense in which the soul is a *plêrôma* of *logoi*, cf. Proclus, in *Alc.* 187.18.

³²² On the super-particular ($n+1/n$) and super-partient ($n+m/n$ for $m > 1$), see above 168.2 and 180.23.

³²³ The inverse of the super-particular and the super-partient; cf. Nicomachus, *Arith.* I.17.8.

³²⁴ One natural assumption is that Proclus has in mind here the multi-super-particular and the poly-*epimerê* relations. In the former, the larger number contains the smaller several times with one part of it left over. For 7 stands to 3 in this relation, since 7 contains 3 2 and $1/3$ times. The relation of 8 to 3 illustrates the poly-*epimerê* relation, since the former contains the latter 2 and $2/3$ times. Cf. Theon 78.23 and 79.15. These ratios involve plurality presumably because, unlike super-particular or super-partient ratios, they do not have the form of a *unit* – i.e. 1 – plus some fraction. However, later (229.32) the ratio of 9:8 seems to be associated with corporeal *logoi*. It seems entirely possible to me that Proclus has sought correspondences between numbers and participation relations that are not consistent throughout. Since the correspondences seem to be somewhat arbitrary, it is not difficult to see how this could happen.

manifest simplicity in plurality and unity of form in what is divided
 into parts. Therefore, they have neither been allocated a hypostasis
 among the monadic and indivisible – as is the case with Intellect, for
 this is solely monadic and indivisible – but neither has the plural-
 ity of these ratios proceeded into the ratios that are composed out of
 them.

The multiple ratio is divisible in only one way, with respect to the
 larger term in the ratio (*prologos*),³²⁵ for the lesser term (*hypologos*) does
 not get divided – indeed, nothing prevents this from even being a 1. But
 the super-particular is divided in two ways: with respect to either the
 greater or the lesser term it is divisible, but it is indivisible with respect
 to the difference between them. But the super-partient is divisible with
 respect to both these terms, as well as with respect to the difference
 between them.³²⁶ So it turns out that the first is divisible in one way,
 the next is divisible in two ways, and last one is divisible in three ways.
 But, by contrast, equality is indivisible. And surely it is by these ratios
 that the soul has established the universe: the corporeal is established by
 what is thrice divisible, while the two-dimensional nature is established
 by what is twice divisible, and the linear nature is established by what
 is only divisible in one way. However, the indivisible nature that limits
 all things is established by what is indivisible, for there is something
 indivisible in all things that are divisible.³²⁷ These things then are surely
 true.

It is necessary to consider these things in a different manner too –
 presupposing that it is necessary to think that the numbers that are sim-
 pler and closer to the monad are more originary than the composite
 numbers. This is so since Plato positioned the single portion prior to
 all the subsequent ones and described them in terms that refer back to
 it,³²⁸ extending these composite numbers into cubes that are particu-
 larly composite. Having presupposed this, then, I say that Equality and
 the ratio of equality has the status of a monad in relation to all other

³²⁵ For the terminology see D'Ooge's note on Nicomachus, *Arith.* I.19.2, together with Asclepius, in *Nic. Arith.* 122.1–5.

³²⁶ So, for example, the ratio of the musical fourth, 4:3, is a super-particular. It is divisible with respect to the *prologos* 4, since 3 goes into it 1 time. It is also divisible with respect to *hypologos* 3, since 4 is 3 and $\frac{1}{3}$. The 1 in the $\frac{1}{3}$, however, is not divisible since what makes this a super-particular is that it has only one part of the smaller term. By contrast, 5:3 is a super-partient, since 5 is $1\frac{2}{3}$ of 3. Here the numerator of the fraction is not the unit and so it too is divisible. So the sequence multiple, super-particular, super-partient can be seen to involve a 'falling away' from unity to the extent that each is divisible in more ways.

³²⁷ Proclus again invokes a line from Aristotle. See 194.26 above.

³²⁸ That is, when he described the setting out of the portions at 35b4–c2 he concluded with τὴν δ' ἕκτην τῆς πρώτης ὀκταπλασίαν, ἑβδόμην δ' ἐπτακαίκοσιπλασίαν τῆς πρώτης.

ratios, and the role that the monad plays with respect to quantity *simpliciter* (*kath' auto*), the equal plays in the case of what exists relationally (*pros ti*).³²⁹ This is because, thanks to this ratio, the soul imposes a common measure on all things that are self-identical, bringing to them a single look (*idea*) that is an image (*eikôn*) of Sameness. But the soul also governs the entire series in accordance with the multiple ratio and the submultiple since it encompasses these wholes: in the encosmic things, it exhibits each form in its entirety many times in all of the things that have been enformed in relation to it. Take for example [the form of] the solar, if you wish, or the lunar [which is exhibited] among divine souls, in daemonic souls, in human souls, in irrational animals, plants and in the rocks themselves. The series appears as one thanks to the ratio of multiplication.³³⁰ But it is in virtue of the submultiple ratio that the one form in its own series appears to be whole several times and to be advanced [into plurality].³³¹ Now the more particular kinds organise the series that are more universal, some in accordance with the sub-super-particular and super-particular ratio (in cases where a thing participates in the wholes through participating in some *single* particular [aspect] of things in them), others in accordance with the sub-super-partient and the super-partient ratio (in cases where it participates in a whole by doing so through *two*, along with the division of each one into a plurality). For

³²⁹ In his *Euclid* commentary, Proclus invokes the Pythagorean division of the mathematical sciences. Arithmetic and harmonics study quantity (ποσόν), while geometry and “spherics” (i.e. astronomy) study magnitude (πηλίκον). With respect to the first division: τὴν μὲν ἀριθμητικὴν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ ποσὸν θεωρεῖν, τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο (*in Euc.* 35.28–36.1). It is not unlikely that Proclus is here drawing on the division in Nicomachus, *Arith.* I.3.1.

³³⁰ In the case of human beings, Proclus connects this notion of a solar or lunar series manifested at different levels of reality with the leading gods of an individual soul's progress in the *Phaedrus* myth (252c2–253c1). If my soul is in the solar series, then I should pursue a life that accords with the powers of my leading god – say medicine (*in Tim.* III. 279.12–20). The manifestation of the solar or lunar series in physical objects, as well as souls, provides the basis for these things to function as symbols or watchwords in theurgic practice. Cf. van den Berg (2001), 66–85. The connection with the relation of the multiple is that we get one and the same thing again and again in each series – n, 2n, 3n, etc.

³³¹ Not an entirely pellucid observation on Proclus' part. I suspect that what he has in mind is something like this: with the multiple relationship, we were considering distinct levels of a series. So we could think of the move from 2n to 3n as parallel to the move from intellectual to psychic being, with n as the form that is manifested at both levels. Now, however, I think we are supposed to concentrate on the diversity within one of Proclus' ontological levels: say the intelligibles. 2 is a submultiple of both 6 and 8. We may suppose that 6 and 8 ‘belong to the same series’ since they are both within the decad. Here I think we are supposed to imagine that 6 and 8 are ways in which the form, 2, appears as a whole several times and advances into plurality. So the multiple relation should be taken vertically, while the submultiple relation is conceived horizontally.

man participates in living thing and is a whole and the form is in this [whole], but not this only – rather the whole is [living being] in accordance with one [aspect of it], for example the form humanity. So it turns out that along with the whole, there is some single something that is just like a part present to the participant.³³² But in the case of things called hybrids³³³ (*Pol.* 265e), while they participate in one genus, they have not merely participated in this, but they also participate in another genus along with the plurality of other genera and their parts in the former, this other genus not being a further part. So the form of mule, for example, possesses a mixture of the species from which it is composed. Therefore either each of the forms participates in one genus in accordance with one [aspect] and imitates the super-particular, which has the whole as well as one part, or else a form participates in a common genus and a further plurality, in which case it imitates the super-partient ratio, which has the whole as well as a plurality of parts greater than one.³³⁴ There is no way of participating in forms apart from these.

With an eye to these distinctions, it is possible to give an explanation of the way in which some things have been enformed with respect to one form, for example, the Sun, the Moon, man, and to give an explanation of the things that have been enformed by a plurality of forms in addition to the common ones. For many such things have been created on the Earth and in the sea – for instance, beings that have a human face but the rest of it is like a fish, or beings having the form of a dragon but with the face of a lion. These are examples of things where there is a composite that has been mixed from many kinds. Therefore since all these ratios have doubtless been antecedently comprehended (*prolambanein*) in the soul, all the participation relations among forms throughout the universe have been determined. Nor could there be other ratios of communion [between forms] apart from these two, since all things have been enformed in accordance with them.

Once more, then, the fact that there are *seven* ratios entails that the portions [set out from the psychic stuff by the Demiurge] be numbered by the Hebdomad, for the soul is hebdomadic through and through: in

³³² So your participation in Living Being is analogous to an *epimorios* relation of N (the form) to $1 + \frac{1}{n}$. You are a living being, plus one specific part of living being, viz. human.

³³³ τὰ δὲ καλούμενα κοινογένη, cf. Plato, *Polit.* 265e8.

³³⁴ Proclus seems to envision two possibilities with respect to Bec the mule. Let us suppose that horses are a species under genus A, while donkeys are a species under genus B. We can think of Bec as the sum of two super-particulars having the participational structure of $1 + 1/A$ plus $1 + 1/B$. Alternatively, if horse and donkey fall under the same genus, G, she is a super-partient whose structure is $1 + 2/G$. That is, she has the genus plus two parts of it – horse and donkey.

its parts, in its ratios, in the circles – being seven-parted, seven-ratioed, and seven-circled.³³⁵ For if the Demiurgic Intellect is the monad, and if the soul proceeds primarily from Intellect, then it will have the ratio of seven to itself since the number seven has a father and no mother.³³⁶ And perhaps equality provides to all the ratios in the soul an association that results from the equal in order that all should commune with all. The ratios of the multiple <and the sub-multiple>³³⁷ provide an indication of the manner in which what is more unified measures that which is more pluralised – when the former wholes permeate the latter ones, those that are less divisible measure those that have been divided to a greater extent. The super-particular ratios and their subcontraries are indicative of the diversity through which the whole ratios fail to be communicated throughout the whole, but rather have the partial relation through which *one* particular thing is strictly connected with itself. The super-partient ratios and their subcontraries indicate the final stage of deterioration through which the communion becomes something partial and there is as well a multiplication of the psychic ratios because of deterioration.³³⁸ The highest forms [of these ratios] are those where wholes are united to one another through wholes, while the middle rank of ratios are cases where they are not united through wholes, but the highest aspects are connected in virtue of a part. The third rank of ratios naturally conjoin their terms partially through a plurality that is part of the nature of both terms. I mean, for example, Being is shared among all the ratios, measuring out all their processions – for nothing in them is lacking in Being. But Sameness, since it is itself a genus, leads their extreme terms in particular into single communion. Difference, on the other hand, has differentially measured itself out with their division and procession. Conversely, the communion indicates the psychic ratios. For either this

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³³⁵ The idea that the soul is ἑπταμερὴς καὶ ἑπτάλογος καὶ ἑπτάκυκλος is not attested elsewhere in the Platonic commentary tradition. We do find in Philo the idea that the *irrational* part of the soul has seven parts, in contrast with the sensitive soul that has five parts, i.e. the five senses. Cf. *Leg. alleg.* I–III. 1.11.2.

³³⁶ Hierocles, in *Aureum Carmen* 15.4–16.5: ‘The monad as first principle of all number includes the powers of all of them within itself. In so far as it lacks a mother and is itself virginal, the hebdomad has the value of the monad in a secondary way, for it is neither born of any number within the decad (as 4 is twice 2, or 6 is twice 3...) nor does it give birth to any of the numbers within the decad (as 2 does to 4 or 3 does to 9 or 5 to 10).’ Cf. *Theol. Ar.* 54.11 and Asclepius, in *Metaphys.* 36.15–17.

³³⁷ Reading καὶ ὑποπολλαπλασίσιος with Diehl at line 9.

³³⁸ These two sentences are rather obscure, but it seems that Proclus has in mind a contrast between super-particular and super-partient ratios built around the idea of increasing plurality. In the $1 + \frac{1}{n}$ ratio, a thing is still connected to a single part of itself. In the superpartient relation, the unit is connected to two or more parts of itself.

communion is perfect or it has been established in virtue of the highest forms alone, or it has come about through a departure into plurality.

After this, let us consider the following: in what manner have the seven portions [that the Demiurge sets out] been allocated their relative ranks (*hypostasis*)? Now surely the first portion is the most intellectual and highest [aspect] of the soul, being connected to the One itself and to the subsistence (*huparxis*) of universal Being. For this reason it is called **a single** (35b4) portion in as much as it is uni-form (*henoeidês*) and its number and plurality is arrested by unification, and there is something analogous to the cause and the centre of the soul, for the soul remains in the same condition and is inseparable from the whole. The *tetrad* exists among the first units [set out by the Demiurge] because it is stable and rejoices in equality and sameness. But the number *eight* belongs among the secondary series of numbers³³⁹ because of deterioration and the soul's providence extending from the highest to the lowest things. *Three*, however, is in the tertiary series of numbers because the plurality in it involves a revolution toward that which is wholly complete. And it is simultaneously clear from these facts – just like from icons – that the highest part of the soul is not purely one (though it has the form of the one) but rather is a plurality in a unified form (*plêthos hênômenon*), just as the unit is not devoid of plurality, though it is the unit nonetheless. But the One of the gods is solely one, as the One of the Intellect is especially one, and if this has been made a plurality, then the soul's One is similarly both one and many. Likewise in the case of the things that come after the soul, where it is more many than one – I mean in the case of the Being that is divisible in relation to bodies – where the One that belongs to the bodies is not simply one, but rather a phantasm and an image of one. For this reason the Eleatic Stranger says (*Soph.* 246bc) that all body 'has been shattered into pieces',³⁴⁰ indicating that the One in the case of bodies is an extra addition (*epiktêtos*) and that nothing prevents it being divided further and further.

The second [portion that the Demiurge takes] multiplies the part prior to it by a generative procession which is indicative of the dyad and exhibits all the processions of Being. For this reason, it is said to be

³³⁹ ἐν δευτερωδουμέναις and below in line 9 ἐν τριωδουμέναις. These seem to be Pythagorean coinages, or at least Iamblichus sees fit to associate them with the Pythagoreans (*in Nic.* 88.25; 103.18). Asclepius provides an explanation at *in Nic.* 1.129. In a sense, both 10 and 100 can be regarded as units in as much as we can use them to number things by tens or by hundreds. But it is a unit by secondary repetition. Proclus' point in what follows, seems to be that 8 is a secondary repetition of the tetrad, 4. By contrast, 3 is a tertiary repetition of the unit.

³⁴⁰ It would seem that Proclus is relying on his memory rather than Plato's text, since he has καταθραύεσθαι rather than the διαθραύοντες in the *Sophist* passage.

twice (35b5) the first in as much as it imitates the indefinite dyad and the intelligible infinity.

The third [portion] conversely brings about the reversion of the entire soul to its first principle, and it is a third part of it that has been further unfolded in relation to the principles. On the one hand, it is measured by the first portion in as much as it is a further pluralisation of its unity, but on the other hand, it is also connected in a more partial way to the second unit, and for this reason it is said to be **three times** the former and **one and a half times** (35b6) the latter. The fact that it is composed from half of the second portion indicates that it could not possess equal power with it, while it is completely composed from the first.

Furthermore, the fourth portion (i.e. 4) and the remaining fifth portion (i.e. 9)³⁴¹ exhibit the fact that the soul governs secondary things in a distinctive manner. For these are the intellectual causes of the incorporeals that have been divided among the realm of bodies, since they are planes and squares – the former derived from the second portion and the latter from the third. The fourth portion is [the cause of] procession and generation, while the fifth is the [cause of] reversion and of completion. While both are plane numbers, the fourth portion is derived from the second portion since it is two times it. The fifth portion, however, is derived from the third portion, multiplying it three times. And it seems that the first one is generative of those generative divisible portions that exist in the body – these being reproductive forms that simultaneously imitate the soul's procession.³⁴² The other one correlates with what is divisible in the case of body, having a power of knowing things, and by this fact imitating the soul's reversion. For all knowledge brings about the reversion of the knower upon that which is known,³⁴³ just as all nature seeks to reproduce and to have the procession taken into the things below.

The sixth (i.e. 8) and seventh (i.e. 27) portions have antecedently subordinated (*proÿpotithesthai*) the primary-effective (*prôtourgos*) causes

³⁴¹ As the following makes clear, Proclus is following the order in which Plato gives the numbers – not their relative values. So 9 is discussed prior to 8.

³⁴² It is not easy to guess what Proclus is thinking about here (as Festugière also notes), but since these are intellectual causes of incorporeals that have been divided in the realm of bodies, I suspect it may be the forms of natural living things. These, unlike the forms of artefacts or even of inanimate natural things, reproduce themselves. Cf. Simplicius, *in Phys.* 278.18 τὰ γόνιμα εἶδη. Such an identification also makes sense of the contrast that Proclus will make between 4 and 9: ἡ μὲν γεννητικὴ τῶν μορίων περιστῶν... ἡ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μὲν περιστῶν, γνωριστικὴν. The number 4 is the square of the dyad, which is a principle of reproduction and multiplicity, while the number 9 is the square of 3 – a number that Proclus associates with reversion upon the cause and thus knowledge.

³⁴³ Cf. II. 287.1–3 below.

of bodies themselves and of three-dimensional extensions in the soul, for these numbers are solids – the one derived from the second portion, the other from the third portion. The account [given by Plato] makes both the final term revert upon its first term and the soul's completion (*apoperatōsis*) revert upon its highest point when he says that 8 is 8 times the first portion, while 27 is 27 times it.³⁴⁴ In this manner the essence of the soul is seven-parted, in as much as it remains, proceeds and reverts, and is the cause of both procession and reversion, as well as a cause of the divisible being that pertains to bodies, and of the bodies themselves. If you like, it is because the soul has been allocated an intermediate sort of existence (*hypostasis*) between the indivisible and divisible things that it imitates the former through the triad of terms, while it has antecedently comprehended the latter through the tetrad.³⁴⁵ But on the other hand, all come to be from all, because the soul is entirely the centre of the whole.

It is also possible for these portions to be divided in accordance with the double row³⁴⁶ if one were to take the highest [aspect] of the soul as the phase of 'remaining in itself'. The soul's procession from what is higher than it, and then its procession into that which is proximately after it, will also be the final foundation of solid things – or rather the deterioration of the causes of things in accordance with the ratio of doubling, for you would discover that this category [that of doubling] is entirely dedicated to the generative dyad.³⁴⁷ Moreover, once again, the capacity of the soul to revert upon itself and the [reversion] of what is proximately after it and the [reversion] of the third things that result from it upon the single-formed and uniting Being of the wholes [takes

³⁴⁴ Throughout this, Proclus has been very mindful of Plato's exact wording. The reversion of the last terms upon the first is conveyed in the words: τὴν δ' ἔκτην τῆς πρώτης ὀκταπλασίαν, ἐβδόμην δ' ἑπτακαίκοσιπλασίαν τῆς πρώτης at CI–2.

³⁴⁵ The roles of the soul that have just been enumerated are now subdivided. The first three correspond to the intelligible (and thus indivisible) being: viz. remaining, procession and reversion. The remaining four correspond to the divisible: that is, being a cause of procession, a cause of reversion, a cause of the divisible being, and a cause of the bodies themselves. The triad corresponds to the intellect, since the triad is associated with reversion and knowledge. The tetrad, of course, is the divisible realm of bodies. Cf. *Theol. Ar.* 23.11–4 ὅτι ἐν πρώτῃ τετράδι σωμάτων ἐλαχίστη καὶ σπερματικωτάτη, εἴπερ καὶ στοιχειωδέστατον τῶν σωμάτων καὶ μικρομερέστερόν ἐστι τὸ πῦρ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τούτου σχῆμα.

³⁴⁶ Proclus use of '*stichos*' here perhaps recalls 170.30 and 176.7 above where he is discussing graphic representations of the numbers within the soul.

³⁴⁷ This is terribly obscure: τὴν δὲ πρόδοον αὐτῆς τὴν εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν προσεχῶς μετ' αὐτὴν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν τῶν στερεῶν ἐσχάτην ὑπόβασιν, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς αἰτίας αὐτῶν τὴν ὕφεσιν, κατὰ τὸν διπλάσιον λόγον· δυάδι γὰρ τῇ γονίμῳ πᾶσαν ἂν εὗροις ταύτην ἀνειμένην τὴν συστοιχίαν. I have followed Diehl's suggestion that one should understand τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς εἰς αὐτὴν for τὴν εἰς αὐτὴν.

place] in accordance [with ratio of] tripling.³⁴⁸ These intervals which
 are seen to be substantial beings and exist *per se* are filled up by the
 arithmetic and harmonic means, the former binding them together with
 Sameness, while the latter binds them with Difference, as we said ear-
 lier [199.22]. Furthermore, you might say, in a manner that is closer to
 the facts of the case, that it is united to those things which are prior
 to it in virtue of the single portion, and that this portion is the highest
 aspect of the soul. But in virtue of the double and triple multiples, it
 proceeds from *intellect* and reverts upon intellect. However, in virtue of
 the double of the double [i.e. 4] and the triple of the triple [i.e. 9] portion
 it both proceeds from itself and reverts upon *itself*. And then thanks to
 the remaining portions³⁴⁹ it produces the things that come after it and
 brings about their reversion upon itself, again providing through itself
 an intermediary to its own first principles, for it is stable thanks to those
 principles and filled with the secondary [existents] because of them. As
 the procession from the soul to what comes after it depends upon the
 procession from the things that come before the soul, so too the rever-
 sion upon soul [by its effects] depends upon the reversion of the things
 that are prior to it. The final portions through which the things that
 come after the soul are created³⁵⁰ and made to revert [upon their cause]
 are brought back up to the first portion so that an endless circle might be
 exhibited – the end points having been brought into contact with the ori-
 gin, a universe is created that is simultaneously ‘ensouled’ and ‘possessed
 of intellect’ (30b8), the first portion having been ordered alongside the
 solid numbers.

Furthermore, Plato says that the *bêmiolios*, *epitritos* and *epogdoos* [ratios,
 i.e. the 3:2s, 4:3s and 9:8s] are exhibited as a result of these [arithmetic
 and harmonic means]. So what is it, then, that he wants these things
 to indicate? Or is it not the case that he has conveyed to us the less-
 universal³⁵¹ varieties of the psychic ratios? The *bêmiolios* conveys an

³⁴⁸ Here too we lack a verb and the sense is very obscure: πάλιν δὲ αὐτὸ τε ἐπιστρεπτικὸν αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς αὐτήν καὶ τὸ τῶν προσεχῶς μετ’ αὐτήν καὶ τὸ τῶν τρίτων ἀπ’ αὐτῆς πρὸς τὴν ἐνοειδῆ καὶ συναγωγὸν τῶν ὄλων οὐσίαν κατὰ τὸν τριπλάσιον.

³⁴⁹ I.e. the cubes 8 and 27 that have been identified as the most proximate cause of three-dimensional being.

³⁵⁰ Here again Proclus seems to be thinking of the cubes 8 and 27 that mark the end of the double and triple series.

³⁵¹ μερικωτέρας τῶν ψυχικῶν λόγων. ‘More partial’ would be a more literal translation but a puzzling one. These ratios are not partial in the sense of being *incomplete*. The problem is that ‘partial’ in English doesn’t reliably convey the opposition to ‘universal’ in quite the same way that these terms do in Greek. We have echoes of this opposition in some uses of ‘partial’, as when we speak of ‘partiality’ or ‘partial duties’ in ethics and mean thereby duties that we do not have to all moral agents in a similar situation, but only to those that stand in some specific relation to us. Where Proclus does not

5 image (*eikôn*) of divisible association, but in virtue of the most primary of the parts, while the *epitritos* does so through the intermediate parts, and the *epogdoos* conveys an image of partial association in virtue of the final parts. This is because the means are bound together in accordance with the *epogdoos*, for though they have been considered to belong to opposed kinds that have the least association with one another, each has
10 been appropriately connected to the extreme terms.³⁵² So Timaeus then adds another thing: that all the *epitrita* [4:3 ratios] have been filled by the interval of the *epogdoos* together with that of the semi-tone. This indicates that among the ratios, the completions (*apoperatôsis*) of all of them have been terminated in less-universal existences until we come to that from which the last things in the cosmos have been composed. Since the
15 soul antecedently comprehends all the causes of divisible things, the first principles of their orders and harmonies have been made to pre-exist in the soul in accordance with the will of the Demiurge. Accordingly it has the first principles of the harmonious procession and reversion, and the first principles of the division into first, middle and last things, and is a single intellectual *logos* that has been filled up with all of these ratios. Moreover it is consistent with these things that its entire harmony is a concord consisting of four octaves, a fifth and a tone. For since there is a harmony among the things in the cosmos, and among the things in Intellect, and in the soul – because Timaeus says that it participates in
20 harmony and *is* a harmony (37a1) – the cosmos participates in harmony in the manner of the decad. The soul, on the other hand, participates in harmony in the manner of the tetrad, while the things in the intellect pre-exist in a monadic manner.³⁵³ And just as the monad is the cause of the tetrad, and the tetrad in turn is the cause of the decad, in the same manner the intellectual harmony provides it to the psychic harmony, which in turn conveys it to the harmony of the sensible realm. This is

contrast *bolikos* and *merikos* in ways that alert us to the contrast that he intends, I will sometimes render *merikôteros* as ‘less universal’ to avoid the sense of incompleteness that the English word ‘partial’ can carry.

³⁵² Festugière supposes that the opposed kinds are Sameness and Difference. This certainly seems possible, since they are so described at II. 162.20. However, it then becomes difficult to know how one is to understand the claim that they have been attached together to the extreme terms. Sameness and Difference, which are hard to combine (*Tim.* 35a9), are unified through Being. It seems more likely to me that Proclus has in mind the opposition between the arithmetic and harmonic means. The basis of the opposition between these means has been spelled out previously (198.14–200.21). And in fact they do unify the different portions that have been allocated by the Demiurge and these have been previously described as ‘extreme terms’ between which the means are filled in.

³⁵³ Reading <τά> at line 27 and adding a comma after ψυχῇ: δεκαδικῶς μὲν ὁ κόσμος μετέχει τῆς ἁρμονίας, τετραδικῶς δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ, μοναδικῶς <τὰ> ἐν τῷ νῷ προουπαρχούσης.

why Timaeus took the range of *four* octaves to be proper to the harmony of the soul: because it is a close paradigm of the harmony in the sensible realm. And since there are *five* shapes³⁵⁴ in the universe and since the centre serves to make the whole complete, the musical fifth provides the cosmos with a concord in virtue of its parts. And since the universe is divided into *nine* parts,³⁵⁵ the *epogdoos* [with its 9:8 ratio] creates an association between the universe and the soul. You can see that the soul – in as much as it is one and a four-parted whole, and in as much as it is five-parted and divided into nine – apparently harmonises the cosmic whole and encompasses it in a preliminary causal manner (*kat' aitian*). For the 1, 4, 5 and 9 provide us with the entire number in terms of which all the parts of the cosmos have been divided. It was for this reason that the ancients set the Muses and the Apollonian Conductor to rule over the universe.³⁵⁶ The one provides a single unification of the entire harmony while the others hold together its divided procession and bring their own number into harmony with the eight Sirens in the *Republic* (X, 617b).³⁵⁷ Thus, between the one and the nine, the universe has been elaborated “tetradically” and also “pempadically” [i.e. in the mode corresponding to five]. It has been elaborated in the tetradic manner by virtue of the four forms of living being which the paradigm [of the cosmos] includes (*Tim.* 39e7–10). But it has been elaborated pempadically in virtue of the five shapes through which the Demiurge has arranged everything, when he introduces the fifth form [of solid figure, i.e. the dodecahedron] as Timaeus says (55c4–6), and these things are harmoniously arranged in the universe.

Let us then say again from the start that since the Demiurge has two powers – the one to make things the same, as has been taught in the *Parmenides* (143a3), and the other to make things different – he both divides and binds together the soul.³⁵⁸ There exists a *final cause* of these things³⁵⁹ in order that the soul might become a middle between wholes,

³⁵⁴ Diehl directs us to *Dox. Gr.* 334a17, b8 where Plutarch and Stobaeus tell us that the Pythagoreans assigned the five regular solids to the universe.

³⁵⁵ Presumably the ‘nine parts’ are the stars, Neptune, Saturn, Mars, Venus, Mercury, the Sun, Moon and Earth. Aristotle, at least, regards these nine as the parts, to which the Pythagoreans add the counter-Earth as a tenth due to their desire to make a decad (*Metaphys.* I, 5, 986a2–12).

³⁵⁶ Cf. Proclus, in *Crat.* §176.65–71.

³⁵⁷ Cf. in *Remp.* II, 68.5–16. ³⁵⁸ Cf. 197.14–98.15 above.

³⁵⁹ καὶ ἔστι τελικὸν μὲν αἴτιον τούτων etc. It is not entirely clear what, precisely, ‘these things’ are. The explanandum seems to be the fact mentioned in the previous sentence: the two-fold power of the Demiurge to divide and unite. This works pretty well for the final, efficient and paradigmatic causes that Proclus goes on to cite. But the formal cause doesn’t seem to pertain so much to the Demiurge as to the soul.

25 unified and divided in a similar manner. There are two [kinds of] beings prior to it: both the gods (considered as henads) and the Beings [i.e. the intelligibles] (considered as things that have been unified). On the other hand, there are two [kinds of things] posterior to it: both those things that have been divided and those that have been wholly divided.³⁶⁰ And, if you like, prior to the former is the One, but posterior to the latter is matter. The *efficient* [causes] are the Same and the Different which are distinctive of the creative [Demiurgic] order. But the *paradigmatic* [causes] are the divisions and bonds of the Father, for he cuts these things firstly and binds them with unbreakable bonds. The Theologians present these matters enigmatically when they speak about the “cuts” and bonds of Kronos with which the maker of the universe is said to surround himself (*Orph. frag.* 154) – matters which Socrates mentioned in the *Cratylus* (404a).³⁶¹

30 The *formal* [causes] of the divisions are the numbers, for the portions have been distinguished in virtue of these. But the formal causes of the bonds are the means and the ratios interpolated between them. It is not, however, possible to consider the auxiliary causes that play the role of matter in the case of the soul, since the soul is incorporeal.

209 These things having been presupposed, it is clear how the Demiurge, when he actualises these two powers – that is, the power to divide and the power to bind together – divides the soul’s tri-morphic and thrice-plaited³⁶² mixture by means of the primary-effective causes of all divisions (though the soul nonetheless remains just the whole it is). He makes the whole seven-parted and seven-membered³⁶³ when it has been divided by intellectual limits. For since it has been established as an intermediary

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³⁶⁰ τῶν τε μεριζομένων καὶ τῶν πάντῃ μεριστῶν. The contrast is far from clear. Perhaps Proclus has in mind enmattered forms (since these have been multiplied) and the bodies so enformed.

³⁶¹ The *Cratylus* passage mentions the famous bonds of Kronos only in passing. Festugière explains that in the Orphic poems Kronos both castrates his father Uranus and is in turn castrated by Zeus (Kern fr. 137 = Proclus, in *Crat.* §55.11–21). This is amplified, and the idea of bonds included, in Porphyry’s *De Antro. Nymph.* 16.8–20 (= Kern fr. 154) where Kronos is ensnared by Zeus when he is drunk and then bound and castrated. Kronos was himself bound by the snares of desire when he castrated Uranus and descended to Earth in his desire for sexual intercourse.

³⁶² Festugière’s ‘tridimensionnel’ for τριπλεκές is surely wrong. The soul has no extension. Rather, Proclus has in mind that it contains three genera – Being, Sameness and Difference – each of which occurs in the third, intermediate form: the mixture of indivisible and divisible being, sameness and difference.

³⁶³ ἑπταμερῇ καὶ ἑπταμελῇ. These are terms that Proclus likes but are otherwise very uncommon. For the former, 4 of 13 occurrences on the TLG disk are found in Proclus. The only other philosophical deployment is one in Philo where he uses ἑπταμερής (*De Arith.* 63b) to convey a suitably Pythagorean-sounding point about the six parts of the irrational soul. *Papyri Magicae* 1.201 suggests, perhaps more significantly, that the term had an employment in magical practice. The occurrence of ἑπταμελής here is unique.

between the indivisible being and the divisible being that comes to be 15
in the realm of bodies, the indivisible aspect is triple: remaining, pro-
ceeding and reverting. Of this fact, a representation (*aphomoiōsis*) has
been established³⁶⁴ among the three portions. Its [phase of] remaining is
symbolised (*apeikonizesthai*) in virtue of the first [portion], but the [phase
of] procession is symbolised by the second portion (perhaps it is for this 20
reason that it is said to be double the first portion, for all things that pro-
ceed have the procession's [phase of] remaining in a pre-existent way).
But the [phase of] reversion is symbolised by the third portion because
it is the three times the first, for everything that reverts has already pro-
ceeded and remains. But since he produces [the soul's] Being with it, it
has its entire Being in itself. On the one hand, it possesses the incorporeal 25
kind that is inseparable from bodies³⁶⁵ in virtue of the fourth and fifth
portions. But, on the other hand, it has the corporeal Being in virtue of
the solid numbers, the sixth and seventh portions. Or alternatively one
might say that since it is self-subsistent (*authypostatos*) and self-actualising
(*autenergêtos*), the soul produces itself and reverts upon itself in virtue of
the square numbers, but that it produces the entire divisible Being that
come after it in virtue of the cubic numbers. These seven portions, then, 30
have been divided in three and four, as we said [205.27]. Having been dif-
ferentiated in a substantial manner, a single ratio binds them together in
the geometric proportion. However, it is in virtue of Sameness that there
is a harmonic mean, and it is thanks to Difference that there is an arith-
metic mean. These have been inserted between the geometric means
and are said to fill in the series of double and triple multiples since it is
surely the case that Sameness in its entirety and Difference in its entirety
have been encompassed in a uni-form manner (*benoeidōs*) by Being
and the harmony that exists in virtue of it. The plurality of *bêmiolios*, 5
epitritos and *epogdoos* [ratios] became apparent from these [geometric,
harmonic and arithmetic] means. These too have the capacity to bind
together and connect things, like the means do, but they are less universal
than these means, since these are cases where there is some specific ratio,
while each of the means can hold between numbers that stand in many
different ratios, whether the same or different. So just as [the concept 10
of] proportion is more inclusive than that of a ratio, so too the previ-
ously mentioned means do more to enable the soul to hold together the
plurality of causes in it, [these means] having been extended through-
out the soul in a manner that is intellectual. The *bêmiolios*, *epitritos* and
epogdoos [ratios] therefore are specific bonds that are less universal and 15
are encompassed within the means. They don't differ from the means

³⁶⁴ Reading παρεστήσατο for προεστήσατο with Kroll and Festugière.

³⁶⁵ This is Nature, the *logos* or *eklampsis* of the World Soul; cf. in *Tim.* I. 12.26–7.

in terms of the [kind of] relation that they have to the extreme terms on either side – for [in both cases] this is a mathematical relation – but rather they differ in terms of their status (*hypostasis*) in holding causes together, and the extent to which they are universal. These bonds in turn hold together the second and third processions of the ratios. The
20 *bêmiolios* [3:2 ratios] tightly bind the harmonies of the ratios by virtue of the five centres [207.33], while the *epitritos* [4:3 ratios bind them] by virtue of the four elements whose presence everywhere is indicative of their power, bringing it about that ‘all things are rational and convertible in relation to one another’ (*Rep.* VIII, 546c). The *epogdoos* [ratios] bring into harmony the division into nine and eight. This is why the ancients
25 sometimes suppose the cosmos to be divided into eight parts,³⁶⁶ and other times suppose that there are nine parts to it. They make either the eight Sirens or the nine Muses rule over the universe, from whence harmony is present to the whole thing. The *epitritos* and *bêmiolios* [ratios] are, of course, more universal than the *epogdoos* because the concordances they provide are more perfect and presuppose the enharmonic division of the cosmos in fewer numbers. So while among the partici-
30 pants down here [in the sensible realm] the divisions have been separated from one another, among the immaterial *logoi* of the soul, the more universal [ratios] are continuous with those that are less so. But since the *epogdoos* [ratios] are causes of the least universal concord, that which comes after them has been plausibly relegated to the universe’s last rank. [That which comes later]³⁶⁷ is not discordant, nor does it bring discord
5 to the universe, and since the elements are everywhere in the heavens and in the sublunary realm, this [thing which comes after the *epogdoos* ratios] draws the particular exhalations from each of the elements to its place below the Earth and somehow brings together their final sediments and arranges them along with the wholes up there, in as much as these things, together with the former complete the single harmony of the universe.

³⁶⁶ For 8 as the number of the universe on the ground that there are eight spheres around the Earth, see *Theol. Ar.* 75.5 (= Eratosthenes fr. 17 (Hiller)) and Theon 105.11–14.

³⁶⁷ As Festugière notes, it is not clear what τὸ μετ’ αὐτοῦς refers to. One likely guess is that it must be the ratio of the semi-tone. But whatever it is, it is the subject corresponding to the neuter participle that make up the remainder of this sprawling and ill-constructed sentence: οὐκ ἀσύμφωνον οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τῷ ὅλῳ ὄν, ἀφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν στοιχείων μεριστάς ἀπορροίας εἰς τὸν ὑπὸ γῆς τόπον συναῖνον καὶ πολλὰ τοῦ τῶν στοιχείων ὄντων καὶ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ σελήνῃ τὰς ἐσχάτας αὐτῶν ὑποστάθμιας ἐκεῖ που συνάγον καὶ συντάττον τοῖς ὅλοις, ὥς καὶ αὐτὰς μετ’ ἐκείνων τὴν μίαν ἁρμονίαν πληροῦν τοῦ παντός. But the task performed by this mysterious something looks like the work of Nature. So is Proclus supposing some correspondence between the 243:256 ratio and Nature? It has, after all, just been alluded to at 209.25–6.

5. Summary

To put it briefly, then, we may say that the soul includes the ratios of all the harmonies that are in the centres, in the elements, and in the spheres. This is why we say that its harmony is perfect, intellectual and substantial – foreshadowing the harmony of the sensible realm in a manner that is causal (*kat' aitian*). When Timaeus wishes to indicate this fact through images, he uses the harmonic ratios and pre-establishes in the soul some causes as more all-encompassing than others, some having been established prior to the forms [into which the soul will be shaped] and others prior to the soul's activities of knowing.³⁶⁸ For this very reason, I believe, it is appropriate to add nothing further to such matters as pertain to either the setting out of the portions, or the ratios, or the proportions, but instead it is appropriate to treat all these things in a substantial manner [195.11] – to consider in itself the soul's first division and its harmony; to trace all things back to the Demiurgic and intellectual causes; to encompass the *epogdoos* [ratios] and the semi-tones within the *epitritos* and *bêmiolios* ones, and these in turn within the [arithmetic and harmonic] means, and these again within that which is most strictly a single thing;³⁶⁹ and to both lead the less universal causes back to the more universal ones and also see them as divided from them. Let these things, then, be said by way of summary of the harmonic ratios. But setting out the passage from Plato's text again from the beginning, let us go through it and make these things clearer.

D. The initial psychic portions: second consideration of Tim. 35b4–6

First he took a single portion from all of it. And after this he took a second that was twice the first, then once again he took a third which was one and one half times the second, but three times the first. (35b4–6)

1. Introduction

As we said earlier [174.15], it is necessary to interpret what has been said by Plato not only mathematically, but also physically or philosophically. For the the soul's essence has not been *composed from* mathematical numbers and ratios, but instead all these ratios and numbers *symbolise*

³⁶⁸ 17–18 πρὸ παντὸς μὲν εἶδους, πάσης δὲ γνώσεως ψυχικῆς ὑφεστώσας. The claim that these ratios are prior to 'forms' does not mean that they are prior to Forms. Rather, this remark needs to be understood in terms of Proclus' division of the psychogony into the soul's essence, harmony, shape or form (*schêma* or *eidos*) and its powers and activities (II. 127.29).

³⁶⁹ I.e. the geometric mean; cf. 199.1–10.

the soul's genuine essence and the Demiurgic and life-generating divisions within it. But what things the mathematical ratios can plausibly be taken to be ratios *of*, and how they disclose the essence of the World Soul, this is not easy to explain to those who fail to pay attention to the very thought of Plato. The differences of opinion among the exegetes is obvious, and the objections that more recent interpreters make to the more ancient ones prove the difficulty of looking into such matters.

2. *Mistaken interpretations*

15 Some of them think that it is worthwhile to trace these initial seven terms³⁷⁰ – terms which, as we have shown, encompass the numbers that are analogous to the full musical scale – back to the seven heavenly spheres. Others relate these seven terms to the distances of these spheres from the centre of the Earth, correlating that position with the monad.³⁷¹ Others relate them to the motions [of the heavenly bodies], while others think that they have to do with the size of the stars. Still
20 others relate them to the speed of the circles [upon which the heavenly bodies move], while others give yet other explanations of this sort. There are various and sundry difficulties with these [interpretations]. For one thing, they are at odds with the observations of recent astronomers and with the demonstrations laid down as foundational by them.³⁷² And
25 Plato nowhere defines either the magnitude, or the distance, or the time [interval], or the motion of the stars. But having said that one is greater than another, he does not add by what amount it is greater. And it is the generation of the soul, not the generation of the cosmos that is the subject at hand (for even if it was necessary to somehow create the same things in the soul and in the cosmos, it was nonetheless necessary to consider the properties and ratios within the soul itself prior to their external
30 manifestation). And more particularly, they fudge the terms that have
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³⁷⁰ Though the lemma quoted above deals only with the first three terms of the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27, Proclus chooses to discuss the text down to 35c2. He did the same thing when he quoted this line earlier at 174.15.

³⁷¹ Festugière refers the reader to Macrobius' *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* II. 3, 14–15 which includes Porphyry, *in Tim.* fr. 72 (Sodano). See also Nicomachus, *Harm.* 3.1.1–39 which attributes a harmonic sound to the motions of the seven stars, but is agnostic about whether the differences among the notes are due to the relative sizes, speeds or positions of the heavenly bodies. Plutarch (*De An. Proc.* 1028a–b) reports a similar diversity of views.

³⁷² Macrobius tells us that Archimedes' calculations of the distances between the heavenly bodies were criticised by 'the Platonists' for failing to correspond to the ratios in the World Soul.

been set forth and give an exegesis that contradicts [what is strictly said]. For among these terms, the one that has the fifth position is larger than the one in the sixth position, since 9 is greater than 8,³⁷³ in which case these people are [in effect] saying that the fifth magnitude or distance (or whatever they suppose is at issue here) is really smaller than the sixth. Therefore there is no agreement between the numbers that have been set out and the conceptions imposed [on the text] by them.

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3. *The views of earlier Platonists*

a. Amelius

After these people, there is yet another crowd of interpreters who hold views that are more in keeping with the facts (*pragmateiôdês*).³⁷⁴ Amelius pretends not to lay claim to a view which he attributes to Plotinus in his unwritten teachings since it had been sufficiently refuted by those who came after him.³⁷⁵ This view attempts to interpret the text at hand in a different way.³⁷⁶ According to it, since the World Soul is such as to connect all of the things within the cosmos, such as gods, daemons, men and irrational animals, it is said to establish continuity in the entire encosmic genus of gods in virtue of the 1. (Let no one regard it as astounding if the soul is said to be such as to connect gods: this charge was already brought against him by one of those who came after him. For the term 'god' is said in many ways. There is not only the hypercosmic god and intellect, but there are also the divine souls and the divine bodies. Therefore, the World Soul will be such as to connect these in virtue of its own monadic number encompassing the divine.) But it will be such as to connect the daemoniac genus in virtue of the 2 and the 3 (for since daemons are dependent upon the gods and exercise providence over us, they are summoned to exercise providence over us in virtue of the dyad, but in virtue of the triad they will be perfected by their reversion upon the gods – the reason, as we said, is that they stand in a two-fold relation between the gods and us).³⁷⁷ In virtue of the 4 and the 9, [the World Soul]

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³⁷³ Here, as before, Proclus derives significance from the fact that Plato doesn't give the terms in his sequence in their exact numerical order. Plato's word order gives us the 9 prior to the 8.

³⁷⁴ Cf. note above at 193.9.

³⁷⁵ Dillon (1973), 333 supposes that Amelius attempts to father this view upon Plotinus after it had been refuted by Iamblichus.

³⁷⁶ Cf. Brisson (1987), 838–40 for a discussion of this passage.

³⁷⁷ In this section of the text I temporarily deviate from my usual practice of translating terms like *μονάς*, *δυάς*, or *κατὰ δὲ τριάδα* by 'monad', 'dyad' and 'in virtue of triad' where it is clear that Amelius and Iamblichus are discussing the cosmological significance of the psychic number sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27. I use the numerals where it is clear

will exercise providence over all human affairs (for here too, matters are two-fold, since humanity is divided into the better and the worse, and it orders the affairs of the better by the 9, while that of the inferior by the 4). By virtue of the numbers 8 and 27 it proceeds all the way, even to the final things, and perfects the domestic animals with the odd number, but the wild animals by the even number. (For it orders things by the powers that are appropriate to each thing that is ordered, but in every case the even number is proper to what is subordinate, while the odd number is proper to what is more dignified, authoritative and to what pertains to a greater extent to the divine.)

b. Porphyry

Since some of those things that were said beforehand were offered in such a remarkable manner, Porphyry³⁷⁸ built his case that the soul is harmonised and that it fills the cosmos with all the harmonies on the basis of several reasons. He argues from the fact that the soul is a plurality. But, being a plurality, it must be either one that is harmonised or one that is disordered. The former, however, is true and not the latter (for the creation of Intellect would not in any way be disordered or lacking in harmony). He also argues from the fact that all the things within the cosmos are guided by harmonic ratios, both the generations of living beings and their single arrangement in relation to the universe. But how these ratios are defined in terms of the soul's very hypostasis, he neither teaches us nor sees fit to attend to. But the essence (*ousia*) of the soul has been declared to have these harmonic ratios in itself – not as images of other things, nor as first principles of something else – but as something that binds together the plurality of powers in it. For if it really is not only indivisible, but also divisible, then it is equally necessary that its Being (*ousia*) be not only single, but also one that has been pluralised. But if it has been pluralised, then it is either numberless or counted by some definite number. But it is impossible for it to be without number, for a numberless plurality is without order. So therefore it has been numbered. But if it is numbered, then it is either composed from parts that are harmonious or those that are inharmonious. But it is impossible for it to be composed from inharmonious parts, for nothing of this sort possesses being in a way that is natural. Therefore it is composed from parts that are entirely harmonious. But if it is composed from parts that are entirely harmonious, it is necessary that it exists in accordance

that it is, for instance, the significance of the soul's 2 that is being discussed, but I use 'dyad' where this conveys the idea of a Platonic principle of plurality or multiplication.

³⁷⁸ Proclus, *in Tim.* II. 214.4–215.5 = Porphyry, *in Tim.* fr. 79 (Sodano).

with the best harmony – if indeed, it is the first of the things that are harmonised. But the best harmony is that which exists in accordance with the diatonic genus, for this is dignified and strong.³⁷⁹ Thanks to this fact, then, the soul is entirely harmonised, with the result that its essence would be composed of parts in accordance with the diatonic genus.

But nothing prevents this being true while at the same time the harmonic ratios are images of certain divine things, as in the case where the body of the world is a sphere, but this is because the spherical shape is said to be an imitation of Intellect.³⁸⁰ These things entail one another. These things that Porphyry says at least afford us the opportunity to draw some true conclusion about the soul.

c. Iamblichus

The divine Iamblichus³⁸¹ celebrates these numbers with all his power as things with the causal efficacy to bring about certain wondrous properties. He denominates the 1 as a cause of sameness and unification, while the 2 is able to provide for procession and differentiation. The 3 is such as to originate the reversion of things that have proceeded. The 4, in turn, is capable of genuinely pan-harmoniousness, since it includes within itself all the ratios and exhibits within itself a secondary cosmic order.³⁸² The 9 is productive of true development and of similarity, since it is completely composed from complete parts and participates in the nature of the Same. The 8 he calls the cause of procession to all things and progression through all things. It remains for the number 27 to be such as to produce the reversion of even the last of the things [that have proceeded], so that on each side of the 4 there might be [a causal influence that corresponds to] remaining, procession and reversion – in the first case [i.e. in 1–3] it exists in a primary way, but in the other case in a

³⁷⁹ Cf. 168.30 ff. above. ³⁸⁰ Cf. *Laws* X, 898a–b and in *Tim.* II.69.15–28.

³⁸¹ in *Tim.* 215.5–29 = Iamblichus, in *Tim.* fr. 53 (Dillon). Dillon takes this fragment to be very important and supposes that it provides us with the earliest definite reference – apart from the problematic anonymous *Parmenides* commentary – to the triad ‘remaining, proceeding, and reverting’ *within* a hypostasis. Dillon supposes that this innovation might have been original with Porphyry, though Iamblichus is the first author to whom it can be definitely assigned.

³⁸² The Pythagorean tradition makes the tetrad particularly important since the numbers that compose it sum to the decad: 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10. The decad is associated with ‘the all’ and thus the cosmos. It is probably this association that explains Iamblichus’ claim that the tetrad contains a secondary cosmic order. In addition, the numbers that figure in the ratios that define the octave, the fourth and the fifth are all contained in the tetrad.

secondary way. For the 9 has a kinship with the monad, since it is a ‘new one’.³⁸³ The 8 corresponds to the dyad, since it is a cube from it, and 27 corresponds to the triad for a similar reason. Through the prior [set of correspondences], he grants to the simpler beings [a capacity for] remaining [in the cause], proceeding [from the cause], and reverting [upon the cause], but through the secondary correspondences he also grants them to the things that are more composite. The 4 is a mean, which is explained by the fact that, since it has four sides, it has the [stable] characteristic of remaining. But because it is an even times even number, it has the characteristic of proceeding. And then, because it has been filled with all the *logoi* coming from the monad, it has the characteristic of reverting. These are symbols (*symbola*) of divine and ineffable things.

d. Theodore of Asine

Well then, following on this doctrine so wondrous³⁸⁴ . . . the philosopher Theodore [of Asine]³⁸⁵ going through a line of argument peculiar to himself. For he says that following the single first principle, the soul is three-fold: the Soul Itself or Fontal Soul is one thing, while the universal soul is yet another, and the third is the soul of this universe. The first one is indivisible, while the second soul has been divided in terms of universals (*kath’ hola*), and the third soul has various divisions. Of these three souls, the first one – the Soul Itself or Fontal Soul – has come to be between the indivisible and divisible Being; the indivisible Being is the universal intellect (*ho katholou nous*), while the divisible Being has been divided into the individuals (*ta atoma*). Therefore, the first soul surely has the status of an intermediate between these in as much as it has its hypostasis from these two [i.e. divisible and indivisible Being] that are prior to it, having come to be one whole from the three intermediate genera. The second soul after this is universal one that has been divided into the portions and harmonised. For since the first soul remains a whole in itself, the division comes to be in the procession from it, the one being a whole before the parts, the other having been constituted as a whole that results from the parts.³⁸⁶ Finally, the third soul is the one created

³⁸³ ἡ ἔννεός = ἐν νέον. Dillon conjectures that the “etymology” is a Neopythagorean invention, not found before Proclus and Hermeias. Cf. *in Remp.* II. 4.20 and Hermeias, *in Phdr.* 90.27. It does not, however, appear in the *Theology of Arithmetic*, which has sometimes been assigned to Iamblichus.

³⁸⁴ Diehl marks a lacuna following θαυμαστήν οὔσαν καί. At least another adjective and the finite verb are missing.

³⁸⁵ Proclus, *in Tim.* II. 215.29–218.8 = Theodore of Asine, T. 22 (Deuse).

³⁸⁶ Proclus here adumbrates Theodore’s view of the soul in terms of his own division of the ways in which things may be a whole. Cf. above 195.25–8.

through the straight lines and circles,³⁸⁷ for in this case the cutting of the single thing makes clear that there is a decline (*hyphesis*) from the whole that results from the parts and a procession into a wholeness in the parts. This is because the whole is a plurality of parts and it is this way in each of the straight lines and circles. The entire psychogenesis is divided into three parts in terms of these *three souls* as has been said: the one soul having its hypostasis in virtue of the co-mingling activity of intellect, the second one [having its hypostasis] in virtue of [intellect's] harmonising [activity], while the third [has its hypostasis] from [intellect's] shaping (*schēmatistikos*) [activity].

Having demarcated in this way the main topics within the psychogenesis, and the souls beyond the universal soul, and having divided it into portions – speaking exclusively of the seven portions that have been arranged and referring these back to the universal division – he thinks it is necessary to derive the heavens from the soul, composing them from the row of double multiples, while he derives the things in the sublunary realm from the soul by composing it from the row of triple multiples. For he assigns appropriate numbers to each of the elements, giving earth the number 7, fire 11, assigning 9 to water, and 13 to air. He assigns the geometric progression 1, 2, 4 to earth, perhaps because of the name,³⁸⁸ perhaps also in as much as earth possesses the remaining elements just as the geometric proportion includes the other means. He assigns the arithmetic proportion 2, 3, 4, which is the proportion of water, because it has two terms in common with earth,³⁸⁹ and doubtless also due to the fact that it is especially dear to plurality and is associated with the element that has more plurality than any of the others, the icosahedron.³⁹⁰ He assigned the harmonic proportion, 3, 4, 6 to be that of air because it has two terms in common with the arithmetic proportion [assigned to water], the 3 and the 4 – numbers which are the larger ones in the arithmetic proportion, but smaller among those in the harmonic proportion. Now the harmonic mean is two-fold: either in the double multiple of the extreme terms or in the triple multiple, for Plato assumes the harmonic mean either in the double series or in the triple series. When he makes

³⁸⁷ Theodore has in mind here the actions of the Demiurge in 36b6 ff. when he takes the “soul stuff” and cuts it into strips which then go to make up the circles of the Same and the Different.

³⁸⁸ Theodore seems to have in mind the similarity between γῆ and γεωμέτρης.

³⁸⁹ That is, if we take these particular instances of the geometric and arithmetic proportions as paradigmatic, then it will share the 2 and the 4 with earth. Proclus too has an account of the elements according to which each one shares two essential properties with the one immediately next to it. See Introduction to volume III, 18–19.

³⁹⁰ Among the regular solids assigned to the four elements by Plato, water's shape has more triangles than any other (*Tim.* 55a–b).

the extreme terms stand in the 2:1 ratio, we have as extreme terms 3 and 6 which yields the distinctive element of air – the octahedron. This has the number 6 in virtue of its angles, but 4 thanks to the edges of the two pyramids, and 3 in virtue of its faces since it is triangular. Now in the other case, which is [the harmonic proportion] 2, 3, 6, we have the [distinctive element] of fire because this too shares two terms with the element prior to it – the 3 and the 6 – these being the extreme terms in the case of the harmonic proportion and the larger terms in the case at hand. It is also because the element of fire has 6 edges, twice the tetrad angle-wise and surface-wise,³⁹¹ as well as a triangular base. Therefore, it is likely³⁹² that 7 is the number of earth, 9 the number of water, 13 of air, and 11 of fire, since these ratios have been assumed in the numbers that have just been mentioned and from which these elements have come to be. For 7 is composed from 1, 2 and 4, while 9 is the result of 2, 3 and 4. From 3, 4 and 6 we get 13, while 11 results from 2, 3 and 6. In each case there are two terms in common with the one next door, just as the elements each share two sides [i.e. properties or powers with the element next door]. The row of the triple multiples is brought about from permutations of these.

Among the ones in the middle,³⁹³ the larger terms of the one form the smaller terms in the remaining one. In the case of the ones at the ends, the larger terms form the extremes of the next triple, as is the case

³⁹¹ δὲ δὲ τὴν τετράδα, γωνιακῶς καὶ ἐπιπéδως. The form ἐπιπéδως is found in Nicomachus and Theon, as well as in the *Theology of Arithmetic*. Cf. *Arith.* II. 7.3–5 ὁ δὲ γραμμικὸς ἀριθμὸς ἀρχὴ ἐπιπéδου ἀριθμοῦ ἐφ' ἑτέρον διόσστημα ἐπιπéδως πλατυνομένου: 'linear number is the beginning of plane number, which spreads out like a plane in one more dimension' (trans. D'Ooge). γωνιακῶς, however, is unique to this passage in Proclus.

³⁹² *Eikotôs*. This might carry a double sense. Not only is it plausible, but each element is its number in the manner of an image.

³⁹³ Festugière is right to think that a diagram is needed to see the point

Element	Terms	Sum	Proportion
Earth	1 2 4	7	Geometric
Water	2 3 4	9	Arithmetic
Air	3 4 6	13	Harmonic
Fire	2 3 6	11	Harmonic

Proclus reports Theodorus as making two observations here. The middle elements are water and air. Here the smaller terms in air (3, 4) are the largest two terms in water. Second observation: when we consider earth and fire, along with the elements next to them, then the largest terms in these two cases form the extreme terms in the element next to it. So the 3 and 6 which are the largest terms in fire form the end points of air. Similarly the 2 and 4 which are the largest terms in earth comprise the end points of water.

with earth and water or again when fire is considered as the substrate from which air is derived. This is obvious in the case of the terms that are under consideration.

The number 15, in turn, is allocated to the heavens since we have the monad for the circle of the Same, but twice times 7 for the circle of the Different because you count each of the revolutions twice – once for each of the seven spheres and once for the seven stars in them.

From a mathematical point of view what has been said is not without a certain level of sophistication (*ouk amousos*). But how it compares with the facts which are the subject matter of our discourses or how one might interpret this in a Pythagorean manner, nothing is said by Theodore that would allow a diligent interpreter to be satisfied. While all these things have been quite ingeniously discovered, they carry the task of analysis of the Platonic musical scale only as far as the monadic numbers.³⁹⁴ He does <not>³⁹⁵ look to the ratios derived from them in order to grasp everything, viz. the means, the *hēmiolios* and *epitritos*, the *epogdoos* [ratios] and the semi-tone. Many of these would need to be discovered in the primary numbers by means of which Theodore has attempted to make the aforementioned distribution of ratios to the elements and the heavens.

e. *Syrianus*

After this, let us turn to another mode of reasoning – one which our teacher adopted, not just on this matter, but one that he used in many circumstances with us and which generated wonderful conceptions as a result, and which we have ourselves deployed earlier. He therefore said that it is first necessary to interpret each [portion taken by the Demiurge] in two ways: in terms of the whole of the soul (in as much as it is single in virtue of unification) and then in terms of the plurality of *logoi* in it, since there are also a plurality of them in it by virtue of division. The soul is both one and many – a single *logos* and a number of various forms – and it imitates both the Demiurgic wholeness as well as the Father's differentiation among his powers.

First then we must understand what it is considered as a whole, both remaining in itself, proceeding and reverting. And surely it exercises

³⁹⁴ Mugler, in Festugière, suggests that here 'monadic numbers' means just those numbers in the first sequence set out by Timaeus – i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27 – a suggestion accepted by Deuse in his commentary on Theodore.

³⁹⁵ Reading οὐκ εἰς at line 15 with Q. The general point of Theodore's reading is that it is incomplete: he fails to take into account anything other than what Proclus here calls the 'monadic numbers'. Deuse seems to agree with my general assessment of Proclus' critique in his paraphrase, but I cannot see how the Greek that we have here can convey this.

providence in one manner over the incorporeal and pure forms of encosmic things, but it exercises it in another way over all the bodies and divisible Being. Having understood this, we must say that it remains in virtue of the *single* portion, but it proceeds in virtue of the *second* 5 [portion], this being a divine procession, but not one that takes place through being affected or being cognised indefinitely. The reversion takes place in virtue of the *third* [portion] (for the power of completing things descends to beings from this). Being completely whole, established among the intelligibles, and remaining in the intellect throughout eternity it exercises providence over secondary things. It does this in one way 10 in the case of the things that are proximately dependent upon it, but in another way in the case of three-dimensional extensions themselves. In each case, it happens in two ways. In the case of the things that are proximate to it and thus enjoy its [immediate] benefit, these proceed from it and revert upon it. Procession takes place thanks to the reproductive 15 power of the *fourth* [portion], but it is reverted to return to its single cause thanks to the power of the *fifth* [portion]. In the case of solids, however, and among all the forms that are seen in things with extension, here procession takes place in virtue of the [portion] that is *eight times* the first [portion] since this is dyadic and solid, as well as being simultaneously reproductive and also enabled to proceed to all things. But it reverts in 20 virtue of the 27. Since this is a reversion of solid things, [it happens] in as much as 27 is triadic and [participates in] the nature of the Same, for the odd is that sort of thing. Therefore, there are three processions and three reversions with respect to the single and unified position (*stasis*) of the soul. This is because there are three even numbers and three odd numbers proceeding from the monad. And these have been interwoven 25 with one another so that the soul itself both proceeds and reverts. When it has reverted, it produces its primary receptacles and that which has been primarily configured.³⁹⁶ When it has produced it, it also gives to it dimension (*diastasis*) and extension, but when it has reverted it makes it spherical in form. When this process has created a thing of this sort, 30 then the cosmos is produced in it. The procession has been accomplished in the mode of even numbers (*artiakôs*), while the reversion takes place in the mode of that which is odd in form (*perissoeidôs*),³⁹⁷ and both take

³⁹⁶ Syrianus and Proclus seem to be adverting to the creation of the Receptacle. Cf. τὸ πρῶτως ἐσχηματισμένον at line 27 with *Tim.* 53b4–5 οὕτω δὲ τότε πεφυκότα ταῦτα πρῶτον διεσχηματίσατο εἶδεσί τε καὶ ἀριθμοῖς.

³⁹⁷ Proclus, or perhaps Syrianus, here out-Pythagorises even Iamblichus! The adverbial form '*perissoeidôs*' is unique in the TLG disk, though '*perissoeidês*' has occurrences in Nicomachus, Theon and Iamblichus. The adverbial form '*artiakôs*' occurs in Nicomachus and in Iamblichus' commentary on Nicomachus. However, in both cases it is used with the verb *onomazein* to indicate that a number may be called odd. It is Proclus,

place in the mode of what is cubic (*kybikôs*) because it is the production and reversion of solid things that has been brought about. Therefore the procession and reversion is triple: the [procession and reversion] of that which is without shape or figure, the one of that which has been primarily configured, and the [procession and reversion] of that which has been configured in a secondary manner – all these things taking place as it does in the case of the numbers.³⁹⁸

In addition to these matters, let us continue our consideration in terms of the plurality in it and let us say that the ratios within it are such as to include other ratios. Some of them are divided in it in the manner of wholes, while others are so in the manner of the parts. Some are universal (*holikos*), others pertain to the genera (*genikos*), others are to do with forms (*eidikos*), while others are of the nature of particulars (*merikos*). The universal [ratios] are like those between the [arithmetic and harmonic] means, while the generic ones are those [ratios] in the double and triple multiples. The [ratios that have the status of] forms are the submultiples of these (for each one of these occurs in various ways). The [ratios that correspond to] particulars are the *epogdoos* ones and the semi-tones into which all the *bêmiolos* and *epitritos* ones have been divided as into parts. Let us also say that the single unification holds the ratios together because of the substantial monad, but that the division of the ratios takes place because of the double-formed (*dyoeidês*)³⁹⁹ procession, while the inclusion of the ratios takes place through the multiples. For these [multiples] are such as to include the super-particulars (*epimorion*) and have an essence that is more universal than them; just as these, in turn, have included the *epogdooi* and semi-tones, where the one has the status of form, while the other has been assigned to the order of parts. And if indeed⁴⁰⁰ the geometric proportion alone is really proportion,

or perhaps Syrianus, who seems to turn this into a mode or manner in which procession may take place.

³⁹⁸ πάντα δὲ ὡς ἐν ἀριθμοῖς. The sense of this is not clear, though I suspect that Proclus means to call attention to something like the parallel between linear, plane and solid numbers, on the one hand, and points, lines and three-dimensional extension in Nicomachus, *Arith.* II.7.1–3. Festugière's 'tout cela autant qu'il est possible lorsqu'il s'agit de nombres' seems to me to import a sense of deterioration which, though it may well be true, is hardly evidenced by Proclus' words.

³⁹⁹ Another Neoplatonic neologism that is used frequently by Proclus. The earliest surviving occurrence is in Porphyry's *Life of Pythagoras* 50.2, but see also his *in Tim.* II.70.5–9: καὶ ὡς ὁ γε Πορφύριος ἱστορεῖ, παρὰ τοῖς Αἰγυπτίσις ἦν τις τοιοῦτος χαρακτήρ σύμβολον φέρων τῆς κοσμικῆς ψυχῆς, τῷ κύκλῳ περιβαλὼν· ἐστήμαινον γὰρ ἴσως διὰ μὲν τῶν εὐθειῶν τὴν δυοειδῆ πρόδον αὐτῆς, διὰ δὲ τοῦ κύκλου τὴν μονοειδῆ ζωὴν καὶ τὴν κατὰ κύκλον νοερὸν ἐπιστροφὴν.

⁴⁰⁰ Reading εἴπερ for ἐπεὶ at line 19. Festugière notes the difficulty posed by the beginning of the sentence: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν μόνην ἀναλογίαν οὐσαν

20 then to first make the whole essence of the soul such as to include the other two middles makes it like Demiurgic geometry, for elsewhere Plato called this proportion ‘the judgement of Zeus’ (*Laws* VI, 757b).

25 Next [Syrianus] shows that when the [other] two means are seen together with the geometric proportion and are comprehended within it, then they order the wholes in accordance with justice.⁴⁰¹ But when these means are realised in the absence of geometrical proportion, then they are the causes of sin (*plêmmeleia*) and excess. For to assign equal portions to beings that are unequal is entirely unjust, and so is connecting opposites with one another in the absence of some sort of geometrical balancing. For this reason, the harmonic mean stands in need of geometric proportion so that it can bring together opposites harmoniously (*emmelôs*),⁴⁰² just as the Demiurge himself did when he harmonised fire and earth through the other two elements. The arithmetic mean also operates successfully when its activities take place in conjunction with geometric proportion. For in the case of things that are unequal, it is equitable to assign them unequal shares. In any event, assigning equal shares to unequal beings preserves the defining characteristic of arithmetic proportion and exhibits how it stands with respect to value (*to kat’ axian*) – [proper valuation] was surely something that was distinctive about geometric proportion.

5 Furthermore, then, we must surely say that the soul imitates the primary first principles. On the one hand, it is due to the single portion that it imitates the single cause of wholes, while it is due to the double procession that it imitates the double-formed first principles that come after the One.⁴⁰³ Due to the even and odd numbers it imitates the male

περιληπτικὴν ποιεῖν τῶν ἄλλων δύο μεσοτήτων πρῶτον μὲν ὁλην τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς οἷον γεωμετρίαν ποιεῖ δημιουργικὴν· and translates, ‘Syrianus commence par tout cela, car rendre la proportion géométrique compréhensive, à elle seule, des deux autres médiétés, c’est tout, d’abord constituer l’essence entière de l’Âme comme une géométrie démiurgique’, noting that the first part of the sentence is supposed to capture the sense of ἐπεὶ καί. It is true that in this section of the text Proclus is relating the views of his teacher (cf. 218.19), and it is true that in the next lines we will return to the order of Syrianus’ exposition (ἐπεὶτα δείκνυσιν...), but this seems to me to be an ornament that Proclus has added himself. He has invoked this line from the *Laws* three times up to this point in book III (78.29, 90.15, 198.20). In none of these cases is he relating the views of his teacher. εἴπερ καί appropriately introduces this insightful addition to Syrianus’ general picture.

⁴⁰¹ There is a long tradition of interpreting the three forms of proportion in moral terms. See Ausland (2006).

⁴⁰² Perhaps playing on their linguistic form, Proclus contrasts harmony and sin. Cf. Plato, *Critias* 106b2 and in *Tim.* I. 286.28.

⁴⁰³ It seems likely that Proclus is referring here to the principles of the Limited and the Unlimited (*ET* 89–90).

and female among the gods, while it is because of the individual triadic divisions that it imitates the triads that are both intelligible and intellectual. Due to the fact that there are seven terms, it imitates the unified hebdomad. Then it is by means of the single portion that the cosmos is created as a god (*Tim.* 34b8–9), while by the second portion he indicates the plurality and variety in it. By means of the division into odd and even numbers, he divides the universe into male and female, from the gods themselves right down the level of plants. This division into male and female happens in accordance with the 2 and the 3 in the case of the gods, but in accordance with the 4 and the 9 in the case of the genera that are superior to us, while it happens in accordance with the cubed numbers [8 and 27] when the procession goes down as far as the forms of life that are on or under the ground. By means of the seven-fold collection of terms, he holds all things together, preserving them, and deeming them worthy of intellectual providence, arranging the wholes as is needed in a way that is stable and steadfast, ordering the parts of these wholes and the parts of the parts. And if there is something among the last ranks that is irrational in itself, this is like the leftovers⁴⁰⁴ of the cosmic creation.

Now, in terms of these ideas we will be able to interpret the words of Plato, and by looking to them we will be able to resolve many of the puzzles.⁴⁰⁵ Let us go through each of the things that has been said from the beginning so that we might take them up in terms of these ideas with the guidance of our teacher.

First, from the fact that the Demiurge is not said to insert the portions into the soul, but rather is said to *take them away* [from the totality of 'soul stuff'] (*Tim.* 35b4) as if they were already there, and having taken them away, in turn fills out the essence of the soul from them – [from this fact] it is exhibited to us that the mixture (*krama*) [of soul stuff] is not like a substrate of the soul, nor like matter that is without shape until it is configured by the Demiurge. Since the psychic essence is form, it is a plenum of forms.⁴⁰⁶ So it turns out that “indefiniteness” and the matter among the intelligibles discussed by the more

⁴⁰⁴ This is a play on the word for the semi-tone, the *leimma*, since this is what is left over when you subtract two tones from the musical fourth.

⁴⁰⁵ This seems to be Proclus' grounds for preferring Syrianus' sound methods over the number-associationism of Iamblichus and Theodore of Asine. Syrianus too reads symbolic significance into each of the seven numbers corresponding to the psychic portions; however, he does so in a way that illuminates the specific wording of Plato's text.

⁴⁰⁶ Normally Proclus describes *nous*, not soul, as a plenum of forms (*ET* 177; *in Parm.* 901.2). However, he also describes the World Soul this way (*in Parm.* 896.3–4; *Ecl. Phil. Chald.* 5.8–9 (des Places)).

recent [interpreters of Plato] is not apposite to the consideration of this passage.⁴⁰⁷

Furthermore, when it comes to the setting out of all the other portions in relation to the single [initial] portion – the one that is double it; the one that is three times [the first]; the quadruple [portion]; the one that is nine times [the first portion]; the one that is eight times; the one that is 27 times [the first] (*Tim.* 35b4–c2) – he gives to the [initial single portion] a superior position and does not permit anyone to think of it as ‘the many’ (*hoi polloi*) think of the monad: that is, as the smallest in quantity and having the status of matter in relation to number. Rather, one must think of it as the originary point of the entire essence of the soul and ‘root’ of all the powers in it, the ‘hearth’ of all the numbers it fills up.⁴⁰⁸

In the case of these things, how is this not consistent with what was said by us earlier about the double of the single portion? For the double is entirely formed by the dyad and descended from the uni-formed existence (*henoeidēs hyparxis*). It proceeds into plurality by, on the one hand, a pluralisation of quantity, but, on the other, a lessening of power. But the manner in which the procession of soul takes place is surely like that too, for its own most divine [aspect] also remains, as Orpheus says, ‘with its own head in intellect’.⁴⁰⁹ It proceeds from there in virtue of the dyad in it, proceeding into itself and producing the plurality of ratios and the various forms that are in it. Going forward again, it reverts upon the first principle and thus furnishes itself with a sort of substantial circle.⁴¹⁰ Through its reversion it is connected with both the reproductive power in itself through which it was itself produced, and also with the single establishing and unifying [cause]; for the power of making things perfect and of reverting have been connected with both the reproductive and the unifying cause. If it is necessary to put the matter briefly, then it may be said that just as Life proceeds from Being and as Intellect is united

⁴⁰⁷ It is not clear who is intended here. The phrase ‘intelligible matter’ is not, of course, a recent innovation but rather appears twice in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (1036a11–1037a4; 1045a34–6). It seems possible to me that Proclus may have in mind Plotinus’ rather unorthodox speculations (III.5.6–7) on the role of what he there calls ‘intelligible matter’ in the composition of daemons and the nature of Eros who has soul as a first principle, but involves an admixture of indefiniteness.

⁴⁰⁸ For the monad as root of number, see Nicomachus, *Arith.* I.8.9. For the monad as the hearth, see *Theol. Arith.* 6.17.

⁴⁰⁹ *Orph. fr.* 199 (Kern). Cf. II. 105.28–106.1 above, where Proclus again relates this Orphic idea to his teacher’s interpretation of the manner in which the World Soul is present to Intellect.

⁴¹⁰ Proclus here likens the way in which reversion upon the cause completes the circular pattern of emanation with the circles soon to be produced from the “stuff” of the World Soul.

with Life and Being, so too surely the procession of soul has come to be from the reproductive cause, but the reversion takes place with respect to both. It takes place in the mode of the 3:2 [ratio] (*bêmiolios*) with respect to what is above it, but in the mode of the multiple of three (*triplasiôs*) in relation to what is beyond that which is above it. It pertains to the form of reversion to both seek after the whole and to lessen division, which is something that the *bêmiolios* [3:2 ratio] surely does. For while the multiple of two (*to diplasion*) subordinates itself entirely to the dyad throughout, the *bêmiolios* [ratio] is proportional to the former, but it is also a ratio where there is a lessening of deterioration.⁴¹¹

Furthermore, the triple multiple clearly shows that it is at the third remove in the order of reversion from that which remains [in the cause]. In addition, since the triad is a prime number and a whole in the primary mode (*prôtôs*) by having beginning, middle and end, it is assimilated to the monad which includes the complete plurality in a unified manner. Therefore, on account of these facts, the underlying subject (*hypokeimenon*) of the soul has been shown to be established from three wholes, each of which itself has a three-fold nature. For he divided it into the [aspect that] remains, that which proceeds, and that which reverts in accordance with the division of the divine genera, since the genera in these were triple: that which remains, that which proceeds, and that which reverts. The first is the cause of Sameness, the power of stability and essence, while the next is the generative origin of procession and multiplication, and the third is such as to complete and perfect things and leads secondary things back to the primary ones.

Through what comes next, he shows how the soul orders the secondary things by virtue of its very own essence. For before he gives the soul either powers or activities,⁴¹² the presence of these ratios in the soul indicates the things from which and through which the soul directs those things that participate in it in a primary manner as well as the extent to which the things that stand at a secondary distance from the soul are ordered by it. While the soul has the status of a universal monad, the latter things imitate its processions and reversions, for it has gone out dyadically prior to these secondary things, though it reverts triadically. Its going out has been entirely distinguished from its remaining [in its

⁴¹¹ τὸ ἡμιόλιόν ἐστι μὲν ἀνὰ λόγον ἑκείνω, τὸν δὲ τῆς ὑφέσεως λόγον ἐλαττοῖ. This is very terse, but I think the idea is that 3:2 'pursues the whole' by being a super-particular rather than a super-partient ratio. That is to say, 3 is $1\frac{1}{2}$ of 2 and in this respect more closely approximates unity than 5:3, where 5 is $1\frac{2}{3}$ of 3. The fact that $2x > 1.5x$ is supposed to correspond to the tendency of reversion to lessen plurality and division.

⁴¹² Bear in mind the way in which Proclus divides the psychogony into stages corresponding to the essence (*Tim.* 35a–36b), form (36b–c), powers (36c–d), and activities (36d–37c) of the soul.

30 cause], since it happens in the manner of multiplication by two (*diplasiôs*). It has been reverted from the half, for differentiation is distinctive of procession, but sameness and similarity are the defining features of reversion. Reversion has already come to be in a way that is like remaining in the cause. On the one hand, [as a consequence of reversion] ‘all’ (*pan*) has
 224 come to be instead of ‘one’ (*hen*), and on the other hand, the whole of parts has come to be instead of the whole prior to the parts.⁴¹³ Though it seems to be three times that which has remained, it in fact has less power than that which has remained in the cause but it is inclusive of the portions in it.

E. Subsequent psychic portions, Tim. 35b7–c2

5 [Taking a] fourth [portion] double of the second (i.e. 4), and then a fifth triple of the third (i.e. 9), then a sixth which was eight times the first (i.e. 8), and then seventh [a portion that was] twenty-seven times the first. (*Tim.* 35b7–c2)

10 The all-perfect essence itself of the soul has been incorporated through the numbers that were given previously [i.e. 1, 2, 3] – that in it which remains, that which proceeds, and that which reverts. But since it is also necessary to look at its portions and the causes of the beings in it, Plato has also included an explanation of these matters, providing us with the forms of all the things in the soul – both those which encompass others and the things that get encompassed. Therefore, through the fourth and fifth portions he includes the *logoi*⁴¹⁴ of all the things that
 15 participate in the soul in a primary manner. And while the procession of these things has been stimulated by the fourth portion, their reversion is provided through the fifth. This is because the one has been referred back to the second portion, while the other goes back to the third portion, since the parts imitate the wholes and stand in an analogous relation to them. Through the sixth and seventh portions, they establish the solid things that have volume, as we said earlier [219.15] – engendering them
 20 in virtue of the sixth, but bringing about their reversion through the seventh, for the soul’s universal form leaves off at the point where these things proceed. And you can see how both the numbers and the order of
 25 procession are proper to the soul. The fact that its first principle is the monad gives the soul a procession⁴¹⁵ from Intellect, while the fact that its

⁴¹³ For the distinction, see *ET* 67.

⁴¹⁴ Here again, Proclus seems to be relying on the double sense of *logos* in Neoplatonism. Most concretely as ‘ratio’ but also in the sense of ‘rational-forming principle’. Cf. Witt (1931).

⁴¹⁵ Reading *προόδον* for *πάροδον* at line 26.

procession stops with these cubes illustrates that the soul is a harmony of harmonies⁴¹⁶ for the things that are compounded from them will make the celestial harmony. There exists a harmony of each of them, for the Pythagoreans were in the habit of calling the cube a harmony because it alone among all the shapes has a harmonic mean between the number of corners and the edges and faces.⁴¹⁷ The ones that come second among these terms have both procession from and reversion upon the monad.⁴¹⁸ Again, since these [second terms] remain as wholes, the third terms are divided, having both procession and reversion, and they are referred back to the things that are proximately located above them.⁴¹⁹ But the fourth terms [correspond] to the monad because, among the seven terms contained in it, the monad imitates that which remains, while the middle ones – since they are dual in form (*dyoeidês*) – correspond to procession, while the final terms [correspond to] the reversion, for both of them

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⁴¹⁶ The notion that the soul is itself a harmony of harmonies is one that occurs again at *in Tim.* III. 336.17. The identification of the soul as such a harmony of harmonies seems to be Proclus' own. Iamblichus (*Comm. Math.* 9.34) explains the fact that the soul enjoys harmony by appeal to the idea that it is itself one, and this idea about the psychic basis for the apprehension of harmony is common to *in Tim.* III. 336.17. Proclus' characterisation of the soul in these terms must be qualified by the fact that soul is not a harmony in the sense that it is an attunement of the body – an idea rejected in the *Phaedo*. For Proclus, as for any good Platonist, the soul is (metaphysically speaking) a *substance*, not a harmony. It is far more real than the body whose "attunement" its presence produces.

⁴¹⁷ A cube has 6 faces, 8 corners and 12 edges, thus forming a harmonic proportion. Cf. Nicomachus, *Arith.* II. 29.1 and Simplicius [?] in *DA* 68.6–8: τὸν γὰρ κύβον διὰ τὸ δώδεκα μὲν ἔχειν πλευρὰς ὀκτώ δὲ γωνίας ἕξ δὲ ἐπίπεδα τὴν ἀρμονικὴν ποιῶντα ἀναλογίαν ὁρμονίαν ἐκάλουν. Festugière is right that the text here needs to be amended in order to bring it into line with the arithmetical facts of the matter: διότι μόνον τῶν σχημάτων τὰς γωνίας ἔχει μέσας <ἀρμονικάς> [ἀνὰ λόγον] τῶν τε πλευρῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιπέδων.

⁴¹⁸ These terms will be the ones that come second in the double and triple multiples respectively – that is, 2 and 3.

⁴¹⁹ The ones that come third will be the numbers 4 and 9. In view of what comes next, I think that Proclus must intend that the terms 2, 3, 4 and 9 correspond to both reversion and procession. This is in spite of the fact that he also associates the dyad and its multiples with reproductive power and thus procession, while 3 and things triadic correspond to reversion. (Presumably this is because reversion defines the resulting *platos* in the same way that three points define a plane – or perhaps just because reversion comes third!) That each of these numbers corresponds to both reversion and procession seems clear from his claim at line 6 that the ones intermediate between the monad and the cubes 8 and 27 are *dyoeidês*. If this is right, then the *te* at line 1 and again at line 3 should not be taken to imply that one of each pair corresponds to procession while the other corresponds to reversion. If so, then Festugière's division of labour here is mistaken: 'les troisièmes se partagent entre eux ce qui procède et ce qui se retourne et ils se rapportent aux termes immédiatement au-dessus d'eux'. In any event, the passage is puzzling, since it seems to run together correlations that Proclus usually keeps apart.

are triadic since the [term that is] 8 times [the first] is triadic and the [term that is] 27 times [the first] is, in a way, triadic itself, in as much as they proceed to the third order.⁴²⁰ Therefore, we have both the single wholeness of the soul in the mixture [from which the Demiurge takes the portions] and also the triple [character] of it in the three terms, as well as the quadruple [character of the soul] in the four terms. Thanks to this, he creates the wholes [within the soul] in accordance with each of the forms of providence, and we discover that it includes by means of its wholeness the triple-natured form. But by means of this, [in turn, it includes] the tetradic [form], and always brings the parts together into unity by means of the wholes.

F. The means, Tim. 35c2–36a5

After these things, he filled up both the double and triple intervals, cutting off yet more portions from it he placed these in between them. (*Tim.* 35c2–36a2)

The Theologists say that in the Demiurge there are powers that divide things and powers that connect things. They say that through the former he divides his own kingdom from that of the Father, but through the remaining powers he fastens his entire creation to the Paternal Monad. And the Theologists call such activities ‘divisions’ and ‘bonds’.⁴²¹ Well then, it is in virtue of these powers that, when he now *divides* the essence of the soul among Demiurgic divisions, he is said to be **cutting off portions** (36a2) of its wholeness. Contrariwise, he is said to *bind* the portions by certain bonds because of the means through which he makes that which has been divided stick together again – just as he [earlier] made that which is unified divided through the divisions. These [claims] therefore are held [to be true] because the [doctrines] of Plato stand alongside the first principles of the Theologians. Let us carry on with a consideration of the particular words [of the lemma] in the following manner.

That the whole soul is of similar substance (*homousios*) with itself, and homoiomerous and is, as it were, “monochrome” – being entirely intellectual and an intellectual *logos* – these things, I presume, Plato has made clear from the fact that both the whole and parts in it are made from the same mixture. For the portions that are cut off are certain essences in it that have been divided. [It is also clear] that there is a certain value among the first, middle and final forms, and he shows this by the addition of the words **yet more** (*eti*). For in the cases where we see the same form

⁴²⁰ Presumably the thought is that 8 is equal to 2 cubed, while 27 is 3 cubed.

⁴²¹ Cf. above II. 208.31–209.4.

with increasing degrees of indistinctness, then in these cases we deploy the term 'yet more'. It is like in the case where we say that the Moon results from 'yet more' of the celestial composite. On the one hand, we see a certain kind of alteration in its case [i.e. its phases], yet on the other hand we also see its similarity to the divine bodies and recognise that this similarity is preserved in it.⁴²² Therefore, in order that we should not suppose that there is the same value in all the *logoi* in the soul, he added the term 'yet more', thus indicating, just as we said, that to the extent that we advance toward the interior and search out the middle of the middles, to that extent we encounter forms that are less universal. For what gets included is less universal than that which includes it, and what encompasses is more divine than that which gets encompassed – a fact which the cosmos imitates when it has the divine body all around the [realm of] Becoming, but then the universal soul all around the [world's] body.⁴²³ Therefore all the aforementioned divisions of the soul – the reproductive (for these are the double multiples) and the perfective (for these are the multiples of three) – are such as to encompass the less-universal ratios through which the parts of the universe are ordered right down to the final things. Which is just what Plato communicates to us in what comes next.

... so that in each [interval]⁴²⁴ there are two means, the one exceeding and being exceeded by the same part of the extreme terms, the other exceeding and being exceeded by an equal number. (*Tim.* 36a2–5)

In these words it is certainly necessary to consider, first, how he says that the two middles are encompassed in the geometric proportion, and then [we must observe] that the harmonic [ratio] is established as prior to the arithmetic one in as much as they are superior. For although the harmonic mean doubtless has the property of being self-productive (*autophuês*) and of being simple and of possessing a kinship with Sameness – well, at least equality is a kind of sameness, and because in the

⁴²² The Moon thus stands as an intermediate between the celestial realm which admits only of changes in position and the sublunary realm which admits of all manner of qualitative change. See II. 87.33 for the Moon as an 'isthmus' between the generated and the divine.

⁴²³ Cf. *Tim.* 34b4 where the Demiurge both places the soul in the centre of the world body and wraps it around the outside. Proclus' idea seems to be that there is a difference in the value of the divine bodies in the heavens and those that are located here on Earth in the interior of the cosmos. So too, there will be a corresponding difference among the *logoi* – probably understood ambiguously between the ratios and the rational-forming principles – in the World Soul.

⁴²⁴ Proclus' quotation of the lemma omits διαστήματι.

*Constitutions*⁴²⁵ (*Laws* VI, 757a) the arithmetic mean has been shown to be the efficient [cause] of [civic] friendship since [the distribution of benefits] in terms of arithmetic equality is welcomed, just as the
5 geometric [proportion is the cause] of justice since it aims at [a distribution of benefits] in accordance with merit. Furthermore, the arithmetic [proportion] has been allotted absolute quantity, while harmonic proportion has relative quantity, and while the first is seen to pertain to the quantitative aspects of the portions, the other concerns the size of the portions, for size is the distinctive feature of the third or fourth [of the mathematical sciences].⁴²⁶ – But even though this is so, the harmonic [proportion] has properly been arranged ahead [of the arithmetic
10 one] in as much as it is nearer to geometric proportion, for it provides the extreme terms [in the proportion] with Sameness and distributes the greater ratio to the greater terms and the smaller one to the smaller terms, and in this respect it has been made more appropriate to a division in terms of merit. Indeed, it must be said that the harmonic mean and Sameness bind the entire soul and give to the heavenly [spheres]
15 an indissoluble association, since they distribute to the larger circles a greater motion and power, but a lesser motion and power to the smaller circles, for what encompasses moves at a different rate from that which gets encompassed. But on the other hand, the arithmetic mean and Difference connect all that is in the soul and provide to the things below the Moon an association that involves paying equal recompense to one
20 another. For each thing [in the sublunary realm] gets done to by others no more than it does to them, and the property of changing into one another pertains equally to all the elements in the realm of generation in virtue of arithmetic equality by dint of the elements. It gives to the ones that have
25 lesser surface area motions that are more extensive and swifter, while to those with larger surface area it give motions that are less and slower.

⁴²⁵ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις. Festugière invites us to compare *in Tim.* III. 353.11–12: ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς σκέμμασιν.

⁴²⁶ τὸ γὰρ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον πηλικότητός ἐστιν ἴδιον. This is very obscure indeed, but I am not persuaded by Festugière's 'car «troisième» ou «quatrième» désigne proprement un degré de grandeur'. Given the proximity of the notions of absolute and relative quantity, I think this is a slightly botched allusion to the breakdown of mathematical sciences in Nicomachus and Iamblichus. Here we find the four-fold scheme that correlates absolute quantity with arithmetic, relative quantity with music, size at rest with geometry and size in motion with astronomy. This fits well with the correlation between arithmetic proportion and absolute quantity, while harmonic proportion gets assigned relative quantity, since it is it found particularly in music. Why does Proclus then go on to correlate the harmonic proportion with what has size? This, it must be said, is mysterious. But having made this strange connection, he then goes on to add the somewhat gratuitous information that size is the subject matter of the third or fourth of the mathematical sciences.

G. The tone, Tim. 36a6–b1

When, as a result of these bonds, the intervals of the *bêmiolios* [3:2], the *epitritos* [4:3] and the *epogdoos* [9:8] had come to be in the previous intervals, he filled up all the *epitritos* ones with the interval of the *epogdoos*... (Tim. 36a6–b1)

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It is obvious from what has been said that two of the means, the harmonic and the arithmetic, have come to be as bonds in the intervals of the doubles and the triples, and that when they are divided by the interval of the *epogdoos*, both the *epitritos* and the *bêmiolios* ones appear in the aforesaid middles. This is obvious both from what has been said and also if you would now care to focus upon the terms 6, 8, 12 and 18, for in these terms the double and triple result from the *epitritos* and the *bêmiolios* [ratios].⁴²⁷ How then could these things also be consistent with what was said beforehand? Or is it the case that these things must be taken to be consequent upon the former? For just as these two middles divided the universe into two, in the same manner the *epitritos* and *bêmiolios* ones have created a more specific (*merikôteros*) arrangement. Although they are whole beings, these ratios that have arranged things are also parts of parts. Therefore each of them is a whole in virtue of the numerator, but a part in virtue of the denominator, and a part of parts in virtue of the fact that the one exceeds the other. Now if indeed in each of the spheres there exist the divine kind of souls, daemonic kinds, and those that are partial – like the genera of our own souls where the secondarily divine ones participate wholly in the wholes prior to them, while the daemonic [genera] participate perhaps in the whole of the divine, albeit in a certain respect. (In fact, they are said to be more partial precisely because they are incapable of receiving the entire distinctive characteristic of those [that are prior to them].) The [genera of souls that are even] more partial participate in the daemonic in a partial manner, in different ones at different times⁴²⁸ and not always. – [As I was saying since these kinds of soul are in each sphere] the soul has the *logoi* of these [psychic kinds], with the multiple corresponding to universal participation, while the super-particular corresponds to constant participation in one and the same respect, where that respect is the most proper one. The super-partient [*logoi*] in turn correspond to participation in respect of many, where the association between the participants and that in which they participate comes about in a partial manner.⁴²⁹ Through these things, therefore,

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⁴²⁷ $6 \times \frac{4}{3} = 8$. In turn, $8 \times \frac{3}{2} = 12$. $12 \times \frac{3}{2} = 18$. So we produce the double of 6 (i.e. 12) and the triple of 6 (i.e. 18) by the application of one *epitriton* and two *bêmiolia*.

⁴²⁸ Reading ἄλλου for ἄλλο with Diehl.

⁴²⁹ Recall that a super-particular ratio is one of the form $1+1/m$ while a super-partient is $1+n/m$ (for $n > 1$). See 202.1–20 above for another account of the way in

both the elements and the spheres of the heaven are arranged, and while
 25 they participate in the third [kind of] wholeness, at the same time they
 are also parts of the two divisions of the universe. But since the uni-
 verse possesses every [kind of] wholeness and all the parts together with
 itself – in any event, a different plurality is appropriate to each sphere and
 30 a different number advances alongside each element – the *epogdoos* [9:8]
 ratio that has filled in the *epitritos* and *hêmiolios* ones also creates these
 complete sets (*plêrôma*) of partial wholes and harmonises them with their
 appropriate wholenesses. You can see how, just like in the case of the
 229 mathematical [entities] where the geometric [proportion] encompasses
 the remaining two middles, and these in turn encompass the *epitritos* and
 the *hêmiolios* [ratios], and these in turn the *epogdoos* ones – well, in the
 same manner the soul has established the whole [realm of generation]
 in virtue of its own wholeness, but in virtue of the substantial dyad the
 soul has divided the universe into two and led forth the primary parts
 of the universe. (These primary parts are themselves wholes, albeit in
 5 a secondary manner.) In virtue of the causes of the third wholeness the
 soul has ordered both the [heavenly] spheres and the elements, while in
 virtue of the appropriate numbers the soul filled these with both forms
 and parts that are appropriate to these parts.

Accordingly let us say the following: while this universe possesses
 whole spheres, in each of these spheres there is life: divine, daemonic
 or psychic [i.e. human] – there are distributions of non-universal souls
 10 to each sphere. But among all these lives and all these souls, it is the
 harmonic ratios of the universal soul (*tês holês psychês*) that harmonise
 the divisible Being that comes to be in relation to bodies and the bodies
 themselves, for by the very fact of its essence (*to einai*) it is such as to
 constitute them. In the cases where a thing's essence is such as to be
 15 constitutive of something, here its essence includes the *logoi* of what is
 comprised. It is just like in the case of fire where the essence is such as to
 heat, fire is hot in a primary way (*prôtôs*). Therefore, [the universal soul]
 possesses the harmony of the musical fourth through which it mutually
 harmonises the divisible Being that comes to be in relation to bodies
 and the bodies themselves with each of the spheres and the lives in each
 sphere, whether divine, daemonic or psychic [i.e. human].⁴³⁰ For after
 20 all, it is not by chance that some things are such as to include others,

which super-particular and super-partient ratios correspond to different participation relations.

⁴³⁰ It appears that Proclus' reasoning is as follows: we have three kinds of life in each sphere (divine, daemonic and human). The universal soul harmonises each of these kinds of life with four other considerations: the sphere itself, some one of the kinds of life, the divisible kind of being that composes a body, and the body itself. This gives us the 4:3 ratio characteristic of the musical fourth.

nor is it by chance that some things are dependent upon others. The daemonic lives that depend upon divine lives are one thing, while the human lives that are dependent upon daemonic ones are another. But it is natural for the secondary things always to be harmonised with what is prior to them. Therefore the [harmony] of the musical fourth exists in each case. Some ratios harmonise each sphere with the divine lives in it, while others harmonise these [divine lives] with the daemonic ones. These latter ratios must be genuinely *epogdooi* since [the 9:8 ratio] has a complete interval, being simultaneously in tune in the primary manner but also fitting for bodies, for with its three dimensions, 8 is corporeal in form (*sômatoeidês*),⁴³¹ and since 9 is a plane number, each of the two is akin to equality.⁴³² The natures of secondary corporeal composites are always dependent upon the things prior to them in which⁴³³ they participate and upon the corporeal *logos* in them. This is clearly the portion of the participated thing that is said to be $\frac{1}{8}$.⁴³⁴ The remaining ratio of souls to the daemonic lives has the status of the ratio of the semi-tone since it is super-partient and since this is appropriate to a part with the value of $\frac{1}{3}$.⁴³⁵ For these [souls] do not have a single life, but rather ascend and descend, having the benefit of [participation in] the things that are prior to them in a manner that is partial and irregular. And since the number 12 has been assigned to the gods [*Phdr.* 247a] and to what is superior to us, it is fitting that the number 13 correspond to those who fall just beyond the number of the gods. And if among the psychic lives themselves, some belonged to souls that were undefiled (those which Plato habitually calls 'heroes'),⁴³⁶ but others belonged to souls among 'the many', then the

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⁴³¹ The point is that 8 is a cube number, being equal to 2^3 . Proclus here uses *sômatoeidês* – not as he sometimes does, as a synonym for 'corporeal' – but to indicate something like the idea that it is a number whose *instantiation* produces three dimensions.

⁴³² Proclus must imagine that there is something like a relation of equality between 2^3 and 3^2 – not because the functions yield the same numbers, but because the squaring and cubing functions are defined by these numbers respectively.

⁴³³ Reading ἐν οἷς for ἐν τοῖς in line 31.

⁴³⁴ This is very obscure. Perhaps Proclus has in mind the idea that if the form remains whole and unitary when participated, and if $\frac{9}{8}$ somehow captures the idea of participation, then the $\frac{8}{8}$ must remain with the Form, leaving $\frac{1}{8}$ for the participant. For what *may* be a different view about the ratios that correspond to corporeal *logoi*, see above 200.27.

⁴³⁵ Recall that the ratio of the semi-tone is 256:243 which is here treated as the super-partient 1 and $\frac{13}{243}$.

⁴³⁶ The Platonic text that Proclus takes to license speculations on heroic souls is *Laws* IV, 717b; cf. *in Crat.* § 117.13–23 and *in Remp.* II. 231.19. Heroic souls as further intermediaries between human souls and the divine have a well-established tradition in Neoplatonism at least from Iamblichus' *de Mysteriis* (cf. Shaw (1995), 78–80). However, Proclus' speculation on harmonic correlates to daemonic, heroic and human lives is unique, at least to my knowledge.

10 musical fifth would be present in each of the spheres.⁴³⁷ The heroic lives would preserve the ratio of 9:8 in relation to the daemonic lives because of the undefiled form of the life, but the lives of the many would have the ratio of the semi-tone to the heroic lives, so that in each of the spheres we would have the *epitritos* [4:3], *bêmiolios* [3:2] and *epogdoos* [9:8] ratios.

15 Or maybe instead it is like this: the universe has been divided into four parts in accord with the Paradigm's four forms (*Tim.* 39e–40a). In accordance with each portion among the four, all the lives are present – the divine, the daemonic, the heroic and the lives of human souls – having been arranged harmoniously with one another and in relation to their appropriate wholeness, the heaven. Together with this wholeness, these
20 lives make the musical fifth, but without it they make the fourth in the four forms of living beings, in as much as Plato has divided both the universe and the various forms of living things.⁴³⁸ Therefore, through these things Plato has taught us that there are ratios that are inclusive of ratios that have been filled up in accordance with the single harmony.
25 Since the soul is a complete set (*plêrôma*) of these ratios, it has filled up this visible cosmos revealing that 'all things are rational and convertible in relation to one another' (*Rep.* VIII, 574c).

H. The semi-tone, *Tim.* 36b1–5

23I ... leaving a portion out of each of them; the terms of the interval of this portion that was assumed⁴³⁹ have [the ratio] of the numbers 256 to 243. (*Tim.* 36b1–5)

⁴³⁷ Here too Proclus' reasoning is not easy to follow. I think what he has in mind is this. In each sphere we have four kinds of life: divine, daemonic, heroic human and ordinary human. Harmonising all of these is the universal soul, indicated above. Think of the intervals between it and the first three as tones, but the interval between heroic souls and those of the multitude as that of the semi-tone. These intervals span a musical fifth.

⁴³⁸ The text at lines 18–20 is corrupt. καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ μοῖραν τῶν τεσσάρων τὰ πάντα ἐστὶ ζῶα, τὰ θεῖα, τὰ δαιμόνια, τὰ ἡρώικα, τὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν, συντεταγμένων ἐναρμονίως ἀλλήλοις καὶ πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν ὁλότητα, τὸν οὐρανόν, [τὸν ἀέρα, τὸ ὕδωρ] <μετά> τῆς ὁλότητος τὴν διὰ πέντε ἱποιοῦσα, ἀνευ δὲ ταύτης τὴν διὰ τεσσάρων ἐν τοῖς τέτρασιν εἶδеси τῶν ζῶων, Diehl offers two alternative suggestions and both Festugière and I take the first of these. Read συντεταγμένα for συντεταγμένων and ποιοῦντα for ποιοῦσα so that τὰ ζῶα is the subject throughout. In addition, Diehl brackets τὸν ἀέρα, τὸ ὕδωρ but not τὸν οὐρανόν and inserts μετά.

⁴³⁹ Proclus' lemma differs from our OCT text of Plato by having ληφθείσης – a participle of λαμβάνω – rather than λειφθείσης, a participle of λείπω. Certainly the latter is easier to read. Since it comes after λείπων αὐτῶν ἐκάστου μόριον, 'the portion that was left' makes it clear what we are talking about. Proclus also omits the line καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ μειχθέν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα κατέτεμεν, οὕτως ἤδη πᾶν κατανηλώκει at 36b5–6 from his quotation, picking up the discussion again with b7.

What this “left-over”⁴⁴⁰ is, and what kind of ratio it has, and how (since it is in tune) it comes to be in harmony with the others when it is arranged with them – this is all obvious through mathematics. There is something like this in the universe, as there is in the whole. Even independently of the significance of the four-fold division of the whole that has been mentioned already [229.9–230.27], the ratio of the semi-tone is present in the last of the lives encompassed [within the cosmos]. From each of the spheres certain exhalations, come down into the [regions] below the Earth, [these exhalations] being the dregs of certain mixtures of the elements.⁴⁴¹ While they possess much of the disturbed character, darkness and materiality [of the elements], they nonetheless contribute toward the composition and harmony of the whole cosmos. Plato surely placed the cause of these things in the whole soul and called it ‘the left-over’ – a term which undoubtedly connotes the ultimate degree of deterioration. When the Theologians too arrange the powers of the highest gods around a place in such a way that when Zeus arranges things there, it turns out to be receptive to participation in such great gods – what then must we think about the case of the World Soul? Must we not think that to an even greater degree it orders what appears to be disordered, and that it has every cause of [the universe’s] hypostasis, and, in virtue of this cause, sets things up in a way that is fitting? And how would it rule the universe or lead all things in accordance with intellect unless it ordered what is disordered and harmonised the final things [in the order of procession] in relation to the single life of the cosmos? And if even the causes of these [exhalations composed from the mixtures of the dregs of the elements] pre-exist in the Demiurge, just as the Theologians⁴⁴² say

And roots beneath the Earth, his feet stand fast
Tartarus dank, of Earth’s limits, the last.

What then is so remarkable about the universal soul (*holê psychê*) possessing all things in itself in a manner that is appropriate? [Will it not do this] to the same extent that divine Intellect possesses all things in a manner that is demiurgic and antecedently comprehends the causes of

⁴⁴⁰ *To leimma* is the word that has been regularly translated as ‘semi-tone’. I use the non-technical sense here to convey the sense of its origin.

⁴⁴¹ See above 211.1–9. Earlier in the commentary, Proclus gives an account of how exhalations from various heavenly bodies generate various metals to be found below the earth (I. 43.2–14). The idea that different substances owe their nature and character to exhalations from various heavenly gods is likely part of theurgic practice, as the subsequent mention of the Theologists and Proclus’ own *de Sacr.* 149.20 and 150.29 suggest. Cf. Shaw (1995), 162–78. Mugler (in Festugière) offers parallels with astrological texts.

⁴⁴² *Orph. fr.* (Kern) 168, 29–30. Cf. *in Tim.* II 45.7–11.

232 the final stages of the cosmos and the dregs, as it were, of the wholes [of the pure elements]? For the soul includes the invisible cosmos prior to the one that is visible and sensible. Therefore, what the left-over [or semi-tone] is should be obvious through these remarks.

Now, the semi-tone exists in a four-fold manner (*tetrachôs*), as well as in the manner that is unitary (*monachôs*), and it was necessary for the
5 soul to include the ratio in both ways. In virtue of this fact it is both four-fold and unitary – if it is indeed necessary for this [semi-tone] to contribute toward both the universe and each portion [in the soul]. And if you would be willing to consider the numbers of the terms, you will see them preserving the proportion in a way that is quite remarkable. The procession to the tertiary dyadic order [i.e. the 200 in 243 and 256]
10 exhibits an absolutely complete and total deterioration of the cause and separation from it, for the most partial things in the soul include the final and maximally enmattered things in the universe. But in the tens place, the 4 and the 5 [in 243 and 256 respectively] make these things dependent upon the primary beings and arrange them together with the first principles. For 4 has been allocated the property of being creative and bringing about order,⁴⁴³ while 5 recalls everything that has gone
15 forth back to the more unified powers. Furthermore, in the unit place, the 3 and the 6 impart completion to these things through reversion. And even if 13:243 is a super-partient ratio,⁴⁴⁴ this number would not be out of harmony with the universe. For following the absolutely complete procession of sensible things and the deterioration right down to the Earth – where Earth is said to be the twelfth part of the cosmos – everything below that level would be the thirteenth of the whole. And the appearance of the elements that have gone down to this level would
20 be fitting for this number. The maximally enmattered [aspect of] universe therefore proceeds all the way, and in going forth it is ordered, and having been ordered, it reverts. And in each of the portions there are the final genera that are inferior to the everlasting beings – beings to which
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⁴⁴³ ἡ μὲν γὰρ τετραὶς δημιουργικὴν ἔλαχεν ιδιότητα καὶ κοσμουργόν. These adjectives are not otherwise attested for the tetrad. The *Theology of Arithmetic* characterises the monad as δημιουργός (4.9), while the tetrad is κλειδοῦχόν τινα τῆς φύσεως (28.13) – perhaps an idea sufficiently akin to κοσμουργόν.

⁴⁴⁴ 256 exceeds 243 by 13, so we can think of the semi-tone as corresponding to the super-partient ratio $243 + \frac{13}{243}$. Recall that Pythagorean harmonic theory denies that such super-partients express genuine concords (cf. above 168.1–5). This provides their grounds for denying that the eleventh (8:3, an octave plus a fourth) is genuinely a concord. Proclus here provides reasons for denying that this presents a problem given its presence among the psychic *logoi* that order sensible creation. The super-partient semi-tone expresses just the attenuated notion of harmony (235.26–28) that is fitting to the disorderly character of the elements in the subterranean world.

the number 12 has been dedicated – and plausibly too in virtue of the fact that they have association and reciprocal relations with one another in accordance with the status of 13, since it was said long ago that 12 is dedicated to the gods [230.5] and to the kind of beings that are always dependent upon them. Therefore, the soul has included all these things in a unified manner by means of the ratio of the semi-tone. And in relation to these things, the set of 9 units which the 3 [in 243] and the 6 [in 256] provide would indicate the limit of the psychic *logoi*. For beginning from the unit, they have proceeded to the 9.⁴⁴⁵ At that point we go from the unit place to the tens place, and then on to the hundreds place. For the entire procession of the soul was triadic and the manifestation [of the soul results] from Demiurgic causes both in terms of its essence and its harmony, just as we said earlier [225.2]. Therefore, what the semi-tone is indicative of in the soul has been stated.

I. Correlations between the scale and the soul

All the musical scales involved in the generation of the soul involve 34 terms, or else 36 terms through the inclusion of the *apotomê*.⁴⁴⁶ Now if it does have 36 terms, this number is fitting for the soul in as much as this number is generated by the 6 proceeding into itself,⁴⁴⁷ the number 6 having long ago been dedicated to the soul.⁴⁴⁸ This is because 6 is the first of the even-odd numbers,⁴⁴⁹ so it is like the soul which is an intermediate between indivisible and divisible [Being] – the first of which is appropriate to the odd, while the [divisible Being] belongs to the even. It is also because 6 is circular like 5.⁴⁵⁰ But while the one is an image of the circle of intellect, in as much as it is manly, the other is an image of the circle of the soul in as much as it is feminine.⁴⁵¹ But even if the number of terms in the soul is 34, it nonetheless turns out that this number too

⁴⁴⁵ Cf. 236.13–16. ⁴⁴⁶ See above 188.8–29.

⁴⁴⁷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξάδος εἰς ἑαυτὴν εἰσελθούσης γεγονώς. This is presumably the metaphysical counterpart to the fact that 36 is 6².

⁴⁴⁸ Purportedly a Pythagorean notion; cf. II. 270.3–9, *Theol. Arith.* 45.11–48.6.

⁴⁴⁹ ὀρτιοπέρισσος describes even numbers whose halves are odd. 6 is the first such number, while 10 is the second.

⁴⁵⁰ A number is called circular when its square ends in the same digit, as when 6² is 36 and 5² is 25. Cf. Nicomachus, *Arith.* II. 17.

⁴⁵¹ There is always some room for argument about proper reference with ἐκείνη μὲν... αὕτη δέ... But here it seems to me that Taylor is right and Festugière is wrong ('sauf que l'hexad est une image du cercle de l'Intellect...'). We are considering reasons why the number 6 – the square root of 36 – is appropriate to the soul, so it should be assigned to the circle of the soul. Moreover, *psychê* is the feminine noun, while *nous* is masculine. Finally, the Pythagoreans associate the odd number with the masculine and the even number with the feminine (Aristotle, *Metaphys.* I.5, 985a22).

is fitting to the soul – if indeed the unit is Intellect (as it is indivisible), but the cosmos is the number 10, then the soul is 4. For this reason, all number proceeds ‘from the undefiled depths of the monad’ –

25 up to the sacred tetrad, which has given birth to the mother of all, ...
the undeviating one, the unwearying one; they call her pure decad.⁴⁵²

234 The tetrad has sides that form a dyad, and when we take the square twice and add the [dyad] of sides, we get the aforementioned number [34],⁴⁵³ while the number 34 is an imitation of the soul when it pluralises itself from itself together with the appropriate generative power. But if the soul is composed from the second *epogdoos*, i.e. from the 16 and the 18, then here too the number 34 would result since the tone is also particularly appropriate to the soul. This second *epogdoos*, since it forms the *paramesos* between the intervals that are in tune and those that are not, is appropriate to the intermediate [nature] of the soul, and generally characterises the diatonic genus in terms of which the whole soul has been harmonised. Since it has received a secondary kind of essence (*to einai*), this would make it correspond to the soul’s position [in the scale of things] in which all the genera of being exist in a manner that is secondary. 5 Moreover, since the scale has a tetrad’s worth of octaves in it (the octave being the ‘most complete of concordances’),⁴⁵⁴ as well as one fifth, and is complete with an additional single tone, this would make it correspond to the four-fold division of the cosmos, as we said [230.15]. It proceeds downward from the Living Being Itself to the universe through the soul, and from the four Forms in the Living Being to the quadruple causes of the complete harmony in each of the regions [corresponding to these Forms]. It is through this cause that the heaven is a single cosmos that 10 forms a concordance with itself in the celestial manner, while the Earth possesses all things in a terrestrial manner, and similarly in the case of each of the regions in between these two. Since the cosmos is not only 15 such as to have four parts, but also such as to have five shapes⁴⁵⁵ (since it has a fifth form (*idea*), along with the four), it is plausible that the soul possesses intrinsically the concordance of the musical fifth, along with the four octaves. Since the remaining divisions are into the eight spheres of the heaven, on the one hand, and the nine of the entire cosmos on the other – the first being consecrated to the Sirens in the *Republic* (X, 617b) and the other to the universal Muses, from which the Sirens are 20

⁴⁵² Cf. *Orph. fr.* 315. Proclus’ quotation of this passage at *in Tim.* I. 316.21 includes a further line which is omitted here.

⁴⁵³ $2 \times 4^2 + 2 = 34$. ⁴⁵⁴ Nicomachus, *Harm.* 5.1.6 (ed. Jan).

⁴⁵⁵ A reference to the five Platonic solids that the Demiurge uses in the construction of the cosmos, *Tim.* 54d–55c.

derived⁴⁵⁶ – it is again plausible that the tone [which has the ratio of 9:8] has been included with the musical scale. Nor is it possible to conceive of divisions different from these that have been communicated to us by Plato – I mean the division into 4, into 5, into 8, and into 9 (the one being given in this text, while the other division results from what has been written in the *Republic*) – so that it turns out that the entire psychogonic scale results quite plausibly (*eikotôs*) from all that has been said. I mean [the scale] comprising the tone, the fifth, and the four octaves, now quite reasonably taking the tone, the fifth and the four octaves in a different order than we did earlier so that the cosmos in general might be seen to have these things just as the whole musical scale possesses the power. And surely all these things have been taken in accordance with all three of Plato's divisions of encosmic things: in terms of Forms, in terms of figures, and in terms of the spheres.

Therefore all the other *hēmiolios* and *epogdoos* ratios were bonds of orders of things that include things less universal than either the five portions of the universe, or the divisions into eight and nine; for example, [they are bonds of orders] of gods, or daemons, or souls, or natures or bodies. And among the gods, some are bonds of one order, while others bind different orders (in the case of each portion there are different orders of gods and the secondary things stand in an analogous relation to the things that come before them). And similarly in the case of daemons; some are bonds of one series, while others are bonds of another. The same thing goes for souls, natures and bodies. However, he has done nothing pointless in assuming the concordance of the musical fifth and the *epogdoos* ratio together with the set of four octaves. Rather, [they have been assumed] because they are constitutive of the wholes in a communal fashion. I mean, for example, that there has been a simultaneous arrangement of all things in terms of the five-part division, as well as a division of all things into eight and nine. As one ratio connects the division into nine spheres with that into eight spheres, so too surely the leftovers of all of the *epitritos* ratios correspond to either final and most pluralised deteriorations of the individual portions of the four-part arrangement, or else they are common legacies of all of them to the final place, and through which gods, daemons, partial souls and natures descend into them and are concordant with one another – though they have a concord with one another due to the last and totally divisible concordance which is the sort that we say is characteristic of the super-partient. Therefore it is quite plausible that when Plato arrived at this point, he added that the Demiurge had by now 'used up' (36b6) all the mixture in the division,

⁴⁵⁶ See above 210.27.

30 for neither God nor Nature does anything in vain. Therefore he made
 236 the mixture neither more nor less than the portions. Instead his activities
 produced as much as was necessary for the very wholeness of the soul,
 for the *whole of parts* is neither more nor less than the appropriate parts,
 but is essentially constituted by all the appropriate parts.⁴⁵⁷ Therefore
 5 'all the mixture' (36b5) is composed of harmonic ratios, and – to put the
 point generally – the harmony itself within the World Soul is a substan-
 tial paradigm of the harmony found among all the divisions within the
 cosmos.

Furthermore, the total number of the substantial units within the soul
 10 is ten 10,000s, five 1,000s, <nine 100s, four 10s,>⁴⁵⁸ and seven units [i.e.
 105,947]. It has proceeded [from its source] in conformity with all these
 arrangements of numbers. It has proceeded in the manner of the decad
 in order that the soul may become cosmic, for 10 is the number of the
 cosmos.⁴⁵⁹ The procession took place in the manner of the number 5 so
 that reversion upon itself might take place, for the number 5 is such as
 to revert upon itself.⁴⁶⁰ The procession in the manner of the number 9
 15 takes place lest the universe be composed in a monadic manner. Instead
 it has proceeded from the monad as far as possible to the last rank of
 things.⁴⁶¹ The procession took place in the manner of the number 4 in
 as much as the four-fold division [of the realms within the cosmos] has
 been brought together into a single thing. Finally, the procession has
 taken place in the manner of the number 7 in as much as all things revert
 upon the monad to which the number 7 has been made to refer, since it
 alone is without a mother and not at all womanish.⁴⁶² In this case [sc. in
 the World Soul], this number exists in the manner of a whole (*holikôs*),
 20 while in divine souls it exists in as much as there are activities that are
 whole-and-partial (*holikôs kai merikôs*) directed toward the former. But
 in the souls of daemons this number exists as activities that are yet more
 partial but, contrary to the previous case, partial-and-total (*merikôs kai
 holikôs*). In human souls, however, this number exists in a manner that is

⁴⁵⁷ Cf. *ET* 67. ⁴⁵⁸ ἑκατοντάδες <ἐννέα, δεκάδες> τέσσαρες added by Diehl from 5.

⁴⁵⁹ Cf. *Theol. Arith.* 80.1.

⁴⁶⁰ Like 6, 5 is a circular number: its square ends in itself. Hence Proclus thinks that it
 reverts upon itself. Cf. *in Remp.* II. 53.26–9.

⁴⁶¹ The number 9 is the last number before we come to the Decad, which itself forms
 a new unit. Thus 9 is symbolic of going to the final rank of things. Cf. *Theol. Arith.*
 76.5–77.4.

⁴⁶² The number 7 is unique among the numbers in the Decad in having no other number
 as a factor. Hence it is 'motherless' being born of the unit alone. Nor is it a factor in
 any of the other numbers in the Decad. Hence it 'gives birth' to none of them and is
 not at all womanish. Cf. *Theol. Arith.* 53.20.

only partial and only in a manner that is cognitive (*gnôstikôs*).⁴⁶³ For in this way all Forms are in human souls, for instance, the Form of Man, or Daemon or God, in order that all things may be known through them. However, they are present in superior souls in a manner that is both cognitive *and productive*.

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This mixture, therefore, relates only to the case of the World Soul, and it is the same way for each of the divine souls. It exists in a similar manner in the case of daemonic souls, each of which has an elevated intellect of the appropriate essence, a distinctive [psychic] vehicle and a life that is divisible in relation to this vehicle. If it is necessary to assume a defining feature in the case of each of the partial souls it is that what is indivisible is prior to them, while what is divisible is posterior to them, or that each is the former in one way, but the latter in another way. Though this question has already been deemed worthy of investigation by us, we will deal with it differently when we come to the account of the generation of such partial souls and hunt down Plato's judgement on these matters.

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V. The soul's form

A. Psychic linearity, Tim. 36b6–c1

So then, he divided this entire composite in two lengthwise strips, affixing each to the other, middle to middle, like an X. (Tim. 36b6–c1)

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1. Mathematical interpretation

First it is necessary to speak about this in a mathematical fashion, determining what sort of shape the soul has. Then it is necessary to introduce the consideration of the facts so that we may provide ourselves with the receptivity to be well directed by our imaginative capacity (*phantasia*) toward a knowledgeable apprehension (*epistêmonikê antilêpsis*) concerning what is said here.

We must therefore conceive all these numbers as having been inscribed along a monochord, just as those who study harmonics customarily do.⁴⁶⁴ Let it have these numbers inscribed through its whole

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⁴⁶³ Proclus' reasoning here is a variation on his usual means of ordering a triadic procession. Normally where we have predicates A and B where A is superior to B, and entities x, y and z in order of precedence, x is A, y is both A and B, and z is B only. So, for instance, Intellect is ungenerated only; soul both generated and ungenerated; and sensibles generated only. Here we have four terms – the World Soul, divine encosmic souls, daemons and humans. The order of predicates is A only; A-and-B; B-and-A; B only.

⁴⁶⁴ For the term κανών as monochord cf. Ptol. *Harm.* I.8. But it seems that Proclus here intends us to envision the numbers inscribed on something like a ruler or frets over

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depth, and let the monochord be divided lengthwise. Now surely all the ratios will be present in each of the pieces. For if the division had been made *across* the width, then it would necessarily have been the case that some of the numbers would be found here, while others were there. But since the strips were taken lengthwise, all the numbers would be in all the strips, and the same numbers will be present in each of the portions. For this is obvious: that it is not the same thing to *divide the length* and to *divide lengthwise*. The latter signifies that the strip runs through the whole length, while the former implies that someone cuts the length. So therefore let the monochord be divided lengthwise in this manner and let these two lengthwise strips be affixed to one another at the point midway along the strips – not entirely right angles (for the circles will not be at right angles) – and so that the straight lines have been thus bent around so that the end points have again been joined. Now surely two circles come into being, and these have come to be in such a way that one is on the inside and the other is on the outside, and they are at an angle to one another. Now one of these is called the circle of the Same and the other is the circle of the Different. The one corresponds to the equator while the other corresponds to the circle of the ecliptic. The entire circle of the Different is carried around the ecliptic, while the circle of the Same is carried around the equator. Because of this it is immediately evident that it is not necessary to assume these circles to be at right angles to one another, but rather **like an X**, just as Plato said, so that only the angle at the top is equal [to the one below it] and the adjacent ones are unequal.⁴⁶⁵ It has to be this way because the equator does not divide the path of the ecliptic at a right angle. Such then is the summary of the mathematics concerning the shape of the soul.

2. *Implications for the soul's essence*

Considering the facts again from the start, let us say how these words relate to psychic essence. First, however, let us draw this distinction: that the mathematical sciences are distinguished from one another by whether they deal with what is continuous or what is discrete.⁴⁶⁶ These

which the single string is stretched and upon which all the psychic ratios are inscribed. It has both depth and length. We are then to imagine peeling strips off the ruler which will preserve all the numeric ratios that are inscribed on it in each strip.

⁴⁶⁵ τὰς κατὰ κορυφὴν ἴσας εἶναι μόνον, τὰς δὲ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα καὶ ἐφεξῆς ἀνίσους. Strictly speaking, the angles in the X that are opposite one another are equal – not merely the one at the top and the one at the bottom.

⁴⁶⁶ For this Pythagorean division of mathematical sciences by their objects – first by continuous or discrete quantity and then whether absolute or relative – see in *Euc.* 35.17–36.5 and *Theol. Arith.* 20.15–21.2.

things are opposed to one another in a certain manner. The discrete is not able to be continuous, nor is the continuous able to be discrete. In the case of the soul, both run right through it, and there is both unity and division, for the soul is both unit and number; a single ratio and a plurality; both one and many. In as much as it is whole, it is continuous, but in as much as it is number it has been divided in virtue of the ratios in it. Because of its continuity it is made similar to the unification of the intelligibles, but because of the plurality in it, it is similar to their differentiation (*diakrisis*). And still higher than these intelligibles, in virtue of its unification it is an image and appearance of the One. But on the other hand, in virtue of the division and plurality in it, it is also an image of the divine numbers. As a result, the soul has an essence that is not merely arithmetic (for then it would not be continuous) nor merely geometric (for then it would not be discrete), but one that is simultaneously both. Therefore it is said to be both arithmetic and geometric. But to the degree to which it is arithmetic, its essence is simultaneously harmonic in character (for the plurality in it is harmonised, and in its Sameness is included together with both absolute and relative quantity). But to the extent that its essence is geometric, it is spherical, for there are circles in it that are both motionless and moved. They are motionless in terms of their essence (*kat' ousian*), but in terms of their activities (*kat' energeian*) they undergo the motions characteristic of life. Or rather, they have both simultaneously, for the circles are such as to move themselves. But what is self-moving is simultaneously moved and unmoved, for it moves itself, but the motion is that of an immovable power.⁴⁶⁷ Therefore the soul has antecedently comprehended (*prolambanein*) all these [mathematical] sciences in a substantial manner (*ousiôdês*) – the geometric science in virtue of its wholeness, in virtue of its shape, and in virtue of its lines; but it comprehends the arithmetic science in virtue of the plurality and the substantial units within it, as has been shown previously. The harmonic science is included in virtue of the ratios of numbers, while the science of spheres is there in virtue of its double revolution. And this is truly the binding together of the mathematical sciences, including all things that are substantial, self-moving, intellectual, and unified in a manner that is pure and devoid of shape. It includes the shapes in a manner that is without shape, while things that are discrete are there in a manner that is unified. The things that involve extension are there in an unextended manner. After all, these things pertain to the essence of the soul and it is necessary to consider that all things are in it in this manner.

⁴⁶⁷ Cf. *Phys.* 8.5, 257a32–258a26 where Aristotle argues that every self-mover is moved by a part of itself that is unmoved.

And in addition to this, it is necessary to infer from what has been said that all secondary [effects] are analogous to something prior to them and that in every case the one is prior to the many. For as the consideration of the existence (*hýparxis*) of the soul had its origin from the psychic essence and the consideration of the harmony of the soul began from the
20 *single* portion, so too the teaching about its shape sets out the *one* strip [of psychic mixture] prior to the two [strips into which the Demiurge now divides it]. Likewise as we went from Being to Sameness and Difference [in the case of the soul's essence], so too we went from the unit to the double and triple ratio [in the construction of the soul's harmonies]. Now we'll go from the one lengthwise strip to the circle of the Same and of the Different. The things that are prior are related to one another
25 in the same way that things that come later are related to one another, and all things are consistent with one another: the essence, the harmony, the form. And it is like this everywhere because of the "monochrome" (*homochrous*) and homoiomerous [character] of the soul's life. While the Same and the triple [ratio] are found *especially* in the circle of the Same, and the Different and the double [ratio] are found *especially* in the circle
30 of the Different, nonetheless *all* the ratios are found everywhere, but in a different manner in the primary things and in those that are their secondary products. They are in the former in a manner that is intellectual, universal and unified. But they are in the secondary things in a manner
240 that is opinative, divided and partial. This, therefore, is how it is with these things.

3. *The division into linear portions*

a. *Iamblichus' view*

It is worthwhile to consider what one must say about this 'splitting' and the two lengths or circles. For the divine Iamblichus⁴⁶⁸ busies himself with higher matters, as it were, and 'scrutinises things invisible'⁴⁶⁹ –
5 that is, both the single soul and the two souls that have proceeded from it. For in every order there is an unparticipated unit at the head, prior

⁴⁶⁸ Proclus, in *Tim.* II. 240.4–28 = Iamblichus, in *Tim.* fr. 54 (Dillon).

⁴⁶⁹ Aristophanes fr. 672. Compare the implicit charge against which Socrates seeks to defend himself: Σωκράτης ἄδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια...τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν (*Apol.* 19b4–c3). Dillon comments: 'For Proclus to indulge in such jocularities – to the extent of quoting Aristophanes – at the expense of the divine Iamblichus, there must be grave provocation.' Yet Dillon thinks that there is nothing here that Proclus should disagree with, philosophically speaking, though he might object to the propriety of drawing such morals from this passage in the *Timaeus*.

to the things that are participated. There is also an appropriate and connate number corresponding to the unparticipated things, and from the unit the dyad results, just as is the case with the gods themselves. Iamblichus says, therefore, that since Timaeus has created the single and hypercosmic soul in words through the generation of the soul – the soul from which the World Soul and the other [souls] are derived – he now produces the dyad from this [unit]. For the splitting shows the Demiurgic division which proceeds in Sameness and completeness resulting in the generation of the same things in accordance with secondary numbers. But the lengthwise division [of the strip] from top to bottom [signifies] the procession downward from the Demiurge. Through this, two souls are produced after the first, each of which has the very same ratios. These souls are conjoined to one another, and are in one another, and yet are separated from one another, thus preserving both their unmixed purity as well as their unification with one another, for each is united to the other by its own centre. This is why we have the phrase **middle to middle**. Now since these souls are intellectual and participate in divine intellect, the Demiurge bent them round into circles even prior to the generation of the heaven and encompassed them in the motion ‘around the same things and in the same place’ [*Tim.* 36c2, cf. 248.8 below], thus both making them intellectual and endowing them with divine intellect, and also inserting the dyad of souls into the intellectual dyad that is superior to them in essence (*kat’ousian*).

b. Proclus' view

Now, we say that everything that Iamblichus has said is all well and good as regards the consideration of the facts, for these things are prior to the cosmos. Because of this, there is a unit in the case of encosmic things, and then a dyad, and then a heptad (seven). For in the case of the things *within* the universe, there is first the single World Soul, then the two souls after it which divide the heaven into the revolution of the Same and the Different. This is followed by the arrangement of the seven planetary revolutions after those of the Same and the Different. But we think that it is more consistent with the words of Plato to interpret what is said here as pertaining neither to the former hypercosmic souls, nor to the many encosmic souls, but rather as concerned with just the World Soul. At any rate, Plato says a bit later (*Tim.* 36d8–e1), after he has dealt with all the divisions: ‘When the entire psychic composite had come about in accordance with the intention of the one who created it, after this he framed all that is corporeal inside of it.’ The word ‘soul’ is in the singular here and this soul is none other than the World Soul, for it is this that encompasses the corporeal [universe]. Therefore the Demiurgic divisions, the

two lines and circles must be taken to pertain to the World Soul, and we will not be at a loss for reasons [to take it this way]. In any event, since [the World Soul] is such as to bring together all the motionless things with the things that are moved by another, and the things that are indivisible and with those that are divisible, and to unite paradigms with their final images, as well as the things that really are (*ta ontôs onta*) with the things that are not really not-being (*ta ouk ontôs ouk onta*),⁴⁷⁰ it is quite plausible that the nature of the World Soul is two-fold – one [nature] relating to that which is superior to it, while the other relates to what is inferior to it⁴⁷¹ – because these things [sc. intelligibles and sensibles] have surely been entirely separated from one another, then in some manner they stand in need of *two* intermediaries.⁴⁷² While in the case of sensible things, the [intermediaries] that do the connecting have been separated from one another,⁴⁷³ in the case of incorporeal things we have a single bi-formed (*dyoeidês*) essence that connects the extreme terms. That which establishes the connections with the intelligibles is itself intellectual, scientific, suffused with divine wisdom, capable of leading things back [to their source], and such as to include the causes of things. Since the other [aspect of its nature] is proximate to particulars, it makes things different, binds itself with sensible beings, spreads providence over secondary existences, is such as to craft things (*technikos*),⁴⁷⁴ and includes whatever else is akin to these [properties]. Now all the ratios are present in each of these [aspects of the World Soul] for it is in this respect that the essence of the soul differs from intellectual essence: while the one is uni-form (*monoeidês*) and antecedently comprehends (*prolambanein*) all

⁴⁷⁰ All these oppositions – the motionless and the hetero-motive, etc. – are features of intelligibles, on the one hand, and sensibles on the other. Proclus' point is that soul's role as mediator between these two orders is sufficient to ground the claim that soul somehow has a double nature.

⁴⁷¹ εἰκότως διπλῇ τις αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, ἥ μὲν πρὸς τοῖς κρείττοσιν, ἥ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ὑφειμένοις. The two uses of the feminine ἥ need not introduce a superior and inferior *soul*: this is what is involved with Iamblichus' Hypercosmic Soul and World Soul. Rather ἥ goes with φύσις. Syrianus, at least, thinks that it is sufficient if the World Soul has these two dimensions to its nature – something that falls short of positing a separate hypercosmic soul.

⁴⁷² Two intermediaries are needed to establish a geometrical proportion – the finest of bonds (*Tim.* 31c) – between such separated things. However, in this instance we need only posit a single substance with a bi-formed nature, not two separate substances.

⁴⁷³ Sc. the elements air and water which bind together the fire and earth in the cosmic body (*Tim.* 32b–c).

⁴⁷⁴ Festugière suggests that Proclus here relates this aspect of the World Soul to the designing fire or *technikon pur* of Stoicism. This is certainly possible. Reydam-Schils (1999) argues that the Stoics adapted much of the picture in Plato's *Timaeus* to their own ends. There is no reason that a Platonist might not seek to allude to this and credit such insights as one may find in Stoicism to this Platonic source.

the forms in a monadic manner, the other is dyadic and has the same *logoi*⁴⁷⁵ in the manner of discursive thought (*dianoêtikôs*) and opinion (*doxastikôs*). They are present in the first mode in the circle of the Same, but in the other mode in the circle of the Different. For [the soul] is both monad and dyad, and by this fact it imitates its own cause which is also a monad and a dyad in comparison with the monad that is the Father of the intellectual gods. While [the soul's cause] plays the role of monad in relation to the universe, it has the role of dyad in relation to intellect, for generally speaking division itself and the process of pluralisation exist as a result of this goddess.⁴⁷⁶ In any event, when it comes to procession, plurality and multiplications, there is a life-engendering (*zôïogonikos*) cause. It is on account of this that some philosophers who assimilate the effects of the gods to the gods who produce them deem it worthwhile to place the intellects under the male genus of gods, but the souls under the female genus, for intellect is indivisible and has the form of the odd number (*perisoeidês*), while soul is divisible and bi-formed (*dyoeidês*).⁴⁷⁷ While the first is analogous to paternal causes, the other is analogous to reproductive causes. And while the one akin to the Limited, the other one belongs with the Unlimited. And if you were to ask me how the soul is single and how it is bi-formed, I would reply that it is single in as much as it is self-moving (for this is common to every psychic life and the parts in it), but that it is bi-formed in virtue of its two-fold lives, the one life involving reversion upon the primary beings, while the other life involves exercising providence over the secondary existences. I should add that it has the one life in virtue of its substantial [nature] (for the soul's essence is that which moves itself), but that its own life is differentiated into the further two by virtue of the Same and the Different.

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4. *Why the soul is like a line*

But for what reason did the Demiurge first set the soul out in the manner of a straight line, and then in a circular fashion? And in what manner is the straight line fitting for the essence of the soul? *** <Now it is

⁴⁷⁵ Given the previous claim that the World Soul has a nature that is *technikos*, it is probably necessary to hear a double resonance of 'logos' here – both as ratio among the portions in the World Soul and as rational-forming principle.

⁴⁷⁶ On the question of whether the life-engendering goddess should be identified with Rhea, Hecate or the mixing bowl in which the Demiurge combines the soul stuff, see above note 154.

⁴⁷⁷ While male and female appear in the Pythagorean table of opposites, intellect and soul do not. However, for a similar report of philosophers who assimilate the male to the intellectual and the female to the psychic, see Ammonius, *in Int.* 35.32–4.

surely necessary to conceive that the soul⁴⁷⁸ is analogous to the straight line; for just as the straight line proceeds from here to there in a manner that is direct and determinate – for there is only one straight line between any two points – and in as much as the straight line is by its own nature without limit, so too the soul is engendered having infinite power. The extensionless point is prior to the line, and surely in the same way the intellect precedes the soul, having included it in a manner that is undivided and antecedently comprehended it indivisibly. For while what is partless is appropriate to intellect, the soul is that which is primarily divisible. But the point and the straight line are exactly things of this sort. So he (the Demiurge) properly distinguished them, and the account connects the straight line, and subsequent to this the circle – both of which we say are simple lines – to the soul, while the point is connected to intellect. But the point, on the other hand, is dedicated to intellect. It is due to this fact that the account of the soul is revealed like something from within the forbidden, innermost sanctuary;⁴⁷⁹ displaying the partless [character] of intellect and announcing its secret and ineffable unification. But intellect itself is founded in itself in a stable manner (*monimôs*), cognising all things in a manner that is peaceful and quiet, it has the status of a point or centre in relation to the soul. If the soul is a circle, with intellect as its centre, then the soul is the power of the circle. But if the soul is like a straight line, then intellect will be the point; including what is extended in a mode that is unextended, what is divisible in a mode that is indivisible, and the circular form in the manner of the centre. Intellect in turn has the status of the circle in relation to the nature of the Good around which it converges as a whole at every point by dint of its yearning for the One and its contact with the One.

Furthermore, we may also answer that the straight line is fitting for the soul in another manner. For in the case of intellect, if someone were to grant it motion, it would possess the actuality [of this motion] without change. After all, it contemplates the whole intelligible realm simultaneously, having an eternal life in relation to the intelligibles and being active ‘concerning the same things and in the same place and manner’ (*Laws* X, 898a8–9). But the soul [possesses an activity that] is subject to transition (*metabaticos*), for it projects (*prosballein*) different Forms at different times.⁴⁸⁰ And this could be said even of the World

⁴⁷⁸ There is a lacuna in the text here. The Latin translation of Proclus’ text by Thomaeus has *dicendum quod oportet proportionali . . . modo* and I have translated accordingly.

⁴⁷⁹ Cf. *in Tim.* I. 133.20 and *in Remp.* I. 86.2.

⁴⁸⁰ On the soul’s projection of concepts in the framing of judgements, see Sorabji (2005b), 37–43.

Soul, for it is a defining characteristic of soul to be active diachronically, as Plato says in the *Phaedrus* [247d3].⁴⁸¹ But all change is a line that is subject to transition, for it has a “from whence” and a “to where” it is going directly, and its origin is different from where it ends up (*to peras*). So it turns out that by virtue of this we are able to trace the line back to the life of the soul.

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Furthermore, the motionless cause is such as to move the things that are self-moving, for the latter things participate directly in the former. The self-moving things, in turn, are such as to move those things that are moved by something else. Now since the soul exercises providential care over the things that are moved by something else – since it is prior to them in essence (*kat' ousian*) and in as much as it is intrinsically alive (*autozôios*) it has been mounted above all the things that possess life extrinsically (*epeisaktos*) – in virtue of this fact it has the form of a line in its own providential care [for these secondary things]. Since it is such as to move things that are different [from itself] and constitutes things that are moved by another, it is just like a line which involves extension from one place to another, and going out from and retiring into itself. Therefore, on the one hand, in the accounts concerning the mixture [from which the soul's essence results] and concerning its numbers and means, he has displayed the very being (*auto to on*) of the soul – how it is one and many, what sort of procession and reversion it has both in relation to what is above it and in relation to itself, how it brought forth and reverted the things that come after it, and how it rationalised the whole cosmos and bound it together. On the other hand, in the accounts concerning the straight line and the circles, Plato teaches us about the life-engendering and intellectual character of the soul, and in as much as it participates of the life in intellect and in as much as it has reverted upon itself, to just that extent it is something that is intrinsically alive and is self-moving. For the straight line makes clear the procession of psychic life from superior beings, while the fact that it has been bent round in a circle indicates the intellectual turning back. The soul has been allotted this power that is productive of the life in itself from the Father. But since the life of the soul is two-fold, the one involving discursive knowledge and the other opinion, *two* straight lines have proceeded and been bent into *two* circles.

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Therefore, to speak concisely, since the *essence* of the soul is a whole and composed of parts, it is a number that has been harmonised. But its

⁴⁸¹ See above at 122.24 where Proclus again uses this passage from the *Phaedrus* as proof that Plato regards psychic activity as necessarily temporal.

25 *life* [corresponds to the line] straight and circular⁴⁸² which is uni-form and bi-form. But [soul's]⁴⁸³ *intellect* involves both discursive knowledge and opinion: there is in it Being, Life and Intellect. Or rather – seeing that the life-giving powers it possesses in itself are prior to its cognitive powers, and that the former are simultaneously subject to transition and also self-moving – we will say that the straight line represents their transitional character, while the circles represent the property of self-motion. For these are moved from themselves towards themselves. It is for this reason that Timaeus assumes in the words at hand only the intrinsic life-engendering motion, both the straight and the circular. However, in what follows he teaches us about the cognitive motions of the circles, since the soul's self-motion has already come about through this [life-engendering motion] and he calls it [something] 'entirely moving itself'.⁴⁸⁴ If, therefore, we now deem these straight lines to be *lives*, and substantial (*ousiôdês*) ones at that (this is why Timaeus made its composition from the straight lines of the soul, in as much as this would indicate that it has its life by its very being)⁴⁸⁵ – if we assume that, then we will certainly also have to say that the circle indicates *what form of life* it has. That is, a form of life that is self-moved, originating from itself and reverting upon itself. It is not the sort of life in irrational living things which is carried into external things in a direct line, as it were, due to the fact that they are never enabled to converge upon themselves and are desirous of other subjects external to them. By contrast, that which is self-moving is moved by itself toward itself, prompts its own desire for itself, and is conjoined to itself. For this reason, such a form of life is circular, since in the case of the circle, the same thing is both the origin and limit.⁴⁸⁶ It is just like the case in which a thing is reverted upon itself, originated from itself, and finds its completion in itself. The

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⁴⁸² Diehl marks a lacuna in lines 23–4 ἡ δὲ ζωὴ εὐθεῖα *** μονοειδὴς καὶ δυοειδὴς and Kroll suggests <καὶ κυκλική>, no doubt because of the different symbolic associations just mentioned in lines 15–17.

⁴⁸³ That this is not the intellect as an independent hypostasis is clear both from Proclus' description of it and from the line that follows where this intellect is specifically said to be *in* the soul: ὁ δὲ νοῦς διανοητικός καὶ δοξαστικός· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ὄν, ἡ ζωὴ, ὁ νοῦς.

⁴⁸⁴ The reference seems to be to *Tim.* 36a7–8, but Proclus' quotation is not exact, and the inexactness serves his purpose. He has καὶ πᾶσαν ἑαυτὴν κινουσαν ἀποκαλεῖ which makes the soul the mover, but Plato writes κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς – the soul is moved through the entirety of itself.

⁴⁸⁵ Since the straight line is indicative of change (243.25–6), and the soul is essentially a self-mover and source of life, its initial composition in the form of a line shows us that it is essentially alive.

⁴⁸⁶ For the claim that circular *motion* has neither origin nor end point, see Aristotle *Cael.* II.6, 288a22–4.

straight line and the circle, therefore, lack extension, and while the one is an image of life, the other is an image of the life that reverts upon itself and not of all life *simpliciter*. Both of these are able to be seen in the case of souls; the first through the transition of desires, but the second through the revolution from the same things to the same things. This is doubtless known by Socrates in the *Phaedrus* (247d) when he says the souls are 'carried around' and 'nourished' by the intelligibles as objects of desire and sometimes undergo positive affections (*eupatheia*)⁴⁸⁷ by other things, and return from the same things to the same things.

Will we then be frightened by those clever people among the Peripatetics⁴⁸⁸ who ask us, 'What sort of line has Plato assumed we are talking about here? A physical line? That's absurd, for the line is the limit of bodies. But what about a mathematical line? But the mathematical line is immobile and not a substance.' We say, however, that the soul is a substance that is separate from bodies. Therefore we will say that it is pointless to ask these questions. This is because, for a long time now, we have not been prevented from saying that this line is substantial, and prior to us Xenocrates said it too, calling this sort of line indivisible.⁴⁸⁹ Now it would be ridiculous for anyone to think that a *magnitude* is indivisible. But it is obvious that Xenocrates supposed that it is requisite to call the *logos* of line the substantial line.⁴⁹⁰ But doubtless Plato secretly used mathematical terminology like a disguise (*parapetasma*, *Prot.* 316e) for the truth of things, just as the [Orphic] Theologians used myths and the Pythagoreans used symbols. For it is possible to see the paradigms in the images and it is possible to make the transition to the paradigms through the images. Nothing, however, will satisfy these people [i.e. the

⁴⁸⁷ This is a technical term from Stoic moral philosophy that refers to those 'quasi-emotions' that the perfectly rational sage may yet experience. Unlike the feelings or *pathê* that they regard as diseases and failures of rationality, joy, watchfulness and wishing are rational and healthy. Cf. Diogenes Laertius VII.116 (= SVF III.431).

⁴⁸⁸ Note that it is members of Aristotle's school, not the daemonic Aristotle himself, who are charged with such rudeness to Plato. In view of the earlier criticisms at 120.8–22 one might well suspect Theophrastus as chief among the clever Peripatetics that Proclus has in mind.

⁴⁸⁹ Proclus, *in Tim.* II. 245.23–246.4 = Xenocrates fr. 146 Isnardi-Parente. This suggestion of a connection between Xenocrates' views on indivisible lines and his theory of the soul is intriguing but vague. Certainly it differs both from Plutarch's account of Xenocrates' views on the psychogony in the *Timaeus* (*De An. Proc.* 1012d–1013b = fr. 188) and also from Proclus' account of the motivation for indivisible lines (*in Remp.* II. 27.1–8 = fr. 130). The use of *logos* as a kind of rational-forming principle in the present passage leads me to suspect that Proclus may be recruiting Xenocrates to his own cause by finding some way in which the notion of a self-moving number might be seen to point toward the truth (as Proclus sees it).

⁴⁹⁰ Reading τὴν οὐσιώδη γραμμὴν with Q rather than Diehl's τόν.

10 Peripatetics] since they are contentious. Let us then return to the terms
(*lexis*) and consider each of the things that are said.

5. *Lexis* for Tim. 36b6–c1

Now since the soul is single and also divided in terms of its own portions and is one and many, he refers to it as **this** in as much as it is single, but **entire** in as much as it is a plurality. And he calls it **composite** in so far as it is both – which also points to the fact that its essence differs both
15 from things that have divided and things that have been combined, for these things are unmixed with one another. The soul, however, is both one and a plurality that is simultaneously discrete and composite.

Since the psychic *logoi* are bi-formed – for the soul is ‘double-mouthed’ and ‘two-faced’⁴⁹¹ in virtue of its own paradigm, cognising indivisible Being by means of the circle of the Same, but encompassing divisible Being by means of [the circle of] the Different – he has referred to it with **two**. Because it has the same ratios above and below (and not, as some people suppose, having the double ratios here but the triple ones
20 over there) he has presented it as **divided lengthwise**, for only such a division preserves the same ratios everywhere. The word **strip** indicates the demiurgic division, since it is appropriate to the Demiurge:

... beside him sits a Dyad

and he says that one of the gods flashes with intellectual divisions.⁴⁹²

30 Furthermore, the words **middle to middle** perhaps indicate that the division and the contact of intangible things has come about in a manner appropriate to the soul’s role as intermediary, for it happens *mediately* (247 *mesôs*). Now there is division in intellect because there is Difference there, but in a mode that is primary and, so to speak, hidden and undivided. There is also division among sensible things. However, it is in the latter in virtue of the final [sort of] division, due to the fact that unification is indistinct and faded [at that level]. But in the soul both [kinds of division] are present in a middle way (*mesôs*) that is fitting to it. If
5 Timaeus had spoken about *intellect* and soul, he would have said that he affixed the middle [of the one strip] to the first [part of the other]. And if he were speaking about body and soul, he would have said that the Demiurge affixed the middle to the last [part]. But since instead he is teaching us about the psychic dyad, he is said to have affixed them **middle to**

⁴⁹¹ Cf. note on 130.23 above.

⁴⁹² The first quotation approximates *Or. Chald.* fr. 8 (Majercik) δυὰς παρὰ τῷδε κάθηται. For a slightly different version, see *in Crat.* §101.27. The second comes from *Or. Chald.* fr. 1.

middle. Perhaps it is also because soul's contact has come to be in virtue of the things that are means in the strict sense, for the lowest aspect of the faculty of discursive thought (*to dianoêtikon*) and the highest part of the faculty of opinion (*to doxastikon*) form the intermediates of the entire psychic composite. These things have been united with one another, and thanks to these, a single unity of these two lives has come about, since in every order of beings the lowest parts of the primary things have been united with the highest aspects of the secondary things.

The X shape itself that results from the affixing [of the two strips] has the highest degree of appropriateness to the universe and to the soul. Porphyry in fact records that something with this character, i.e. an X within a circle, was taken by the Egyptians as a symbol of the cosmic soul.⁴⁹³ Perhaps it signified the soul's bi-form procession through the straight lines, but through the circle it signified its uni-form life and the reversion it has in virtue of the intellectual circle. We must not, however, think that Plato supposed it necessary to discover the soul's divine essence (*ousia*) through these things. For the truth about [divine] beings is not known from characters, positions or pronunciations, as some suppose,⁴⁹⁴ but instead these things function variously as *symbols* of the gods – just as a certain sort of motion,⁴⁹⁵ and so too a certain shape or colour [is a symbol], as those who practise mystic rites say. Different characters have been appropriated to different gods, and different watchwords (*synthêma*) as fitting to different gods. Doubtless it's just like this in the case of the soul and the symbol presently under discussion. The coming together of the straight lines indicates the unification of its bi-form life, since it is a symbol of the straight life that flows from above. In order that we should not neglect the facts (*ta pragmata*) through spending too much effort over the theory of the character, Plato adds the words **like [an X]**, thereby indicating that this too is for the purpose of disguising [things] and that the account communicates secretly when the attempt is made to provide a shape for the shapelessness of soul.

B. Psychic circularity, Tim. 36c1–2

He bent them back into one circle, conjoining them to themselves and to one another at the point opposite to where they were affixed. (*Tim.* 36c1–2)

⁴⁹³ Proclus, *in Tim.* II. 247.18–23 = Porphyry, *in Tim.* fr. 70 (Sodano).

⁴⁹⁴ Proclus has in mind Theodore of Asine; cf. 277.24–6.

⁴⁹⁵ It is unclear just what sort of motion Proclus might have in mind. One possibility is the direction in which the practitioner of theurgy spins Hecate's magical top, the *strophalos*, used in summoning gods or daemons. Spinning one way calls the gods, while the other way releases them. Cf. Lewy (1956), 249.

I think that from what has been said already it has become obvious that through the straight lines the dialogue has made clear the procession of the soul, the fact that its life proceeds from Being, and its providential care for things that are not self-moving. I think it is fitting to provide an interpretation of his bending it into a circle that is analogous to these things. Since reversions are conjoined to processions and the things that have proceeded are called back once again to the same things from which they have proceeded, he says that [the Demiurge] bent the [strips of soul stuff] into circles. And since the vitality (*to zôtikon*) of the soul is intellectual and such as to return to the starting point (*apokatastatikos*)⁴⁹⁶ and also articulates the intelligible plurality, it is returned again to the same thing [when it is bent back into a circle]. It is also because, when the soul has reverted upon itself and moves itself, then it moves the things that are not self-moving [i.e. sensible objects]. In virtue of all these things, the circular [shape] belongs to the soul, for its procession is also continuous with its reversion since it is not incomplete or imperfect, while the motion of the things that don't move themselves is dependent upon its self-moving life.⁴⁹⁷ In addition, just as some things are not destroyed by other, different things, but are instead made complete by them, so too the composite of straight lines [joined like an X] is not destroyed through being bent round into circles. Rather, the former [composite] remains when the circles are created, for all things are simultaneous in

⁴⁹⁶ The noun from which this adjective derives is, of course, *apokatastasis* – a term that in astronomical texts denotes the return of a planet or the Sun to its original position in relation to the stars (e.g. Alcinoüs 3.4.3). The Stoics used the term to describe the return of all things to the cyclic conflagration (*SVF* II. 599 and 625). Possibly as a result of the reciprocal influence between Stoicism and Platonism, within the Platonic tradition, this term gets connected with the Great Year whose number is alluded to at *Tim.* 39d2–7 (cf. Dodds (1963), 302). In addition to this astronomical notion of *apokatastasis*, there is also a mathematical sense. Spherical or recurrent numbers are those that, when squared or cubed, ‘come back to the number from which they began’ (Theon 38.20). For instance $5^2 = 25$ and $6^3 = 216$. There is also a psychic sense in which *apokatastasis* occurs when the soul returns to its purified astral body after the required number of incarnations – an idea drawn from *Phaedrus* 248e, cf. Proclus, *ET* 199. The two can even come together, as in the ps.-Iamblichean *Theology of Arithmetic* where it is said that Pythagoras’ soul had a 216-year reincarnation cycle: evidence for the intimate connection between the number six and the soul! However it is Proclus who exploits the multiple meanings and associations of the idea of *apokatastasis* to the fullest.

⁴⁹⁷ The argument here is hardly transparent, but the point seems to be that while *all* things revert upon their causes, and so could have *some* prima facie claim to the circle as a shape fitting to them, the soul reverts upon its cause *from its own nature*. Since it is self-moving, nothing is required for it to turn back upon its cause in a circular fashion. Other things that are not self-moving must be stimulated by it. So though they too revert, the circle is proprietary to the soul.

the case of the soul, and as its continuity is present together with its discreteness, so too the straight lines are present together with the circular character. It is likewise necessary for the straightness to remain along with the revolutions, as the divisible and indivisible [aspects of the soul are there together] simultaneously. For the Demiurge creates things in an eternal manner (*aiônios*) so that the things that come to be due to him always exist (*pantôs aei*). Therefore both the straight and the circular exist simultaneously in the soul, whatever each should be there.

What then are these two circles and how are they optimally appropriate to the soul? Now if, having proceeded from Intellect, the soul's essence were of such a sort as to be entirely deprived of that which is distinctive to Intellect, then the circular form would not be proper to it.⁴⁹⁸ But since it is intellectual through participation (*kata methexin*) and is intellect in further articulated and bi-formed state, then through its *own intellectual character* it is a circle that is shapeless, without magnitude and self-motive. However, through its *dyadic character* it is double, with the result that it is said to be a circle, for its procession is double, with the result that its reversion is also double, and its reason (*logos*) is double, with the result that there is a double intellectual participation in virtue of its two lives.⁴⁹⁹ Since these lives are conjoined thanks to their first procession, when they proceed they are divided from one another. Following the procession, they are again reverted upon their first principles, where they are again conjoined thanks to the distinctive feature of reversion. The initial point of attachment indicates the [phase of] remaining [in the cause], while the cleavage between the strips indicates procession that takes place following this attachment. The fact that they are conjoined at the point opposite from this indicates that they revert once again upon the same thing, for that life which is more divine conjoins its own end (*telos*) to its first principle through reversion,⁵⁰⁰ while the life that is lacking to a greater extent reverts its procession upon that which remains [in the cause]. Through this [the soul reverts] both in relation to its one intellect and also in relation to its superior life. Therefore up there (*ekei*) there is a conjunction of the two lives **at the point opposite to where**

⁴⁹⁸ Recall that circular motion is the spatial analogue of *noësis* – the activity distinctive of Intellect (cf. *Laws* X, 898a and *in Tim.* II. 69.15–20). Thus if the soul's essence were completely divorced from that of Intellect, it would not deserve to have the circular shape as something fitting and appropriate to it.

⁴⁹⁹ Proclus seems to have in mind the two functions of the soul corresponding to the circles of the Same and the Different. There is the opinative reason – the *doxastikos logos* – of the circle of the Different, as well as the discursive reason of the circle of the Same. Cf. II. 241.21–242.1.

⁵⁰⁰ Perhaps an allusion to Alcmaeon, DK 24 A2: τοὺς ἀνθρώπους φησὶν Ἀ. διὰ τοῦτο ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ τέλει προσάψαι.

they were affixed, the one [intersection] surely [indicating] the unification of the two lives through procession, while the other [intersection indicates the unification that takes place] through reversion. But procession is opposed to reversion to the extent that the one belongs to the nature of the Same, while the other belongs to nature of the Different, and while the one creates division in the things that proceed, the other imparts similarity that brings things together. Nor is there anything that requires us to accept what is said by those who take the soul's shape to be genuinely composed from two circles. For if circles are without breadth, how is it possible to split the one from the other without their having breadth? And if they are particular rings, how is the soul composed from them supposed to be interwoven 'from the middle all the way to the furthest reaches of heaven' (*Tim.* 36e2)? For in what manner can rings be stretched through the whole of a spherical body? In addition to this, if these rings are corporeal that will imply the existence of some body outside the universe and will doubtless create void, thanks to the fact that we'll have something lying around the outside of the sphere creating the impression of an armillary sphere,⁵⁰¹ the circles themselves having the additional dimension that goes with body by virtue of being arranged from the middle to the outermost limit [of the heavens]. Therefore it is necessary to conceive of this life-engendering shape of the soul as shapeless and lacking in extension, unless we intend to infect ourselves and the theory of Plato with many absurd consequences, such as those which Aristotle introduced (*De An.* I. 3, 406b26–407b11). He assumed that the soul is a magnitude according to Plato because of the circles, and then demonstrated that, as such, it is incapable of being intellectual, for intellect is indivisible and such as to cognise (*noêtikos*) indivisible intelligible

⁵⁰¹ πρὸς τῷ καὶ σωματικούς μὲν ὄντας ἀποφαίνειν ἕξω τι σῶμα τοῦ παντὸς καὶ δὴ καὶ κενὸν ποιεῖν, περικειμένους κατὰ τι τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ τῆς σφαίρας ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν κρικωτῶν σφαιρῶν. This is very compressed but I think Proclus' point is two-fold. First, if the psychic circles are corporeal then by virtue of being wrapped around the *outside* of the universe, they will entail the existence of an extra-cosmic body. The point about the void is less clear. One thought is that the resulting structure will resemble an armillary sphere, and since these have open space between the various rings, so too the universe will possess void if it is similar. But one might object that the similarity need not extend that far. Alternatively, and perhaps preferably, one could read the δὴ, not as a particle of emphasis, but as marking an inferential transition. We have already seen how this inference might go. Recall Proclus' employment of the argument of Aristotle's *de Caelo* 2.4, 287a11–23 at *in Tim.* II. 73.26–74.6. The idea that the circle of the Same and the circle of the Different are bodies on the exterior of the sphere of the cosmos will give you bumps or projections on this surface. As the sphere of the fixed stars moves, we can then say that first the bump occupied this place which is now vacant, and now another place, which will in its turn become vacant. Thus there will be extra-cosmic void if the circles are περικείμενα σώματα.

beings. In addition, if the soul is the sort of thing with magnitude, then it will *only* be divisible, and not in any way indivisible – much less will it be composed of Being that is indivisible in addition to being divisible. [A magnitude], whether it be a circle or a ring, has only a divisible nature and will be in no way indivisible.

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C. *Psychic revolution*, Tim. 36c1–2

And he enfolded (*perix lambanein*) them in a motion that is carried around in the same way in the same place. (Tim. 36c1–2)

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Genuinely daemonic in its manner is the conception of the divine Iamblichus,⁵⁰² and it clings to the thought of Plato relentlessly (*aprix*). Unlike the interpreters before him, he does not suppose that it is necessary to interpret the motion ‘carried around in the same way in the same place’ as pertaining to the case of the soul (for the motion of the soul is already *in* it, not *around* it), but rather pertains to the Intellect and the intellectual life. For at no point in the remainder [of the dialogue] does he seem to conjoin the soul to the intellect. But it is necessary [that this should be so] in order that with this addition the universe may be displayed as a ‘living being, ensouled and *endowed with intellect*’ (Tim. 30b8). Therefore we must interpret the motion around the same point and in the same way as intellectual motion. It encompasses the soul just as the soul covers the heaven externally.⁵⁰³ But intellect is *motionless motion*, for it subsists in its entirety simultaneously and in a manner that is unified. But the soul is *self-moving motion*.⁵⁰⁴ While the former is uni-form, the latter is bi-form, and where the first one is single and undivided, the second one divides and multiplies itself. Since the soul participates in intellect, it is to that extent intellectual and on account of this is conjoined to the divine intellect, for since the World Soul participates in intellect, it goes up to the intelligible [realm].

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Now it is necessary that the motion ‘around the same and in the same’ be intellectual since it is a different life than that of the two circles if it indeed encompasses them. Therefore we shall say either that this motion is that of a participated intellect that presides over the soul, or else that it is the motion of the Creator of the soul himself. But the latter is impossible. Therefore it must be said to be the motion of participated intellect. Despite the fact that it is intellectual and above the soul, the motion ‘around the same and in the same’ is not the motion of the Creator of

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⁵⁰² in Tim II. 250.21–251.11 = Iamblichus, in Tim. fr. 55 (Dillon).

⁵⁰³ Proclus’ use of *perikaluptein* here echoes Tim. 36e3.

⁵⁰⁴ Cf. Larws X, 895b1: τὴν αὐτὴν [sc. κίνησιν] ἑαυτὴν δῆπου κινουσαν.

the soul. One may learn this from the fact that he makes the universe
 20 'endowed with intellect' (*Tim.* 30b8), not giving himself to the universe
 as he gives the soul to the universe, but rather giving it a different, partici-
 pated intellect, as was indicated earlier⁵⁰⁵ when, presiding over the
 soul, as it were, 'he put intellect in the soul and the soul in the body' and
 'created the universe' (*Tim.* 30b4–5). And this is obvious because [the
 Demiurge] did not put *himself* in the soul, for it would be absurd if he
 25 had ranked himself alongside the soul, since he is in fact separate. In any
 event, Plato himself says in what follows that all Being 'neither [receives]
 anything separate into itself nor does it go into anything else'.⁵⁰⁶ Since
 this is how it is in the case of true being, the Demiurgic intellect would
 not place itself into the soul. Prior to the establishment of the soul he
 252 created another [intellect] which exists in itself⁵⁰⁷ which he placed in
 the soul when it was created. If this is true, then it is the movement of
 this [intellect] 'around the same and in the same' that encompasses these
 psychic circles, but it is not [the motion of the intellect] that created it [sc.
 this second intellect] and the soul. Surely *that* [intellect] is shortly said to
 5 'remain in itself in its customary manner' (*Tim.* 42e5–6), transcendent
 and separate from the universe. Therefore this is the encosmic intel-
 lect, the life of which encompasses the psychic lives; the uni-form life
 encompassing the bi-form life, and the eternal life the lives that are not
 moved in an eternal manner.⁵⁰⁸ The universal soul (*holê psychê*) has thus
 10 proceeded, being both a unit and a dyad, and – to the extent that we
 have just said – undifferentiated from itself. In what comes next Plato
 communicates what remains – how from the Demiurgic divisions we
 get one circle that has in itself what is more divine, while the other one
 is lacking to a greater degree. For thus far we have just assumed these
 things for the sake of clarity, but let us now pay attention to the words
 15 of Plato himself, which are as follows:

⁵⁰⁵ Diehl suggests that this is in *Tim.* I. 406.14 where Proclus discusses *Tim.* 30b4–5. But it seems to me that the question of *which* intellect renders the soul *ennoun* actually arises immediately prior to the lemma that Proclus refers to here – that is, at 405.7–406.10.

⁵⁰⁶ Cf. Proclus οὔτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ φησιν ἄλλο χωρεῖν οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ἰέναι with Plato, *Tim.* 52a2–3: οὔτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποι ἰόν.

⁵⁰⁷ καὶ πρὶν ὑποστήσῃ ψυχὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ὦν ἄλλον ἐγέννησεν. Festugière supposes that καθ' αὐτὸν ὦν refers to the status of the Demiurge on the basis of χωριστός ὦν above at line 26: 'Et ainsi, avant de créer l'Âme, tout en restant isolé en lui-même, il a créé un autre Intellect.' This seems plausible. Equally, however, it could convey the idea that the participated intellect created by the Demiurge is independent of the soul into which it will be placed. I think this is the better alternative in view of I. 406.14–21.

⁵⁰⁸ This must surely mean that though the lives of the heavenly bodies are not *eternal*, they are nonetheless *sempiternal*. Cf. 249.1–3: αἰωνίως γὰρ ὁ δημιουργὸς ποιεῖ, ὥστε τὰ γινόμενα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πάντως αἰεῖ ἔστιν.

D. Differentiated psychic rotation, Tim. 36c4–6

And he made one of the circles external and the other internal. He denominated the external rotation after the nature of the Same and the internal one after the Different. (*Tim.* 36c4–6)

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1. General interpretation

These two circles the divine Iamblichus⁵⁰⁹ referred respectively to the Intellect separated from souls and the one that is not separated, as he does the ‘motion carried around the same place’ which enfolds them round about, in as much as the former *contains* the two souls, while the latter is *in* them, and the former is unmixed with the other life and powers of the soul, while the latter is mixed with them and organises them. This explains why the Whole Soul⁵¹⁰ is active in a manner that is stable and is united to the Demiurge himself.

25

However, our account interprets this in terms of two-fold lives of the soul – the intellective (*noêtikos*) and the reverter (*epistreptikos*) – and the two-fold powers of the soul – the discursive power (*dianoêtikos*) and the opiniative one (*doxastikos*) – for the World Soul has both. Now, Plato himself tried to say in the *Phaedrus* that of the two horses, the one belongs to the Same while the other belongs to the Different⁵¹¹ – though he provide horses to the gods too, but good horses from good stock. Consequently, in this passage the exterior of the two circles is discursive reason, while the interior one is opiniative, for the Demiurge bestowed power on the one able to engage in discursive thought, thanks to which it is more divine than the opiniative one. This is because discursive thought is more unified and intellectual to a greater degree.

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No one must assume that the word **denominated** implies merely the imposition of a name, but rather that it involves passing along the power of making things the same,⁵¹² just as the property of making things different has been allotted to the opiniative [circle]. Earlier, therefore, Plato taught us about the soul's similarity to itself, but now he imparts its superiority to itself and its inferiority (*hypothesis*) – something which it has, having received it from the Demiurge. Since he makes one of the circles external, to that extent he makes it more similar to the intellect

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⁵⁰⁹ in *Tim.* II. 252.21–9 = Iamblichus, in *Tim.* fr. 56 (Dillon).

⁵¹⁰ This seems to be Iamblichus' hypercosmic soul from in *Tim.* II. 105.14–20 (fr. 50 Dillon).

⁵¹¹ Cf. *Phaedrus* 246a8. Hermias' *Phaedrus* commentary (123.4–19) shows that Syrianus read the image of the soul as a chariot drawn by two horses in terms of the mixture of the psychic essence in the *Timaeus*, assigning Being to the chariot driver, Sameness to the better horse, and Difference to the lesser horse.

⁵¹² Reading μετάδοσιν δυνάμεως ταυτοποιού instead of ταυτοποιούν with Kroll.

15 and the intelligible [realm] (for the latter are strictly external things in as much as they are things that transcend all the secondary wholes).⁵¹³ But he made the other circle internal in so far as it is encompassed by that which is superior, and as something that deserves to be ruled by it, and in as much as it has a nature that is inferior. It is therefore greatly necessary that Plato create the mathematical illusion of two circles –he doubtless
20 makes them unequal when they are in fact equal, and creates them as different from one another when they are in fact similar, allotting an essence to them in accordance with the Demiurgic will.⁵¹⁴

2. *Objection and replies*

Nonetheless, some people raise a puzzle about these things. How is it that the soul is homoiomerous when one of the circles relates to Sameness while the other relates to Difference? And how can it be homoiomerous when one has been shown to be internal, while the other is external,
25 Porphyry⁵¹⁵ refers to the case of sensible things and enmattered mixtures such as honey and water or wine and honey. He blathers on and on⁵¹⁶ about how all these are homoiomerous, but nonetheless cause different effects in different people, for some are disposed to taste the wine more, while others taste the sweetness. But our father [Syrianus] thinks
30 it more worthy to consider the mixture of the kinds [in the soul] in terms that are fitting to immaterial and incorporeal things. This is not one in terms of the fusion (*synchysis*) of forms, nor the mutual destruction (*symptharsis*) of powers,⁵¹⁷ but instead the latter are preserved in spite of the unification and interpenetration through one another. For instances

⁵¹³ These ‘secondary wholes’ are presumably those totalities of earth, air, fire and water that constitute the World’s Body. Cf. *in Tim.* II. 2.22–3.2 on ἡ ὅλη δημιουργία τῶν ὅλων.

⁵¹⁴ 253.19–20, μαθηματικῶς ὁ Πλάτων σκιαγραφεῖν... By conjuring a physical picture in which one strip is affixed to the interior of the other, Plato creates the illusion that they are not the same size. In fact, one *unextended* psychic power is not unequal in size to another. Yet this nonetheless conveys the deep truth that one power is superior to the other.

⁵¹⁵ Proclus, *in Tim.* II. 253.23–30 = Porphyry, *in Tim.* fr. 71 (Sodano). Cf. Porphyry’s account of Aelianus’ view on concord; *in Harm.* 35.29–36.2.

⁵¹⁶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω θρυλεῖ, cf. Olympiodorus, *in Phdo* 7.2.5.

⁵¹⁷ I think Syrianus urges Platonists to eschew the disagreements between Peripatetics and Stoics over the nature of mixture since these pertain to things that are too material. The terms used here are deployed by the Stoics in their account of the various kinds of mixture. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Mixture* 216.14–218.6 (= *SVF* II.473). For Syrianus’ own contribution to the idea of *immaterial* mixtures, see Sorabji (1988), 111–14.

of destruction and the lessening of powers reside in material things because of the inability of matter to conserve unmixed the various properties that are fused in it. The distinctive property of *immaterial mixtures* is for the same things to be unified and divided, and mixed together and yet preserved unmixed. However, the distinctive property of *material mixture* is for the things that have been mixed together to be undifferentiated from one another, for mixture [of this sort] involves mutual destruction. That it is possible for there to be the kind of immaterial mixtures that we are talking about is easily recognised from the cases where we have many branches of knowledge, or many physical forming principles (*logoi*), or many lamps. The many lights both make one light and yet simultaneously are preserved without being fused together.⁵¹⁸ In the case of the many forming principles, they all exist simultaneously, but are nonetheless distinguished from one another in virtue of physical difference. In the case of the many branches of knowledge, they are in one another, but also unmixed in relation to one another. This is obvious from the case where they are active, for it is impossible for things that have been blended together to manifest their appropriate activities in a way that is pure. But the sciences maintain their own proper activities on a purely individual basis. Now if the soul's genera have been mixed in a way that is immaterial, they are also in one another and situated by themselves. By being in one another they make the soul entirely "monochrome" because all its parts are composed of genera like this. On the other hand, by being situated by themselves and preserving their appropriate purity, different powers of the soul are highlighted at different times and one predominates more than others. There is total homoiomerity and sameness of form among things completely mixed and subject to mutual destruction, but when what is unmixed is there in the mixture, and what has not been fused is there among what is intermingled, and what is pure remains amid the blend, then in such a case it is possible to have total interpenetration, so that each part can be composed of all of the constituents and yet each remains itself by itself, in order that one can predominate in one place and another in another. Now surely because of these facts there's nothing remarkable if there is an interpenetration of all the genera in the soul together with the preservation of the form of each of them: Sameness predominating at one point, the nature of the Different at another, while the genus of Being (*ousia*) is common, since this defines the soul's singular mean through which it is intermediate between indivisible Being and the divisible Being that comes to be in relation to bodies. So therefore the soul is a single life in as much as its essence (*ousia*) is single, but it is bi-form in as much as

⁵¹⁸ Cf. Syrianus, in *Metaphys.* 85.19–22 where the example of light is also used.

there is a two-fold distinction between the two genera. So with respect to this puzzle, this is the sort of thing that should be said.

3. *Lexis* for Tim. 36c4–6

It is obvious that the words **he made** need to be taken in the strictest sense so that the form of the intermediate might again be preserved, as in the cases where he said ‘he compounded’ (35a3) and ‘filled up’ (36a1). The words **he denominated** are also the most appropriate ones to refer to the subject at hand, for since the names for the circles are ordained because of the *predominance* [of one circle over the other], the word **denominated** evinces the fact that the names are not derived from their whole *hyperaxis*, but they are named eponymous for the dominant position that the one has over the other.⁵¹⁹ The fact that the names are imposed after creation [of the circles] indicates the fact that names in the proper sense of the term aim at the nature of things. For it is not the case that the Demiurge denominates a circle which is not related to Sameness in this manner. Instead [he denominates] the one that has been established by him to be a certain sort [as ‘the circle of the Same’]. Or rather, it is strictly his act of creation that has the cause of the name and the imposition of the name is the creation – if it is indeed the case that up there (*ekei*) the activity of cognition (*noêsis*) has not been severed from the Demiurge but rather the gods create by means of thought itself, for it is in this way that things have been established by means of the act of naming itself.

4. *The symbolism of Plato’s terminology*

Now, if it is necessary for me to say where I stand, it is that through these things it is possible to comprehend the secrets of Plato’s theory. He has first provided us with the Demiurge, not only as Name-giver,⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁹ I borrow from Thomas Taylor the nice parallel between the English ‘denominate’ and ‘predominate’ to convey the connection that Proclus sees between *epiphêmizein* and *epikratein*.

⁵²⁰ The ‘name-giver’, of course, alludes to the *Cratylus*, though the term *onomatōthetês* is not found there (except in the B family of manuscripts at 389d7). Nonetheless, within the Platonic tradition, the term becomes the standard way of referring to the one who imposes names on things in a way that conforms with their nature (cf. Alcinous 6.10–11). Not all names partake of naturalness to the same degree, but those that do provide the basis for etymological arguments (Proclus, *in Crat.* §9.11–13). Following Iamblichus, *V. Pyth.* 82, Proclus recruits Pythagoras to the cause of the naturalness of names (*in Tim.* I. 276.15–18). In his *Cratylus* commentary, it appears that it is the World Soul, not the Demiurge, who is the primary giver of names (*in Crat.* §16.13–22).

imposing the names on the two revolutions of the soul, but also prior to this revealing the soul's essential character, [giving us] the two straight lines separate from the X that has come to be as a result of them, and then the two circles that result from this – which is no doubt what, after Plato, theurgy reveals when it fills up the character of the soul through the Xs and semi-circles.⁵²¹ Both names, therefore, and psychic characters were handed over to us first by Plato. These were things he beheld in an intellectual manner and which were eagerly followed by the wise men who came after him; for it is necessary to suppose that there are psychic characters that are not only common among all souls such as these, but also individual characters for some of them. As a result the [individual characters of the souls] of Heracles, Pentheus son of Agave,⁵²² and Plato himself have doubtless been handed over by the gods themselves. But while these [individual characters] were only for the gods to know and to reveal, the common character of all souls, starting from the World Soul, Plato first saw and wrote about. And he has shown that the Demiurge is the author (*poiêtês*) of this when [Plato depicts] the Demiurge having inscribed upon the soul's essence its life-engendering character and, as we said, having imposed names on its two intellectual revolutions which were two-fold from the start, and having done all these things from the appropriate Being that he had at hand. For he himself is characterised by these kinds of being in particular (I mean Sameness and Difference), since the one pertains particularly to the Demiurge in virtue of the fact that he enforms matter in accordance with the final [gradations] of Forms, but the other pertains to him in as much as he brings together the multiplicity of things as one in relation to the single Form of creation. This is why, according to Orpheus, the Demiurge questions Night in various ways, saying:

Tell to me, how it may be that all things are one and yet each is separate?⁵²³

[The answer is that] he makes each things separate through Difference, but makes all things one through Sameness. And when the Oracles say that the Demiurge is 'flashing with intellectual divisions' they indicate

⁵²¹ Cf. *Or. Chald.* fr. 95 = Proclus, *in Remp.* II. 143.22–7. Here it seems we encounter a technical sense of 'character' in which it is equivalent to the 'symbol' or 'watchword' (*synthêma*) in Neoplatonic mystagogy. Cf. *in Tim.* III. 6.13–15 and Lewy (1956), 252–4.

⁵²² It is easy enough to see why Heracles the demi-god and the divine Plato should be thought to have had this special dispensation granted to them by the gods, but why Pentheus? Proclus seems to have in mind the god Dionysus' pun on *penthos* (grief) at Euripides, *Bacchae* 507–8: [Πε.] Πενθεύς, Ἀγαυῆς παῖς, πατὴρ δ' Ἐχίονος. [Δι.] ἐνδυσ-τυχήσαι τούνομ' ἐπιτήδειος εἶ.

⁵²³ *Orph. fr.* 165 (Kern). For a longer quotation of the passage and Proclus' reading of it, see *in Tim.* I. 314.5.

his property of making things different (*Or. Chald.* fr. 1), but ‘the filling of all things with love’⁵²⁴ indicates the property of making things the same. As a result, it is quite plausible that he has bestowed these names upon the World Soul’s circles from the substance of his own estate,⁵²⁵ since they are Demiurgic watchwords (*synthêma*). Therefore this name – the circle of the Same – is divine in as much as the watchword conveys the intelligible cause of Sameness. The circle of the Different [is a divine name] in as much as it possesses a symbol (*symbolon*) of the nature of the Different.⁵²⁶ This is so since among the kinds of Being,⁵²⁷ one kind is kindred to Sameness, while the other kind is akin to Difference; but among the intellectual gods, the one is dependent upon causes that are paternal, encompassing and immutable, while the other is dependent upon reproductive and life-engendering causes; and among the intelligibles, the one participates in the Limited, while the other participates rather more in the Unlimited. Therefore, these watchwords which result from these levels [of being] have brought it about that one name happens to apply to one of these circles and the opposite to the other circle.

5. *Another objection and replies*

So how about this: Might someone might not ask ‘Hasn’t the soul’s single essence then been destroyed in the division of these two circles?’ We will reply that this has in no way happened. For in the case of things that are divine, division is secondary to unification and the procession is an intermediary between their capacity to remain [in the cause] and their completion in the phase of reversion. But since the soul is both a unit existing substantially and a dyad, and also one and many, it simultaneously remains [in its cause], proceeds and reverts. It was unified prior to its division because the one universal mixture [of the genera from which the soul is composed] was created prior to the many parts. And while it is divided thanks to its procession, it is unified again through its reversion. In any case, the smaller circle [of the Different] is encompassed within the larger [circle of the Same] in just the same way that intellect includes

⁵²⁴ ἔρωτος δὲ ἐμπλήσαι πάντα. Cf. fr. 39: πᾶσιν ἐνέσπειρεν δεσμόν πυριβριθῇ ἔρωτος.

⁵²⁵ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ ταῦτα τὰ δνόματα οὐσίας καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις ἔθετο seems to me to play on the original sense of *ousia* as one’s property or estate.

⁵²⁶ ‘Symbol’ and ‘watchword’ are treated by Shaw as synonymous in theurgic practice: Shaw (1995), 48. The use of such watchwords enables the skilled practitioner to align his soul with various gods and overpower daemons that might seek to interfere with his conjunction with the god.

⁵²⁷ The kind of being that is indivisible and always the same (*Tim.* 35a) is akin to Sameness, while the kind of being that is divisible in the realm of bodies is akin to Difference.

the soul, shining into it the light from itself.⁵²⁸ So too the circle of the Same surely communicates unification and completeness to the circle of the Different, rendering it undefiled among the things over which it exercises providence, unified in its acts of procession, and even intellectual in a way in its knowledge of sensible things. Hence in this remarkable manner, one of the circles has been created and named in virtue of Sameness, while the other has been created and named thanks to Difference. But that which is substantial [i.e. the Being among the genera mixed in the soul] has been omitted: in so far as it is common to both of the circles, it has not been given to either of the parts [individually]. Thanks to this, therefore, the soul is single but bi-formed due to the fact that Sameness and Difference are, in a way, opposites to one another.

VI. *The soul's powers*, Tim. 36c6–d7

He made the circle of the Same revolve horizontally towards the right, but the circle of the Different along a diagonal toward the left. (Tim. 36c6–8)

A. *The different powers of the two circles*

1. *General interpretation*

Since it remains to discuss the *powers* of the soul, the dialogue goes into these matters and deals with the Demiurgic differentiation of them from one another, for the power (*dynamis*) comes after the essence (*ousia*), while the activity (*energeia*) has third place, as we said earlier [125.12–22]. Plato has also shown this to be so, calling it the *rotation* (Tim. 36c4) of the Same and the *rotation* of the Different, but not the essence of these things. He produces various powers from these two circles, and subsequent to this communicates to us what sort of activities they have. He has done the same kind of thing in the *Phaedrus* when he spoke about the horses, the better one and the worse one.⁵²⁹

⁵²⁸ Cf. above 252.7. Since Proclus rejects the idea that any soul remains undescended from the intellect (ET 211), it seems likely that the intellect that includes soul is the *encosmic* intellect.

⁵²⁹ Diehl and Festugière think that the relevant reference is *Phdr.* 253d where Plato does indeed discuss the better and worse horses. However, the point at hand is how Plato's order of exposition both in the *Timaeus* and the *Phaedrus* evinces the metaphysically correct order: essence, power and activity. I suspect that Proclus actually has in mind *Phdr.* 246a. Having just said that it is too much to expect him to talk about the idea of the soul (i.e. its *ousia*), Socrates says: 'let it be likened to the innate *powers* of a winged chariot' (246a7). See above 253.1 and Hermias, in *Phdr.* 123.14–16.

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10 Well then, what does he say here about the powers of the World Soul? First, as we said, he divides the universal powers into two – I mean the power of the Same and the power of the Different, the one being analogous to the Limited, the other to the Unlimited. Next he divides [the circle of] the Different in accordance with other distinctive
15 properties and takes it into smaller numbers and unifies the plurality through Sameness. After this he allocates the superior and more divine things to the superior powers, but the things that are further deteriorated to the inferior powers. So to take an example, if you will, the movement to the right has been allocated to the circle of the Same, but movement to the left to the circle of the Different. Also, one gets to move horizontally, while the other gets movement along the diagonal. Furthermore, in the table of opposites,⁵³⁰ the series that includes the Same, the Right, the Square, and the Rational [number] (*to rhêton*)⁵³¹ has been assigned to the superior member, while the remaining one similarly gets their opposites: the Different, the Left, the Oblong, and the Irrational. So the general intention behind the text at hand is something like this.

2. *Right and left in the universe*

25 Let us consider the truth about these matters and what kind of character it has. First, if you like, let us say how there is this real right and left in the universe. Now I know that the daemonic Aristotle calls the East right and
30 the West left, since the first motion is indeed from the East, while that which comes after this is from the West, and the origin of motion in all living things is the right.⁵³² And in this respect he is surely in agreement
259 with the teaching of Plato when it comes to the Same and the Different. In any case, he says that the innerrant [sphere of the fixed stars] is the cause of sameness in all things, while the wandering [planetary bodies] cause different things at different times.⁵³³ It seems to me, however, that the teaching of Plato goes beyond this by not demarcating [left from right]
5 in terms of our relation [to things] but by deriving these properties from the process of creation itself. For if the Demiurge himself has introduced

⁵³⁰ The terms that Proclus lists do not all find a place on the famous Pythagorean table of opposites given at Aristotle, *Metaphys.* 1.4, 985b23–6. In particular, Same and Different are missing from this list, but present on the list of contraries that Aristotle discusses in relation to the Academy (*Metaphys.* 4.2, 1003b33–1004a2. On these various tables and the possible relations between them see Kahn (2001), 65–6. Proclus also employs a table of opposites in his exegesis at *in Parm.* 1203, 31–9.

⁵³¹ See *in Tim.* II. 25.31 and note ad loc.

⁵³² For the stars, *Cael.* 2.2, 285b16 with Diehl. For the origin of motion in living things, *De Mot. An.* 705b30.

⁵³³ Cf. *GC* 2.10, 336a31–b10.

right and left in the divine souls themselves, then when each of these souls has proceeded into the cosmos, [right and left are present] not just as a matter of our position, nor as a mere relation at all, but rather these properties are substantial (*ousiôdês*), just as being paternal or maternal are real properties of the gods.⁵³⁴ Among the non-universal living things, in some places nature has created right and left among the parts, not merely as relations but as physical powers. (This is obvious from the fact that some parts develop in one place, but other parts in another place, the one having been made an origin of motion, while the other is not.) What then must one think about the process of creation itself? Will we then say that the right and the left only appear as relations? And how will we preserve the idea that nature brings forth that which it brings forth by its very being, or explain how it is that a divine soul is purified from all of the accidents that it introduces, or deny that it is the very nature of [Demiurgic] creation to bring forth substances? Rather I suppose that just as we say that nature establishes left and right in bodies in a natural manner, and tends to attach itself to the right as a starting point of its own motion, so too we surely ought to say that prior to this it belongs to the Creator of the soul to introduce both of them into the soul in a demiurgic manner to an even greater degree. The right is, as it were, an image of the Demiurge himself and thus it is that in the cosmos the inerrant [sphere of the fixed stars] revolves to the right, while those that wander in their paths [sc. the planetary spheres] go to the left – the one having primary-generated life and the acme of powers and effective activity, while the other has the property of productivity and variation, and has received the sources of motion from something other than itself. For this reason the inerrant [circle of the fixed stars] is in charge of everything in the universe, carrying everything around in a single circle while the planetary circle has a variety of forms and is the cause of Difference among generated things, as we said. The first is an image of intellect, while the second is an image of the soul, for the circle of the Same is intellectual. But in the case of the soul itself, while the right stands in a relation to the intelligibles and genuine beings and is reverted upon the gods themselves (for the right is the power of the divine life that fills up the soul), the left is directed toward the care for sensible things and their orderly arrangement (for the left is a power that is capable of motivating all secondary existences and removing their

⁵³⁴ I think that Proclus' point here is that these properties in the case of the gods are not *really* relations or *pros ti*. How can this be? *Parmenides* 134d is probably in the background here. The knowledge and mastery that the gods possess is not what it is *in relation to* us whose affairs are known or we who are their servants. Cf. *in Parm.* 967.37–968.13 for Proclus' attempt to make sense of this.

disorder, as well as introducing differentiations and variety among the works of the Demiurge).

10 Furthermore, one might also say that the conjunction of the words **along the diagonal** with **toward the left** includes both the motion from the West to the East and also the oblique motion that results from the ecliptic. In the case of the soul itself, the circle of the Different (since it is such as to know all the sensible things at the same time) recruits the
15 the four Quadrants as an assistant through establishing the four Cardinal points, [an arrangement] according to which the apparent motion of those things that run to the left along its diagonal [has significance].⁵³⁵

⁵³⁵ τὴν τετραμερῇ διακόσμησιν συνειληφέναι διὰ τῶν τεσσάρων κέντρων, καθὰ καὶ ἡ φαινόμενη γίνεται κίνησις τῶν καὶ ἐπ' ἄριστέρα καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάμετρον θεόντων. What, in this context, are the τετραμερῇ διακόσμησιν and the τεσσάρων κέντρων? Festugière seems right to claim that here τετραμερῇ διακόσμησιν does not refer to the regions corresponding to the four elements, as it does elsewhere in Proclus. He translates: 'à embrassé l'ordonnance quadripartite au moyen des quatre points cardinaux de l'écliptique selon que se produit le mouvement apparent des astres qui courent vers la gauche suivant la diagonale', and notes that 'les quatre *kentra* ne peuvent désigner que les quatre points cardinaux... de l'écliptique, puisque c'est du cercle de l'Autre qu'il s'agit: soit donc les deux points de rencontre avec le cercle de l'équateur (= Nord, Sud) et les deux points de rencontre avec les deux tropiques (= Est, Ouest). Il doit y avoir derrière cette assimilation des régions aux *kentra* des théories astronomiques sur lesquelles je n'ai pu trouver de renseignements'. He is right to suspect an astrological context, but the details can be filled in somewhat more accurately. The 'four centres' are terminology that is regularly used to refer to the four cardinal points that are used in the calculation of a nativity – not simply the points of the compass. All relate to the path of the ecliptic one way or another. The first is now called the Ascendant (the point of the ecliptic rising above the horizon at the time of birth). The second is the Midheaven or MC (the point at which the arc of longitude that passes through the observer's zenith intersects the ecliptic). The third is the setting point or *occasus* (the point on the ecliptic which is setting). The fourth is the IMC or *imum caeli* (where the other half of the meridian intersects the ecliptic). These cardinal points or centres were thought to establish four regions corresponding to the ages within a person's life. The positions of heavenly bodies in those regions foretold the course of one's life; Tester (1987). These four quadrants are the likely reference of τὴν τετραμερῇ διακόσμησιν. Thus 'the things that run to the left along the diagonal' are the Sun, Moon and planets. Their position against the backdrop of the constellations of the zodiac was taken to have significance for various aspects of a man's life. In view of this, I suggest that καθὰ introduces the idea that these stars and planets have some information to report. Save for one instance (*in Parm.* 744.14), all twenty-three other instances of καθὰ (= καθ' ὃ) in Proclus function to introduce what someone else *says* (καθὰ φησιν ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ξένος, *in Alc.* 148.12) or what has *been said* elsewhere (καθὰ καὶ πρότερον εἶπομεν, *in Parm.* 817.16). Hence my interpolation that gives the movement of the Sun, Moon and planets a *significance*, i.e. something to say. For συλλαμβανεῖν as 'take as an assistant', cf. LSJ s.v. V.

The thought behind the sentence then is something like this: another indication of the fact that the circle of the Different is such as to know everything about the sensible realm is that the path of the ecliptic – which corresponds to it – plays an important role

It's just like the case where the circle of the Same knows the intelligibles as primary-effective (*prôtourgos*) causes, and as manifesting from above all the secondary existences, and articulating the varied order of sensibles as a single, unified thing.⁵³⁶ These things in turn extend through the soul thanks to its similarity to the whole life-engendering [process]. For just as the soul is both unit and dyad thanks to the former [similarity], so too there has been a right and a left allotted to it due to this. These things have appeared in it and from it, one having been born from the right, the other from the left, whether one calls them 'temples', 'hands' or 'flanks', for the Theologians have imparted its reproductive powers through all these terms.⁵³⁷

With these matters satisfactorily interpreted, this further point is clear: that it is not the same to say that something is moved 'to the right' (*eis to dexion*) or 'to the left' and to say that it is moved **toward the right** (*epi dexia*) or **toward the left**. For since these things have been attributed to the circles that are being moved, they make it clear that the one is moved toward that which is on the right-hand side – that's what it means to be moved toward the right – while the other is moved toward that which is on the left-hand side. This is what it means to be moved toward the left. Now, since 'right' and 'left' have been called 'East' and 'West' for the reasons previously given, then in as much as one of the motions is dominant and the other one is carried with it, and similarly since the one of these is the motion in the circle of the Same, while the other is the motion in the circle of the Different <on account of the>⁵³⁸ powers from which each has its movement, then **toward the right** and **toward the left** are used appropriately in these cases. To be moved 'to the right' or 'to the left' involves being moved in a straight line since this connotes the endpoints of the horizontal motions. For this reason, since Timaeus previously set circular motion apart from the six rectilinear

in the casting of horoscopes by means of which those who understand how to interpret the circle of the Different's visible image can know about the life of an individual. One might even suppose that Proclus thinks this is *how astrology works*: the skilled practitioner looks to the visible image of the circle of the Different for indications of the knowledge of sensibles that is present in the invisible psychic circle.

⁵³⁶ Grammatically, the subject of these participles is the intelligibles, but Festugière is right to suggest that, logically speaking, these things appear to be the result of the activity of the circle of the Same. Since this circle is directed upon the intelligibles, perhaps its results and the results of the intelligibles are treated as one by Proclus.

⁵³⁷ For the hands in the Chaldean verses, see *Or. Chald.* 210c (= *in Crat.* §101.26–8) and Lewy (1956), 92, n. 104. The salient point is that the right and left are thought to have different powers. The same is true of the right and left flanks of Hecate in *Or. Chald.* 51 and 52; cf. Lewy, 88–90. For the temples in the Chaldean system, see Damascius, *Princ.* I. 242.14–15.

⁵³⁸ Diehl marks a lacuna at line 7. Kroll proposed either δὴ ἢ ἢ ἐκαστοῦ κίνησις. Festugière suggests that an article is needed as well in view of subsequent ἀφ' ἧς ἢ ἐκαστοῦ κίνησις.

motions and since he is now dealing with the case of the soul's motion, he has quite plausibly given it motion toward the right and toward the left. This, therefore, is what needs to be said about 'toward the right' and 'toward the left'.

3. *Horizontal and diagonal*

15 Let us take a look at the remaining opposition [in terms of which the circles are described]. As in the case of the cosmos where he revolved the inerrant [fixed stars] along the side, but the wandering [planets] along the diagonal, so too in the case of the soul, the circle of the Same goes **horizontally**, while the circle of the Different goes **along the diagonal**. One must first conceive this in a mathematical manner. Having set out a
20 quadrilateral with its diagonal, you must rotate the circle of the Same in terms of its sides, while taking the remaining circle in terms of the diagonal, thus making the horizontal lines of the quadrilateral correspond to the two circles formed by the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn. [Imagine] the circle of the Same moved along the two lines we have assumed, as
25 as well as along the larger circle intermediate between them [i.e. the celestial equator], with a motion toward the right. [Imagine that] the circle of the Different is moved along the diagonal of this quadrilateral at an angle to both [the lines of the tropics]. It is along this diagonal that the path of the ecliptic has been drawn, in terms of which the circle of the Different revolves through its whole cycle.

Next, having set aside these mathematical issues, let us look at some
30 properties of the diagonal and of the side. Examples of properties of the side include being straight,⁵³⁹ being rationally commensurable (*to rhêton*), being such as to encompass things, and being such as to unite
262 angles. But the diagonal has properties opposite to these: being crooked, not rationally commensurable (*to alogon*), such as to be encompassed, and such as to divide angles, for the side has been differentiated from the diagonal by all these [properties]. These [properties] also belong to the soul's circles. While one is akin to simplicity, boundary and limit, the
5 other is akin to variety, plurality and the infinite power of nature. While the one is such as to bring things together, the other is divisive; and while one has been accorded the status of what encompasses, the other has the role of being encompassed. Therefore the one has been plausibly

⁵³⁹ Proclus here plays on the double senses of τὸ ἀπλᾶγίστον and its opposite τὸ πεπλεγισμένον in terms of which the straight is free from mistakes while the oblique is crooked or untrustworthy. The diagonal of a square is not, of course, literally *crooked*, but no pair of English terms I can think of quite reproduce the double sense of the Greek.

said to be carried around along the side [i.e. horizontally] in as much as it is incapable of deviation, unified, and uni-form (*monoeidês*). But the other is said to be moved along the diagonal in as much as it delights in procession, multiplying things, and making things different, for the diagonal is capable of greater things than the line: it divides angles, makes many spaces from one, and is positioned at an angle. It is for this reason that he says later that 'the motion of the Different is at an angle' (38e6–39a1). All these things are tokens (*gnôrisma*) of the nature of the infinite.

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B. The superiority of the same: Tim. 36c8–d2

But he gave authority to the revolution of the Same and the Similar, for he allowed it to be single and undivided. (*Tim.* 36c8–d2)

This is the Demiurgic law, proceeding downward from the intelligibles on high in an intelligible manner: those things that are simpler rule over those which are more complex, and those things that are more uni-form rule over what is plural in form, the things that have been limited over that which is unlimited, the more intellectual over that which is less so. Thus it is just as it is among the intelligible beings, where the Limited dominates over the Unlimited.⁵⁴⁰ Likewise among the intellectual beings, the Male dominates over the Female;⁵⁴¹ and in the hypercosmic things, Sameness dominates over Difference, and Similarity over Dissimilarity. So too in the case of the soul, the revolution of the Same dominates over the revolution of the Different. Doubtless this is also the reason why, in the case of sensible things, the [revolution of] the planets is dominated by the [revolution of] the fixed stars, and in every case the multi-formed sort of life is held together by the uni-form causes. It follows from these facts that the only remaining alternative is that Sameness is superior to Difference and that likewise Similarity appears to be superior to Dissimilarity. It is not the case, as many Platonists say,⁵⁴² that Difference is better than Sameness or that Dissimilarity is better than Similarity, for it is because of the Form of Sameness Itself that the circle of the Same is more divine. The word **undivided** signifies its divine unity, undivided life and the fact that it is uni-form in its powers.

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Well, someone might ask, 'If this [i.e. being undivided] is superior, why did he not allow the whole soul to remain undivided?' We reply that it because it is necessary for the soul to possess all the Forms, ratios and rational-forming principles, and causes of encosmic things. Additionally, that which is such as to include the two circles is more complete or perfect

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⁵⁴⁰ Cf. *Plat. Theol.* III. 44.22–45.6.

⁵⁴¹ Cf. in *Tim.* I. 46.16–48.5 and 220.4–221.8. ⁵⁴² See above 155.5.

than that which is defined by just one power, for that which is the same in such a manner as to mysteriously encompass Difference within Sameness is better than [something that is the same] thanks to the intermediate psychic [combination of Being, Sameness and Difference]. It belongs to the Being of the soul to obtain mastery over the Different along with the Same. There exists, on the one hand, intellect and the intelligible, as if they were only [like] the circle of the Same. On the other hand, there is the sensible realm and the cosmos which are [like] the circle of the Different. The Difference of the first of these is something hidden, while Sameness of the other exists in a dim and superficial way. But the soul is intermediate, being a dyad and having the two circles – the one oriented toward intellect, the other toward sensible Being. And it has two-fold rational-forming principles (*logoi*) – some intellectual (*noeros*) and others organisational (*kosmourgōs*), and while some are planted facing the things that are, others are in contact with sensibles.

C. The division of the different: Tim. 36d2–7

But the interior circle he split in six places, making seven unequal circles in accordance with each interval of the double and triple series, there being three intervals in each.⁵⁴³ He assigned these circles opposite directions, three moving with a similar speed, while the other four moved with a speed unlike one another or the other three, though they were carried round in a ratio. (*Tim.* 36d2–7)

1. Astronomical interpretation

Let us consider what is now said by Plato, first from an astronomical point of view, if you will, for this mode of instruction is suitable. Let us conceive of the depth (*bathos*) that includes the planets as one and the same throughout⁵⁴⁴ because it is composed of a single matter, as those who have wisdom on such subjects say, divided into seven circles which are somehow moved in an opposite manner to one another. Or, as some people say, it is that the Moon and Sun are moved in a similar manner upon their epicycles, while being moved in accordance with their own motion in an opposite manner to the sphere of the fixed stars by their own circles. Others say that a single motion is performed that is both

⁵⁴³ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τριπλασίου διάστασιν ἐκάστην οὐσῶν ἐκατέρων τριῶν. As Proclus goes on to point out (265.12), there are a variety of ways to construe this. I have translated the passage in accordance with what I take to be Proclus' preferred alternative.

⁵⁴⁴ Lit. 'the same in colour with itself'. The planetary *bathos* is, of course, a body of a certain sort since there is no void in the Platonic cosmos.

regular and irregular. [Still others say] that Saturn, Jupiter and Mars
 make their first appearances in the morning following their conjunc-
 tion with the Sun since the Sun's movement along the ecliptic is faster
 than theirs, but the Moon, by contrast, makes its first appearance in the
 evening, due to the fact that it is moved more quickly [than the Sun] and
 so appears further to the East than the Sun. Mercury and Venus, how-
 ever, make their first appearance sometimes one way [sc. in the morning],
 sometimes the other [sc. in the evening]. [Yet others consider] that [the
 planets] are made to exhibit the phenomena of station, progression and
 retrogradation, and are both in opposition to one another and carried in
 opposite directions, some being moved toward the north, some toward
 the south – in whatever manner you like,⁵⁴⁵ for some say it happens in
 one way, others in another way. [Yet others say] that which has been
 more truly said: that when he says that the Demiurge **ordained that
 the circles would go in opposite directions**, he did not mean that
 the seven planetary circles go in opposite directions *to one another*, but
 rather that the one [circle of the fixed stars] and the seven [circles of the
 planets go in opposite directions] because of their contrary revolutions.
 For it is thus that he said in what comes later that the planets 'proceed
 simultaneously in opposite directions' (*Tim.* 39b1), since they are moved
 by their own individual motion as well as that of the sphere of the fixed
 stars. Nor did Plato here or elsewhere make any mention of eccentrics or
 epicycles. Rather the seven circles all determine a single centre, without
 the addition of any other centres. He also does not make the differences
 among these motions something that has arisen mechanically; and with-
 out these [assumptions], the hypothesis of epicycles or concerns about
 the risings of the planets are in no way appropriate to the subject of the
 circles within the soul. Therefore, he says that the Demiurge did indeed
 divide the circle of the Different into these seven circles, with three of
 them being moved with a similar speed, while the other four are moved
 at different rates. For three of them (the Sun, Mercury and Venus) keep
 pace with one another, as was said in the *Republic* (X, 617a–b), while the
 other four (the Moon, Saturn, Mars and Jupiter) move at different rates.
 All of them, however, are moved in such a way as to have a ratio both with
 one another and with the universe because their motion has been articu-
 lated with reference to determinate numbers, and all their rotations are
 complete with a return to an original position (*apokatastasis*).

⁵⁴⁵ Deleting εἴθ' before οὐτινὰς βούλει τρόπον. Its presence breaks the sequence of facts that we are supposed to consider (cf. εἴτε at 263.31; 264.4, 10 and 14). Proclus is similarly agnostic about the mechanism by which retrogradation takes place at *in Tim.* III. 56.27–9.

It seems that, just as in these matters he makes clear the difference between the stars that move at the same speed and those that move at a different rate, so too in the case of the things that came prior to what is visible, he substitutes for the stars themselves the equal or unequal rates of the circles in which they are carried. In any event, only the circles,
5 without the stars, have thus far been placed in the soul – for that is what has been established so far – and he has said that some of these circles are moved with the same speed, while the others are unequal in speed both to one another and to the former [circles that move with the same speed]. These matters, then, are clear.

Now, [the claim] that the division of the strips into the seven circles has come about **in accordance with each double and triple, there
10 being three each of each interval** is surely difficult to understand when it is put in just these terms. However, it signifies that the division has come about simultaneously in each interval of the double and triple intervals (there being three of each – since in intervals containing four terms there are three intervals between the terms), which is the same thing as saying that the splitting takes places lengthwise. It happens this
15 way in order that in each of the seven circles all the intervals and all the ratios are unified. For if the cutting had taken place just along a single interval, then, when they were divided, some of the ratios would be in some of the circles and others in others. But thanks to the fact that the division has taken place with respect to each of them, each one is a part of
20 each of them, and all the circles participate in all of the ratios.⁵⁴⁶ Unless, of course, it is even truer to say of these [words that they indicate] that it was in accordance with the number of the double and triple intervals (these being six) that there was a six-fold cutting in the case of the circles. When the intervals are placed next to one another and divided in some way other than in terms of depth – I mean by ‘next to one another’
25 extended so that [the intervals] are present throughout the whole circle, just as they were extended so as to be there in the whole straight line which was bent round to form a circle – it would be ridiculous to make

⁵⁴⁶ Cf. 239.28–31. Though the division into the seven circles corresponding to the paths of the planets occurs in the circle of the Different, and the double ratio pertains especially to it as a principle of plurality, nonetheless all the ratios are found in each circle. Proclus now considers that the division of the circle of the Different is similarly a lengthwise cutting so that each planetary circle may contain all the psychic *logoi*. This is consistent with the Neoplatonic axiom that ‘all is in all, but in each in a different manner’. However, it is unclear how this reading is supposed to explain the fact that the Demiurgic division results in seven *unequal* circles (36d1) as the text says. Surely a lengthwise division in six places of the circle of the Different would yield seven strips of equal length!

such a cut in terms of depth, with the result that each of the circles is demarcated by a single portion.

2. Interpretation in relation to the soul

a. General interpretation

Now, since these matters have already been grasped, then taking the appearances themselves as our point of departure, let us say that the World Soul – since it has all of the rational-forming principles of encosmic things and the properties that establish them – necessarily has not only the intellectual causes of man or horse or all other living things, but also has prior to these the causes of whole regions of the cosmos. By these regions I mean the regions of the fixed stars and of the planets. As a result of the *dyad* that is in the soul, the heaven admits of a division into *two* parts, and prior to the seven planets, there pre-exists the genuine *hebdomad* that comes prior to the things that appear. The World Soul also has the causes of the similarity and dissimilarity of the circles [in which the planets move]. It is like the situation where our nature generates two eyes, five fingers and seven internal organs in virtue of the rational-forming principles in it (for this nature antecedently comprehends the numbers of these parts due to the fact that Form always makes the same thing, unless the impediments that arise from matter prevent natural generation).⁵⁴⁷ Just as in our case where there is a single sense that has the causes of the five senses and generates them in a secondary manner from itself and divides their powers among the parts of the body,⁵⁴⁸ in the same manner the circle of the Different antecedently comprehends the primary-effective (*prôtourgós*) causes of the seven circles in itself – causes in terms of which this order has been established. While the entire heaven participates in both of these circles, the sphere of the fixed stars participates more in the circle of the Same, while the planets participate more in the circle of the Different. Because of this the former is undivided, while the latter has been divided [into the seven circles], and while the first is moved from the East, the latter is moved from the West. The first one imitates the uni-form (*monoeidês*) and intellectual

⁵⁴⁷ Cf. the way in which the failure of form to subdue matter completely leads to monstrosities in Aristotle's theory of reproduction, *GA* IV.3, 769b11–14.

⁵⁴⁸ For the view that the sense perception is in some sense one thing, see Aristotle, *Sens.* 7, 449a17–20. Proclus seems to champion the view that the single perceptive power's differentiation into the five senses is from itself – not a result of the different organs. Contrast the Stoic view at *S/F* II.826. Proclus would likely agree with the view of Priscian that the organs of the five senses adapt themselves to an antecedent differentiation of psychic powers (*Metaphrasis in Theophrastum* 5.10–18).

power of the soul, while the other imitates a power that is plural in form (*polyeidês*) and enjoys varied motions. Furthermore, while the sphere of the fixed stars is such as to include many *divine living beings* [sc. the visible heavenly gods], the circle of the Same includes the *causes of all things*. However, it is not cut into a strip because all the plurality in it has been naturally united to itself through unity and it is dominated by the bond of Sameness. And this is also why the sphere of the fixed stars is moved with a single motion. Though each of the seven circles antecedently comprehends a plurality of powers – some more universal, some more particular – Timaeus now communicates their unities and their initial circumferences (*periochê*), but leaves out the innumerable inferior gradations (*hypobasis*) of the divine rational-forming principles. Each circle is a plenum of specific lives; whether they be the sort that create continuity or division, or the sort that conjoins or disjoins, or some other sort – many powers contribute to its completion, some being such as to generate primary and secondary gods, others daemons, others partial souls.

b. Objections and replies

For what reason, someone might ask, did he not produce some circle specifically for Being, as he has produced a circle of Sameness and of Difference? We shall reply that while the latter two are antithetical, Being is common to all soul. Therefore, while all soul is single thanks to Being, it is bi-formed thanks to Sameness and Difference, just as in the case of the straight lines, there is single [strip of soul stuff] prior to the two [strips that result from its splitting] (*Tim.* 36b5–7). In the case at hand, the unit is prior to the hebdomad [seven], just as the partless nature of the soul comes before the divisions into seven parts. In the case of the *hebdomad*, the division into four and three has the *epitritos* [4:3] ratio, this ratio being the first of the concordances, while the numbers are first among the odds and evens.⁵⁴⁹ But among these three, the one is analogous to Truth, the other to Beauty, and the third to Symmetry – these things standing in the ‘vestibule of the Good’ as we have been taught in the *Philebus* (64c). But among the other four, the one that is most stationary is analogous to Rest, while the one that is moved most easily is analogous to Motion, the one that is the most temperate is analogous to Sameness, while that which is maximally divisive is analogous to Difference.⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁹ This presupposes of course that 2 is not a number but rather a principle of number. See Nicomachus, *Arith.* I.7.3–4 and D’Ooge (1972), 116–17.

⁵⁵⁰ Mugler (in Festugière) entertains the idea that these terms involve correspondences between the numbers in the double and triple series and principles from the *Philebus*

[Someone might also ask] why did he not insert the partial Forms (*ta merika eidê*) into the World Soul, rather than only the genera of these various Forms? We shall reply that this [portion of the text] pertains to the universal creation (*holê dêmiourgia*), for the individualised parting out of rational-forming principles belongs to the particular creation (*meristê poiêsis*) which occurs when, after receiving each of the souls that have been divided into the common genera of all beings, the creation further articulates (*epidiarathroun*) the variety in these souls in accordance with the divine divisiveness and conducts the additional division (*epidiairesis*) of each one down to the level of individual Forms (*atoma eidê*). For this reason, it is said to be divided and secondary to universal creation.⁵⁵¹ Hence he has provided a division of the soul into universal genera and a mixture from universals that is relevant to the universal creation under discussion. These matters, then, are clear enough.

‘For what reason’, someone might ask, ‘has the division been made only into the planetary and fixed [spheres of the heavens], or rather into the paradigmatic powers of these, but there has not been a division into the four elements?’⁵⁵² After all, the World Soul contains them with its own powers and leads them forth by its own motions. Therefore it has been said by some that all the four elements have been taken together in the circle of the Moon, for this is small in relation to the universe, the material [portion] of the cosmos being a little like the narrow base of a jar. Thus in the *Republic*, when the whole cosmos is divided into eight circular whorls (X, 616d ff.), the entire material [portion] is in

and the *Sophist*. The correlations are: 1 = Truth, 2 = Beauty, 3 = Symmetry, 4 = Rest, 9 = Motion, 8 = Sameness, 27 = Difference. Proclus’ treatment of the triad of Truth, Beauty and Symmetry indicates a certain level of flexibility in its correlations however. Cf. *Plat. Theol.* III. 43.11–22 and III. 63.18–21.

⁵⁵¹ Cf. *in Tim.* II. 2.2–3.2 where Proclus distinguishes wholesale or universal creation of “whole parts” from the creation of particulars, which is allotted to the Young Gods at *Timaeus* 42d6.

⁵⁵² εἰς τὸ τετραστοιχίον. Festugière supposes that *tetrastoichion* here, and again in line 9, refers to the four kinds of living being on the basis of Proclus *in Crat.* §53.31. This seems possible, but I think less likely than that Proclus is referring to the four elements. If the four genera of living creatures are at issue, how is the size of the sublunary area relative to the whole cosmos relevant? Moreover, one genus of the four is found throughout the cosmos – the visible heavenly gods. If we suppose that the τετραστοιχίον here refers only to the familiar four elements, then we can see what sort of person might pose such a question – a Peripatetic who thinks that the total quantity of them is in the sublunary sphere. These would form a relatively small portion of the cosmos. Of course, by Proclus’ own lights, the higher forms of the four elements are everywhere throughout the cosmos, and he has already dealt with the question of the aether in what has gone before.

the eighth one down.⁵⁵³ Hence these things have been said and said well.

3. *Additional numerological correlations*

15 But further to this one might reply more completely that through both this unit [sc. the circle of the Same] and through the seven circles [of the Different] he includes all the portions of the cosmos. For just as in the case of the heaven there is the monad and the hebdomad, so too there is an analogical correspondence with the sphere of the aether: some things corresponding to the fixed circle, others to the planetary arrangement. There is a universal cosmic arrangement up there which 20 the heaven imitates in an aetherial manner and [imitates] in the depth of its air, and in the extended portions of its water, and in the folds of earth. For not only has the earth been divided by analogy with the heaven, but the other elements have been too. In each case there are monads and hebdomads that take in the arrangements among them and the full complement of them. [This is the case] among the things that are fiery (*ta* 25 *empyria*), those that are aerial, and those that are aquatic. The circles of the soul antecedently comprehend in a causal manner (*prolambanein kat' aitian*) all these monads and hebdomads, some through the circle of the Same, others through the circle of the Different. It also seemed this way to the most scientific of the Theologians ever to exist.⁵⁵⁴ Plato would 30 also agree that there are series that stretch from both the planetary and stellar [spheres] down to the terrestrial [regions], whether these be series of divine, daemonic or partial souls, since he was surely willing at some point to bring the series of twelve liberated leading gods from above down to the last of things.⁵⁵⁵ For it is necessary that less authoritative cycles should follow the more authoritative ones, and that each of those below the heavens should imitate those in the heavens. As a result 5 the former have been arranged in a way analogous to the latter, since the psychic circles include the causes [of the things below]. If these [views] were to prevail, it would be obvious that one must again say that those [planetary circles] that move with the same speed (*Tim.* 38d) have been

⁵⁵³ Cf. *in Remp.* II. 94.11–16 where Proclus gives in summary form such a reading of the cosmological significance of the Spindle.

⁵⁵⁴ The fact that Proclus has interchanged 'aetherial' for 'fiery' (*empyrian*) suggests that he has in mind the *Chaldean Oracles*. Cf. II. 57.9–14.

⁵⁵⁵ The 'leading gods' are the twelve gods that conduct souls on their tour of the high vault of heaven in the *Phaedrus*. Presumably Proclus has in mind the claim that love affairs between embodied human souls are determined by the nature of the god followed by the lover and beloved (*Phdr.* 252c–e). Hence the influence of this series extends down to the terrestrial realm.

placed in the middle of the whole. This is the case not only because they are analogous to monads in the 'vestibule of the Good' (*Phlb.* 64c), i.e. Truth, Beauty and Symmetry, but they are also in the middle in a different manner which we mentioned earlier. Since they possess the bond that holds together wholes, then in terms of leading up (*kata to anagôgon*), they take the secondary things up to the first things; while in terms of revealing (*kata to ekphantikon*), they reveal the first things to the secondary things; and in terms of binding together (*kata to syndetikon*), they do this with both similarly. In the case of the remaining [planetary circles], the Earth and the sphere of the fixed stars [are analogous] to the Connectors, Heaven and Earth.⁵⁵⁶ Water and the planet Saturn are analogues of Rhea and Kronos, while air and the planet Jupiter correspond to Zeus and Hera. After these it would not be inappropriate to say that the Moon and Mars belong to a different order (*taxis*), the one being such as to distinguish the primary and masculine things from those that are intermediate, while the other is such as to demarcate tertiary and, as it were feminine, things from these intermediates.⁵⁵⁷ But among these intermediates, that which leads up (*to anagôgon*) [i.e. Mercury] and that which reveals (*to ekphantikon*) [i.e. the Sun] are the extremes, while in the middle are the erotic bonds [i.e. Venus] connecting all things. The Theologians also make this clear, calling the one 'the messenger of the Gods', the other 'the gate to upward progress'.⁵⁵⁸ Between these two is the 'Love of the Universe', since this is an intermediate whether it be before the Sun and after Mercury or vice versa.⁵⁵⁹ And perhaps these things all move at the same speed in as much as all things look to one thing – the bond that holds together wholes. Their activities also have the same goal, binding together all things in a single unification, so that the universe is filled up by appropriate causes. Therefore all things are in the soul thanks to a single act of inclusion, for the eight circles [of the Different] are powers that include in a unified manner what subsists in a divided manner among the things that are visible both in the heavens

⁵⁵⁶ The Connectors (*sunoches*) are lesser divine beings within the Chaldean system whose function is to protect various parts of the universe and to create harmony within it. Cf. Majercik (1989), 10–11 and Brisson (2003), 120.

⁵⁵⁷ All ancient accounts of the ordering of the planets put Jupiter, Saturn and the fixed stars above Mars. The Moon is proximate to Earth and has connotations of the feminine because of the connection with the female cycle. The Earth (*Gê*) is of course a feminine goddess as well. The intermediates, then, will be Mercury, Venus and the Sun.

⁵⁵⁸ Cf. *in Remp.* II. 129.1–29 and Numenius fr. 32. The tropics of Cancer and Capricorn are the 'gates of the Sun'. The southern gate is impassible to mortals and is reserved for the gods. Cf. Porphyry, *Antro.* 26.8–11.

⁵⁵⁹ Proclus refers here to the difference between the Pythagorean and Chaldean order of the planets. See *in Tim.* II. 48.16 and note ad loc.

and in the case of each of the elements. So much then for what needs to be said in brief about the *all* the circles.

However, focusing once again *specifically* on the circle of the Different itself, we may say that the division into six is maximally appropriate to the soul, for according to the Pythagoreans' account the soul is a hexad.⁵⁶⁰ They arrange analogical correspondences between the monad and the point, the dyad and the line, the triad and the plane, the tetrad and the body, the pentad and the qualified body.⁵⁶¹ While the number six corresponds to that which has been ensouled, the number seven is analogous to that which is intellectual. And so we shall say, 'How could the number of the seven circles *not* be appropriate to the soul since it comes from the life-engendering goddess – who is herself a monad, dyad and number seven, encompassing all the female Titans in herself?'⁵⁶² Furthermore, after another fashion the Seven is a number that is naturally adapted to the opportune moment (*kairophyês*) and one which brings cycles to completion and back to their starting points.⁵⁶³ By virtue of this, it has an appropriate relation to the soul that brings forth and directs all things by its own motions. But if this is so, then it is clear that these circles of the soul are both cognitive powers and – significantly prior to this – also life-engendering powers;⁵⁶⁴ powers both tetradic and triadic, for thanks to these two they are such as to encompass all sensible things. The soul knows⁵⁶⁵ all the similarities in these things through the triad, and all the dissimilarities through the tetrad, and all the variety, all the genera in all things, and whether Truth is present in any way at all to these things, or Symmetry or Beauty [is present to them] as a result of those things which really are.

In addition, the fact that these seven terms are present in each of the circles multiplies the geometric ratios by seven. This is a token (*gnôrisma*)

⁵⁶⁰ Cf. above 233.14–17 and *Theol. Arith.* 45.11–48.6. Festugière seems correct to suggest that μέν in line 5 is a repetition from 4 and should be omitted, as it is in Q.

⁵⁶¹ The first four correspondences are given at *in Euc.* 97.18–22 as point, line, surface and solid. We find the same list for one to six at *in Tim.* III. 328.13–16.

⁵⁶² Cf. Damascius, *in Parm.* 134.24–8 where we are told that, according to Orpheus, Rhea encompassed the female Titans. At *Plat. Theol.* V. 76.2 she is identified with the life-engendering source of souls. However, Rhea is more frequently associated with the Ogdoad (i.e. 8) in the Neoplatonic texts rather than the number seven. Cf. [Iamblichus] *Theol. Arith.* 74.7–8 and Damascius, *in Parm.* 133.7.

⁵⁶³ Cf. *in Remp.* II. 191.4 which attributes this notion to Pythagoreans. Cf. *Theol. Arith.* 54.10–56.7 where we get a quotation from Anatolius that relates it to childbirth, the key moment in an illness, and to the Hippocratic seven ages of man. The term *kairophyês* is not found in any other Neopythagorean texts and, indeed, occurs only in Proclus.

⁵⁶⁴ Cf. 244.25 where the life-engendering powers of the soul are similarly prior to its capacities for knowing.

⁵⁶⁵ Reading γινώσκουσα for γινώσκουσι in line 22.

of psychic self-motion, for it engenders and multiplies itself and is simultaneously seven and the number that results from seven.

Furthermore, the fact that the psychic circles are carried in opposite directions from one another shows that these powers proceed everywhere; that they are productive of everything; causes of the Difference that has been shared out everywhere, and the same oppositions within the realm of generation. For there are opposites in the soul, in the heavens, and in matter, but genesis is made up *from* the enmattered oppositions, *through* [the agency of] the heavenly oppositions, being *derived from* the psychic ratios. The first is that *out of which*, while the second is that *through which*, and the last has the role among the things that have been produced of that *from which*.

Moreover, the similarity of the triad and the dissimilarity of the tetrad have been given appropriately to these numbers. For 3 is such as to bring things to completion (*telesiourgos*) and such as to revert upon the same form. But 4 is productive (*gonimos*) and the cause of a whole plurality. All the numbers are therefore entirely present to the soul's essence: the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and above all these the number that results from multiplying 7 by 4 – all these numbers are completed in 7.⁵⁶⁶ Therefore, every way you look at it the essence of the soul is *hebdomadic* [i.e. something pertaining to seven]. And while the circle of the Same is a monad, the circle of the Different is, as we just said, the hebdomad; for the one is intellect being moved, while the other is the light in virtue of intellect, which is just what 7 is according to the Pythagoreans.⁵⁶⁷ The one is indivisible, analogous to intellect, and indeed composed from the indivisible Being and the Being that is divisible in relation to bodies – though in it the indivisible [aspect] predominates, just as Sameness does – while the other one is divisible, for in it Difference predominates. On account of this, the one is monadic while the other is hebdomadic. It is not only the case that 7 pertains to the soul's essence because of its similarity to the life-engendering god (for the latter is a monad including the two triads which have been comprehended in her)⁵⁶⁸ but also because the initial sharing out of the soul involves division into 7, as has already been made clear, for the things that were divided from a power single and indivisible possessed

⁵⁶⁶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπτάδος τετράγωνος. On one way of looking at it, this could be 7 squared, since we have the 7 numbers terminating in 7. Alternatively, the sum of the numbers just listed is 28. If, in Pythagorean fashion we think of numbers as corresponding to geometric figures, this number equates to a *rectangle* with sides of length 7 and 4. τετράγωνος is typically a square, but can mean simply a quadrilateral.

⁵⁶⁷ ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς ἐστὶ κινούμενος, ὃ δὲ τὸ κατὰ νόον φῶς. For the former, cf. *Enneads* VI.6.9, 29–31 and *Plat.Theol.* III. 27.7–10. For the Pythagorean identification of Seven with the latter, cf. *Plat.Theol.* V. 14.13.

⁵⁶⁸ See above 270.111.

30 the primary number in a seven-fold way.⁵⁶⁹ The number that results
272 from 7 [i.e. 28 or 49] is also appropriate to the powers that divide things,
just as 7 doubtless is, but while the latter is appropriate to hypercosmic
powers, the former is appropriate to encosmic ones.

If it is necessary to trace the entire psychic construction back to the
divine orders – for it has images of all [of the things up there] – we must
5 take our start from the very first words about it, where Timaeus said the
soul was constructed, not in the order in which we have been speaking
about it, as younger than the body, but [the Demiurge] ‘gave the soul pri-
ority and seniority over the body both with respect to birth and virtue, as
soul was the master and future ruler’ (34c4–5). Having begun his speech
about it from this point, Timaeus gives to it the prerogatives of the eldest
10 over the genesis of the entire corporeal construction. Therefore it must
surely be said that in as much as it is ‘master and ruler’, its procession
is derived from the principle of all things. But in as much as it has been
allotted a hypostasis that is both triple and unified,⁵⁷⁰ it will be traced
back to the highest point in the intelligibles. But in so far as it is generated
15 from Being, Sameness and Difference, it goes back to the entire realm
of what is genuinely intelligible, the highest point of which embraces
essence (*ousia*) and Being (*to on*), while the middle is that eternity which
is the cause for all things remaining in the *same* [condition], and the limit
is the Intelligible Living Being which has *differentiated* itself by its pro-
cessions into the intelligible living beings, since even the whole up there
20 is the whole composed of dissimilar parts, as Parmenides teaches.⁵⁷¹ This
thrice-plaited whole, this [psychic] “dough”, has come to be a thing com-
posed of *dissimilar* parts.⁵⁷² In as much, though, as it is a self-generated
(*autogonos*) number and intelligible, it must be referred to the highest
point of the intelligible and intellectual arrangement, for there is the
25 first number after Difference. Since the former has the first order, as the
Theologians say, we have beheld it being the cause of the series that is
divisible in terms of number. And there the *Parmenides* has established
the whole number and from thence has revealed all the beings. How-
ever, in as much as [the psychic dough] has been mixed together from
the three means [sc. geometric, arithmetic and harmonic] is a whole of

⁵⁶⁹ That is to say, in the initial setting out of the portions of the soul, we get seven numbers.

⁵⁷⁰ Its hypostasis is *triple* and unified since it is one kind of being compounded from two other kinds – the divisible and the indivisible. Cf. *Tim.* 35a3–4: τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος.

⁵⁷¹ Festugière, following Diehl, refers to *Parm.* 129a–b, but it is hard to see how this is particularly apposite to the claim that the intelligible whole is made up of dissimilar parts.

⁵⁷² τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ τριπλὲς ὅλον τοῦτο στοιχείων ἀνομοίων φύραμα γεγονός. For ‘thrice-plaited’, see above 209.11.

similar parts – for all result from three elements – then the [origins of the soul may be traced back] to the intellectual wholeness that connects both wholes and parts. For the three means have been derived from these Connective Gods:⁵⁷³ the one [geometric mean] results from the first god that includes the remaining ones and leads all things together into one cosmos and a single unity in virtue of one ratio; while the second [harmonic mean] results from the second god who provides for things to be bound together – some to some things, others to other things; the greater to the greater, the lesser to the lesser – while the last [arithmetic mean] results from the third god whose own illumination provides a communion to things that come third, by means of which the things with lesser volume are unified to a greater degree than the things which possess greater volume but are less unified. Surely this is the distinctive characteristic (*exairetos*) of the arithmetic middle.

In as much as the soul has a certain shape (*idea*) and dimension (*diaschêmatisis*) and has been furnished with a procession that goes in a straight line but a reversion that is circular – the causes through which this is the case having been stated [247.18 ff.] – then [the soul must be referred back] to the triad of intellectual shapes.⁵⁷⁴ For up there is the primary straight line and that which is circular. It was for this reason that in the shape (*idea*) of the soul both lines and circles were used both together and separately.

In so far as it has received both monadic and hebdomatic powers [the soul should be traced back] to the intellectual hebdomad. But in so far as it is an intermediary between sensibles and intelligibles and in as much

⁵⁷³ For the role of the Connectors in Chaldean cosmology see above note 556. Proclus here assigns them roles in unifying the cosmos that correspond in rather vague ways to the characteristics of these three means. The geometric mean preserves the same ratio in all of the things that it connects. The harmonic doesn't preserve the same ratio through all the terms, but rather in a harmonic sequence *b* exceeds *a* by the 'same part' of *a* by which *c* exceeds *b*. So in the sequence 2, 3, 6 the $\frac{1}{2}$ of *a* (i.e. 1) by which *b* exceeds it is lesser than the $\frac{1}{2}$ of *c* (i.e. 3) by which it is exceeded. Hence Proclus' remark that this Connecting God assigns the greater to the greater and the lesser to the lesser. Finally, in an arithmetic proportion each term exceeds the next by the same amount. So if we think of this amount as the term's share of unification then a larger number has more plurality to be "stuck together" by the same amount of "glue". For a rather different identification of the triad of Connective Gods, see *Plat. Theol.* III. 107.2–12.

⁵⁷⁴ As Festugière notes, the reference to a triad of intellectual shapes is unclear. Proclus distinguishes a variety of ways in which shape exists prior to extension at *in Parm.* 1128.17–1129.14. We find a triad here: the shapelessness of the One, the intelligible cause of shapes (ἡ νοητὴ τῶν σχημάτων αἰτία), and intellectual (τὸ νοερὸν σχῆμα). However, our present passage makes it sound as if Proclus has in mind a triad specifically within the realm of 'the intellectual' – a layer of being that he often explicitly distinguishes from 'the intelligible' and that which is both 'intelligible and intellectual'.

as it makes the sensibles resemble the intelligibles, the soul is referred to the Leading series [of gods],⁵⁷⁵ for it is such as to make secondary things like the unitary high points [from which the secondary things proceed]. However, in as much as the soul is active with a two-fold activity (the one presiding over sensibles, the other in contact with intelligibles), then [it can be referred to] the Liberated [gods]⁵⁷⁶ who both are and are not in touch with the universe.

Let these brief remarks serve as a reminder to those who have carefully followed the writings of our teacher [Syrianus] in which the truly ineffable conceptions of Plato on these matters are revealed.

4. Remarks on earlier views

a. Platonists

I am astonished at those Platonists who think that the soul is divided in such a way that it is portioned out into celestial souls, both a single soul [of the fixed stars] and the seven [souls that animate the planets]. (For where, in the case of incorporeal things, is it possible to find such a division that does away with the whole? This sort of division is distinctive of divisible masses.) And [I am also astonished that] some of them think that this soul is entirely hypercosmic, since immediately in what follows (36d8) Plato indicates both that all that has been said concerns *one* soul and that this soul is surely *encosmic*.⁵⁷⁷ Hence I take it that it is better to assume this as a starting point concerning these matters: that it is necessary that the soul remain whole in spite of its division and, in addition to the former, that the dialogue is concerned with the encosmic animation. Assuming these things to have been said [it is also necessary that] there is surely just a single soul of the cosmos that is indivisible and divided in terms of these powers: first the dyad, second the triad and tetrad, and third the hebdomad, for it is in terms of these numbers that its division has come about. Such, then, is our account of these matters.

⁵⁷⁵ The Leading Gods are *hypercosmic* divinities associated with the twelve gods that lead the disembodied soul in its tour of the hypercelestial realm of Forms in *Phaedrus* 246e. Cf. in *Crat.* §126.6. See also above 107.10 and 129.29.

⁵⁷⁶ The Liberated Gods play a role as intermediate between cosmic and hypercosmic gods that is similar to the role played by the soul as intermediate between intelligibles and sensibles. Cf. Damascius, *Dub. et Sol.* II. 214.8–15; 215.4–6.

⁵⁷⁷ It seems likely that the Platonists in question here are Porphyry and Iamblichus respectively. Proclus has repeatedly rejected Iamblichus' exegesis of Plato's text in terms of a hypercosmic soul. Nothing so definite identifies Porphyry as the first of the unnamed Platonists here, though it seems plausible that here, as elsewhere, he first discusses Porphyry, then Iamblichus and then Theodore of Asine.

b. Theodore of Asine

The philosopher Theodore of Asine,⁵⁷⁸ being filled up with the arguments of Numenius, produced views on the generation of the soul quite novel, creating accounts derived from the number of letters in a word, their shapes and their numerical values.⁵⁷⁹ Therefore in order that what we have written should briefly contain his beliefs on these matters, let's go through each of the things he said so that we may make a synopsis of each topic. 10 15

The first thing is well celebrated by the terms 'ineffable' and 'unspeakable', 'font of all things', and 'cause of goodness'.

After the first which transcends everything comes a triad that, according to him, defines the intelligible realm which he calls 'the one'. Being composed from breath, it is sort of derived from the ineffable, which the rough breathing of [the word] '*ben*' (one) imitates. Being composed from the arch of its lone E, it is separate from the consonant that is voiced with it, and then its final letter, N.⁵⁸⁰ 20

After this triad is another that defines the Intellectual level (*bathos*), and another that defines the Demiurgic [level]. The first is the Being (*to einai*) prior to being (*to on*), the Intellect prior to intellect, and the Life prior to life. The Demiurgic triad after this is: Being in first place, second Intellect, third the Source of Souls.⁵⁸¹ 25

Resulting from this triad is another triad: the Soul Itself, the Soul as a universal (*kathalou*) and the Soul of the World whose division we have spoken about before. Each of these has proceeded from the entire Demiurgic triad, but the first one comes more from Being, while the second derives especially from Intellect, and the third from the Fontal Soul. It is surely about this World Soul that [Theodorus thinks] Plato proposes to speak, rather than about the soul *simpliciter* which results 30 275

⁵⁷⁸ in *Tim.* II. 274.10–278.25 = Theodore, Test. 6 (Deuse). This, together with 215.29–218.20 above are by far the longest of the testimonia on Theodore.

⁵⁷⁹ ἀπὸ τῶν γραμμάτων καὶ τῶν χαρακτήρων καὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν, cf. Gersh (1978), 289. I translate this with an eye toward what Proclus says later at 278.1 about Iamblichus' criticisms of Theodore's methods.

⁵⁸⁰ A slightly fuller but perhaps somewhat different account is given at in *Parm.* book VII (Klibansky 52.9–17, trans. Morrow and Dillon): 'The first of the things that emanate from it [sc. the ineffable One] is represented by the rough breathing with which we utter "*ben*". Itself, it is unnameable, just as the breathing is by itself silent. The second is represented by the utterable vowel which now becomes utterable with the breathing, and it itself becomes both utterable and unutterable, unspeakable and speakable; for the procession of the second order of existence has to be mediated. Third comes *ben* which contains the unsoundable breathing and the soundable force of the e and the letter that goes with this, the consonant n, which represents in a converse way the same thing as the breathing.'

⁵⁸¹ Cf. I. 309.17–18 = Theodore, Test 12.

from the source of souls, or about the Soul as universal conjoined with the World Soul,⁵⁸² or about the Source Itself. For all things are in all, even if they are somehow different in one case and in another. They are in the soul prior to the triad [sc. in the Source of Souls] in a unified manner (*kath' benôsin*), but in the soul that exists *simpliciter* in the manner of the wholeness prior to the parts, and in the Soul as universal in the manner of the wholeness of the parts, but in the third soul [sc. the World Soul] in the manner of the whole that is in the parts. (As if Plato had arranged all these souls and it was necessary to refer all his words back to all of them, disregarding the differences among them!)⁵⁸³

Theodore thinks that it is first necessary to give the reason why the soul is composed from three means. And he certainly also says that, on the whole, the soul is a geometric ratio, established from both the First

⁵⁸² περὶ τῆς καθόλου καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντός. Deuse commends Festugière's 'et l'Âme au sens universal conjointement à l'Âme du Tout'. Whatever the text means, it can't mean to list the World Soul as among the souls that are *not* up for discussion since we've just been told it *is* the subject. Another more radical suggestion would be to emend the text to read καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος. This would give us a parallel with περὶ τῆς ἀπλῶς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀπὸ τῆς πηγῆς τῶν ψυχῶν where the soul to be ruled out is given together with the element in the triad from which it derives. Of course, this treats the soul *simpliciter* as corresponding to Soul Itself, and deriving from the Source of souls. And the Soul as universal then derives from Being, leaving the World Soul to correspond to Intellect. This doesn't match Deuse's schema of Theodore's order of hypostases, though it is unclear to me that this diagram is built on texts apart from this one. Moreover, it requires that we suppose that the lists at 274.27–8 and 29–30 are not in a coordinated order. But in its favour, it may be said that all of the souls derive from all of the elements at the Demiurgic level.

⁵⁸³ The parenthetical remark is, of course, Proclus' criticism. One might be tempted to suppose that in the previous lines Proclus expresses Theodore's views in his terms, just as Aristotle embeds the pre-Socratic discussion of principles within his own framework. But this is perhaps the result of a common legacy. Iamblichus credited Numenius with the principle that 'all things are in all but in each appropriately' (ap. Stob. I p. 365.12 (Wachsmuth)) and Theodore, we have just been told, is full of the doctrines of Numenius. We have already seen that Iamblichus and Theodore seem to share the idea of a triad in which the first element is unparticipated (Iamblichus' *amethbektos*, 240.6–7) or unrelated to anything (Theodore's 'aschêtos', 142.24). In this case, the role of unparticipated monad is played by the Source of Souls which contains everything *kath' benôsin*. The vocabulary of the wholeness prior to the parts, from the parts and in the parts is certainly present in Proclus (ET 67–74, in *Parm.* 1102.8 ff.), but it may also be present in Iamblichus as well (in *Tim.* I. 426.12–14). It is difficult to say to what extent Porphyry anticipates it (in *Tim.* I. 422.14 ff.), but if it, or something like it, were present, this would have been known to Theodore who was a student of Porphyry (Test. 1 = Damasc. *Vita Isid.* §166). On the basis of this passage Dodds ((1963), 237) attributes the part-whole doctrine to Theodore, but this seems to overlook the whole question of the extent to which Proclus is presenting Theodore in Theodore's terms or in his own – an issue that is not raised as forcefully as perhaps it should be by Deuse either. Cf. O' Meara (1974).

God in accordance with Being and from the Second God in accordance with Intellect, for these are the two [kinds of] Being, the divisible and the indivisible. Both the arithmetic ratio (which bears a likeness to the first Being) and the harmonic ratio (which bears a likeness to the second Being) are brought to completion in it, for the one is monadic, since it is unextended, while the other one has been drawn apart – albeit in a harmonious manner.

20

Next, it is shown that since it is the number four, it results from the tetrad of the elements, and that all geometrical number might be some particular number.⁵⁸⁴ Lest one think that this number is lifeless, you will discover Life in the letters at each end, if you take the first heptad instead of the third.⁵⁸⁵ If, however, you posit the base number of the first letter and those subsequent to it you will see that the soul's life is intellectual. Take ζ ο ψ (i.e. 7, 70, 700). The circle [ο] is intermediate, being intellectual, because intellect is the cause of the soul. But the smallest term shows that the soul is a sort of geometric intellect because what joins the parallel lines is a straight line across the diagonal:⁵⁸⁶ it thus both remains above and also advances towards opposites, evincing a form of life that is both oblique and non-oblique.⁵⁸⁷ The largest [number] is the element of the sphere. In any event, the lines will make a sphere when they have been bent around.

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After this, the bases of the next letter [i.e. the υ in ψυχῇ] are δ, μ, υ (4, 40, 400) which are at the same time 3 and also tetradic and because of this such as to generate the number 12, producing the 12 spheres

⁵⁸⁴ The soul is the number four because it has four letters – ΨΥΧΗ. I suspect that there may be some purported connection between Theodore's talk of ὁ σύμπαρ ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός and the way in which the infamous 'perfect number' of marriages is glossed as σύμπαρ δὲ οὗτος ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός in the marriage number of *Republic* VIII, 546c6.

⁵⁸⁵ The claim that life is evidenced in the first and last letters of the word ψυχῇ is justified as follows. The letter ψ represents the number 700 in the Greek notation for writing numbers. This is the 'third heptad' in the sequence 7, 70, 700. The number 7 is represented in the Greek notation by ζ. If you combine this with the final letter of ψυχῇ you get ζη or more precisely ζῆ – it lives!

⁵⁸⁶ The relevant fact here seems to be that the capital form of the number corresponding to 7, Ζ, can be thought of as connecting two parallel lines. The connection with the soul is that the rotation of the circle of the Different along the path of the ecliptic at an angle across the circle of the Same (which represents the celestial equator) describes a similar diagonal. Cf. above II. 261.16–19.

⁵⁸⁷ The allusion is surely to *Tim.* 43e4 where Timaeus describes the ways an influx of sensations and nutrition affect the circles within the soul – or at least within the human soul: ἀλόγως δὲ φέρεσθαι, τότε μὲν ἀντίας, ἄλλοτε δὲ πλαγίας, τότε δὲ ὑπτίας, cf. Theodore's ἀπλαγίαστον ἅμα καὶ πεπλαγιασμένον ζωῆς εἶδος. Presumably the circles in the World Soul are never so disordered, so the kind of life had by souls, generally speaking, is a form of life that is simultaneously oblique and non-oblique.

5 of the universe.⁵⁸⁸ The largest of these numbers shows that the soul's essence stretches itself out toward two things and extends itself after two things, on account of which some people also call this letter a 'lover of wisdom'⁵⁸⁹ *** [the soul] having flowed to the bottom of both.⁵⁹⁰ At any rate, we have also found that the letter υ has itself been so named by
10 some extraordinary individuals. The letter υ [in ψυχῇ] is also between two spheres, that of the ψ (700) and the χ (600),⁵⁹¹ the one being hotter thanks to the *pneuma*⁵⁹² and more life engendering, the other having each of these [features] to a lesser extent. So once again it turns out that the soul is intermediate between two intellects – the one prior, and the other posterior – and manifests its most appropriate middle character
15 and relation toward each. Nonetheless, Plato has given the soul a χ shape rather [than the ψ], although the letter is also the element of a sphere, in order that the *balanced* character of its motions should be indicated, all of the straight lines in the χ being equal. The fact of the soul's self-motion is thus made known. But if the Demiurge has brought forth the
20 soul in virtue of his own essence, then it is obvious that he arranged it analogously to the letter, for this is the very first intellect. Therefore,

⁵⁸⁸ Deuse refers us to the anonymous Pythagorean views cited in Photius (*Bibl.* 249 p. 439b17–26). We have the sphere of the fixed stars, seven planetary spheres, and one sphere for each of the four elements.

⁵⁸⁹ Presumably this is because of the shape of the character, Υ, which might be thought to suggest reaching forth with one's arms toward something that one lacks. Deuse notes a possible connection with Plato's account of philosophy as midway between wisdom and ignorance. The person who is *philosophos* at least knows enough to be troubled to extend his grasp toward that wisdom which he recognises he does not yet possess.

⁵⁹⁰ *** αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ κάτω ῥυεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρων. Diehl supposes that there is a lacuna at line 9, but Festugière wonders whether the text might not be complete and sensible as it stands. Deuse thinks that though the soul is certainly the subject, ἀμφοτέρων cannot depend on τὸ κάτω – apparently because he thinks that ἀμφοτέρων would have to cover both above and below. He supposes that ἀμφοτέρων rather depends on some verb of striving that has been swallowed up in the lacuna. The thought would be that when the soul remains above, it strives only for the incorporeal, but when it has descended it strives for both. Deuse's objection does not seem to me to be overpowering. The text – whether complete or incomplete – is certainly obscure.

⁵⁹¹ Why, you might wonder, are these letters spheres? With Theodore, one is never sure whether it is the graphic properties of the letters, their phonemes, or the associated numbers that ground such an association. I think in this case it must be shape. We know that Plato has the Demiurge bend the X of the World Soul stuff around into a sphere (*Tim.* 36b8). Since there are no obvious mathematico-geometrical connections between 600, 700 or spheres, it seems very likely to me that Theodore supposed that a bit more bending at the cosmic panel-beater's shop might yield a sphere from Ψ.

⁵⁹² Festugière supposes that this point depends on the fact that χ is an aspirated letter in Greek. So *pneuma* here would literally mean 'breath', but of course the assumption that this should be life-engendering depends on the associations of the *pneuma* in the ancient medical tradition, Aristotle and the Stoics.

because of these facts, he says that the soul is a certain intermediate essence between two intellects, proceeding and producing itself. These then are the things that must be accepted.

Through the last letter, η, [of the word ψυχή] one may see the soul's procession to its end point in the cube.⁵⁹³ But if it is also a dyad on account of the difference involved in its life, and if it is a triad because of the tripartite character of its essence, then it has in itself the *bêmiolios* [3:2] ratio. This it introduces into itself and through this introduction makes the triad over the dyad produce the hexad. When this connects with the indivisible and the tripartite, the harmony in the double series is established through these terms.⁵⁹⁴ And as 3 reverts upon itself, the 9 [is produced], but as the dyad has gone into itself dyadically, the 8 is wholly present. And from both of these the *epogdoos* ratio [of the tone, 9:8] is produced.

The production [of the soul] in terms of straight lines shows both its indivisible [character] and also that it is the same throughout; for [with respect to the first point] every part of a line is a line and [with respect to the second] all the ratios are present everywhere [in the soul]. But the cutting into two strips indicates that its form is dyadic. And while its wholeness is an indivisible image of the first intellect, the fact that one of these two – which Plato called the circle of the Same remains uncut – is an image of the second intellect. But the counting out into six strips is an image of the third remaining intellect.

Moreover, the number 8 has appeared as a result of the soul's dyad. As for the 7, when it is regarded in terms of units it represents the first form of life. But when it is taken in terms of tens it represents the intellectual [form of life] because of the circle.⁵⁹⁵ But in the hundreds place it represents in itself the third remaining distinctive property of the soul.⁵⁹⁶

⁵⁹³ In the Greek system for writing numbers, η stands for the number eight. This is the first of the cubed number – 2^3 – within the series of numbers within the soul. It also corresponds to the eight-sided cube shape of earth, the element that lies at the furthest innermost point of the extended cosmos.

⁵⁹⁴ It is perhaps possible that Theodore is able to produce the numbers that make up the geometric, arithmetic and harmonic ratios in the double and triple series through such mechanisms. See Deuse (1973), 87–90 for the details. Deuse thinks that in the sentence at hand, we should take the joining of the indivisible to the tripartite to be $1 + \frac{1}{3}$. When we connect this to the unit and the dyad (which he thinks is the object of συνάπτουσα in line 30) we get the sequence that starts out the harmonic ratio in the double series: 1, $\frac{4}{3}$, 2. Further complex manoeuvres are needed to yield the remaining elements $\frac{8}{3}$, 4, $\frac{16}{3}$, 8.

⁵⁹⁵ One writes the Greek number for 70 with omicron, which is of course a circle.

⁵⁹⁶ This is perhaps the spherical shape that Theodore connects with the letter Ψ. It may be that Proclus indicates that this is an association based on the graphic properties of the

The fact that it has a straightforward, natural conjunction with that which created it has established the [sphere of] the fixed stars, while the procession and indefiniteness have established the planetary [spheres]. The reversion, together with the procession, are responsible for the life that wanders inerrantly.

20 And since the shape of the soul is like a χ , its form is dyadic (for there is a cutting into two strips), the dyad multiplied by the number six, which is the first base of the χ (or the number 600), makes the number twelve, from which one may assume the twelve primary leading souls.⁵⁹⁷

25 These things, then, are a few examples drawn from the many ways in which Theodore philosophised about these matters, basing his interpretations on the letters and pronunciations.⁵⁹⁸

c. Iamblichus

30 But the divine Iamblichus⁵⁹⁹ knocks all such speculations (*theôria*) on the head in his ‘Refutations of Amelius and his school and of Numenius’ – for such is the title that he gives to the chapter – whether he is ascribing
278 Numenius’ opinions to them or perhaps finding that they have written similar things concerning these matters, I am unable to say. In any event, the divine Iamblichus first says that it was not requisite to make the soul the sum of number or the geometrical number because of the plurality

symbol for the number by his use of ‘in itself’. Equally, however, this could be taken to say how the distinctive property belongs to its subject: 277.15–16 ἡ δὲ ἐν ἑκατοντάσι τρίτον κατ’ αὐτὸ λοιπὸν τὸ ἴδιωμα τὸ ψυχικόν.

⁵⁹⁷ These may be the leading gods of the *Phaedrus*, or perhaps as Deuse suggests the souls that animate the twelve spheres of the heavens, cf. above 276.4.

⁵⁹⁸ On pronunciations specifically, see 274.20 and 276.12.

⁵⁹⁹ in *Tim.* II. 277.26–278.25 = Iamblichus, in *Tim.* fr. 57 (Dillon). In his commentary, Dillon considers the question of Proclus’ apparent ambivalence about the relation of Numenius to Amelius. Could Proclus not say because he didn’t have the books of both Numenius and Amelius to consider in relation to Iamblichus’ critique? Dillon thinks it distinctly possible that Proclus might have had access to them, but couldn’t be bothered to consult them, at least on this point, and relied on Iamblichus alone. He might have been motivated, however, to consult the works of Amelius on other points that he might have deemed more worthwhile. Moreover, there is the question of the relation of Numenius and Amelius to Theodore of Asine, for this extract from Iamblichus is used by Proclus as a criticism of the latter. One source says that Theodore was a student of Porphyry, not Amelius (Damasc. *V. Isid.* §166 = Theodore, Test. 1, Deuse), while another has him as the student of Iamblichus himself (Eunapius, *V. Soph.* V. 1.4–5 = Test. 3), a claim perhaps supported by Proclus himself (*Plat.Theol.* I. 6.16–19.24 = Test. 2). Perhaps Proclus thought that the criticisms in Iamblichus’ chapter of his commentary were relevant to Theodore because he was ‘full of the ideas of Numenius’ (in *Tim.* II. 274.10) or perhaps he thinks that he is covered by virtue of being among the school of Amelius (τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀμέλιον).

of its letters, for the word 'body' is composed of an equivalent number of letters, or even the term 'non-being' (*mê on*), so that non-being would thereby also be the sum of number. One might discover many different words composed from an equivalent number of letters – words that are shameful or maximally opposed to one another – and it would surely be incorrect to mix all of them together or treat them as kindred to one another.

Secondly, he says that it is not safe to attempt to prove anything from the shapes of the letters (*charaktêr*), for these are stipulated and their imprint was one way long ago, but is different now. To begin with, the letter Z, on the basis of which he has put his argument, did not have its opposing features entirely parallel, nor was its middle stroke slanted, but was rather at a right angle, as is obvious from ancient monuments.

In the third place, analysis [of the letters of the word 'soul'] into their bases and wasting time over this just moves the speculation from one number to another. For the number seven in the unit position ($\zeta = 7$), or in the tens ($\omicron = 70$), or in the hundreds ($\psi = 700$) is not the same thing. Since, therefore, it is the latter one that is in the name of the soul, why is it necessary to smuggle in (*pareiskyktein*) the argument on the bases of the numbers? For we could thus transform any number into any other by dividing, adding or multiplying.

These are his general points, but he also refutes each individual proposition as contrived and having nothing sound in it. Anyone who is keen to understand the weakness of the whole thing can easily take the book and read through the particular counter-argument to each of the things that have been written [by these misguided interpreters].

d. Aristotle

Having touched on these matters for the sake of history [in order that our account may be a complete one], the thing that follows naturally is to give the exegesis of the doctrines of Plato that are at hand. And since I know what has been written in the Aristotelian objections to the generation of the soul and the alleged solutions⁶⁰⁰ of Platonists in response to them, I don't think it is necessary to expend much effort [over them]. In any case, refutation would be totally superfluous,⁶⁰¹ for the soul is not a circle like an extended [circle is a circle]. Neither is it necessary when this supposition has been refuted to think that you have thereby accepted the theory of Plato. For this reason, it seems to me that it is surely

⁶⁰⁰ τὰς τῶν Πλατωνικῶν πρὸς αὐτὰς ἐπειρηγεμένας λύσεις, cf. Dillon and Morrow's translation of τῶν ἐπειρηγεμένων ἀτόπων at *in Parm.* 872.33.

⁶⁰¹ Reading πάντη for πάντη at 278.31.

acceptable to pass over these matters, for I know that an investigation of them has been undertaken in the book I published specifically on this, *An Examination of Aristotle's Objections to the Timaeus*.⁶⁰² In it I have dealt
5 with these issues at length and shown that magnitude is not correctly ascribed in the case of the soul according to the *Timaeus*. As a result of this, I also show that it is no more possible that the soul should cognise the indivisible intelligibles by means of divisible magnitude than that one should make the indivisible fit over the top of the divisible.⁶⁰³ In
10 addition I show that the movements of the heaven are not identical to the movements of the soul, but rather, according to the teachings of the *Timaeus*, the former have been made to exist *as a result of* the latter. Neither is it impossible that the soul should often cognise the same object by means of the same thing, but it is even necessary in the case of discursive thought – if it is indeed the case both that the intelligibles have been limited and also that cognition takes place by means of a circle. So therefore it seems to me that these matters can be set aside
15 at present because I have dealt with them at greater length in the book just mentioned. Let us turn to the next passage of Plato, sticking to the precise words of the philosopher which seem to me to indicate what Plato transmits concerning these things.

VII. The activities of the soul

A. Containing the material cosmos: Tim. 36d8–e1

When the entire psychic composite had come about in accordance with the intellect (*kata noun*) of the one who created it, after this he framed all
20 that is corporeal inside of it. (Tim. 36d8–e1)

The first chapter of the discourse on the soul, as we said earlier (125.12) concerns the nature of its existence (*hyparxis*), while the second chapter is concerned with its harmony. The third chapter deals with the shape, and the fourth with the soul's powers. The fifth chapter deals with its
25 activities. In all the other subjects, therefore, the philosopher has taught us most completely, but this final chapter was about the activities of the soul which he surely appends in these words. But since the form

⁶⁰² See in Tim. I. 404.20 and Philoponus, *Contra Proclum* 31.10. This work is lost to us, but Simplicius probably quotes from portions of it that deal with the elements in his *De Caelo* commentary. See Siorvanes (1996).

⁶⁰³ καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀμερὲς ἐφαρμόσαι τῷ μεριστῷ δυνατόν. Cf. II. 287.1–3: πᾶσα γνώσις εἶναι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστροφή πρὸς τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ οἰκείωσις καὶ ἐφάρμοσις πρὸς αὐτό. The idea is that knowledge is a kind of 'fitting over' or 'adjustment' between the knower and the thing known. This clearly cannot happen when the two are too different.

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of activities in the soul is two-fold – I mean those pertain to knowing (*gnôstikos*) and those that are to do with motion (*kinêtikos*) – he will give one account that is specific to the motive powers and another one that is specific to the cognitive powers. So he will convey to us both how it moves other things by moving itself, and also how, in knowing itself, it knows the things that are prior to it and also those that are posterior to it. Such, therefore, is the purpose (*skopos*) of the words before us.

He did not, however, present us with any teaching about a plurality of souls in what has gone before, as some would have it, who say that the first part concerning the soul's essence dealt with what they call the unrelated (*aschetos*) soul, while the chapter on harmony dealt with what they call the related soul (*tên en schesei*), and the chapter on shape dealt with the soul that is coordinated with the body (*tên en katataxei*).⁶⁰⁴ Nor [does this part of the *Timaeus* deal with a multitude of souls in another sense], as others have written, saying that it introduces a single soul and seven hypercosmic souls (II. 273.26–33). That nothing like this is the case has, I think, been made sufficiently clear through what Timaeus says. For the soul that has been created by the Father in accordance with his intellect, he conjoins to the universe, arranging that which is corporeal within it. This is also evident from the arrangement of the whole thing, since the entire dialogue is about the cosmos and not about the production of hypercosmic beings.

Look too at the way that Timaeus adds each word with precision. For the words **in accord with intellect** (*kata noun*)⁶⁰⁵ makes clear both that Intellect is the paradigm of the universe (for the intelligible all-perfect Living Being was an intellect, in accordance with which both the World

⁶⁰⁴ Festugière supposed that Theodore of Asine is alluded to here, and Deuse has included this as testimonia 25 in his collection. Festugière calls attention to the similarities with II. 142.14 above and III. 154.19 that follows. But it seems to me that *in Remp.* II. 310.16–311.20 and II. 335.7 are relevant too. There Proclus gives his account of how human souls may be said to “enter” animal bodies in reincarnation, which he says is indebted to Theodore (310.5). Some animal bodies are animated by human souls, and when this happens the souls are merely *en schesei* to the animal's life. But other animal bodies are animated by souls that will never pass into a human body (cf. *Phdr.* 249b5). These souls are *en katataxei* with these bodies. So in this context, the soul that is purported to be the subject of the chapter on shape is one that is more closely associated with the World Body and therefore, as Festugière has it, ‘à un rang dégradé’.

⁶⁰⁵ In the lemma from Plato (ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν τῷ συνιστάντι πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις ἐγγένητο) *kata noun* doubtless means something like ‘when the Creator was satisfied with the psychic composite’; cf. *Rep.* II, 358b3, III, 399b7; *Symp.* 193c8; *Phlb.* 26c3. Proclus, however, is anxious to find a deeper meaning behind this common way of speaking. As Festugière notes, he forces the same meaning on the casual *kata noun* at *Tim.* 17c4 (*in Tim.* I. 32.22). The occurrence of the phrase at *Tim.* 26d7 passes without comment since Proclus abridges his quotation of the lemma (I. 196.1–2).

itself and the World Soul were established),⁶⁰⁶ and also that nothing
 20 pointless has been made; nothing more and nothing less than what is
 required for all the things that form essential parts (*symplērôtikos*) of the
 psychic essence [to come about] and for the soul's essence to receive
 the entire will of the Demiurge. For while enmattered things divide the
 25 indivisible Form thanks to their matter and they receive the whole as
 partial and the unextended as extended, the soul, on the other hand, has
 received entire the Demiurgic creation, just as the Demiurge willed it.

The words **the one who creates it** [makes it clear] that the activity
 of creation⁶⁰⁷ is universal, for [the use of the aorist tense in] 'the one
 who created it' implies completion, while [the use of the present tense in]
 'the one who creates it' implies that the activities are always present
 simultaneously.

The words **the entire psychic composite** indicate that there is nothing
 30 that falls outside the Demiurgic craft and that the entire procession
 281 of the soul has been controlled by the Form and power of the Demiurge.

The words **after this** must not be taken in a temporal sense, but
 instead should be taken as indicative of order. For the separable life of
 the soul is one thing, but the life that it has in association with the body
 is something that is secondary to this, and in the case of divine essence
 what is more complete is prior to that which is less so.

5 The words **inside of it** show that the body is connate with the soul and
 an offspring of it. For if the body proceeds *within* the soul, then the soul
 is the lord over the *hypostasis* of the body and includes its entire essence
 and cooperates with the Demiurge in the arrangement of the body. The
 World Soul is not like the case of partial souls which receive bodies that
 10 have been made by others, and because of this sometimes rule over these
 bodies, but at other times are unable to rule over their own instruments.
 When the World Soul proceeds, she produces together with the Father
 her own dwelling, or more accurately, her own *vehicle*.⁶⁰⁸ For this reason,

⁶⁰⁶ Repunctuating with Festugière so as to remove Diehl's full stop after the parenthetical remark and replace it with a comma. The τε at line 17 requires that the καὶ at line 20 be coordinate with it, not part of a new sentence.

⁶⁰⁷ τὸ δὲ τῷ συνιστάντι τὴν καθόλου αὐτῆς ἐνέργειαν. Festugière is surely right to suppose that the feminine pronoun must refer to τὴν δημιουργικὴν . . . ποίησιν in line 26. In what follows, Proclus contrasts the present participle τῷ συνιστάντι that we find in Plato's text with the aorist τῷ συστάντι that would not have so clearly indicated the universal or whole character of the Demiurge's creative activity. We have no manuscript tradition that records such a variation, so perhaps Proclus is merely making the point that Plato has chosen his words carefully (cf. σύν ἀκριβείᾳ in line 16) – not correcting another reading that was current.

⁶⁰⁸ For Proclus' views on the vehicle of the soul or 'astral body' see, *ET* 196, 205, 207–10 and in *Tim.* III. 236.31 ff.; 297.16 ff., as well as Dodds (1963), Appendix II. The World Soul's first and primary body is the space in which the cosmos exists. This

the World Soul rules over the universe perpetually and is active without any hassles, since everything that creates in accordance with its essence makes whatever it makes in a relaxed way.⁶⁰⁹

The word **framed** makes clear, on the one hand, the Demiurgic creation which proceeds through solids and things that have resistance, but, on the other hand, also makes clear the second-hand (*episkeuastês*) formation and endowing it with properties that the sensibles get from some external source. He practically conveys the image of him [sc. the Demiurge] using the tools of Hephaestus by means of which he forges the whole heaven – painting all things by means of the Forms, turning the things with extension on a lathe and configuring each of the objects with the Form that is appropriate to it. Now, since there are three stages in the creation that concerns the universe – the first that by virtue of which it has been produced as a whole of wholes that is composed from the elements and bound by proportion; the second that by which it has been arranged from whole spheres (for it is impossible for it not to be divided into spheres since it is composed from the elements); and the third which involves filling it up with the particular kinds of living beings: those that are celestial, those that dwell in the air, the aquatic ones, and the terrestrial ones⁶¹⁰ – in the words [in this lemma Plato] has revealed to us the middle [stage in creation]. For since the framer framed everything corporeal within the soul, and the soul has been divided into circles, obviously he framed the corporeal so that it was divided into spheres. The spheres are presumably images of the circles and are formed from the shapes of the psychic circles inside which **all that is corporeal** is said to be framed – [a fact] by which it is also made clear that the eight circles encompass within themselves the sublunary region, if indeed the Demiurge has placed everything corporeal within them. For if this were not so, then he would surely have said that ‘he framed *the entire heaven* within them [i.e. the psychic circles]’, but not that ‘he framed *all that is corporeal*’. Therefore everything below the heaven is in these circles, either in so far as these have been divided along with the heaven or else in as much as they have been included within the circle of the Moon, for

is an ‘immaterial body’ like light. See see Siorvanes (1996), 247–56; Schrenk (1989); Schrenk (1994); Sorabji (1988), 116–24.

⁶⁰⁹ ἀπραγμόνως ἐνεργεῖ... ἃ ποιεῖ μετὰ ῥασιτώνης ποιεῖ. A sign of the World Soul’s divinity is the ease with which it creates, cf. *in Parm.* 1037.36–1038.3.

⁶¹⁰ The first two stages correspond to the third and fourth gifts of the Demiurge (*in Tim.* II. 5.21–3). The connection between its division into spheres and its composition from the four elements is not entirely clear. It seems likely to me that Proclus adverts to the fact that the four elements – corresponding to the regular solids – may all be inscribed in the sphere (*in Tim.* II. 76.9–11). The third stage seems to skip over several of the other gifts and go straight to the tenth (II. 5.29–31).

the Theologians also call the Moon ‘an Earth’⁶¹¹ due to the connection between it and the Earth. In any event, it is common to both of them to obscure the light.

And conjoining them middle to middle, he harmonised them in relation to one another. (*Tim.* 36e1)

15 Since Porphyry⁶¹² interpreted the **middle** of the soul in terms of the growth principle (*to phytikon*), [his reading of this lemma] attempts to harmonise together this growth principle with the middle of the universe, in spite of the fact that Plato’s words here in no way pertain to the growth principle, nor has he even used the word up to this point. Surely if one wishes to interpret this phrase more naturally, it is necessary to say the following: that he places the middle of the cosmos within the soul since
20 the soul itself has the position (*taxis*) of an intermediate between intellect and body. Moreover, the cosmos is not within the soul *simpliciter*, but rather it is in the very middle of the soul since he says that the Demiurge **conjoins** the soul’s very **middle to the middle** [of the other]. That this is the thought [behind the words] is evident from what follows [where he says] ‘the soul was interwoven from the middle on out in every direction to the outermost edge of the heaven’ (36e2). Accordingly we should
25 assume from this that *of course* everything corporeal has been animated from every direction, and simultaneously that the entire soul everywhere transcends the body. And *of course* it happens this way in order that it may imitate the universal (*holos*) Demiurge who both transcends the wholes and is present to all things. It also happens because the fact that the corporeal is the middle of the soul makes the animation of it stretched through it in all directions simultaneously. For if the limits [rather than the middle] of the universe were joined to the middle of the soul, then some things would be closer to the soul and other things would be further
30 from it. But it is necessary for all things to remain within it – rooted, as it were, and suffused with the life that results from it. That which is corporeal was fitted to the soul’s middle, and at the same time this middle has been made to transcend all things and to be at an equal distance from all of them. For if some of the [corporeal] things are at a greater or lesser distance from the soul, we will give it a relation to secondary existents.
283 Therefore each of these statements is true: that the corporeal is the middle, and also that a fitting together with the psychic middle has been brought about.

⁶¹¹ Cf. *in Tim.* II. 48.17 where this idea is assigned to the Pythagoreans and Orphics. Cf. III. 172.20 = *Orph. fr.* 93 (Kern).

⁶¹² *in Tim.* II. 282.15–18 = Porphyry, *in Tim.* fr. 73 (Sodano).

Furthermore, the word **conjoin** reveals the Demiurgic unification and the very bond on account of which the universal is everlasting. But the words **harmonised them in relation to one another** reveals the harmonious community (*homilia*) of the body with the soul, wherein the latter minds its own business and the former keeps to its appropriate rank, neither diverting nor pulling down the intellection of the [soul's] divine essence. This, after all, is the harmonious form of association (*koinônia*). But if there is an association between the better and the worse where the better is distracted from its own perfection or the worse makes a noisy intrusion upon the activities of the better partner, then such an association is unharmonious and discordant.⁶¹³ Therefore the soul has been established in accordance with harmonious ratios, and that which is corporeal has come to be an object of love itself through proportion, and the whole has been put together harmoniously. What bonds could appear to be more indestructible, more everlasting, or more divine than these? None; unless someone might say that the will itself of the one who bound it [is superior to these, this will] being something separate from the things that have been bound.

B. Animating the cosmos: Tim. 36e2–5

The soul was interwoven from the middle on out in every direction to the outermost edge of the heaven, and covered it from outside in a circle. Revolving within itself, it initiated a divine origin of a life unceasing and filled with wisdom throughout all time. (*Tim.* 36e2–5)

1. General interpretation

The mode of animation through reversion, as we said earlier,⁶¹⁴ is initiated from below and proceeds toward the things above, and goes from the outermost things (*ta eschata*) up to where it stops with the highest forms of things – which is surely just the thing that Plato has here delivered to us. For when the soul has proceeded from above down to the very last nook and cranny of earth, and all things have been illuminated with the light of life, then the cosmos reverts upon the soul. Starting from the last point it reached, the cosmos is animated through both its middle and

⁶¹³ For the ‘noisy intrusion’ of the lesser partner (the body) in the association between body and soul in our own case, see *in Tim.* III. 349.30–350.5.

⁶¹⁴ Diehl supposes that Proclus here refers back to 244.5 ff. Festugière suggests that this, in turn, takes us back to 106.30. In both cases, we have the soul’s procession being matched with a reversion – a process that describes a circle. Hence the connection with our present text: the soul’s “movement” from the centre to the limits of the World’s Body will give rise to a circle of reversion: κύκλω τε αὐτὸν ἔξωθεν περικαλύψασα.

entire extension until it again enjoys from an external vantage point⁶¹⁵ the soul's intellectual illumination. It is because of this that the soul is said to occupy the middle of the universe, in as much as its own powers have been placed in the latter and it is a symbol of the soul's appropriate presence. It has been said to be stretched to the outermost heaven in as much as it makes the universe similarly enlivened everywhere. It covers the universe in as much as it has its powers in a way that transcends extended particular things, all but setting before the reader the aegis of Athena:

from which are hung a hundred tassels all of gold. (*Iliad* 2.448)

On account of this it also surrounds the world from outside. And if it is necessary to tell the truth, through these words Plato silences those critics who suppose that the shape of the soul is really circular or that it is extended in this manner. For how would a circle admit of being **interwoven** throughout a body and stretched out equally so as to **cover** it externally while at the same time being positioned so as to coincide with its entire extension? This, therefore, makes it clear from whence one may show the falsity of the mental images (*phantasia*) of those who make such assumptions.

In addition to this, it is necessary to consider that which we said earlier (250.20–9) – how both the ‘interweaving’ and the phrase ‘**covered it from outside in a circle**’ render the soul similar to the intellectual form of life which was earlier said to have ‘enfolded’ (36c3) its two circles, for as the latter enfolded the soul, so too the soul enfolds the heavens.

In addition to both of these [terms], it is also necessary to conceive in what way it is made to resemble those gods to whom the *Parmenides* connected Similarity and Dissimilarity.⁶¹⁶ The ‘interweaving’ indicates the soul's presence in the cosmos through similarity, for all association of essences, powers and activities has been brought about through Sameness. On the other hand, since ‘covering’ indicates going beyond, the fact that the soul *covers* the universe illustrates how the soul is

⁶¹⁵ ἔτι ἔξωθεν ἀπολαύει τῆς νοερᾶς ἐλλάμψεως τῆς ψυχῆς. Compare the souls in the *Phaedrus* taking up a vantage point on the outside of the vault of heaven: *Phdr.* 247b7–c2 ἔξω πορευθεῖσαι ἔστησαν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νώτῳ, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιάγει ἡ περιφορά, αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

⁶¹⁶ I.e. Sameness and Difference; cf. *Plat. Theol.* II. 70.19–23: τοῦτο τοῖνυν δι’ ὁμοιότητος μὲν ὁ Παρμενίδης καὶ ἀνομοιότητος ἀπὸ τῆς τὸ πέρας συγκλειούσης τῶν νοερῶν μονάδων θεότητος προάγει· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον πεπονθὸς ἐστὶ τὸ ταῦτόν ὥσπερ δὴ τὸ ἀνόμοιον πεπονθὸς τὸ ἕτερον.

incommensurable (*asymmetros*) with it and so unparticipated⁶¹⁷ thanks 5
to its incommensurability, for presumably what is incommensurable is
dissimilar to that with which it is incommensurable. Or perhaps both
[terms] have [a connection] with both [Similarity and Dissimilarity]. For
to be *interwoven* [pertains] to what is in one way similar, but in another
way dissimilar; while *covering over* simultaneously indicates by its inseparability 10
the intellectual [character] of the envelopment which surely
belongs to the universe in a secondary way; for through this envelopment
the universe imitates intellect, having first become an image of
intellect. Therefore it is present to all things in a manner that is separable,
and it illuminates all of them without reverting upon the things
illuminated nor admitting of a relation or position among them. These 15
things [that have been illuminated] are alien to the World Soul, because
surely the body is subordinate to the soul and not the soul to the body,
and by the soul's infinite power it includes the cosmos [within itself,
encompassing] all extension by its lack of extension, all that is divisible
by means of its indivisibility, and what is composite in its simplicity. For
this reason the creation of the body also depends upon the genesis of the 20
soul and not the other way around. The essence of the soul therefore
proceeds first in so far as it is more akin to intellect, and the body is
dependent upon the soul in as much as it results from this cause.

2. *Objections and replies*

What about this? Will we forbear to say that there is some further such
interweaving, as do those who talk about soul's partial powers, actualities 25
(*entelecheia*) and inseparable lives being present with the body?⁶¹⁸
Certainly not. All such distribution (*dianomê*) [of the soul's powers] is secondary
to the single soul, for in us too the actuality animates the body
in one way, while the separable [soul] does so in a different way. While
the one has been divided in relation to those things which are extended,

⁶¹⁷ This may be Iamblichus' hypercosmic soul or perhaps the more modest suggestion of Syrianus that the World Soul has some unparticipated *aspect* (*ti*, 105.30–1) can play this role.

⁶¹⁸ Presumably Proclus has in mind here Peripatetics (like us!) who take *De An.* I.1, 412b10 to mean just what it says: the soul is the actuality of the body in such a manner that it is no more separable from the body than the shape from the wax. Plotinus does not name Aristotle in his criticisms of the view that the soul is the entelechy of the body (IV.7.85). The settled Neoplatonic exegesis of Aristotle's account of the soul as entelechy makes him compatible with Plato. The soul is inseparable, not in the sense that it is *dependent* upon the body, but in the sense that it is *such as to determine or define* the body. Cf. Simplicius (?) in *De An.* 92.20–1: οὐχ ὥς οὐσιoustόμενοι ἐν αὐτοῖς (οὐσίαι γὰρ πρῶτα τὰ εἶδη) ἀλλ' ὥς σωμάτων ὀριστικοὶ καὶ ταύτῃ ἀχώριστοι.

the other has been established within itself and is itself present every-
 30 where in an indivisible manner and sustains the divisible life by its own
 indivisible powers. But if it is necessary to speak about the World Soul
 286 in a manner that is worthy [of the subject], the interweaving of the body
 in relation to the soul is a unification without mixture and an association
 and sustaining of life – an enlivening process that both proceeds from
 the Demiurge and reverts once again upon him. For just as we should
 not interpret the covering over [of the World's body by the World Soul]
 as involving dimension or place, but rather as indicating that the soul
 everywhere transcends the body (and by the fact of its transcendence
 5 uniformly encompasses the body), so too we surely ought not go too
 far in interpreting the 'interweaving'. Instead we ought to think that the
 animation extends through everything and the unification of all things in
 relation to the soul is made clear in this phrase. For in filling all things it is
 full of itself, and connecting all things it connects itself in its purity prior
 10 to the other things, and reverting the cosmos upon itself it is presumably
 to an even greater extent reverted upon itself.⁶¹⁹ It is doubtless for this
 reason that Timaeus added that it is **revolving within itself** in order to
 contrast the soul's rotation with the rotation of the body which does not
 take place *in itself* but rather in the *place* which the universe occupies.
 15 The one rotates in a spatial manner (*topikôs*), while the soul rotates in the
 manner of life and intellect (*zôtikôs kai noerôs*), thinking itself and discover-
 ing itself while being all things. For it is a full set (*plêrôma*) of wholes,
 possessing images of all the things which, when they are contemplated,
 it is said to revolve within itself. While the term 'revolve' indicates that
 it is simultaneously intellectual and returns to the same point, the terms
 20 'itself in itself' indicates the distinctive property of self-motion, for while
 the universe itself also rotates, it is nonetheless moved by another.

In these facts surely we have the solution that we sought for our-
 selves earlier. Looking at the entire generation of the soul, we sought
 to know where Plato has provided the distinctively cognitive property

⁶¹⁹ The text here is puzzling: καὶ γὰρ πάντα πληροῦσα ἑαυτῆς ἐστὶ καὶ πάντα συνέχουσα
 πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἑαυτὴν ἐν τῇ καθαρότητι συνέχει καὶ τὸν κόσμον εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστρέφουσα
 πολλῶν δὴ ποιοῦν μᾶλλον αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐπέστραπται. Diehl suggests either dropping
 ἐστὶ or adding καὶ prior to πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων. Festugière finds no difficulty in the text as
 it stands and translates 'Car l'Âme, tout en remplissant tout, continue de s'appartenir à
 elle-même, tout en contenant tout, avant le reste se contient d'abord elle-même dans
 la pureté de son être, tout en retournant le Monde vers elle-même, s'est retournée
 bien plus encore, je présume, elle-même vers elle-même.' I assume that 'continue de
 s'appartenir à elle-même' translates the bare ἑαυτῆς ἐστὶ, but this seems to me to be
 stretching things a bit. Why not grasp the nettle and either supply a finite verb parallel
 to συνέχει and ἐπέστραπται while deleting ἐστὶ or, better, supply a suitable adjective
 for the copula? I suggest καὶ γὰρ πάντα πληροῦσα πλήρης ἑαυτῆς ἐστὶ – a case of
 haplography.

[of the soul], in just the same way in which he provided us with what is distinctively substantial or life-engendering about it – the first through the triple mixture [of Being, Sameness and Difference], the second in its movement in the same [place around the same point]. We said earlier (244.17) that when the soul reverts upon itself through being revolved in a circle, it has the property of knowing itself. Now this fact has been shown more clearly in what is said here, for Plato has attempted to describe *how* the soul knows all things, when he said it to be **rotated in itself and to have begun a life that is intellectual and filled with wisdom**. From this fact it is clear that its reversion upon itself is knowledge of itself and of all the things in it, as well as those things that come before it and those that result from it. It seems, then, that all knowledge is nothing other than reversion upon what is known and making it one's own (*oikeiôsis*) or being adjusted (*epharmosis*) to it.⁶²⁰ Because of this, truth is also the adjustment of the one who knows in relation to the thing that is known.⁶²¹ But since reversion is two-fold – being in one sense a reversion upon the Good, but in another sense a reversion upon Being – the life-engendering reversion of all things comes to be in relation to the Good, while the cognitive reversion takes place in relation to Being.⁶²² It is because of this that when the one conversion has been achieved it is said to possess the Good, but when the other has been achieved it is said to possess Being, (each of these being the object of the reversion in question). And to arrive at the truth (*to alêtheuein*) is the apprehension of Being, whether it be in the same thing which grasps it, or in what is prior to it, or in what comes after it. So this fact has come to be clear to us as a result of these things, just as I said it would (286.22).

3. *The origin of the cosmos' divine life*

Now, since in the case of the souls of partial living things, reason (*logos*) is at one time active and reverts upon itself in an intellectual manner, but not immediately from the first moment of its birth (for the procession in its case is from what is imperfect to what is perfect and recollection takes place after forgetting) – it is surely because of this that he said that the

⁶²⁰ Proclus utilises the premise that knowledge involves the reversion of the knower upon the object of knowledge, above at 205.14–15.

⁶²¹ Either Proclus means 'to arrive at truth' (cf. *to alêtheuein* five lines below) by the word 'truth' here, or the catalogue of the senses of the word 'true' at *in Crat.* §36.7–17 is incomplete.

⁶²² This division of labour between the objects of reversion makes sense if we think of reversion upon the Good in terms of final causation. All living things aim at the good and are motivated to act through their reversion upon it. Hence we may think of the reversion upon this object as engendering life. Cf. *ET* 144.7–9.

soul **initiated a divine origin**, starting off from on high and from the most primary of its own activities. The soul has, on the one hand, separate divine activities, but on the other hand it also has activities that serve as the origins of motion of the universe, and the more perfect activities are always prior to those that are secondary. Having proceeded from the Demiurge and having its own activity initiated from more divine activities, it gets started and goes on to activate the secondary ones because of these, i.e. both the intellectual and doxastic activities. The starting point itself is entirely divine, whereas the soul that has its impetus from what is imperfect is clearly enmattered. Among the gods those that are more perfect are prior to those that are less so, but with things that are enmattered it is the other way around, for Becoming is originated from what is imperfect and proceeds toward that which is perfect. Therefore the human soul, if it too is at some time active in a manner that is divine, winds up with this activity, having started off by being active in the mode of correct opinion and afterwards moving on to being active in the scientific manner, and then divinely – having awakened its own One (*to beautês hen*) which is superior to the intellect in it. But a divine soul possesses this activity in the first instance, and because of this activity then activates in all of its own more secondary cognitive powers, and a divine soul always engages in the subordinate powers in virtue of the superior ones. Therefore there is an even greater degree of priority when the World Soul initiates the beginning of its life filled with wisdom since it has been activated first in itself,⁶²³ and then in terms of its capacity for discursive thought, this [capacity for discursive thought] having been set in motion and made divine in form (*theoeidês*) from above.

The **unceasing** character of its activities follows from this, for that which is generated and that which projects its divine activities into time is naturally destined to go from the imperfect toward the perfect. On the other hand, that which has been initiated from those activities that are more perfect and divine neither ceases from its activity at some time, nor is it among those things that have been established in time. If, therefore, the World Soul has made a divine beginning of its activity, it is active unceasingly and always in the same manner, for that which receives its own complete status temporally begins from an incomplete or imperfect beginning and not from a divine one.

⁶²³ κατ' αὐτὸ ἐνεργήσασα πρῶτον: Festugière supposes that this is meant to suggest a reference to the One in us and so translates: 'A bien plus forte raison donc l'Âme du Tout a-t-elle "commencé d'un commencement divin" sa vie d'intelligence puisqu'elle a agi d'abord selon "l'un" ...'. This is certainly possible, but I have treated *kat' auto* more modestly.

Moreover, it follows from this that the life of a divine soul is one filled with wisdom, for if its life is unceasing, it is a life that is defined in terms of intellect and wisdom. For we must accept one of three possibilities. Either its life is always filled with wisdom, or else it is always lacking in wisdom (something that it is not lawful to say),⁶²⁴ or else it is sometimes wise and sometimes ignorant. But surely by the term ‘unceasing’ < . . . >.⁶²⁵ Therefore the remaining alternative is that there is a life of wisdom in the case of the divine soul. There also exists another manner in which the term ‘**filled with wisdom**’ is fitting for the soul – in as much as it participates in the wisdom divine – while the term ‘**life**’ (*bios*) is fitting in as much as it articulates the partless life (*zôê*) of Intellect and in so far as among its activities there is a kind of continuation (*paratasis*) and among its motions there is a transition from one thing to another.⁶²⁶ The term ‘life’ (*bios*) is used most appropriately in the case of soul. If one were sometimes to use it in relation to intellect, as for instance in the *Philebus* (21d–e) where one thing is said about the ‘life of intellect’ and something else about the ‘life of pleasure’, this signifies the defining properties of life. For the word ‘life’ makes these two things clear: both the distinctive form of each life and also the evolution of the choice (*anelixis tês haireseôs*) from which it proceeds. Therefore the term is strictly used in reference to souls, for the evolution [takes place] in them. But when the term ‘life’ is used in connection with ‘intellect’ this makes clear the distinctive form of the life to us.

4. Further objections and replies

But someone might say that all these things belong to *all* divine souls – I mean the fact of initiating a divine origin, the unceasing activity, and the life filled with wisdom. In what way, then, is the World Soul superior to the others? Now surely Plato has himself anticipated this when he added the words **throughout all time**. For while all souls are active in an intermittent manner (*metabatikôs*) and have their cycles, some longer and some shorter, only the World Soul receives into its care the most

⁶²⁴ Perhaps an allusion to *Philebus* 28e where Socrates and Protarchus deem the suggestion that the universe is not directed by νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τινα to be impious.

⁶²⁵ Diehl marks a lacuna at 288.19.

⁶²⁶ Proclus sees a distinction between a ‘way of life’ (*bios*) and the life of intellect. The former connotes a narrative structure that the latter lacks. There is a prima facie tension between the attribution of a ‘way of life’ to the World Soul here and the claim above (288.11) that this soul is unceasingly active ‘always in the same manner’. Perhaps Proclus thinks that the earlier claim is true of the hypercosmic ‘aspect’ of the World Soul that Syrianus offers as an alternative to Iamblichus’ separate hypercosmic soul (*in Tim.* II. 105.30).

primary and single temporal extension and the first and whole measure
 [of time] which includes all the other cycles.⁶²⁷ It is just like in the case
 10 of divine bodies where some have different cycles from others, but all of
 them have been antecedently comprehended in the cycle of the generated
 divinity. This contains many cycles in which Saturn returns to the same
 point, and many cycles of the Sun and Moon, and every time exists in the
 single cycle of the universe. In the same way other divine souls return to
 15 the same point in times that are more partial [than the Great Year]. (For
 it is entirely necessary that they come back to the same point, since the
 intelligible plane has been limited.⁶²⁸ But the return to the same point
 is different in different cases, some sooner and some later, depending
 upon whether the object which the soul intelligises is greater or lesser.)
 20 But the World Soul possesses as its measure the *whole* extent of time and
 its entire unfolding – an extension than which there can be no greater,
 unless it be greater by repeating again and again, for it is thus that time
 is unlimited.⁶²⁹ Now since the World Soul is the first of those temporal
 things that think [their objects] one at a time (*kath' hen noousôn*),⁶³⁰ it
 is perhaps necessary that it receive the entire measure [of time], just as
 25 in the case of other Forms where it is necessary that things that have
 participated in them in the primary manner receive their Form in its
 entirety. Therefore it is necessary that the World Soul alone is active in
 relation to the whole of time while other souls are active in relation to
 some part of the whole of time – specifically the portion of time it takes
 for them to complete their cycle. Therefore hypercosmic souls, if indeed
 there are such things, and if they cognise discursively – for every soul

⁶²⁷ For temporal extension (*diastasis tou chronou*), see III. 23.10. The apokatastatic period of the World Soul is the Great Year (see above on 248.18). Hence this soul's period includes the periods assigned to all other encosmic divine souls. Cf. *ET* 200.

⁶²⁸ The visible cosmos is an image of the intelligible paradigm, so it must replicate to the extent that this is possible the features of that upon which it is modelled. The fact that the realm of intelligibles is limited is manifested in the Great Year which forms a sort of boundary for time.

⁶²⁹ This suggests a version of the Stoic doctrine of eternal recurrence according to which one and the same time must be repeated through each Great Year. If this were not so, how could Proclus describe it as the greatest possible temporal extension? However Proclus suggests a rather different sense in which time is unlimited (as well as limited) in *Plat. Theol.* III. 59.22–6. There time is unlimited in the sense that it is continuous (and so infinitely divisible?). However it is limited by the now, since this is a limit between past and future.

⁶³⁰ Deleting the first occurrence of εἶδος in line 24. Its sense is not clear and it is not repeated again when this phrase is invoked a second time at 290.4. Perhaps it is the result of diplography from below: ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη μετέχουσα χρόνου τῶν καθ' ἐν νοουσῶν [εἶδος] ἡ τοῦ παντός ἐστι, δεῖ δὴπου καὶ ὅλον αὐτὴν ὑποδέχεσθαι τὸ μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰδῶν τὰ πρῶτως αὐτῶν μετασχόντα ὅλον αὐτῶν καταδέχεται τὸ εἶδος.

cognises in this manner, and in virtue of this there is a difference between soul and intellect – nonetheless these hypercosmic souls produce for themselves the grasp (*antilêpsis*) of the objects of intellection (*nooumenon*) many at a time (*kata pleiô*), for it is necessary for such souls to think *a plurality* of things simultaneously since they are closer to an intellect that thinks *all* things simultaneously.⁶³¹ But the World Soul is the first of those that think things one at a time, which is exactly what has made it encosmic. In any case, it is by this that all encosmic souls have been set apart from hypercosmic ones. But though it thinks things one at a time, it nonetheless has its return to the same point in terms of the entire time that includes the cycle of the generated divinity. While it is inferior to the hypercosmic gods in virtue of this fact, it is thanks to this that it is superior to all encosmic souls. All [the encosmic souls] have their return to the same point in *part* of the one [stretch of time] <and not> in all the time there is, in as much as the articulation [of their mental activity] is more partial. But the intellectual [World Soul], since it cognises and goes all round the one intelligible cosmos, helps to bring about its own cycle in all the time there is.⁶³² After all, it is necessary that,

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⁶³¹ This seems to be a good objection to hypercosmic souls. The argument is that hypercosmic souls would have to be an intermediate between the ‘all at once’ cognition of Intellect and the ‘one thing at a time’ discursive thinking of the World Soul. This would have to be a kind of thinking in which such hypercosmic souls think a plurality of objects of thought – but not the totality! – at the same time. However, this would seem to make such hypercosmic souls *inferior* to the World Soul in a peculiar way. Both the World Soul and Intellect have a unified object of cognition. The latter thinks as one that which is a unified one-many, viz. the totality of Forms. The former thinks one thing at a time. By thinking many things that do not form a unity in the way in which the realm of intelligibles does, the hypercosmic soul would have an activity that is less unified than that of the things on either side of it. Thus when Proclus says: αἱ μὲν οὖν ὑπερκόσμοιοι ψυχαί, εἴ τινες ἄρα εἰσὶν, etc., I think that what follows is meant to cast doubt on the supposition that there are such things. This objection, I believe, is Syrianus’.

⁶³² It seems that there is some difficulty here with the text. Festugière reads πᾶσαι γὰρ ἐν μέρει <τὰ> τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ τὰς ἀποκαταστάσεις ἔχουσιν, ἅτε καὶ μερικώτερα ἀνελίττουςαι, ἡ δὲ νοερά <τὰ> τοῦ ἐνὸς νοητοῦ κόσμου νοοῦσα καὶ ἐκπεριοῦσα τῷ ὅλῳ χρόνῳ συμπεραίνει τὴν ἑαυτῆς περίοδον since he accepts Kroll’s supplement following νοερά and supposes that we should understand the plural feminine participle νοοῦσαι to parallel the singular feminine νοοῦσα. The result is: ‘Car toutes les âmes qui, dans l’Univers, intelligent l’objet une partie par partie ont leur retour au même point dans le cours du temps, dans la mesure où elles développent mentalement des objets plus partiels, mais l’Âme intellectuelle qui intelliige cette unité qu’est le Monde Intelligible et qui en fait tout le tour accomplit sa révolution simultanément avec la totalité du temps.’ I have followed Diehl’s suggestion that we expect a ‘not’ and read: πᾶσαι γὰρ ἐν μέρει τοῦ ἐνὸς <οὐκ> ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ. Kroll’s supplement at line 13 seems unnecessary provided one takes ἡ δὲ νοερά [sc. ψυχῇ] as subject of συμπεραίνει and τοῦ ἐνὸς νοητοῦ κόσμου νοοῦσα καὶ ἐκπεριοῦσα as a participle phrase explaining why it does this. Taylor

since it is the soul of the cosmos, it articulate the entire cosmic intelligible object [that it is thinking about] and because of this its own intelligible return to the same point is made in terms of the perfect number of the cosmic cycle.⁶³³ It is also thanks to this that the entire corporeal cycle is made, for this universe imitates the invisible cycle of the soul through its own appropriate corporeal revolutions and its point of return coincides in a spatial manner with the return of the World Soul to its starting point, though the latter happens noetically. This is the unique quality (*to exaireton*) of the cosmic soul, which Plato has revealed to those who are able to follow it. But we shall understand this fact when it has thus been spelled out.

Once again it is necessary to investigate what has produced discursive motion in the soul and thinking (*noêsis*) that does not remain [always the same] as in the case of intellect, and why there is time rather than eternity [in the case of soul]. And it must be said that in as much as the essence of the soul is divisible, so too the life that it possesses is not single, but has rather been divided along with its essence, and similarly for its thinking. For [the soul] is substantialised (*ousiômenos*) as opposed to Being (*ousia*), and it has been enlivened as opposed to being Life, and it is intellectualised (*nenôômenos*)⁶³⁴ rather than being Intellect, since it participates in these things in the primary manner because these beings are prior to soul. Therefore, up there [in the intelligible realm], Being is one and Life too. The thinking [that takes place there], in as much as it *is* Being, is a thinking of indivisible Being and it coincides with its object like a point to a point so that it does not involve transition.⁶³⁵ However, the life of the soul and its thinking are not purely indivisible but, as we said, also divisible, and it lacks the strength to be made to fit alongside what is indivisible.⁶³⁶ By dividing itself around its indivisible aspect, it

(following Thomaëus) reads ἐν τινι τοῦ ὅλου χρόνου μέρει for ἐν μέρει τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐν τῷ παντί χρόνῳ, which accomplishes much the same thing.

⁶³³ Cf. in *Remp.* II. 16.3 ff. on Proclus' explication of the 'perfect number' of *Rep.* VIII 546b.

⁶³⁴ Another neologism that seems to be found only in Proclus and Damascius, unlike *ousiômenos* which is common to a number of Neoplatonists.

⁶³⁵ Following Kroll's suggestion to move ἵώς σημείω σημείον to after αὐτήν. Thus we have: καὶ ἡ νόησις τῆς οὐσίας ἀμερῆς ὡς ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἐφαρμόζουσα πρὸς αὐτήν ὡς σημείω σημείον οὐκ ἔχει μετέβασιν.

⁶³⁶ The general intention of the following explanation is clear enough: Proclus wants to show how the discursive thought that is characteristic of soul (and furthermore generates time) is a consequence of the psychic composition from Being of both the divisible and indivisible sort. The details, however, are very difficult to fathom. Proclus seems to resort to the very spatial metaphors – e.g. the soul's "rolling out" of its divisible part alongside what is indivisible – that he has earlier been at pains to show cannot apply literally to the soul.

brings one part after another of itself to bear on the former object – an object that always remains the same – in order that it might grasp with the whole of itself that which has been established prior to itself. It thus produced both a transition (where what is divisible in it rolls itself out alongside what it indivisible) and simultaneously, by dint of making this transition, it produces time. However the soul makes a transition in two senses. In the first sense there is transition when it is unfolded about the One and possesses the One thanks to all its own parts (for in as many ways as its parts have been divided, in that many ways are Being, Sameness and Difference present in it. So since by means of each of these parts of itself the soul applies and touches the One in many ways, it introduces transition into its own thinking so that all of it can think that which is prior to all of it). But in another sense there is transition because each part of it is active in relation to all things, for every part of the soul has all three aspects: Being, Sameness and Difference. Since it is unable to be fitted alongside each of them in its entirety, the soul applies the whole of itself to each of these to the extent that it participates in each of them, e.g. by means of Being through which the soul is partially so and so, and similarly for the other kinds in it. It is therefore by this means that we resolve the puzzle.

Furthermore, it is necessary to consider something else in addition to this, viz. how, when he has not yet provided us with the generation of time, Plato can already say that the soul lives **throughout all time**? Now it must be said in relation to this question that he will provide the genesis of [the sort of] time in which the animate aspect of the cosmos (*to zôïôdes*) participates when he says (37c6) that when the Father ‘saw it moving and alive’, he established time to measure the motion in it. Therefore, just as the life and the motion had by body is second-hand, so too it has been endowed with time by the creator, from whom it also has life and motion through the soul. But the soul has these things – I mean life and temporal motion – as a result of the Father. However, in as much as the soul also has something self-sufficient about it, it *cooperates* [with the Father] in introducing some aspect of itself into the procession into existence that has been brought about by its creator. Therefore, since in as much as the Demiurge moves it and it is also self-motive, thanks to the same thing surely it is a cause to itself of being moved in time. It is from this fact that even before the Demiurge gave time to this universe, the soul is said to be moved throughout the whole of time, for in the manner discussed the soul creates together with the Demiurge the animate sort of time. It happens in just the way that the soul creates, together with the Demiurge, the life through which there is motion. And the soul naturally governs that which lives and is moved as a result of it, and it will possess oversight [over that which it governs], not like what

happens by chance, but neither will it give [anything of itself] to what it governs.⁶³⁷ However, we will speak again later of time.

5. Summary

From these things one must draw the following summary points: that the
 10 World Soul indeed moves the universe – having established in its midst
 guardian powers and having brought about its enlivening throughout
 and sustaining it from outside in an intellectual manner. In this respect
 the World Soul imitates its own cause when that cause created the three
 classes of leading gods: the guardian, the enlivening and the creative.⁶³⁸
 15 Much prior to this, the World Soul moves itself in a divine manner. It
 takes its origin from its most primary activities and because of this moves
 both itself and the universe unceasingly, and through these things it
 conducts both itself and the whole heaven in a manner that is filled with
 wisdom. Furthermore, having made the single self-same extension of
 20 time the measure of the cycle appropriate for the World Soul, it draws
 round the universe in the same manner, for by its own return to the
 same point, it synchronises (*synapokathistanai*) the universe's return to its
 starting point. Nor is the universe's return to its starting point *prior* to
 that of the World Soul since the same things happen again and again in
 the cosmos, but the things that come to be (*ta gignomena*) come to be in
 virtue of the thinking in the World Soul. On the other hand, neither is
 it posterior, lest the return to the starting point be uncaused. For what
 25 will be the container for the entire thing if not the cycle of the soul?
 But if these things have been correctly stated then again the soul would
 have its divine character as a result of the One Being, while its unceasing
 character results from Eternity, and the fact that it is filled with wisdom
 is a result of Intellect. All these come about from the single cause of
 whole things.

C. The soul is an always existent, intelligible being

30 The body of the heaven has indeed been made visible, but the
 soul is invisible. Since it participates in reasoning and harmony, the
 293 soul is among the intelligible beings that exist always, having been

⁶³⁷ καὶ οὐχ οἶον ἡὐτοματισμένην ἔξει τὴν ἐπιστάσιαν, μηδὲν δοῦσα τῷ ἀρχομένῳ. Proclus is concerned with the question of whether the World Soul's governance over the visible cosmos imposes any burden on it – a theme familiar from Epicurean denials of the gods' providence. Naturally Proclus seeks to deny this. But he also denies that its governance is a *per accidens* cause of the cosmic order, as it would be if it took place by chance; cf. Aristotle *Phys.* II.5, 197a32–6.

⁶³⁸ For these three classes of gods, see in *Tim.* III. 198.16–199.2.

created the best of the things that have come to be by the best [creator].
(36e5–37a2)⁶³⁹

1. *First grammatical construction of 36e5–37a2*

Since all such things as he had earlier given to the body he has later given to the soul as well (viz. essence, harmony, shape, powers, motion) and he has put together both [body and soul] in the composition of the single living thing [that is the cosmos], then in order that you might not mistakenly suspect that both body and soul have a similar worth by dint of the fallacious homonymy [of what is predicated of each], Plato briefly reminds us of the difference between them. He has not just tossed in some extraneous words to the effect that the body is **visible**, while the soul is **invisible**, but shows that the body is the object of opinion in as much as it is sensible and generated, while the soul is ungenerated relative to the body but generated relative to the intellect. This is because the soul is simultaneously among the things that always exist and also among those that have come to be, since it ranks last among those that always are, for time already has a place in it. Additionally, that which always exists in the primary manner is eternal in both ways – that is, both in terms of its essence and its activities, for it doesn't have an activity different from its essence. By contrast, that which has come to be is generated in both ways – that is, it is always coming to be and always active in as much as it is in the process of coming to be in time. But since the soul participates in one way in eternity, but in another way participates in generation, it is active temporally [though its essence is eternal]. Now in the extreme terms [in this series, i.e. Being and Becoming] 'always' applies in only one way – in the first case in the eternal mode, but temporally in the second

⁶³⁹ Καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὁρατὸν γέγονεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόρατος μὲν, λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας ψυχὴ τῶν νοητῶν αἰεὶ τε ὄντων, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γεγενημένη τῶν γεννηθέντων. The text admits of several constructions. Proclus regards τῶν νοητῶν αἰεὶ τε ὄντων as dependent on ψυχὴ and goes to great lengths to show how the soul may be rightly said to be one among the things that always exist. Another alternative is to take νοητῶν αἰεὶ τε ὄντων as depending upon τοῦ ἀρίστου. This is the reading taken by Cornford and Zeyl, following Plutarch (*De An. Proc.* 1016c). On this reading, what is said is that the soul is brought into being by the Demiurge who is the best among the things that are intelligible and eternal. Proclus rejects this reading, though perhaps not for the best of reasons. A third alternative is to take the phrase in apposition with λογισμοῦ καὶ ἁρμονίας. Proclus seems to think that this suggestion has some merit and gives careful consideration to the *kind of reasoning* and harmony in which the soul participates. It will be, of course, the reasoning and harmony 'of the intelligible beings that exist eternally'. It is not clear that he even thinks of the first and third readings as incompatible. I have translated the passage according to the first reading, for which he seems to argue most strongly.

case.⁶⁴⁰ In the case of the middle term [in the series, i.e. the soul], ‘always’ applies in two ways in as much as the soul is ‘two-faced’ and by virtue of this also ‘double-mouthed’⁶⁴¹ – meaning double not only in terms of being divisible and indivisible, or in terms of the two circles in the soul, but also in terms of being something that both always exists (*to aei on*) and has also been generated. It is for this reason that the soul is said to be **among the things that always are** and **best among the things that have come to be** since it was created by **the best**.⁶⁴² And here again you see the difference between the soul and the body, for earlier he applied the phrase ‘*most beautiful*’ of the things that have come to be to the [World’s] *body*, while now he uses the phrase ‘*best* of the things that have come to be’ to the *soul*. While it is common to both of them to have come about by the agency of the best creator, nonetheless ‘the best’ is applied here to the World Soul in as much as it is closer to the creator, while the body of the world is said to be ‘most beautiful’ – but not best – because it is further way [from the Demiurge]. For ‘the most beautiful’ is secondary to ‘the best’, just as the Beautiful is secondary to the Good.

2. Second grammatical construction of 36e5–37a2

It might seem that in these words [Plato] says that the *Demiurge* is the **best of the beings that are intelligible and exist always**, just as the soul is said to be the best of the things that have been generated.⁶⁴³ And this might seem to support the case of those who make one god prior to the cosmos.⁶⁴⁴ But even if one were to interpret it this way by inverting the order of the words, it is nevertheless clear from the proposed analogy [between the World Soul and the Demiurge] that we will not be placing the intelligible beings that always exist *in* the Demiurge but rather *after* him, as things having a different essence [from

⁶⁴⁰ That is, intelligibles *always are* while sensibles are *always coming to be*. This is not a difference of duration. The ‘always’ in the first case implies not never-ending temporal duration but atemporal eternity. In the second case, sensibles are always in the temporal process of coming to be, never enjoying the kind of timeless being had by intelligibles.

⁶⁴¹ A reference to the identification of the World Soul with Hecate. See above 130.23 and 246.19.

⁶⁴² Proclus here proposes to read τῶν νοητῶν αἰεί τε ὄντων as a partitive genitive with ψυχῇ. As Festugière notes, his exegesis makes some sense of αἰεί τε ὄντων but leaves τῶν νοητῶν rather mysterious. Even if soul is among the things that always are by virtue of having an eternal essence but a temporal activity, this still falls short of showing that the soul is among the intelligibles.

⁶⁴³ Cf. Plutarch, *De An. Proc.* 1016b–c and Cornford (1957), 94.

⁶⁴⁴ It is unclear just who these opponents are. It may be that Proclus has in mind Christian Platonists.

him] – if indeed the relation that the soul has to all that has come to be is the same relation that the Demiurge has to the things that always are.⁶⁴⁵ And [if this is the case, then]⁶⁴⁶ either we will make the Demiurge look to things posterior to him [when he creates] – even though when he creates and makes his address to the Younger Gods entrusting them with the creation of mortals we see that he tells them to ‘imitate the power I used in generating you’. Therefore the Demiurge did not create the immortal class of living beings [i.e. the Younger Gods] by imitating the things posterior to him, but rather by imitating things that are entirely prior to him, just as he wishes the Younger Gods to imitate his actions in making mortals. Either that, or if we guard ourselves from this absurd outcome, then we shall have to allow that there are many intelligible gods posterior to the Demiurge, which is just what those [who suppose there is only the one god prior to the cosmos] do not agree with.⁶⁴⁷

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3. *Third grammatical construction of 36e5–37a2*

Would it not therefore be better to say that the soul itself is said to be among the things that are intelligible and always exist, in as much as it is the best of the things that have come to be, being thus indivisible and divisible, a sort of intermediate [between Being and Becoming]? Or else to say that, since he says that the soul is to **participate in reasoning and harmony**, what is shown through these words is where [or at what level] it participates in the aforementioned beings. I mean when he says **participating in reasoning and harmony** this means **among the beings that are intelligible and exist always**. For the harmony in the soul is one that has been generated, since it is not Harmony Itself but rather the product of having been harmonised. And the reasoning in it is not always existent but rather has a genesis in as much as it has been created temporally and is discursive. How, therefore, does the soul participate in reasoning and harmony? And how is it that harmony and reasoning

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⁶⁴⁵ Proclus takes the proponent of this reading to be drawing an analogy between the Demiurge and the World Soul. If the former is the best among the intelligible and eternal things as the latter is the best of the things that have come to be, this suggests that the Demiurge is prior to the Forms. But this is clearly absurd, at least to Proclus’ way of thinking about the matter.

⁶⁴⁶ καὶ ἡ ποιήσομεν at line 9 is continued by ἡ εἰ τοῦτο φυλαττοίμεθα at line 16. But these are not alternatives to what has just gone before at lines 1–9. Rather, these are two equally dire consequences, one of which must be accepted by anyone who embraces the possible interpretation outlined at 1–9.

⁶⁴⁷ I think the point is concessive. Suppose the proponents of this reading keep the Forms prior to the Demiurge. Then in order to preserve the claim that he is, in some sense, the best among the intelligible and eternal beings, they must posit a stratum of eternal intelligibles posterior to him, in addition to the Forms prior to him.

are not in it in the primary mode (*prôtôs*), but in a participatory mode (*kata methexin*)? I say it is because these – viz. reasoning and harmony – have pre-existed in the Demiurge, for he has also created the Muses and the Leader of the Muses⁶⁴⁸ and the series of Hermes. Therefore in him you find the demiurgic reasoning and the harmony that exists in the primary mode, the one belonging to the order of Hermes, the other to the order of Apollo. It is as a result of these that the soul which has been filled with them participates in reasoning and harmony. And, if it is necessary to say expressly what seems to me to be the case, it is that intelligible harmony is three-fold. First there is Harmony Itself. Then there is that which has been harmonised in the primary manner and is this way throughout the whole of itself. Third, there is that which has been harmonised in a secondary manner and *participates* in a way in harmony. One must refer the first to intellect, the second to the soul, and the third to the body. Reasoning is also three-fold. The first is primordial (*prôtourgos*), the second participatory (*kata methexin*), and the third in terms of appearance (*kat' emphasin*), for there is some trace (*ichnos*) of reasoning even in the case of irrational [animals]. Next, we have considered essence, shape and power to be three-fold – for there is essence in the primary way, and primary shape and primary quality (*dynamis*), and these are among the intelligibles. However, the corporeal is that which *in a qualified way* (*pêi*) participates in all these, for there also something [sc. matter] that is without shape, lacking in essence and without quality. But the soul [unqualifiedly] participates in each of them, having shared entirely through the whole of itself, for it has also been strengthened entirely,⁶⁴⁹ informed with shape through and through, and consistently substantialised. For there is not in its case a precedence of that which is without shape over that which has been informed with shape, nor does that which is impotent come before that which is powerful, nor the insubstantial before substance, since then there would be no difference from enmattered bodies. Therefore the soul participates in reasoning and harmony, as well as shape and power, and it participates entirely while what is corporeal only participates partially. Once again, then, the intermediate character of the soul is made evident from these facts. It is also evident that Plato quite plausibly says that it was generated by the best creator as the first and best of the things that have been created, and that it is on the one hand invisible, but on the other also the first thing to participate in intelligible harmony.

⁶⁴⁸ I.e. Apollo. See above 208.10 and in *Crat.* §176. 60–78.

⁶⁴⁹ δεδυνάμωται <δλη>. Presumably Proclus is making an association between *dynamis* (power or quality) and the verb *dynamoun* (to strengthen). His use of the latter verb at ET 70 doesn't seem to carry the sense of 'to be qualified'.

D. The soul's cognitive activities, Tim. 37a2–b3

1. Its contact with divisible and indivisible being

In as much, therefore, as the soul has been blended together from portions of these three, viz. the nature of the Same and the Different and Being, and in as much as it was divided and bound together proportionally, and moreover, being turned upon itself, when it comes into contact with something that has a dissoluble being or when [it comes in contact with that which is] indivisible, then, being moved through the entirety of itself,⁶⁵⁰ it says . . . (37a2–7)

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a. General interpretation

We have made a two-fold division of the soul's activities, first into motive and cognitive activities (for both of these are proper to the soul, as the divine Aristotle⁶⁵¹ also says), but among the motive activities, we have found that there are those that are present within the soul itself, those that have proceeded into the universe, and those that stand between these two. Those that have been stretched through the whole cosmos from the middle to the edge of heaven are solely encosmic, while those activities involved in the soul's own revolution are solely separate. However, those activities carrying the heaven round in a circle are simultaneously separate and inseparable, since they remain and proceed in relation to the universe.⁶⁵² In the case of the cognitive activities, there are some that are primary, some that are intermediate, and some that are last; for the soul knows itself, as well as the things that are prior to it, and those that come after it, since it is an image of things that are prior to it and a paradigm for what comes after it. So when it looks to itself and unfolds itself, it knows all things without in any way 'departing from its own proper character',⁶⁵³ for it is not necessary for it to have gone

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⁶⁵⁰ Proclus' quotation of the lemma has διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς rather than Plato's διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς. However, his subsequent treatment of this part of the lemma on 301 uses ἑαυτῆς and suggests that this is merely a slip rather than a different manuscript tradition now lost to us.

⁶⁵¹ Diehl suggests this may refer to *De An.* I.2, 404b28.

⁶⁵² This three-fold division of the soul's motive activities seems to be a review drawn from *Tim.* 36e2–4. Compare the verbs in ἡ δ' ἐκ μέσου πρὸς τὸν ἑσχατον οὐρανὸν πάντῃ διαπλακεῖσα κύκλῳ τε αὐτὸν ἔξωθεν περικαλύψασα, αὐτὴ ἐν αὐτῇ στρεφομένη with Proclus' three-fold division: αἱ μὲν γὰρ διατείνουσαι διὰ τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς ἐκ μέσου πρὸς τὸν ἑσχατον οὐρανὸν ἐγκόσμιοι μόνον εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ αὐτὴν στρέφουσαι τὴν ψυχὴν χωρισταὶ μόνον, αἱ δὲ περικαλύπτουσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν κύκλῳ χωρισταὶ τε ἅμα καὶ ἀχώριστοι.

⁶⁵³ μηδαμοῦ τῆς οἰκείας ἐξισταμένη δυνάμεως. cf. *Tim.* 50b9 where *the Receptacle* is said to receive copies of the Forms: ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἑαυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἐξίσταται δυνάμεως!

elsewhere in order for it to see the things that are, but rather it has cognised itself. What has been said, then, is enough about the soul's motive activities.

The account to be given here and in what follows, however, concerns the cognitive activities. For it is evident that the soul, and in particular the World Soul, knows the things that are (i.e. the Forms) since we see that in some instances even our own souls apprehend (*epiballein*) them. But if the soul knows these things, *how* it knows them – well, this remains to be seen. And how it knows the intelligibles, and how it knows sensible things; and whether it knows them by the same powers, or whether it knows the one by one set of powers and the others by other powers. It also remains to be seen whether it knows these things by looking into itself and the *logoi* that are in it, or whether it extends itself toward the objects of knowledge themselves, just as in the case of sight where one looks to a visible object that is external. So, to put it briefly, Plato calls these cognitive motions of the soul 'contact' with the objects of knowledge which indicates an apprehension of them that is not mediated (*amesos*) and an association with these objects of knowledge that is indivisible (*amerês*). But if each [sort of] knowing is a case of contact, the soul would be in contact with the two [sorts of objects] by projecting the appropriate activity toward them and is not in contact [with the one] through a different [activity], for it does not put itself in touch with sensibles by means of the activity directed toward intelligibles, nor will it be in contact with intelligibles by means of the activity that is directed toward sensible things. But both these characteristics – that is, to touch and not to touch – were defining characteristics of the Liberated gods, as Parmenides has shown.⁶⁵⁴ Therefore we rightly said earlier (273.20–3) that in virtue of its activities the soul has been made in the likeness of these gods – essential activities through which it knows both the things prior to it and the things posterior to it. Since, then, the passage is about these [cognitive activities] Plato wished first to recall for us what was said earlier – not creating an idle reminiscence, but one that contributes to what will be said later, for from these things and the latter there will be an appropriate spelling out [of the doctrine]. Now these were the things that were said before: the issue of the soul's essence, the question of its harmony, its form, and what was said about its powers. These things, therefore, Plato has recapitulated in saying that the soul has been **blended together** entirely from these three portions – Being, Sameness and Difference – and it has been said what sort of mixture it is, and that it is one that is capable of engendering life (for the uniform cause of souls has established the soul

⁶⁵⁴ Cf. *Parm.* 149d3–5: Οὐτ' ἄρα τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἐπεὶ περ ἅψις οὐκ ἔστιν.

in conjunction with the Demiurge). Additionally, he has said how these **three** [sc. Being, Sameness and Difference] are appropriate to the soul, and from what kinds [of these] it has been composed, i.e. the intermediate kinds [of Being, Sameness and Difference]. It has been divided in terms of the geometric **proportion** by the double and triple⁶⁵⁵ ratios and then bound together again through the remaining proportions (for he called these ‘bonds’). And it has been made to revolve thanks to its two circles – circles which surely include both its harmony and its form, for in the case of harmony, division precedes proportion; and in the case of form or shape, cutting apart comes before sticking together. But, on the other hand, something of the other remains in each, for that which has been joined together has a hint (*emphasis*) of what has been taken apart (for binding takes place from what has been taken apart) and division stands in an analogous relation to joining together since ‘proportion (*analogia*) is the finest of bonds’, as was said earlier (31c2). While the soul has been divided in the mode of the Titans, it has also been harmonised in the manner of the Muses, since its existence (*hyparxis*) has been divided three times in a Dionysian manner, and it has been mixed together in a manner that is life-engendering.⁶⁵⁶ Then in the third stage, the powers in the soul through which it revolves upon itself have been divided, for the two-fold circles were its powers. So, since these matters have doubtless been set out already, what follows must be demonstrated. 20

Since it has been blended together from these three portions – that is, Being, Sameness and Difference – and since these are the kinds intermediate between what is divisible and what is indivisible, it follows that the soul knows both [what is divisible and what is indivisible] in virtue of them, for the one [sort of knowledge] is of images, while the other is of paradigms. Therefore matters are just as Empedocles said: 25

With earth do we see earth, and water by water

and

With Love do we see love, and dread Strife by Strife.⁶⁵⁷

In the same manner, one presumes, we will say that by means of its own essence the World Soul knows every essence, both those from which it results and those which result from it as a cause. By means of its Sameness, it knows the sameness present in the entirety of Being – whether it be in 30

⁶⁵⁵ An addition suggested by Diehl.

⁶⁵⁶ A series of adverbs indicating the different modes of being of the soul: Τιτανικῶς, Μουσικῶς, Διονυσιακῶς, ζωογονικῶς.

⁶⁵⁷ DK B109, lines 1 and 3.

intelligible things, intellectual things or sensible things. By means of its Difference, it knows the difference that runs through all the beings. Since
15 it has been harmonised in virtue of its essence, through the appropriate harmony it knows both intelligible and sensible harmony. Moreover, since it also has powers that are intellectual, through these it knows the power that is everywhere. Therefore, as a result of what has been said previously, the account concerning the cognitive activities of the
20 soul has been made completely clear. That which has these cognitive activities essentially (*kat' ousian*) knows both the paradigms of things and their images as a result of possessing them. Through the *logoi* which the Demiurge has bestowed upon it, it cognises both the things prior to it and those posterior to it, for **being turned upon itself it comes in contact**
25 with **both the indivisible and the divisible**, as Timaeus says. Going into itself, it learns that it is itself the *logos* of all things, since all knowledge is brought about through the similarity of the one who knows to what is known. But similarity is brought about through communion in a single Form. Therefore since there is a single *logos* in both that which knows and in that which is known, and since it is the same *logos*, these things are
30 made to coincide with one another. But since the *logoi* are in the knowing subject in a different manner [than they are in the object of knowledge], being present as metrics of essences and a diminution of them, the [kinds of] knowing admit of various differences between them. On the one hand, there is intellectual knowledge that is indivisible and eternal because the
299 *logoi* of the objects which are in it are of a similar character. On the other hand, psychic knowledge is articulated and consists in transition from one thing to another because the soul's *logoi* (through which it knows objects) have the same sort of nature [as the objects of which they are causes]. Furthermore, intellectual knowledge is uni-form (*monoeidês*) because the *logoi* exist in it in the manner of a unit (*monadikôs*), for they exist in the
5 primary mode (*prôtôs*). By contrast, psychic knowledge is dual in form (*dyoeidês*) because the *logoi* exist in the soul in two different modes – one way in those with the character of discursive knowledge, another way in those with the character of opinion. The soul's knowledge is therefore both single and double, thanks to the substantial division between the *logoi* [present in it]. After all, if one of these two circles were to know the
intelligible realm, and the other the sensible realm, where in the world
10 is that which **says** that these are different from one another and that one is the paradigm and the other the image? It is not possible for it to say something about the *difference between them* unless it knows *both* of them, as we have learned in the *Theaetetus* (185b). Therefore, just as it was said there [in the *Theaetetus*] that that which knows things that are visible and also things that are audible – grasping the one through sight and the other through hearing – must know both of them in order to say that

these are different, so too there is in this case a *logos* different from the two circles, saying **throughout the entirety** of soul some things about the intelligibles and other things about the sensibles. Since it is common to both of them I would say that it is the activity of the substantial aspect of the soul. For to the extent that the soul's essence is one, thanks to this fact it has this single cognitive activity which Plato calls reason or *logos*. It is on account of this that we say that the entire soul is rational *simpliciter*. This reason, then, is the single knowledge of the soul. Because of the Circle of the Same it cognises **indivisible Being**, while through the Circle of the Different it knows **dissoluble Being**. (For even if both circles are composed of the kind of Being intermediate between the divisible and the indivisible, nonetheless the Circle of the Same has participated rather more in the indivisible, while the Circle of the Different shares more in the divisible.) This is the single substantial (*ousiôdês*) reason, in as much as Being (*ousia*) is prior to Sameness and Difference. While its life is a self-motive one which belongs to the two circles, its knowledge is discursive, since it is a knowledge that is common to both circles. It is through this that the soul is not only dual in form but also uni-form. These things have been said, therefore, for the sake of including the whole of the doctrine.

b. Lexis for Tim. 37a2–7

One must also observe the fact that in the case of particular terms Plato has said that the soul is composed of **three portions** and that it has been **blended together** from these. Through the mixing together the unity of the composite is indicated, but through the use of a number he indicated the soul's unmixed purity, for the three kinds would not remain three in number if their own particular essence was not preserved unmingled.

We must also observe that when he talks about the divisible Being, he said **when it comes into contact with something that has a dissoluble substance**. The term 'has' concerns that for which substantial character (*to ousiôdês*) and being (*to on*) belong as things that are acquired or extrinsic (*epithetos*), since the underlying subject is that which is lacking in substance (*to anousion*) and is not being (*to mê on*). And 'something' is most appropriate for that which is in some way divisible or extended.

Furthermore, the verb 'to come in contact' has been used in a manner that is fitting too, because the soul presides proximately over the realm of sensibles and is [proximately] dependent upon the intelligibles. The term 'contact' manifests a knowledge that is evident (*enargês*), without mediation (*amesos*), and one established in accordance with a definite

conception – thinking of the sensibles as capable of being touched (*epaphêtos*), as one of the gods says (*Or. Chald.* 41).

15 About the things that are indivisible it was sufficient for Plato merely to say **when** [it comes in contact with the] **indivisible** for what is simple and uni-form is distinctive of this kind of Being. Unless perhaps it is necessary to supply in one's understanding the words [when it comes in contact with] '*that which has* an indivisible Being' as something in common [with the previous clause], in order that he might be saying that the intelligible Forms themselves are also participants in Being, albeit only in the indivisible kind.⁶⁵⁸

20 Furthermore, the verb 'to say' signifies the psychic cognition (*noêsis*) in a manner that is naturally suited to it. For the soul is discourse (*logos*), and in the case of discourse, the product of the activity (*energêma*) is saying (*to legein*), just as in the case of intellect (*nous*), the product of the activity is cognising (*to noein*) and in the case of nature (*physis*), the product is natural development (*to phuein*), for the activities are named paronymously after the essences from which they derive.⁶⁵⁹

⁶⁵⁸ Festugière finds this puzzling. He writes:

ἐφάπτεσθαι se construit, sans exception connue, avec le génitif. Proclus ne peut donc entendre qu'en ὅταν δὲ ἀμέριστον sentendant lui aussi οὐσίαν ἔχοντός τιος. Que veut-il donc dire par «περί δὲ τῶν ἀμερίστων» ἤρκεσεν αὐτῷ μόνον εἰπεῖν ὅταν δὲ ἀμέριστον τὸ γὰρ ἀπλοῦν καὶ μονοειδὲς ἴδιόν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας ἐκείνης (300.15–17)? Veut-il dire qu'il a suffi à Platon de sous-entendre οὐσίαν ἔχοντός τιος? Cela n'a guère de sens. Ou bien veut-il dire qu'il a suffi à Platon de dire «toutes les fois qu'elle touche un objet qui ait de l'indivisible», sans ajouter les mots «une essence»?

I agree that this is pretty obscure, and Proclus' second thought in the next line doesn't help matters much at all : εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ οὐσίαν ἔχοντος δεῖ προσυπακούειν τῷ ἀμέρι<στον> ὡς κοινόν. Perhaps the point that Proclus is seeking to make here is, first, that Plato uses an economy of words in describing the soul's contact with the indivisible, since such simplicity is appropriate to that realm where there is less plurality than here below. But then, even if we accept that this economy is one of words alone – not ideas – we will perhaps want to say that the soul comes in contact with *that which has* indivisible Being, rather than *something* that has divisible Being. In effect, we should understand a contrast between ὅταν οὐσίαν σκεδαστὴν ἔχοντός τιος ἐφάπτηται and ὅταν οὐσίαν ἀμέριστον ἔχοντός τοῦ ἐφάπτηται. This view gives a contrast with the point about the *τιος* made above at line 8. Perhaps it also makes sense of why Proclus writes εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ οὐσίαν ἔχοντος rather than the supplement that Festugière supposes he *must* understand, given that ἐφάπτεσθαι takes a genitive. He is granting that we must understand this supplement since we do say that the intelligible Forms participate in (indivisible) Being, and so in that sense, 'have' it. Yet the nature of the subject that has it is different. Forms are a *that which*, not a mere *something*.

⁶⁵⁹ Cf. Aristotle *Cat.* I, 1a13–15 and Proclus, in *Crat.* §205.19–206.2.

Nor should we overlook in regard to this passage what Porphyry⁶⁶⁰ has related about whether [the last line of the lemma concludes with] **it says** (*legei*) or 'it ceases to be' (*lēgei*). He relates that he encountered Amelius who explained this passage so that it had the words 'when it *ceased* to be moved' instead of 'being moved... it *says*'. But having this text, he was not able to accommodate the claim that it 'ceased to be moved' alongside the earlier claim that the soul is always moved *without ceasing* (36e4). He said to Amelius that it is necessary to write 'it says' rather than 'it ceases', and Amelius was significantly embarrassed by this – though it was discovered later that Sosicrates⁶⁶¹ had the same reading as Amelius. Noble Amelius would have been greatly delighted if he had learned that someone else endorsed the same reading, but it turns out that he died beforehand. In any case, we too must write it as **'being moved through the entirety of itself, it says'** and not 'it ceases' as the previous Sosicrates and Amelius wrote according to Porphyry, for saying something (*to legein*) is the substantial activity of reason (*logos*). So since the soul is surely reason and rational intellect (*nous logikos*), then whenever it has made contact with Being, whether divisible or indivisible, it would say and think throughout the entirety of itself 'what is this thing that is cognised?' because the soul too is divisible and indivisible. If the kinds within the soul were only divided from one another [and not also mixed together], the entire soul would not discern them when it knows [one of the kinds of] Being through the [intermediate gradation of] Being in it. But if the kinds within the soul were entirely compounded (*symphtheirein*),⁶⁶² there would not be a determinate knowledge of things, nor would it be able to say that Being is one thing and Sameness another. But since the intermediate kinds

⁶⁶⁰ in *Tim.* II. 300.24–301.2 = Porphyry, in *Tim.* fr. 74 (Sodano). The anecdote does not reflect well on poor Amelius and we may wonder at Porphyry's choice to include it in his commentary and Proclus' motives in re-telling it. Brisson (1987), 812–13 considers the relations between Porphyry and Amelius on matters philosophical, religious and on the editing of Plotinus' works. He thinks that, all in all, Porphyry was ambivalent about him. Smith (1974), xv–xvi considers that Porphyry's writings seek to subtly supplant Amelius as the closest associate and chief pupil of Plotinus. Whatever the relations between Porphyry and Amelius, Brisson ((1987), 827) is certainly correct to point out that *Proclus* exhibits a systematic disapproval of Amelius' commentary on the *Timaeus*, as will be seen below at 302.3–10. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Lautner (1997).

⁶⁶¹ A historian and biographer, probably from the mid-second century BC who composed a 'succession of philosophers' charting teacher–pupil relations among prominent philosophers.

⁶⁶² A form of mixture in which the original ingredients are destroyed and a new compound comes about. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Mixt.* 216.24.

15 have both been blended with one another and are also unmixed, the soul cognises each one determinately throughout the whole of itself, as Plato says.

But if ‘it speaks, having been moved through the whole of itself’ is it not obvious⁶⁶³ from this fact that it is therefore both one and not one? And that its knowledge of the things at its limits [i.e. the intelligible and sensible realm] is both common and yet differentiated? Does it not speak as a whole about all things in so far as it is one, but not as a whole in so far as it is not one? Will it not be the case that the Circle of the Same in its knowledge of intelligibles is also aware of sensibles in as much as they result from these paradigms? And will not the Circle of the Different know the intelligibles as a result of knowing their images? (For since in each case it possesses the knowledge of itself completely and perfectly, it must of necessity see that one is the paradigm and the other the image, or else it would be ignorant that they are paradigms or that they are images, having not known this completely. Knowing, then, that this is a paradigm, it knows that of which it is the paradigm; and knowing that this is an image, it knows that of which it is an image. Therefore it was said with total plausibility that the soul **says through the entirety of itself**, etc. So much for this then.

30 But since some people have mistakenly read ‘it ceases’ instead of ‘says through the entirety of itself’ (as we have said Porphyry reported) and because when Amelius read it thus was unable to make sense of the words in the statement, he was terribly vexed to say one should write ‘it says’ rather than ‘it ceases throughout the entirety of itself’ – nonetheless,⁶⁶⁴ one must add something to the effect that, while it is far less trouble to read ‘it says’, one might nonetheless be able to read ‘it ceases’ by allowing ‘ceases’ to signify that a single apprehension (*antilêpsis*) of objects of knowledge composed from many acts of cognition arrives at a concept (*epibolê*) that is determinate and distinctive to each one. On this interpretation, the sense of the whole phrase is that ‘being moved, the soul ceases’ with the knowledge of each thing. For ceasing is the final goal of being moved. In the case of the soul, while it never ceases being moved, it is nonetheless always arriving at some conception (*noêsis*), as Aristotle

⁶⁶³ εἰ δὲ λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς, δῆλον δῆπουθεν, ὥς ἄρα κτλ. Given δῆπουθεν it seems to me more natural to present this as a series of rhetorical questions.

⁶⁶⁴ Here it seems to me that Proclus wishes to pour salt in the wounds of poor Amelius. Amelius gave up his reading because he could make no sense of the text with ‘it ceases’. Proclus now goes on to show that if he had an ounce of imagination, he would have seen how one might take the text in this way. Not that Proclus thinks that one should! He simply wants to hold Amelius up to further ridicule.

saw in the case of the heaven when he said that it is always in [the process of] completion.⁶⁶⁵

10

2. *What the soul says about divisible and indivisible Being:*

Tim. 37a7–b3

ὅτω τε ἂν τι ταῦτόν ῃ καὶ ὅτου ἂν τι ἕτερον, πρὸς ὃ, τί τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅπη καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὁπότε ξυμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γινόμενά τε πρὸς ἕκαστον ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχοντα ἀεί. (*Tim.* 37a7–b3)⁶⁶⁶

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⁶⁶⁵ A phrase from Aristotle (*Meteor.* I. 2, 339a26) that seems to have captured Proclus' imagination. Cf. in *Tim.* I. 282.20; 290.28; 294.19; III. 90.26; 193.9; in *Remp.* I. 35.27.

⁶⁶⁶ The correct interpretation of this sentence has been a thorny issue for both ancients and moderns. Since Proclus is going to proceed to give several interpretations, it seemed to me best to give the text rather than any one translation.

In the modern era the question centres on what one is to do with ὅτω τ' ἂν τι. Cornford, Stallbaum, and Taylor all take its antecedent to be ἕκαστον, while the τι is treated as the subject of ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν. The result, as Cornford describes it is: 'The soul tells – (ὅτω τ' ἂν τι ταῦτόν ῃ καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον), whatever it may be (say B) that something (A) is the same as or different from – in what respect precisely and how and in what sense and when it comes about (ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν) that it (A) is or is qualified by each of these terms (same and different) (πρὸς ἕκαστον) in respect of any such thing B, either in the sphere of things that become or with regard to things that are changeless.' The sentence is confusing because some of Plato's terms are redundant on this reading, ξυμβαίνει ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν meaning no more than ἐστι καὶ πάσχει ἕκαστα, i.e. 'to be the same with or to be qualified by'.

Archer-Hind, by contrast, reads the whole clause as an indirect interrogative subordinate to λέγει and makes the specific antecedent of ὅτω the subject of ξυμβαίνει. So, as he understands it, the soul 'declares of that wherewith anything is the same and wherefrom it is different, in relation to what, etc.'

The different readings that Proclus discusses seem not to have exactly this question in mind, but rather the question of the scope of the claims that are made. Proclus' first reading takes ὅταν οὐσίαν σκεδαστήν ἔχοντός τινος ἐφάπτηται καὶ ὅταν ἀμέριστον, λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς ὅτω τ' ἂν τι ταῦτόν ῃ καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον, πρὸς ὅτι τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅπη καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὁπότε συμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γινόμενά τε πρὸς ἕκαστον ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχοντα ἀεί as a single sentence cataloguing the kinds of judgements that the World Soul makes about the two kinds of Being with which it comes in contact. It makes pronouncements about their identity and difference, their relations and their qualities.

The second reading divides this sentence into two with a stop after λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς but with λέγει κινουμένη being understood at the beginning of the second sentence. The effect of this second reading is to separate what is said concerning the judgement the soul makes about the *essence* of what it encounters from what is the content of the judgements about those things that pertain to essence – i.e. sameness and difference, relations, etc. Cf. 303.8–10: ὅτι χωρὶς μὲν τὸν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας διακρίνει λόγον, χωρὶς δὲ τὸν περὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν.

a. Ambiguities in the text

The text before us has three interpretations, all of them having justification (*logos*), and it is necessary to set out the properties of each of them. The first interpretation makes all the words one sentence, while the second interpretation makes it two by dividing the sentence, as we do. The third reading makes it three sentences, by dividing it at each clause.

20 The first goes something like this: ‘when the soul comes into contact with something that has a dissoluble Being or when it comes in contact with that which is indivisible’, – and here this reading proposes a comma before what follows – ‘being moved through the entirety of itself it says **with respect to whatever it is *what it is the same as*, and *what it differs from*, and precisely *what is that to which it is related*, and in *what respect*, *how*, and *when* it comes about that each one exists or undergoes in relation to each other, whether in terms of particulars or in relation to those things that are always the same**’.⁶⁶⁷ For soul, being moved throughout the whole of itself, says all these things, Plato claims, both when it is in contact with the divisible and indivisible Being, and when it is in contact with the Sameness that exists in both [the divisible and indivisible things], as well as the Difference [in both], the relations, the qualities, the actions they are performing, and what is happening to them. This is so since all of these are present in an analogous manner in the case of both intelligibles and sensibles.

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5 The second interpretation makes what we wrote earlier one sentence and this a second one. So it goes like this: ‘**with whatsoever something is the same or different, when the soul is moved it says with respect**

The third reading divides the sentence into three parts. The first is from *ὅταν οὐσίαν σκεδαστὴν ἔχοντός το λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς*. The second consists in *ὅτω τ’ ἂν τι ταῦτόν ῃ καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον* and then, as Proclus says, what follows. Proclus says almost nothing about this third reading apart from this, but Festugière supposes that it might most closely approximate that of Cornford by treating *ὅτω τ’ ἂν τι ταῦτόν ῃ καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον* as the antecedent of some term in the third, perhaps *ἕκαστον*.

⁶⁶⁷ Festugière rightly notes that Proclus gives his account of this at 304.31–305.3. On his view the World Soul says about each of the intelligibles and about each of the sensibles what its relations are to other things, and whether it acts or undergoes in relation to them. I have sought to render the phrase here in accordance with his understanding of it later at 304.31: *κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγει κατ’ ἄμφω ἕκαστα τῶν γιγνομένων καὶ ἕκαστα τῶν αἰεὶ ὄντων τίνοι ταῦτά ἐστιν, τίνος ἕτερα, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν γιγνομένων πρὸς ἕκαστον καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕκαστον πῶς ἔχει κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ κατὰ τὸ πᾶσχειν μάλιστα*.

to that object precisely *what is that to which it is related*, and in *what respect, how, and when in relation to each of the things that have come to be* etc. This differs from the previous reading because it distinguishes the speech that concerns the Being [of what the soul is in contact with] from a separate speaking that concerns the things that pertain to Being.

The remaining alternative divides the clauses three ways, for it sets out as one sentence what was said earlier, and then makes ‘with what the object with which it is concerned is the same, with what it is different’ a second sentence, and treats what follows that as a third.

Therefore, as we said, the text of the lemma can be taken three ways. It is then particularly necessary to look over the facts themselves.⁶⁶⁸

b. The facts of the case

That Sameness and Difference are among the intelligibles is obvious.⁶⁶⁹ But in what manner do we find relation (*to pros ti*), respect (*to hopêi*), how (*hopôs*), when (*to pote*) and being subject to things (*to paschein*) there? These things are certainly entirely familiar in the case of sensible things, but how do they figure among the intelligibles?⁶⁷⁰ Surely the genera of Being are conspicuous in the latter case because these things [sc. intelligibles] are genuinely beings. You might also grasp these things by analogy when you see relationality in terms of the Paternal, if you like, or the Maternal, both Similarity and Dissimilarity, the Equal and the Unequal – provided that you do not assume that relations among the intelligibles involve only a privation of Being (*anousios*), but grasp them in a way appropriate to intelligible beings. Up there [in the realm of intelligibles] is relationality in the strictest sense, where there is an association [among Forms] that is much greater [than the relations that exist between sensibles] – this is why Plato says in **particular, what is that to which it is related** – and all things exist in the primary manner (*prôtôs*).

⁶⁶⁸ Note the methodology: Plato’s text admits of three constructions, so we must consider the truth of the matter so that we will know which of the three is the right one. This is not a presumption of Platonic infallibility, but just an application of the principle of charity.

⁶⁶⁹ Proclus’ commentary centres on showing that all those categories just enumerated are actually present in the intelligible realm. It is not obvious exactly how this is supposed to help us differentiate among the two possible readings that Proclus seems to take seriously, for it would seem that on both readings these questions are posed about intelligibles as well as sensibles.

⁶⁷⁰ For Proclus’ extended treatment of the question of how relations exist in the case of the intelligibles, see *in Parm.* 935.21–939.11.

Being '**in a respect**' (*to hopêi*) is present in the case of intelligible beings to the extent that [each one] is not entirely of such a sort (*toioutos*), but rather in a way (*pêi*). In any event, each of the intelligibles is said to be in a way one, since the One alone is one *simpliciter*. Once more, the Same or the Different are up there, but it is not [the same or] different *simpliciter*.
 30 Rather the Different would be different *from Sameness*, and similarly for the remaining cases. In any case he says that all are all: each is one in virtue of its essence, but all [the others] through participation.⁶⁷¹ This,
 304 then, is what 'in a certain respect' amounts to among these entities.

The **how** is present among the intelligibles in terms of the differences in the participation relations, for many things participate in the same property in a variety of ways. For instance, on the one hand, Sameness participates in Rest, but on the other hand it participates in Motion, but not in the same manner. Rather it participates more in one and less in the other. Surely among the orders of Forms, for example those that
 5 participate in the One or Being, some intelligibles participate in one manner, while intellectual beings participate in another manner. And among [those of the same rank] some do it in one way, others in another way, in accordance with the measure of each one's essence. Therefore 'the how' exists up there too.

The **when** [is present among intelligibles] either in virtue of the actions of the intelligibles in relation to the things here (for at some times the things here participate in them and they become in some way participated at that time) or else in virtue of the very thoughts of the
 10 soul (for since at some times it is directed upon some Forms and at other times on other Forms), it cognises now one and now another, and it comes to be, and 'when' even comes to apply to things always existent by virtue of the soul sometimes finding it intelligible.

It comes about that **each is in relation to each other** in as much as all [the intelligibles] are in one another and pervade one another, and all is in all appropriately; or in as much as all are dependent upon one thing,
 15 or in as much as one is the cause, the other an effect, or something such as this.

That [each] **undergoes** (*to paschein*) [in relation to each applies to the intelligible realm] in as much as the intelligibles have been filled from one another and all of them participate in all of the appropriate properties.

⁶⁷¹ This is an axiom of late Neoplatonic metaphysics – all things are in all, but in each in a manner that is appropriate. Clearly Proclus thinks that there is some Platonic text that says this explicitly (πάντα γοῦν εἶναι φησι πάντα). It would be interesting to know what he has in mind here. The Eleatic Stranger in the *Sophist* endorses the blending of some Forms with some others, but Theaetetus rejects the idea that all might blend with (i.e. participate in) all.

For Plato often makes clear the fact that something participates by talking about something having acquired a property (*dia tou pepontbenai*), as we may learn in the *Sophist* (245a) where he says that the whole acquires the property of being one, but is not the One Itself because it participates in the One.⁶⁷²

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These things therefore are present both among the intelligibles and among the sensibles. In terms of the things that come to be [i.e. sensibles], it turns out that each both is and undergoes in relation to each one, and in relation to the things that are always in the same condition [i.e. the intelligibles] it turns out similarly that each is and undergoes in relation to the each other, both among the class of sensibles and among eternally existing beings. In any event, Plato was accustomed to indicate the same thing by participation and acquiring a property, and to say that all that participates acquires the property of that in which it participates, as we said.

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c. *The ambiguity resolved*

Therefore, to put it succinctly, the World Soul says throughout the whole of itself, in virtue of a single act of knowing, and with respect to both the things that come to be and also those that are [always] in the same condition – it says with respect to both [classes] what each of the things in the realm of Becoming is the same as and from what it is different; and with what each of the eternally existing beings is the same or different; and it says of each thing in the realm of Becoming considered in relation to each other thing how it is related in terms of being, or doing, or undergoing; [and it also says], in the case of each of the things that are in the same condition [i.e. things in the realm of Being] considered in relation to each other thing, how each is related in terms of being, or doing, or undergoing. For among the things in the realm of Being and those in the realm of Becoming, one thing is affected more by another, or one acts more in relation to some other. These things are surely what the soul says when it thinks all things, some of them by means of the Circle of the Same, others through the Circle of the Different. For it [i.e. the World Soul] has antecedently comprehended (*prolambanein*)⁶⁷³ all the sensibles and their doings and

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⁶⁷² Reading ὅπου λέγει τὸ ὅλον πεπονθὸς εἶναι [τὸ] ἐν, ἀλλ' οὐ[κ] τὸ αὐτόεν, ὡς μετέχον τοῦ ἐνός with Festugière. I also follow his treatment of πεπονθέναι as 'acquérir la qualité de'.

⁶⁷³ Hence all the sensibles and the events that will take place in the history of the universe are in the World Soul in an anticipatory-causal mode (*kat' aitian*). Cf. in *Tim.* II. 44.28–45.1.

undergoings. Since the universe is one living thing, it is sympathetic with itself, so that all the things that have come to be are parts of the life of the world as if it were a single drama – for example if there were some tragic poet who created a drama in which visitations from gods, voices of heroes and other players <were introduced>,⁶⁷⁴ and he assigned to those among the actors who were willing some heroic speech or other part, while he himself encompasses within himself the single cause of all that is said. It is necessary in the case of the World Soul to think along these lines – that surely having established the entirety of the single and diverse life of the cosmos, like a many-headed creature, speaking through all its heads (some in Greek, some in barbarian tongues) it encompasses the causes of all the things that come to be, knowing the particulars by means of universals, the accidents by means of essences, and the parts by means of wholes, [knowing] all things in a simple manner thanks to the divinity within it. For god *qua* god knows all particulars and all things that are contrary to nature in a simple manner, even if one should include matter itself.⁶⁷⁵ All that which one might care to assume is one to the extent that it results from the One. Therefore, the understanding of all things that are simple and self-originated (*autothen*) is divine.

E. The soul's logos: Tim. 37b3–6

This discourse (*logos*) becomes true all the same (*kata tauton*)⁶⁷⁶ whether it is concerned with the Different or the Same, being carried on without voice or sound by it (*hyp' autou* sc. reason) in that which is moved. (*Tim.* 37b3–6)

306 Atticus⁶⁷⁷ interpreted the word *logos* in terms of the power of attention, but Porphyry⁶⁷⁸ interpreted it in terms of the chariot driver [in the *Phaedrus*] who drives the two horses, while Iamblichus⁶⁷⁹ interpreted it in terms of the universal soul, for it moves itself throughout and the

⁶⁷⁴ Reading ἐντάξας in the lacuna at line 12 with Kroll.

⁶⁷⁵ It may seem positively un-Platonic to allow that there can be *knowledge* of particulars, things contrary to nature, or even matter. However, Proclus follows Iamblichus in making the character of the knower, not the object known, the determining factor in considering the nature of the knowledge (ap. Ammonius, in *De Int.* 135.14). The gods may know in a single undivided awareness things that exist in a divided way. They may even know determinately a future that is indeterminate or contingent (*ET* 124; *Prov.* 63.6–64.4).

⁶⁷⁶ The likely import of Plato's text is that this reasoning is similarly true in each case. As Cornford notes ὁμοίως for κατὰ ταῦτά would produce hiatus. In the exegesis that follows, Proclus will give a variety of senses to the phrase.

⁶⁷⁷ in *Tim.* II. 306.1–6 = Atticus, fr. 36 (Des Places).

⁶⁷⁸ in *Tim.* II. 306.1–25 = Porphyry, in *Tim.* fr. 75 (Sodano).

⁶⁷⁹ in *Tim.* II. 306.1–5 = Iamblichus, in *Tim.* fr. 58 (Dillon).

narrative (*logos*) of the things that exist is present throughout it. All these interpretations seem to go along with the thought of Plato, but Porphyry's is rather more consonant with the text before us and also with what is said elsewhere. The *logos* at issue here is neither that which is substantial (*ousiôdês*), nor that which is present in virtue of activity (*kat' energeian*), but rather that which exists as a single power of the essence of souls, a power in virtue of which the soul is a single thing – just as it is in virtue of the Circle of the Same and the Circle of the Different that the soul is dual in form. Otherwise for what reason did it not turn out that there are three circles (a single one for each of the three elements [i.e. Being, Sameness and Difference]), but there are instead only two, unless it is because there is a single essence in both? This discourse is the *power* of this [essence], and is neither the essence itself, nor the *activity* that results from this essence – activity having the third rank [after power and essence].⁶⁸⁰ This reason, being single, knows **invariably** (*kata tauton*), for it does not at one time know the intelligible and at another time know that which is visible, as our reason does, since our reason is not able to be in the same condition (*kata tauton einai*) in relation to both. The former [kind of] reason, therefore, knows the Same and the Different simultaneously in the realm of both intelligible and sensible things – not *being true*, as is the case for intellect, but *becoming true* in the realm of both [Forms and particulars] because of the discursive [character of] the knowledge that it has in both realms. So the words **invariably** (*kata tauton*) signify the difference between our partial knowledge and the knowledge of the divine soul, but the word **becoming** generally signifies the difference between psychic and intellectual knowledge. Therefore this discourse knows both things that are intelligible and things that are sensible, since it is in touch with the Sameness and Difference of both the intelligible and sensible sorts. And when it is carried on throughout the soul, with the Circle of the Same moving in this way, and the Circle of the Different moving another way, by means of the first it contemplates the things that are intelligible, while by means of the other it contemplates the sensibles. By virtue of this fact it represents the universal Demiurge, about whom it has been said:

it both possesses the intelligibles in its mind,
and brings sense-perception to the worlds. (*Or. Chald.* 8, Majercik)

In the same manner, when the psychic discourse in the soul is carried on so as to move itself and the entire soul, then, concerning the Sameness and the Difference present in both the intelligible and sensible realms, it produces in the latter case opinions and convictions, while in the former

⁶⁸⁰ On the triad Essence–Power–Activity, see above II. 125.12–23.

case it produces intelligence and scientific knowing. These states *become true*, though they are not in a condition of *being true* as they are in the case of intellect (for this was really (*ontôs*) true). And it is true **invariably** – either in as much as it simultaneously knows both Forms (*onta*) and sensible particulars (*gignomena*), or else in so far as it is always in a certain state and is not now one way and now another (as happens in the case of the discourse of partial souls where the discourse is not always equally true since it is filled with error and ignorance thanks to generation). Or else [Plato intended] **becomes true** in so far as the discourse in these two kinds of knowing is discursive, but being **equally** (*kata tauta*) **true**, in as much as it always grasps the entire Form of each object of knowledge and does not sequentially articulate each of the Forms (as happens in the case of the discourse in partial souls). Rather, it sees the whole just as it is, contemplating the entire thing simultaneously. But since we encounter one aspect or another of a thing, we do not see things equally, but rather [experience] each thing in virtue of a part. Or else [Plato intended] **equally** (*kata tauton*) with respect to both the Different and the Same, since [the World Soul's discourse] becomes true *simpliciter* with respect to what is intelligible and similarly with respect to what is sensible, in so far as it knows both of them simultaneously *qua* same and *qua* different, and says how it sees that the one has its procession from the other. Therefore the term **equally** (*kata tauton*) is one that manifests the fact that this discourse is able to know both of these [sc. the intelligible and the sensible] and what is really different and what is really the same by virtue of a single conception. For since at the same time it possesses discursive knowledge of these things, this discourse which comes to be is true – a discourse whose activity is to speak about that which is genuinely the same and different in the sensible realm <and in the realm of what is intelligible>.⁶⁸¹ For the function of this [discourse] is to see by what means the intelligibles have been set apart from sensibles, since it is necessary for there to be some one thing that is able to know both so that it might be able to say that these are the intelligibles and these others are among the sensibles.

[The meaning of the words] **being carried on by it in that which is moved** is that in as much as it proceeds into these two circles, it moves both itself and them. The 'carrying' makes clear the divided procession from a single act of knowing into two acts of knowing. But the discourse itself is a uni-form (*benoeidês*) knowledge of both intelligibles and sensibles. Otherwise what could there be in this knowledge that says that

⁶⁸¹ Diehl marks a lacuna at line 26: τούτων γὰρ ἔχων ὁμοῦ τὴν μεταβατικὴν γνώσιν γιγνόμενός ἐστιν ἀληθὴς οὗτος ὁ λόγος, οὗ ἡ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ λέγειν * * * καὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ μέντοι ὄντος ταυτοῦ καὶ θατέρου. Taylor suggests, not implausibly, τοῦ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ.

what is intelligible is one thing and what is sensible another, unless it be that which has known both of them prior to both these sorts of divided knowledge:⁶⁸² So since the soul is both a unit and a dyad, there is a manner [of knowing] that includes both the intelligibles and the sensibles in a single unified act of understanding. But, then again, there is also a sense in which it understands the former by virtue of the Circle of the Same and the latter by virtue of the Circle of the Different. Therefore just as in the case of essence where that which is monadic precedes that which is dual in form – and similarly so in the case of harmony, in the case of form and in the case of powers – so too in the case of the cognitive activities [of the soul] the single discourse begins prior to the divided acts of understanding. (These are things that I have repeated frequently because of the errors of the interpreters on these matters.) In any event, Plato indicates these things when he says that the discourse itself which comes to be true concerning both intelligibles and sensibles is **carried into that which is moved by it** (which surely means each of the [soul's] circles), **being carried on without voice or sound**. While the interior discourse can do entirely without these, exterior discourse⁶⁸³ requires them. So it is as if Plato had said that this discourse has a motion that is more complete than all of the activities that involve some external manifestation, for voice and sound have been assumed as symbols of perceptible motions. When the internal discourse is being carried on, just like the driver of the chariot, and each of the psychic circles is moving [as the two horses do in the *Phaedrus*], then the result is the two-fold understanding in us, which Plato proceeds to tell us about next.

But if we were to read not '**in that which is moved by it**' – where 'it' refers to the discourse – as we find in the more accurate, corrected manuscripts, but instead read 'in that which is moved by itself', this would mean the entire soul, since 'moves itself' signifies the definition of soul, and the object defined is in a way the same with the definition. Accordingly [the text would mean that] when the discourse is carried on in the soul – for this is the same thing as for it to be moved by itself – it knows the Same and the Different, now in the case of the sensibles, now in the case of the intelligibles. And it seems that these things in particular

⁶⁸² Cf. 299.5–21 for a structurally similar argument about the unity of apperception, together with an appeal to the text of *Theaetetus* 185a.

⁶⁸³ Porphyry tells us that the terminology is Stoic (*Abst.* III.2; cf. *SVF* II.223) though it becomes part of the commentary tradition (Porphyry, *in Cat.* 64.28–30; Ammonius, *in Cat.* 57.22). Proclus' point here is that in *lacking* voice the soul's internal dialogue is actually not lacking anything. We should see it as more complete or perfect since it requires nothing of the sort, as is the case in exterior discourse. Cf. the World Body's missing legs, mouth, etc. at II. 86.1–92.10.

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characterise knowledge, just as Motion and Rest characterise life, hence Plato has made a point of mentioning them in particular in as much as all knowledge has a common ancestry with them.

F. The soul's knowledge of sensibles

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When [the discourse] comes to be concerned with something that is sensible, and [when] the Circle of the Different proceeds in a straight line (*orthos*) [and] it announces its [verdict] through the entire soul, then opinions and convictions come to be that are stable and true. (*Tim.* 37b6–9)

1. General interpretation

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In this passage the knowledge of sensibles is discussed – how the discourse in the World Soul produces this knowledge, viz. by moving the Circle of the Different and the rational-forming principles (*logos*) that have been established within it to preside over the orderly arrangement of the wholes⁶⁸⁴ and by guarding against deviation. For, on the one hand, this ‘correctness’ (*orthotês*) means ‘correct opinion’ (*orthodoxia*), as Porphyry⁶⁸⁵ has interpreted this (and Iamblichus⁶⁸⁶ accepted this). But on the other hand, ‘correctness’ also means that which is inflexible and unwavering in providence. For while the power of being unwearied and rapid is appropriate to intellection, to providence belongs generative activities and the power of being inflexible and unwavering. And while the purity of intellection is appropriate to indivisible Being, undefiled activity belongs to divisible Being. <Porphyry> therefore interprets the upright (*orthos*) circle <as undivided,> and treats the one that is not entirely accurate but rather participates to an extent in straightness, <as divided,> because the knowledge of sensible things is both carried out toward that which is external but also bent round again and brought back into the soul itself.⁶⁸⁷ So it turns out that it is neither merely straight, like

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⁶⁸⁴ I.e. the totalities of the elements or species in general, cf. II. 3.1–5.

⁶⁸⁵ II. 309.7–23 = Porphyry, in *Tim.* fr. 76 (Sodano).

⁶⁸⁶ II. 309.7–310.10 = Iamblichus, in *Tim.* fr. 59 (Dillon).

⁶⁸⁷ Reading <Πορφύριος> μὲν οὖν τὸν ὀρθὸν κύκλον, <ἀμέριστον, μεριστὸν δὲ> τὸν μὴ ἀκριβῆ κύκλον, ἀλλὰ μετέχοντά πως τῆς εὐθείας ἀκούει with Dillon instead of Diehl's ἀμέριστον μὲν οὖν τὸν ὀρθὸν κύκλον, <μεριστὸν δὲ> τὸν μὴ ἀκριβῆ κύκλον, ἀλλὰ μετέχοντά πως τῆς εὐθείας ἀκούει. Dillon argues that Iamblichus cannot be the subject of ἀκούει since Iamblichus is presented as rejecting this interpretation in line 23. Nor can Plato be the subject, as Festugière would have it, since a man cannot ἀκούει his own work. So since everyone accepts that μεριστὸν δὲ has fallen out, there is no obstacle to thinking that ἀμέριστον was also missed out and reinserted in such a way as to displace Πορφύριος.

knowledge of sensation, nor is it round, like the knowledge of discursive thought.

Iamblichus, however, rejected this entire interpretation as fitting for the types of knowledge in humans but not for the kinds of knowledge the gods have.⁶⁸⁸ Whenever, then, the charioteer moves the Circle of the Different, and it, remaining in an unwavering condition and being turned toward him, rouses up the rational-forming principles of sensible things and announces to the Universal Soul⁶⁸⁹ what sort of thing each of the sensibles is – for the Universal Soul knows the sensible universe according to him, since even the Circle of Same, when it sees the intelligibles, knows the sensible realm in as much as it knows its causes, while the Circle of the Different knows it from itself (*autothen*) and in the manner, as it were, of something that belongs to the same order (*systoixôs*) – then opinions (*doxa*) and convictions (*pistis*) are engendered in it; for when the soul that is more divine sits in judgement on it (or rather illuminates it with an activity more intellectual than it) the circle with the power of opinion (*ho doxastikos kyklos*) possesses in a purified way its own appropriate sort of life and the knowledge in it is rendered stable. [When this happens] it antecedently comprehends within itself what is being moved in a manner that is stable, and what is fluid and contingent in a manner that is trustworthy and fixed,⁶⁹⁰ for opinion is the activity of the opiniative soul (*doxastikê psychê*) and [the form of] knowledge [appropriate to it], while conviction that is stable and immovable is the judgement of opinion. So much, then, for these matters.

⁶⁸⁸ Dillon is invaluable for seeing what is at issue here between Iamblichus and Porphyry. Both Iamblichus and Porphyry interpret this passage in terms of the image of the soul as chariot in *Phaedrus* 246a ff. On Porphyry's reading, the Circle of the Different even within the World Soul is that within the soul which possesses the knowledge of sensibles. It is the source both of the sensible things themselves, and also the repository of the knowledge of sensibles had by the whole soul. Hence Porphyry says 'the knowledge of sensible things is both carried out [from the Circle of the Different] toward that which is external but also bent round again and brought back into the soul itself'. However, Iamblichus reads this passage and the chariot image generally in such a way as to make the chariot driver the *hypercosmic* soul. This hypercosmic soul rouses up the Circle of the Different, thus stirring up the *logoi* of the things of sense, and reports on them to the soul in general. However, in doing so, it turns out that even the Circle of the Same possesses the knowledge of sensible things.

⁶⁸⁹ I translate πᾶσα ψυχὴ here and below as Universal Soul rather than World Soul since Dillon thinks that the term here refers to Iamblichus' *hypercosmic* soul. See above II. 105.15–28.

⁶⁹⁰ τὰ μὲν φερόμενα μονίμως, τὰ δὲ μεταρρέοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα πιστῶς καὶ ἀραρότως ἐν αὐτῇ προειληφύτα. There seems to be a small slip in Dillon's translation: 'forming preconceptions... of things fixed (presumably τὰ μεταρρέοντα!)... fixedly'.

2. *Problem and solution*

It is worthwhile to consider (given that the Circle of the Different is able to know all of the sensible realm, as has been said, and the Circle of the Same is able to know all of the intelligibles, as will be said) how is it that, since the one circle is the cause of motion toward the right, while the other is the cause of motion toward the left, and the kinetic powers of the two have thus been articulated from one another – how is it not *already* the case that the soul's cognitive powers have been similarly articulated from one another, but instead are differentiated by virtue of the fact that the soul has knowledge of the sensible realm by means of one [circle] and knowledge of the intelligible realm by means of the other? Must one not reply thus: That the life-engendering motions [to the right or the left] pertain to the phase of progression, while the cognitive [motions] pertain to the phase of reversion. And since the Circle of the Same is next to the intelligible realm, when it proceeds from thence, by having this present to it, it is moved in a vital manner and thanks to its procession moves the first revolution [of the sphere of the fixed stars], and because of the latter the entire cosmos is moved. For the subordinate revolutions result from those that are superior, as Aristotle truly observed⁶⁹¹ when he said that the [realm of] generation [below the Moon] is moved in terms of both, possessing an invariant character due to the motion [of the sphere of the fixed stars] to the right, but experiencing diversity as a result of the revolution [of the planets] toward the left.⁶⁹² When [the Circle of the Same] reverts, it reverts upon the intelligibles and because of this fact it is able to know them. In any case, it is always necessary to connect reversion with permanence. And while the Circle of the Different doubtless remains in the same condition – for it is encompassed proximately within the Circle of the Same, just as the Circle of the Same is encompassed by the Intellect – it proceeds because of vital motions into the second of the things moved (I mean it goes into the secondary revolution [of the planetary spheres]), and because of this it also moves the realm of generation [below the Moon], as the former [circle] through its invariant motion has moved the universe as a whole. When it [sc. the Circle of the Different] reverts, it reverts upon the vital motions of the former [sc. the Circle of the Same], since it is located proximately to it. But when through its knowledge it reverts upon that very thing which the Circle of the Same governs vitally, then it undergoes reversion in a cognitive manner; and in this way it doubtless

⁶⁹¹ ἔπονται γὰρ αἱ ἀκυρότεραι περίοδοι ταῖς κυριωτέραις. Diehl notes the parallel with *GA* IV.10, 778a1–2: γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀκυροτέρων περιόδους ταῖς τῶν κυριωτέρων.

⁶⁹² Cf. *GC* II.10, 336a31–b4 and *Cael.* II.3, 286b1–5.

comes to possess the knowledge of the entire cosmos, since it has joined that aspect of itself that reverts to that aspect of what comes before it that remains. It will thus have come about that the one [circle] is knowledgeable about intelligibles while the other is such as to know the sensibles, for if revolution of the Different moves [something] it was necessary for it to know that whose movement it leads, as well as that to which it is subordinate⁶⁹³ (since it is an intermediate [between higher and lower]). It is just as in the case of the Circle of the Same where, if it moves the universe, it was necessary for it to know to what sort of life its single form of life is to be assimilated. So reversion takes place in the one case through the parts reverting upon the whole, while in the other case it comes about through the whole reverting upon a different whole. Such then are the sorts of things that we have to say about this inquiry, one that demands deep consideration.

Surely it is therefore not to be conceived that the World Soul admits the knowledge of sensible things from somewhere external, nor that it is in need of sense organs in order to apprehend them, for these things are for partial souls.⁶⁹⁴ Rather we should think that when it has reverted upon itself, it possesses the projected rational-forming principles (*probal-lomenos logos*) of sensibles on its own.⁶⁹⁵ It is for this reason that Plato says quite accurately that the Circle of the Different is active **concerning** what is sensible and not *toward* (*peri to aisthêton*) what is sensible (*pros to aisthêton*), in order that the inclusion of the sensibles within the rational-forming principles in a preliminary causal mode (*kat' aitian*) might be indicated, rather than conveying the idea that the knowledge [of sensibles] stands in a reciprocal (*syzygos*) relation to the sensibles or that the knowledge has been placed within the sensibles. So much then about these matters.

3. *Lexis* for Tim. 37b6–9

The words **announces its [verdict] through the entire soul** are consonant with the [earlier] statement that ‘it speaks, being moved through

⁶⁹³ αὐτὸν καὶ ὧν ἡγεῖται καὶ ᾧ ἔπεται. It seems likely to me, in light of ἔπονται γὰρ αἱ ἀκυρότεραι περίοδοι ταῖς κυριωτέραις at 310.23 that this should be understood as sense B.I.7 (LSJ) of ἔπομαι – not ‘les objets auxquels elle commande et l’objet duquel elle est la suite’ as Festugière would have it.

⁶⁹⁴ See in *Tim.* II. 86.10–89.1 on the cosmos’ lack of sense organs.

⁶⁹⁵ On ‘projected’ concepts see Sorabji (2005b), 37–43 and the other primary texts and secondary sources cited there. The soul, being superior to the body, is impassive in relation to it. In perception, the soul discerns the form that enforms the sense object and projects the same form over the percept. The language of projecting Sorabji attributes to Iamblichus; cf. Priscian, *Metaphrasis in Theophrastum* 7.11–20.

the whole of itself (*Tim.* 36a6–7). It indicates that when the Circle of the Different comes into contact with the sensibles that are proximate to it and by virtue of this fact the *entire soul* receives the knowledge. However, one might interpret the word **its** in various ways, as Porphyry⁶⁹⁶ has established, but it is better to take it with ‘discourse’ (*logos*),⁶⁹⁷ for opinions and convictions come about from this very discourse when the circle proceeds correctly, announcing the sensible things [to the entire soul]. For while the opinions and convictions are *in* the faculty of opinion (*to doxastikon*), they *belong to* reason (*logos*) itself in as much as they are moved, roused up and maintained by it. So much then about the coordination of the soul’s discourse with the Circle of the Different. Next Plato discusses its coordination with the Circle of the Same when he adds these words:

G. The soul’s knowledge of intelligibles: Tim. 37c1–3

However, when it is concerned with the object of reasoning (*to logistikon*), and the Circle of the Same is running smoothly, it declares these things; then, of necessity, both intellect and scientific knowledge result. (*Tim.* 37c1–3)

Plato has opposed all these things. The **object of reasoning** (*to logistikon*) is opposed to that which is sensible; **running smoothly** [in this case] is opposed to [the way in which the Circle of the Different was earlier

⁶⁹⁶ Porphyry, in *Tim.* fr. 77 (Sodano).

⁶⁹⁷ At issue is the αὐτοῦ in *Timaeus* 37b6–8: ὅταν μὲν περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γίγνηται καὶ ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος ὁρθὸς ἴων εἰς πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν διαγγείλῃ, δόξαι καὶ πιστεῖς γίγνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς. Not everyone is happy with the text and Archer-Hind emends it to αὐτὰ which he translates as: ‘when she is busied with the sensible, the circle of the Other . . . announces it throughout all the soul, then are formed sure opinions and true beliefs’. Zeyl seems to me to treat the antecedent of αὐτοῦ as the *logos* which yields the odd implication that the soul belongs to the *logos*, not the other way around: ‘whenever the account concerns anything that is perceptible, the circle of the Different goes straight and proclaims it [?] throughout its [αὐτοῦ? sc. the account’s?] whole soul’. Cornford, it seems to me, may take αὐτοῦ with κύκλος: ‘when discourse that is alike true . . . is about that which is sensible, and the circle of the Different, moving aright, carries its [the circle’s?] message throughout the soul’. My own translation of the lemma attempts to understand αὐτοῦ as Proclus does with the *logos* as its antecedent. I follow Cornford in providing something – a verdict or a message – that belongs to the *logos* and is announced throughout the soul. Perhaps this is what Proclus has in mind when he treats the δόξαι καὶ πιστεῖς as something that belong to the *logos* at 312.1–2: εἰσι γὰρ καὶ αἱ δόξαι καὶ αἱ πιστεῖς ἐν τῷ δοξαστικῷ μὲν, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ λόγου. Festugière complains that Proclus’ reading would require him to move the comma from its position after διαγγείλῃ. But perhaps Proclus means nothing so literal. Rather he too thinks that one needs to supply something like διαγγελία as understood – a missing direct object that he encompasses vaguely by speaking later of δόξαι καὶ πιστεῖς.

said to] ‘proceed correctly’; the [Circle of the Different’s] ‘coming to be’ [concerned with its objects] is opposed to [the Circle of the Same’s] **being** [concerned with its objects]; the [fact that the Circle of the Same] **declares** is opposed [to the earlier] ‘announcing’ [in the case of the Circle of the Different]; while **intellect** is opposed to ‘opinion’, and **scientific knowledge** to ‘conviction’.

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The word ‘*logistikon*’ refers not, as some have supposed, to the faculty of reasoning (*to logizomenon*), but rather to the intelligible itself (for it is this which is opposed to what is sensible). It is for this reason that reasoning up there (in the intelligible realm) is more divine than that which happens in virtue of the soul, as we have often said, since the reasoning itself that is present among the intelligible beings always exists in actuality (*kat’ energeian*). It seems that he has here called the ‘*logistikon*’ the object of reasoning, just as he will later call the ‘object of sensation’ (*to aisthêton*) by the term *aisthêtikon*,⁶⁹⁸ for the sense object is able to activate the sense and the intelligible object is able to activate the soul’s reasoning.⁶⁹⁹ Therefore, the term ‘*logistikon*’ would be inclusive of the object of the soul’s reasoning faculty, and since this antecedently comprehends the cause of reasoning [i.e. the intelligibles] it may be connected homonymously to them. The words **running smoothly** [connote] what is intellectual (*to noeron*); what has no impediment in its transitions (since it has these transitions in a circular fashion); something whose thoughts are in the prime condition;⁷⁰⁰ what is complete [or perfect]; being engaged in activity concerning what is divine; that which is good in form; being borne around the intelligible object as if it were the centre of a circle –

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Urging yourself onward to the centre of the clamorous light (*Or. Chald.* 111)

as one of the Gods says.

The verb ‘to be’ in ‘**is** running smoothly’ connotes the fact that it has been filled with really real beings and unified with them.

The word **declares** means to bring out into the light, to teach, and to bring forth from what is hidden.

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⁶⁹⁸ Diehl lists 61d1, 65a4, 67a7 and c4, 70b6. The first two and last occurrences do seem to be uses of *aisthêtikon* to mean actual or potential object of sensation. But in 67a and c, it seems to mean the sense, not the sense object.

⁶⁹⁹ Proclus here draws attention to the modal force of the *-kon* suffix, though he locates the potentiality in question in what is, by his time, a non-standard way. In most circumstances, *aisthêtikos* means ‘capable of *being perceptually aware*’ rather than ‘potentially an *object of awareness*’. Hence after Aristotle it is almost always ‘the perceptive faculty’; cf. *De An.* II.5, 418a.3 τὸ δ’ αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχέας or *De An.* III.2, 426a.15–17 μία μὲν ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, τὸ δ’ εἶναι ἕτερον.

⁷⁰⁰ τὸ ἀκμαῖον ἐν ταῖς νοήσεσι, cf. III. 47.6.

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Intellect here means intellect in the sense of a stable disposition (*kath' hexin*), for intellect admits of three senses. The first is the divine intellect – for example, there is doubtless Demiurgic intellect. The second is the intellect participated in by the soul, which is substantial (*ousiôdês*) and entirely complete (*autotelês*). Third is dispositional intellect, on account of which the soul is intellectual.⁷⁰¹

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Scientific knowledge (*epistêmê*) is the first knowledge to be filled up from the intelligibles – a knowledge that is invariant, unwavering and without change. It differs from intellect in as much as the intellect is seen in the simple, unitary conceptions of the soul, for it is through this that each of the things that it cognises, it cognises simultaneously as a whole, for the distinctive feature of intellect is the 'all at once' (*to atbroon*)⁷⁰² character among its activities. But scientific knowledge consists in the cognition of causes, for this is the distinctive feature of scientific knowledge,⁷⁰³ which is a synthesis and division of the Forms. Now it is obvious that since it involves knowing the things that are (*ta ontà*), it knows which among them have the status of causes and which have the status of effects. All such knowledge is called 'scientific knowledge', just as the simple conception of each of the objects of intellection is called 'intellect'. This is how we take these terms.

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⁷⁰¹ Dillon (1973), 342 believes that this division of the senses of the term 'intellect' is Iamblichus' on the basis of a parallel with Proclus, *in Alc.* 65.16–19:

For the unparticipated intellect, transcending all the particular classes, differs from the participated, in which the souls of the gods share as being superior, and different again is the intellect which derives from the latter and comes to be in souls; indeed it is the perfection of souls themselves.

Though Iamblichus is not named until ten lines later, it is not implausible that the division is his. Proclus seems to accept the schema, but insists against Iamblichus that it is the third sense of 'intellect' that is at issue in the text here – not the second.

This is not, however, the only three-fold division of senses of the term 'intellect' that we find in the Neoplatonic commentary tradition. These divisions, however, centre around the exegesis of Aristotle. 'Philoponus' attributes clashing categorisations to Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plutarch of Athens. According to the first, we must distinguish 'potential intellect', then dispositional intellect and finally actual intellect which 'comes from outside' (cf. *GA* II.2, 736b15–29). By contrast, Plutarch differentiates, first, dispositional intellect, then dispositional intellect that is in activity (in some respect, but is still potential in others) and finally that which is entirely actual and comes from the outside (*in DA* 518.9–520.21). From the point of view of Iamblichus' classifications, these are differences that pertain either to intellect *kath' hexin* or participated intellect.

⁷⁰² Cf. above 102.7 for the Demiurgic imitation of this defining property of Intellect.

⁷⁰³ αὕτη δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀπ' αἰτίας γνώσεσι – τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἴδιον. Cf. Aristotle, *An.Post.* I.2, 71b.9–12: ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς... ὅταν τήν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν with *ET* I 1.8–10: ἡ γὰρ τῶν αἰτίων γνώσις ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶν ἔργον, καὶ τότε λέγομεν ἐπίστασθαι ὅταν τὰ αἰτία γνωρίσωμεν τῶν ὄντων.

Iamblichus,⁷⁰⁴ however, interprets the term ‘intellect’ to mean something superior to the soul, maintaining and perfecting it from on high. He contends with those who either connect the soul directly with the all-perfect intellect (*pantelos nous*) (for it is necessary that the transition from the things that are transcendent to those that are participated should not come about all at once, but that there should be intermediaries that have been ranked along with the participating substances) or who assume that the intellect here is a disposition of the soul (for what is in itself must be prior to what is in another). 15

These things are correctly stated as far as the facts of the case go (*ta pragmata*). However, it is more consonant with the terms in the lemma before us to consider this intellect as a disposition within the soul itself, since Timaeus says that it results from the activities of the Circle of the Same. While that intellect which has been created by the Demiurge must be said to be superior to the soul – the intellect that the Demiurge places in the soul in a manner analogous to the way in which he places the soul in the body (*Tim.* 30b4–5) – since it is obvious that this intellect is more venerable than the soul, just as the soul is more venerable than the body. 20

However, the intellect that is being discussed now is an effect (*apotelesma*) of the discourse of the Circle of the Same when it moves around that which is intelligible for he says it is produced when the aforementioned circle ‘is moved smoothly around the object of reasoning’ and so on – so it would *not* be more venerable than the soul but would be instead a certain disposition of it, as is the scientific knowledge. For this reason, he said it *has come to be* (37c3), just like the scientific knowledge in it, and the opinions and convictions as well. From all these things one single moral 25

must be drawn: that whenever the discourse is concerned with what is intelligible and the Circle of the Same, because of its own intellectual activities, reveals in discourse the nature of the things that are, then intellect and scientific knowledge are naturally engendered in the soul. And this happens **of necessity**, for there is a concomitance (*synyparchein*) between these activities and the completion that is appropriate to them. 30

‘What’s this?’ someone might say, ‘Does discourse come to be in relation to the intelligibles at one time, but at another time in relation to sensible things?’ Surely we must say no such thing in the case of the Universal Soul, but instead that it is always on high and always in a relation to the intelligibles, and that it has been placed near them and remains up there. 314

It exercises providence over the sensible things inflexibly through the smooth running of the Circle of the Same and persistence of the Circle of the Different’s upright position (*orthotês*). 5

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⁷⁰⁴ 313.15–23 = Iamblichus, in *Tim.* fr. 60 (Dillon).

Terms like ‘**when**’, ‘comes to be’ (37b6), and the like exhibit differences of power, for [the soul] is not equal everywhere in terms of its powers⁷⁰⁵ (though this *is* a distinctive property of intelligible gods because of the simplicity of their being). Instead, some of its powers are especially directed toward the intelligibles by virtue of the Circle of the Same, while others are directed more toward sensible things by virtue of the Circle of the Different.

And it is necessary not to overlook this fact too – that he says, on the one hand, that when the Circle of the Different proceeds in a straight line it knows the sensibles, but, on the other, when the Circle of the Same runs smoothly it knows <the intelligibles>. He does this with an eye on [the circles of] partial souls. When they are fallen, [Plato] describes the Circle of the Same as ‘shackled’, while he describes the Circle of the Different as ‘distorted’ (*Tim.* 43d2–3),⁷⁰⁶ for these terms are antithetical [to the ones he uses here]. Being distorted is opposed to rotating in a straight line, and being shackled is opposed to the smooth running that signifies a relaxed motion. In as much as the upright position [of the Circle of the Different] signifies that its motion up there is not distorted by things below and that its judgement is irrefutable, to that extent he has celebrated each of the circles in appropriate terms.

H. Knowledge and opinion reside in the soul: Tim. 37c3–5

And if anyone should call that in which this pair (*toutô*) of beings comes to be something other than soul, he speaks anything but the truth. (*Tim.* 37c3–5)

315 To what does he refer with [the words] ‘**this pair**’? Intellect and scientific knowledge (since these were just discussed)? Or would this fail to include the entire soul, or not at any rate the Circle of the Different? Or rather does he mean to refer to the two pairs that have been yoked together – treating opinions and convictions as a single thing, and then taking intellect and scientific knowledge together since this comes second? Through these he would include the entire soul. Therefore everything that is receptive of intellect and scientific knowledge, of opinion and conviction, is a soul. For all these acts of knowing or reasoning are also discursive.

⁷⁰⁵ Cf. Proclus’ endorsement of the view that the soul is present in various ways through its various powers at II. 106.1–10.

⁷⁰⁶ These obstructions of the psychic circles can lead to various sorts of problems: ‘The disturbances (διαφοραί) of the circles cause the combination of ratios to be moved in opposite ways (ἐναντίας). The breaking (κλάσεις) causes the slanting or oblique motion (πλαγίως), and the turnings (στροφαι) cause them to be flattened (ὕπτως)’ (*in Tim.* III. 340.29–31). Later in his commentary, Proclus turns these terms into a catalogue of vices from which the embodied soul may suffer. See Baltzly (2006).

Because they are acts of reasoning, they are such as to transcend the irrational powers [of the soul]. But because they are discursive, they are inferior to intellectual knowledge. For if there is intellect and scientific understanding among the intelligibles but it has not *come to be* present to them, but in the case of the soul *they have come to be*, just as he says, then this is surely because in the latter case there is participation in scientific knowledge, for the soul participates in Knowledge Itself. In fact, it has been made substantial thanks to participation (for the intermediate kinds [of Being, Sameness and Difference from which the soul is composed] have proceeded from the primary kinds [of Being, Sameness and Difference]). Moreover, it has been harmonised in a similar manner (for the harmonies in it participate in Harmony Itself). It has also been configured in a similar manner (for the intellectual shape is such as to include all the various shapes). And it has its powers in the same way, since the intellectual and intelligible powers were prior to it. It has received its Motion from the kinds of being and its knowledge from the creative cognitions, the Rest of which is surely manifested. (For all knowledge is a sort of rest and a comprehension (*perilêpsis*) of what is known, or an adjustment (*epharmogê*)⁷⁰⁷ [of the one who knows] with relation to the thing known.) Therefore the motion of the universal soul participates in knowledge. To the extent that it knows itself and looks into itself, it is moved, and participates in the knowledge of motion to the extent that it is discursive. While the kinetic activities of the soul in particular are demarcated in terms of Motion, the cognitive ones are demarcated in terms of Rest, and the Circle of the Different is particularly disposed to move things (*kinêtikos*), while the Circle of the Same is particularly disposed to know things (*gnôstikos*) because Rest pertains to Sameness, but Motion to Difference. Knowledge also exists in the Circle of the Different and Motion in the Circle of the Same, just as in the former there is Sameness [in addition to Difference] and in the latter Difference [as well as Sameness], for the soul participates through and through⁷⁰⁸ in the genera of being.

Surely then as far as these matters go, the generation of the soul has had all its essential parts filled in, since it has been divided into just those headings that we earlier set out in writing. For we said these concerned the matters that pertain to the *hypostasis* of the soul; about its harmonies; about its shape or figure; about its powers; and about its activities.

⁷⁰⁷ Cf. above 287.2–3.

⁷⁰⁸ ὅλη γὰρ δι' ὅλης ἡ ψυχῆ μετέχει... Cf. II. 1.13 [sc. the World's Body] κατὰ χρόνον γὰρ ὅλον καθ' ὅλον ὑφέστηκεν.

VIII. Appendix⁷⁰⁹

5 What does he mean by the first generation of the soul?⁷¹⁰ Since the soul is a plurality and the first of the things that are composite, it has been put together not from an infinite number, but out of [parts that have] a definite number. And since these things are not ill proportioned but rather have been harmonised, numbers and harmony have been plausibly assumed in its generation. But since it includes as well all the first principles of all proportion and all harmony – this being the soul of the cosmos – not a single proportion has been left out. Because the composite is divine, the more divine of the kinds [of harmony] was assumed, i.e. the diatonic, for this [harmonic system] is inspired. Because Being, Sameness and Difference have all been assumed from the start, the soul has been established as a whole *prior* to the parts, but now through the generation of the soul we have the whole *in* the parts. For the Demiurge has divided and unified it through proportions, and through the circles he has provided for the wholeness of the parts in each one. It must also be accepted that the Demiurge in the *Timaeus* acts in conjunction with all the other creators, for he divides [the Circle of the Same] into seven in the manner of the Titans and unifies things in a manner that is Apollonian. In as much as he has the character of Hephaestus, he forges and shapes bodies, while he demarcates the patterns of risings and settings [among the heavenly bodies] and has written the laws of fate in as much as he has the character of Necessity.

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Since it is necessary for <the things>⁷¹¹ in the generation of the soul to have a point (*skopos*), what is said must be referred either to the soul's essence or to the things that are administered by it. Or, if possible, they should be referred to both, for the things in the cosmos are due to those things that subsist in the soul in an essential way (*kat' ousian*).

25 It is necessary to inquire into what the means are, what multiples are, what a super-particular ratio is and what a super-partient ratio is, what the semi-tone is, what the seven portions are [in the division of the Circle of the Different]. It is also necessary to understand the reason why the musical scale has proceeded into four octaves, a fifth and a tone.

⁷⁰⁹ The following paragraphs are separated by two lines from what goes before in the manuscripts. Festugière has chosen not to bother translating it. It must be said that it adds nothing new to what we have in book 3. On the other hand, it is not obvious that it fails to be from Proclus' hand.

⁷¹⁰ τί βούλεται ἡ ψυχογονία; Cf. *in Alc.* 150.24: ἀλλὰ τί βούλεται αὐτῷ “Κῦρος” ἐνταῦθα καὶ “Ξέρξης”; and *in Euc.* 30.8–9: ἀλλὰ τί βούλεται διὰ τῶν ἐν πολιτείᾳ λόγων ἀφαιρῶν αὐτῆς τὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐπωνυμίαν.

⁷¹¹ Reading σκοπὸν δεῖ ἔχειν <τὰ> εἰς τὴν ψυχογονίαν with Kroll.

It is also necessary to understand that, since there are three [kinds of] proportion – the geometric, arithmetic and the musical – the solid proportion composed of all three is equality of Themis, from which all proportions derive their status as proportions. But the three proportions [considered individually] are derived from her three daughters, Eunomia, Dikê and Eirênê. The arithmetic proportion belongs to Eirênê (Peace) since its nature is to exceed and be exceeded by an equal amount – a feature that we make use of in contracts in peacetime and through which the elements [within the cosmos] are quiescent. But the geometric proportion belongs to Eunomia (Good Order), which Plato has termed the ‘judgement of Zeus’ (*Laws* VI, 757b6), and it is through this that the cosmos has been adorned with geometric proportions. But harmonic proportion belongs to Dikê (Justice), through which the greater has the greater proportion and the lesser the lesser. Since, therefore, the geometric proportion includes the other two, as has been shown, the soul’s essence has been ordered by geometric proportion since it is everywhere divisible and indivisible through and through. But [the soul has been ordered] <in virtue of> the arithmetic proportion because of the common powers in it, running either from the power that is indivisible to that which is divisible or from invisible things to the divisible, exceeding and being exceeded by an equal amount all that is divisible and indivisible. But the harmonic proportion [orders the soul], because of the powers that are in it. Some of these powers have been set further apart from the leaders and are to a greater degree inferior,⁷¹² while others have less. Once again, the Sameness of the Forms exists through everything in the cosmos in a manner appropriate to that individual – be it corporeally, vitally, in plants, animals or stones – because geometric proportion has ordered the whole cosmos. But arithmetic proportion shows through among the elements in the sublunary region which the proportion has made co-extensive in terms of their powers. However, harmonic proportion is evident thanks to the heavenly spheres, their motions, and their intervals, for Ptolemy has shown that the intervals between the spheres are in terms of harmonic proportions.

⁷¹² αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον ἀφεστήκασι τῶν προαγουσῶν καὶ μείζονα ἔχουσιν ὑπεροχὴν. Since they are set further from their leading causes, these causes exceed them to a greater extent than members in a series that are more proximate to the leading cause of the series. In effect, μείζονα ἔχουσιν ἑλλειψιν.

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English–Greek glossary

able	<i>dynatos</i>	δυνατός
able, be	<i>dynasthai</i>	δύνασθαι
above	<i>anôterô</i>	άνωτέρω
absolutely complete	<i>pantelês</i>	παντελής
absurd consequence	<i>alogia</i>	άλογία
accident	<i>to symbebêkos</i>	τὸ συμβεβηκός
accidental	<i>symbebêkos</i>	συμβεβηκός
accommodate	<i>epharμοzein</i>	ἐφαρμόζειν
account	<i>historia</i>	ἱστορία
account	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
acquired or extrinsic	<i>epithetos</i>	ἐπίθετος
action	<i>poiêsis</i>	ποίησις
activating	<i>kinêtikos</i>	κινητικός
active, be	<i>energein</i>	ἐνεργεῖν
activities, in terms of (their)	<i>kat' energeian</i>	κατ' ἐνέργειαν
activity	<i>energeia</i>	ἐνέργεια
activity takes place, that in which	<i>to energoumenon</i>	τὸ ἐνεργούμενον
actuality	<i>entelecheia</i>	ἐντελέχεια
actuality, in	<i>kat' energeian</i>	κατ' ἐνέργειαν
add	<i>ephaptesthai</i>	ἐφάπτεσθαι
added extra	<i>epiktêtos</i>	ἐπίκτητος
adjust to fit	<i>epharμοzein</i>	ἐφαρμόζειν
adjustment	<i>epharmogê</i>	ἐφαρμογή
administer	<i>epitropeuein</i>	ἐπιτροπεύειν
admit of	<i>endechomai</i>	ἐνδέχομαι
admit of	<i>epidechesthai</i>	ἐπιδέχεσθαι
Adrastus	<i>Adrastos</i>	Ἄδραστος
advance	<i>propodizein</i>	προποδίζειν
advance alongside	<i>symproerchesthai</i>	συμπρόρχεσθαι
adventitious	<i>epeisodiôdês</i>	ἐπεισοδιώδης
aegis	<i>aigis</i>	αἰγίς
aerial	<i>aerios</i>	ἀέριος
aether	<i>aithêr</i>	αἰθήρ
aetherial	<i>aitherios</i>	αἰθέριος
aetherial manner, in an	<i>aitheriôs</i>	αἰθερίως
affection	<i>pathos</i>	πάθος
Agave, the mother of Pentheus	<i>Agauê</i>	Ἀγαύη

agree	<i>homologeîn</i>	ὁμολογεῖν
air	<i>âēr</i>	ἀήρ
akin	<i>homogonos</i>	ὁμόγονος
akin	<i>syngenês</i>	συγγενής
alien	<i>allotrios</i>	ἄλλότριος
alive	<i>zôtikos</i>	ζωτικός
all at once	<i>athroos</i>	ἄθροος
all-perfect	<i>pantelês</i>	παντελής
alone	<i>monôs</i>	μόνος
alter	<i>exallattein</i>	ἐξαλλάττειν
alteration	<i>exallagê</i>	ἐξαλλαγή
always	<i>aei</i>	ἀεί
Amelius	<i>Amelios</i>	Ἀμέλιος
Ammonius	<i>Ammônios</i>	Ἀμμώνιος
analogous	<i>ana logon</i>	ἀνά λόγον
analogous, be	<i>analogeîn</i>	ἀναλογεῖν
analogy	<i>analogia</i>	ἀναλογία
analysis	<i>analysis</i>	ἀνάλυσις
ancients	<i>palaioi, boi</i>	παλαιοί, οἱ
angel	<i>angelos</i>	ἄγγελος
angelic	<i>angelikos</i>	ἄγγελικός
angle	<i>gônia</i>	γωνία
animal	<i>zôion</i>	ζῷον
animate, adj.	<i>empsychos</i>	ἐμψυχος
animate, v.	<i>psychoun</i>	ψυχοῦν
animate, adj.	<i>zoiôdês</i>	ζωώδης
animation	<i>psychôsis</i>	ψύχωσις
antecedently comprehend	<i>prolambanein</i>	προλαμβάνειν
antecedently subordinate	<i>proûpotithenai</i>	προϋποτιθέναι
antithetically	<i>antithetôs</i>	ἀντιθέτως
Antoninus	<i>Antôninos</i>	Ἀντωνῖνος
Apollo	<i>Apollôn</i>	Ἀπόλλων
Apollonian	<i>Apollôniakos</i>	Ἀπολλωνιακός
apotome	<i>apotomê</i>	ἀποτομή
apparent	<i>phainomenos</i>	φαινόμενος
appearances, risings (of planet)	<i>phaseis</i>	φάσεις
appears (phenomenon), that which	<i>phainomenos</i>	φαινόμενος
apprehend	<i>epiballein</i>	ἐπιβάλλειν
apprehension	<i>antilêpsis</i>	ἀντίληψις
apprehension	<i>katalêpsis</i>	κατάληψις
appropriate	<i>oikeios</i>	οἰκεῖος
appropriately	<i>eikotôs</i>	εἰκότως
appropriately	<i>oikeiôs</i>	οἰκείως
appropriateness	<i>oikeiotês</i>	οἰκειότης

English-Greek glossary

appropriation	<i>oikeiôsis</i>	οἰκείωσις
aquatic	<i>enydrios</i>	ἐνὺδριος
argument	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
Aristander	<i>Aristandros</i>	Ἀρίστανδρος
Aristotle	<i>Aristotelês</i>	Ἀριστοτέλης
Aristoxenus	<i>Aristoxenos</i>	Ἀριστόξενος
Aristoxenus, followers of	<i>Aristoxeneioi</i>	Ἀριστοξένειοι
arithmetic	<i>arithmêtikos</i>	ἀριθμητικός
armillary sphere	<i>krikôtê sphaira</i>	κρικωτὴ σφαῖρα
arrange	<i>diakosmein</i>	διακοσμεῖν
arrange	<i>tattein</i>	τάττειν
arrange alongside	<i>syzeugnynai</i>	συζευγύναι
arranged in opposition	<i>antitetagmenos</i>	ἀντιτεταγμένος
arrangement (orderly)	<i>diakosmêsis</i>	διακόσμησις
arrangement	<i>diakosmos</i>	διάκοσμος
arrive at the truth	<i>alêtheuein</i>	ἀληθεύειν
art	<i>technê</i>	τέχνη
Artemis	<i>Artemis</i>	Ἄρτεμις
articulate into plurality	<i>anelittein</i>	ἀνελίττειν
assimilate	<i>homoion</i>	ὁμοιοῦν
assimilated, be	<i>oikeiousthai</i>	οἰκειοῦσθαι
association	<i>koinônia</i>	κοινωνία
assumed	<i>keisthai</i>	κεῖσθαι
astronomer	<i>astronomos</i>	ἄστρονόμος
at a loss, be	<i>aporein</i>	ἀπορεῖν
Athena, of	<i>Athênaiikos</i>	Ἀθηναϊκός
Athenian (man from Athens)	<i>Athênaios</i>	Ἀθηναῖος
attach	<i>anaptein</i>	ἀνάπτειν
Atticus	<i>Attikos</i>	Ἀττικός
attune	<i>harmozsein</i>	ἁρμόζειν
attunement	<i>harmonia</i>	ἁρμονία
awaken	<i>egeirein</i>	ἐγείρειν
base	<i>pythmên</i>	πυθμὴν
beautiful	<i>kalos</i>	κάλος
beautiful, the	<i>to kalon</i>	τὸ καλόν
become	<i>gignesthai</i>	γίγνεσθαι
Becoming	<i>genesis</i>	γένεσις
before	<i>proteron</i>	πρότερον
beginning	<i>archê</i>	ἀρχή
being	<i>on, to</i>	ὄν, τὸ
Being Itself	<i>to on auto</i>	τὸ ὄν αὐτό
being that comes last	<i>on eschaton</i>	ὄν ἔσχατον
being that exists in the primary manner	<i>to prôtôs on</i>	τὸ πρῶτως ὄν

English–Greek glossary

being that is generated <i>simpliciter</i>	<i>on haplôs genêton</i>	ὄν ἀπλῶς γενητόν
Being that really is	<i>to ontôs on</i>	τὸ ὄντως ὄν
beloved	<i>philos</i>	φίλος
bending	<i>katakampsis</i>	κατάκαμψις
best	<i>ariston</i>	ἄριστον
better	<i>kreittôn</i>	κρείττων
between, in	<i>en mesôi</i>	ἐν μέσῳ
beyond	<i>epekeîna</i>	ἐπέκεινα
bi-form(ed)	<i>dyoicidês</i>	δυοειδής
bind together	<i>synereidein</i>	συνερείδειν
bind/yoke together	<i>syzeugnynai</i>	συζευγύναι
binding (together)	<i>syndesis</i>	σύνδεσις
binding	<i>desis</i>	δέσις
blended	<i>kekramenos</i>	κεκραμένος
blessed (person)	<i>spoudaios</i>	σπουδαῖος
blessed	<i>makarios</i>	μακάριος
blessedness	<i>makariotês</i>	μακαριότης
blunt	<i>amblynein</i>	ἀμβλύνειν
bodily	<i>sômatikos</i>	σωματικός
body	<i>sôma</i>	σῶμα
bond	<i>desmos</i>	δεσμός
bonding together	<i>syndesmos</i>	σύνδεσμος
boundary	<i>horos</i>	ὄρος
boy	<i>kouros</i>	κοῦρος
breadth	<i>platos</i>	πλάτος
break into smaller units	<i>katakermatizein</i>	κατακερματίζειν
bring back	<i>anagein</i>	ἀνάγειν
bring forth	<i>proagein</i>	προάγειν
bring forth together	<i>symparagein</i>	συμπαράγειν
bring/lead forth	<i>paragein</i>	παράγειν
by nature, be	<i>phyein</i>	φύειν
call	<i>onomazein</i>	ὀνομάζειν
causal manner, in a	<i>kat' aitian</i>	κατ' αἰτίαν
cause, n.	<i>aitia</i>	αἰτία
cause, v.	<i>paragein</i>	παράγειν
caused, be	<i>gignesthai</i>	γίγνεσθαι
caused, that which is	<i>aitiaton</i>	αἰτιατόν
cease	<i>lêgein</i>	λήγειν
celebrate	<i>hymnein</i>	ὑμνεῖν
celestial	<i>ouranios</i>	οὐράνιος
celestial manner, in a	<i>ouraniôs</i>	οὐρανίως
centre	<i>kentron</i>	κέντρον
centre, in the manner of the	<i>kentrikôs</i>	κεντρικῶς
change	<i>kinêsis</i>	κίνησις

change	<i>metabasis</i>	μετάβασις
changeless	<i>akinêtos</i>	ἀκίνητος
channel	<i>ochetos</i>	ὄχετός
character	<i>charaktêr</i>	χαρακτήρ
character, ethical	<i>êthos</i>	ἦθος
characterise	<i>charaktêrizein</i>	χαρακτηρίζειν
characteristic	<i>charaktêristikos</i>	χαρακτηριστικός
charioteer	<i>beniochos</i>	ἡνίοχος
chi, the letter	<i>ch</i>	χ
choice	<i>hairesis</i>	αἵρεσις
chromatic (music)	<i>chrômatikos</i>	χρωματικός
Circle of the Same	<i>ho tou tautou kyklos</i>	ὁ τοῦ ταυτοῦ κύκλος
circle	<i>kyklos</i>	κύκλος
circular	<i>kyklikos</i>	κυκλικός
circumference	<i>periôchê</i>	περιοχή
city-state	<i>politeia</i>	πολιτεία
clause	<i>kôlon</i>	κῶλον
clear	<i>emphanês</i>	ἐμφανής
co-establish	<i>synphistanai</i>	συνυφιστάναι
co-extensive, be	<i>exisazein</i>	ἐξισάζειν
cognise	<i>noein</i>	νοεῖν
cognise, such as to	<i>noêtikos</i>	νοητικός
cognised, that which is	<i>to nooumenon</i>	τὸ νοούμενον
cognising	<i>to noein</i>	τὸ νοεῖν
cognition, act of	<i>noêsis</i>	νόησις
cognitive	<i>gnôstikos</i>	γνωστικός
coldness	<i>psychrotês</i>	ψυχρότης
colour, of the same	<i>homochrous</i>	ὁμόχρους
come into being	<i>gignesthai</i>	γίγνεσθαι
come to be	<i>enginesthai</i>	ἐγγίνεσθαι
come to be	<i>gennan</i>	γεννᾶν (pass.)
come/go down	<i>kathêkein</i>	καθήκειν
come/go forth	<i>proerchesthai</i>	προέρχεσθαι
comes after, that which	<i>hysterogenês</i>	ὑστερογενής
coming to be	<i>genesis</i>	γένεσις
commanding faculty, the	<i>to hêgemonikon</i>	τὸ ἡγεμονικόν
commune with	<i>koinônein</i>	κοινωνεῖν
communion	<i>koinônia</i>	κοινωνία
complete (or perfect)	<i>teleios</i>	τέλειος
complete set	<i>plêrôma</i>	πλήρωμα
complete, v.	<i>apotelein</i>	ἀποτελεῖν
complete, adj.	<i>teleios</i>	τέλειος
complete, adj.	<i>teleos</i>	τέλεος
complete, to make	<i>teleioun</i>	τελειοῦν
complete, such as to	<i>teleiôtikos</i>	τελειωτικός
complete, such as to make	<i>telesiourgos</i>	τελεσιουργός

completely and perfectly	<i>teleôs</i>	τελέως
completely perfect	<i>pantelês</i>	παντελής
completely whole	<i>holotelês</i>	όλοτελής
completeness	<i>teleiotês</i>	τελειότης
completion of cycle	<i>apokatastasis</i>	ἀποκατάστασις
completion	<i>apoperatôsis</i>	ἀποπεράτωσις
compose	<i>symplēroun</i>	συμπληροῦν
composite	<i>synthetos</i>	σύνθετος
composition	<i>symplērôsis</i>	συμπλήρωσις
composition	<i>synthesis</i>	σύνθεσις
compounded, be	<i>symphtheiresthai</i>	συμφθεیرهσθαι
conception	<i>ennoia</i>	ἐννοια
conception	<i>epibolê</i>	ἐπιβολή
concord	<i>symphônia</i>	συμφωνία
conditional	<i>protasis</i>	πρότασις
Conductor	<i>Mousêgetês</i>	Μουσηγέτης
configure	<i>schêmatizein</i>	σχηματίζειν
conjoin	<i>synaptein</i>	συνάπτειν
conjoined	<i>synechês</i>	συνεχής
conjoined/united naturally, be	<i>symphyesthai</i>	συμφύεσθαι
conjoining	<i>syndetikos</i>	συνδετικός
conjoins, that which	<i>synochikos</i>	συνοχικός
conjunction	<i>synapsis</i>	σύναψις
connate	<i>symphyês</i>	συμφυής
connate, be	<i>symphyesthai</i>	συμφύεσθαι
connect	<i>synaptein</i>	συνάπτειν
connect, such as to	<i>synektikos</i>	συνεκτικός
connection	<i>synaphê</i>	συναφή
connective	<i>synektikos</i>	συνεκτικός
connective	<i>th. synektikos</i>	θ. συνεκτικός
Connector (<i>Or. Chald.</i>)	<i>synocheus</i>	συνοχεύς
consistent	<i>homologos</i>	ὁμόλογος
Constitutions (a section of Plato's <i>Laws</i>)	<i>hai politeiai</i>	αἱ πολιτεῖαι
contact	<i>synaphê</i>	συναφή
contact, be in	<i>synaptein</i>	συνάπτειν
contact, come into	<i>ephaptesthai</i>	ἐφάπτεσθαι
contain in advance	<i>prolambanein</i>	προλαμβάνειν
contemplate	<i>theasthai</i>	θεᾶσθαι
contemplation	<i>theôria</i>	θεωρία
contentious	<i>eristikos</i>	ἐριστικός
continuous	<i>synechês</i>	συνεχής
converge	<i>synneuein</i>	συννεύειν
convert	<i>epistrephein</i>	ἐπιστρέφειν
conviction	<i>pistis</i>	πίστις

English-Greek glossary

coordinate	<i>systoichos</i>	σύστοιχος
corporeal	<i>sômatikos</i>	σωματικός
corporeal in form	<i>sômatoeidês</i>	σωματοειδής
corporeality	<i>sômatotês</i>	σωματότης
correct opinion	<i>orthodoxia</i>	ὀρθοδοξία
correct opinion, in the mode of	<i>orthodoxastikôs</i>	ὀρθοδοξαστικῶς
correctness	<i>orthotês</i>	ὀρθότης
correlated with things	<i>pragmateiôdês</i>	πραγματειώδης
cosmic	<i>kosmikos</i>	κοσμικός
cosmos	<i>kosmos</i>	κόσμος
counter-argument	<i>antilogia</i>	ἀντιλογία
covering	<i>perikalypsis</i>	περικάλυψις
craft	<i>technê</i>	τέχνη
Cratylus	<i>Kratylos</i>	Κρατύλος
create	<i>dêmiourgein</i>	δημιουργεῖν
creation (object created)	<i>dêmiourgêma</i>	δημιούργημα
creation	<i>poiêsis</i>	ποίησις
creative process	<i>dêmiourgia</i>	δημιουργία
creative	<i>dêmiourgikos</i>	δημιουργικός
creator	<i>dêmiourgos</i>	δημιουργός
cubic number	<i>kybos</i>	κύβος
customary manner	<i>êthos</i>	ἥθος
cutting into parts	<i>katatomê</i>	κατατομή
cutting into strips	<i>schisis</i>	σχίσις
cycle	<i>kyklos</i>	κύκλος
cycle	<i>periodos</i>	περίοδος
daemon	<i>daimôn</i>	δαίμων
daemonic	<i>daimonios</i>	δαιμόνιος
decad	<i>dekas</i>	δεκάς
decline	<i>hypthesis</i>	ὑφESIS
define	<i>aphorizein</i>	ἀφορίζειν
define	<i>horizein</i>	ὀρίζειν
defining (characteristic)	<i>idios</i>	ἴδιος
defining characteristic	<i>idiotês</i>	ἰδιότης
defining property	<i>idiôma</i>	ἰδίωμα
definite	<i>hôrismenos</i>	ὠρισμένος
definite article (gramm.)	<i>arthron</i>	ἄρθρον
definition	<i>horismos</i>	ὀρισμός
definition	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
Demiurge	<i>dêmiourgos</i>	δημιουργός
demiurgic	<i>dêmiourgikos</i>	δημιουργικός
denominator	<i>hypologos</i>	ὑπόλογος
depend	<i>exaptein</i>	ἐξάπτειν
dependent	<i>exêrtêmenos</i>	ἐξηρτημένος

English–Greek glossary

depth	<i>batbos</i>	βάθος
descent	<i>kathodos</i>	κάθοδος
desire	<i>orexis</i>	ὄρεξις
desirous	<i>orektikos</i>	ὀρεκτικός
destruction	<i>phthora</i>	φθορά
destructive	<i>anairetikos</i>	ἀναιρετικός
deterioration	<i>hypthesis</i>	ὑφεις
deviation	<i>paratropê</i>	παρατροπή
diachronically	<i>dia chronou</i>	διὰ χρόνου
diagonal	<i>diametrikos</i>	διαμετρικός
diagonal	<i>diametros</i>	διάμετρος
diagram	<i>diagramma</i>	διάγραμμα
dialectic	<i>dialektikê</i>	διαλεκτική
dialogue	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
diatonic	<i>diatonos</i>	διάτονος
difference (amount by which a number exceeds another)	<i>hyperochê</i>	ὑπεροχή
Difference	<i>beterotês</i>	ἐτερότης (opp. ταυτότης)
Difference	<i>to heteron</i>	τὸ ἕτερον (opp. ταυτόν)
Difference	<i>to thateron</i>	τὸ θάτερον (opp. ταυτόν)
different	<i>beteros</i>	ἕτερος
different	<i>thateros</i>	θάτερος
differentiate	<i>diakrinein</i>	διακρίνειν
differentiation	<i>diakrisis</i>	διάκρισις
digression	<i>epistasis</i>	ἐπίστασις
dim	<i>amydros</i>	ἄμυδρός
dimension	<i>diastasis</i>	διάστασις
diminution	<i>hypthesis</i>	ὑφεις
Dionysian	<i>Dionysiakos</i>	Διονυσιακός
Dionysus	<i>Dionysos</i>	Διόνυσος
discordant	<i>asymphônos</i>	ἰσὺμφωνος
discourse	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
discrete	<i>diôrismenos</i>	διωρισμένος
discursive	<i>metabatikos</i>	μεταβατικός
discursive character	<i>to metabatikon</i>	τὸ μεταβατικόν
discursive manner, in a	<i>metabatikôs</i>	μεταβατικῶς
discursive thought	<i>dianoia</i>	διάνοια
discursive thought, faculty/power of	<i>to dianoêtikon</i>	τὸ διανοητικόν
discursive thought, in the manner of	<i>dianoêtikôs</i>	διανοητικῶς
disorder	<i>ataxia</i>	ἄταξία
disordered	<i>ataktos</i>	ἄτακτος
disposition	<i>bexis</i>	ἔξις
dissimilar	<i>anomoios</i>	ἀνόμοιος

dissimilarity	<i>anomoiotês</i>	ἀνομοιότης
dissolution	<i>lysis</i>	λύσις
divide	<i>merizein</i>	μερίζειν
divided	<i>diairetos</i>	διαιρετός
divine in form	<i>theoeidês</i>	θεοειδής
divine manner, in a	<i>theiôs</i>	θείως
divine, in agreement	<i>kata theon</i>	κατὰ θεόν
with the		
divine, to make	<i>ektheoun</i>	ἐκθεοῦν
divinely inspired	<i>entheos</i>	ἐνθεος
divinity	<i>theotês</i>	θεότης
divisibility	<i>merismos</i>	μερισμός
divisibility	<i>to meriston</i>	τὸ μεριστόν
divisible	<i>diairetos</i>	διαιρετός
divisible	<i>meristos</i>	μεριστός
divisible	<i>merizomenos</i>	μεριζόμενος
divisible manner, in a	<i>meristôs</i>	μεριστῶς
division, method of	<i>he diairetikê</i>	ἡ διαιρητική
domestic (animals)	<i>bêmera</i>	ἡμερα
double	<i>diplasios</i>	διπλάσιος
double, v.	<i>diplasiazein</i>	διπλασιάζειν
double-mouthed	<i>amphistomos</i>	ἀμφίστομος
dough	<i>phyrama</i>	φύραμα
downwards	<i>anôthen</i>	ἄνωθεν
doxastic	<i>doxastikos</i>	δοξαστικός
dragon	<i>drakôn</i>	δράκων
drama	<i>drama</i>	δρᾶμα
dual in form	<i>dyoeidês</i>	δυοειδής
dyad	<i>dyas</i>	δυάς
dyadic	<i>dyadikos</i>	δυαδικός
dyadically	<i>dyadikôs</i>	δυαδικῶς
earth	<i>gê</i>	γῆ
ease of movement	<i>eukinêsia</i>	εὐκίνησις
East	<i>anatolikos</i>	ἀνατολικός
eccentric	<i>ekkentros</i>	ἔκκεντρος
ecliptic (circle/path of the)	<i>zôidiakos</i>	ζωδιακός
educative	<i>paideutikos</i>	παιδευτικός
effect	<i>aitiaton</i>	αἰτιατόν
effect	<i>apotelesma</i>	ἀποτέλεσμα
effect	<i>pathos</i>	πάθος
effective	<i>drastêrios</i>	δραστήριος
efficient (cause)	<i>poiêtikos</i>	ποιητικός
effluxion	<i>aporroia</i>	ἀπόρροια
Egyptians	<i>Aigyptioi</i>	Αἰγύπτιοι
Eirene (Peace)	<i>Eirênê</i>	Εἰρήνη

Eleatic Stranger	<i>Eleatês Xenos</i>	Ἐλεάτης Ξένος
element	<i>stoicheion</i>	στοιχείον
Empedocles	<i>Empedoklês</i>	Ἐμπεδοκλῆς
encompass, such as to	<i>perilêptikos</i>	περιληπτικός
encosmic	<i>enkosmios</i>	ἐγκόσμιος
engendering of life	<i>zôiogonia</i>	ζωογονία
enharmonic	<i>enarmonios</i>	ἐναρμόνιος
enlivening	<i>zôiogonikos</i>	ζωογονικός
enmattered	<i>enylos</i>	ἐνυλος
ensoul	<i>psychoun</i>	ψυχοῦν
ensouled	<i>empsychos</i>	ἐμψυχος
ensoulment	<i>psychôsis</i>	ψύχωσις
epicycle	<i>epikykos</i>	ἐπίκυκλος
epitritos (one and one third)	<i>epitritos</i>	ἐπίτριτος
epogdoos (one and one eighth)	<i>epogdoos</i>	ἐπόγδοος
equal, be	<i>exisazein</i>	ἐξισάζειν
equality	<i>isotês</i>	ἰσότης
equator	<i>isêmerinos</i>	ἰσημερινός
Eratosthenes	<i>Eratosthenês</i>	Ἐρατοσθένης
essentially constitute	<i>symplēroun</i>	συμπληροῦν
establish prior to	<i>proûpotithenai</i>	προὔποτιθέναι
eternally existing being	<i>to aei on</i>	τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν
eternity	<i>aiôn</i>	αἰών
Eunomia (Good Order)	<i>Eunomia</i>	Εὐνομία
even (number)	<i>artios</i>	ἄρτιος
even number of times	<i>artiakis</i>	ἄρτιακίς
even number, in the manner of an	<i>artiakôs</i>	ἄρτιακῶς
even-odd (number)	<i>artioperissos</i>	ἄρτιοπέριστος
everlasting	<i>aidios</i>	αἰδῖος
everlastingness	<i>aidiotês</i>	αἰδιότης
evident	<i>enargês</i>	ἐναργής
evolution	<i>anelixis</i>	ἀνέλιξις
excellence	<i>aretê</i>	ἀρετή
exegesis, to provide an	<i>exêgeisthai</i>	ἐξηγεῖσθαι
exercise the reasoning capacity	<i>gymnazein tên dianoian</i>	γυμνάζειν τὴν διάνοιαν
exhalation	<i>aporroia</i>	ἀπόρροια
existence	<i>hyparxis</i>	ὑπαρξίς
existence	<i>hypostasis</i>	ὑπόστασις
existing in the primary way	<i>to prôtôs on</i>	τὸ πρῶτως ὄν
exists/is, that which always	<i>to aei on</i>	τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν
explanation	<i>aitia</i>	αἰτία
extend	<i>diateteinein</i>	διατείνειν

English–Greek glossary

extended	<i>diastatos</i>	διαστατός
extended manner, in an	<i>diastatôs</i>	διαστατῶς
extension	<i>diastasis</i>	διάστασις
extension	<i>diastêma</i>	διάστημα
extension	<i>onkos</i>	ὄγκος
extensionless	<i>adiastatos</i>	ἀδιάστατος
extent	<i>ektasis</i>	ἔκτασις
exterior discourse	<i>prophorikos (logos)</i>	προφορικός (λόγος)
external	<i>ektos</i>	ἐκτός
extreme term	<i>akrotês</i>	ἀκρότης
extrinsic	<i>epeisaktos</i>	ἐπίεσακτος
fact	<i>pragma</i>	πρᾶγμα
familiar	<i>gnôrimos</i>	γνώριμος
father	<i>patêr</i>	πατήρ
female	<i>tbêlys</i>	θῆλυς
female Titan	<i>Titanis</i>	Τιτανίς
feminine	<i>tbêlyprepês</i>	θηλυπρεπής
fiery	<i>empyrios</i>	ἐμπύριος
figure	<i>schêma</i>	σχῆμα
fill in/out/up	<i>katapyknoun</i>	καταπυκνοῦν
fill in/out/up	<i>sympplêroun</i>	συμπληροῦν
filling out	<i>plêrôma</i>	πλήρωμα
final	<i>eschatos</i>	ἔσχατος
final (cause)	<i>telikos</i>	τελικός
fine and noble, that which is	<i>to kalon</i>	τὸ καλόν
fine	<i>kalos</i>	καλός
finito-form	<i>peratoeidês</i>	περατοειδής
fire	<i>pur</i>	πῦρ
first	<i>prôtos</i>	πρῶτος
first-born	<i>prôtogonos</i>	πρωτόγονος
first principle	<i>archê</i>	ἀρχή
fixed	<i>aplanês</i>	ἀπλανής
flank	<i>lagôn</i>	λαγών
folds (of the Earth)	<i>kolpoi</i>	κόλποι
Aristoxenus, followers of	<i>Aristoxeneioi</i>	Ἀριστοξένειοι
following	<i>hepomenos</i>	ἐπόμενος
font	<i>pêgê</i>	πηγή
Fontal	<i>pêgaios</i>	πηγαῖος
force	<i>bia</i>	βία
forgetting	<i>lêthê</i>	λήθη
form	<i>eidos</i>	εἶδος
form	<i>idea</i>	ἰδέα
rational-forming principle	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
formless	<i>aneideos</i>	ἀνείδεος
foundation	<i>hypobasis</i>	ὑπόβασις

English–Greek glossary

foundation	<i>hypostasis</i>	ὑπόστασις
four	<i>tetras</i>	τετράς
four, in the manner of the number	<i>tetradikôs</i>	τετραδικῶς
four-fold manner, in a friendship	<i>tetrachôs philia</i>	τετραχῶς φιλία
generate	<i>gennan</i>	γεννᾶν
generated	<i>genêtos</i>	γενητός
generated, be	<i>gignesthai</i>	γίγνεσθαι
generation	<i>genesis</i>	γένεσις
generation	<i>gennêsis</i>	γέννησις
generation of the cosmos	<i>kosmogonia</i>	κοσμογονία
generation of (the) soul	<i>psychogonia</i>	ψυχογονία
generative	<i>gennêtikos</i>	γεννητικός
generative	<i>gonimos</i>	γόνιμος
genesis	<i>genesis</i>	γένεσις
genesis	<i>gennêsis</i>	γέννησις
genuine being	<i>to ontôs on</i>	τὸ ὄντως ὄν
genuine substance	<i>he ontôs ousia</i>	ἡ ὄντως οὐσία
genuinely	<i>ontôs</i>	ὄντως
genuinely being	<i>to kyriôs on</i>	τὸ κυρίως ὄν
genus	<i>genos</i>	γένος
geometric	<i>geômetrikos</i>	γεωμετρικός
geometric ratio	<i>l. geômetrikos</i>	λ. γεωμετρικός
geometry	<i>geômetria</i>	γεωμετρία
gift	<i>dôron</i>	δῶρον
god	<i>theos</i>	θεός
god	<i>to theion</i>	τὸ θεῖον
god, in accordance with	<i>kata theon</i>	κατὰ θεόν
goddess	<i>thea</i>	θεά
goddess Athena	<i>Athêna</i>	Ἀθηνᾶ
goddess Earth	<i>Gê</i>	γῆ
godless	<i>atheos</i>	ἄθεος
going beyond	<i>exairetos</i>	ἐξαίρετος
golden chain	<i>chrysê seira</i>	χρυσὴ σείρα
good	<i>agathos</i>	ἀγαθός
Good, the	<i>to agathon</i>	τὸ ἀγαθόν
good in form	<i>agathoeidês</i>	ἀγαθοειδής
goodness	<i>agathotês</i>	ἀγαθότης
govern	<i>kybernan</i>	κυβερνᾶν
growth principle	<i>phytikon</i>	φυτικόν
guardian	<i>phroura</i>	φρουρά
half-tone	<i>diesis</i>	δίεσις
half-tone	<i>hemitonion</i>	ἡμιτόνιον
harmonic	<i>harmonikós</i>	ἁρμονικός

English–Greek glossary

harmonic manner, in a	<i>harmonikôs</i>	ἁρμονικῶς
harmonic ratio	<i>l. harmonikos</i>	λ. ἁρμονικός
harmonious	<i>enarmonios</i>	ἐναρμόνιος
harmonious	<i>harmonikós</i>	ἁρμονικός
harmonious, make	<i>harმოzein</i>	ἁρμόζειν
harmoniously	<i>emmelôs</i>	ἐμμελῶς
harmonise	<i>enarმოzein</i>	ἐναρμόζειν
harmonise	<i>harმოzein</i>	ἁρμόζειν
Harmony Itself	<i>autoarmonia</i>	αὐτοαρμονία
harmony	<i>harmonia</i>	ἁρμονία
Harmony, Form of	<i>autoarmonia</i>	αὐτοαρμονία
health	<i>hygeia</i>	ὕγεια
hearing	<i>akoê</i>	ἀκοή
heart	<i>kardia</i>	καρδία
hearth	<i>bestia</i>	ἑστία
heat	<i>tbermotês</i>	θερμότης
heaven	<i>ouranos</i>	οὐρανός
heaven	<i>to ouranion</i>	τὸ οὐράνιον
heavenly	<i>ouranios</i>	οὐράνιος
hebdomad	<i>hebdomas</i>	ἑβδομάς
hebdomadic	<i>hebdomadikos</i>	ἑβδομαδικός
Hebdomagetan (Apollo)	<i>hebdomagetan</i>	ἑβδομαγέταν
hegemonic	<i>hegemonikos</i>	ἡγεμονικός
hemiolios	<i>hêmiolios</i>	ἡμιόλιος
hemitonion	<i>hêmitonion</i>	ἡμιτόνιον
henad	<i>henas</i>	ἑνάς
Hephaestean	<i>Hephaisteios</i>	Ἡφαίστειος
Hephaestus	<i>Hephaistos</i>	Ἡφαιστος
heptad	<i>heptas</i>	ἑπτάς
Hera	<i>Hera</i>	Ἥρα
Heracles	<i>Heraklês</i>	Ἡρακλῆς
Hermes	<i>Hermês</i>	Ἑρμῆς
Hermes, of	<i>Hermaïkos</i>	Ἑρμαϊκός
hero	<i>hêrôs</i>	ἥρως
heroic	<i>herôikos</i>	ἡρωϊκός
hexad	<i>hexas</i>	ἑξάς
higher term in a ratio (opp. ὑπόλογος)	<i>prologos</i>	πρόλογος
highest form	<i>akrotês</i>	ἄκρότης
highest gradation	<i>akrotês</i>	ἄκρότης
Hipta	<i>Hipta</i>	ἵπτα
homoiomerous	<i>homoiomerês</i>	ὁμοιομερής
homonymously	<i>homônymôs</i>	ὁμωνύμως
homonymy	<i>homônymia</i>	ὁμωνυμία
horizontal	<i>kata platos</i>	κατὰ πλάτος
horizontal	<i>pleurikos</i>	πλευρικός

English–Greek glossary

horizontally	<i>kata pleuran</i>	κατὰ πλευράν
horse (of the soul, Plato's)	<i>hippos</i>	ἵππος
Horse Itself	<i>autoippon</i>	αὐτοῖππον
human	<i>anthrôpikos</i>	ἀνθρωπικός
human	<i>anthrôpinos</i>	ἀνθρώπινος
hybrid	<i>koinogenês</i>	κοινογενής
hyparxis	<i>hyparxis</i>	ὑπαρξίς
hypercosmic	<i>hyperkosmios</i>	ὑπερκόσμιος
hypostasis	<i>hypostasis</i>	ὑπόστασις
hypothesis	<i>hypothesis</i>	ὑπόθεσις
hypothetical	<i>hypothetikos</i>	ὑποθετικός
Iamblichus	<i>Iamblichos</i>	Ἰάμβλιχος
icon	<i>eikôn</i>	εἰκών
iconic manner, in an	<i>eikotôs</i>	εἰκότως
icosahedron	<i>eikosaedron</i>	εἰκοσάεδρον
ignorance	<i>agnoia</i>	ἄγνοια
illuminate	<i>ellampein</i>	ἐλλάμπειν
illuminate	<i>katalampein</i>	καταλάμπειν
illumination	<i>eklampsis</i>	ἐκλαμψίς
illumination	<i>ellampsis</i>	ἐλλαμψίς
illusion, to create	<i>skiagraphhein</i>	σκιαγραφεῖν
image	<i>agâlma</i>	ἄγαλμα
image	<i>eidôlon</i>	εἶδωλον
image	<i>eikôn</i>	εἰκών
image, in the manner of an	<i>eikonikôs</i>	εἰκονικῶς
imaginative capacity	<i>phantasia</i>	φαντασία
imagine	<i>phantazesthai</i>	φανταζέσθαι
imitate	<i>mimeisthai</i>	μιμεῖσθαι
imitation	<i>mimêma</i>	μίμημα
immaculate	<i>achrantos</i>	ἄχραντος
immanent, be	<i>enyparchein</i>	ἐνυπάρχειν
immaterial	<i>asômatos</i>	ἄσώματος
immaterial	<i>aulos</i>	αὔλος
immobile	<i>akinêtos</i>	ἀκίνητος
immortal	<i>athanatos</i>	ἀθάνατος
imperfect	<i>atelês</i>	ἀτελής
impossible	<i>adynatos</i>	ἀδύνατος
imprint	<i>typos</i>	τύπος
in vain	<i>matên</i>	μάτην
inactive	<i>anenergêtos</i>	ἀνενέργητος
include, such as to	<i>periektikos</i>	περιεκτικός
inclusion	<i>perilêpsis</i>	περίληψις
inclusion	<i>periochê</i>	περιοχή
incommensurability	<i>asymmetria</i>	ἄσυμμετρία
incommensurable	<i>asymmetros</i>	ἄσύμμετρος

incomplete	<i>atelês</i>	ἄτελής
incomposite	<i>asynthetos</i>	ἄσυνθετος
incorporeal	<i>asômatos</i>	ἄσώματος
incorporeal	<i>aulos</i>	αὔλος
indefinite	<i>avoristos</i>	ἄοριστος
indefiniteness	<i>avoristia</i>	ἄοριστία
indicate	<i>endeiknynai</i>	ἐνδεικνύναι
indication	<i>endeixis</i>	ἐνδειξις
indicative	<i>sêmantikos</i>	σημαντικός
indissoluble	<i>adialytos</i>	ἀδιάλυτος
indistinct	<i>amydros</i>	ἄμυδρός
individual	<i>atomos</i>	ἄτομος
individual	<i>idios</i>	ἴδιος
individual	<i>merikos</i>	μερικός
indivisible	<i>adiairetos</i>	ἀδιαίρετος
indivisible	<i>amerês</i>	ἄμερής
indivisible	<i>ameristos</i>	ἄμέριστος
indivisible	<i>aschistos</i>	ἄσχιστος
indivisible	<i>atomos</i>	ἄτομος
ineffable	<i>aphrastos</i>	ἄφραστος
ineffable	<i>aporrêtos</i>	ἀπόρρητος
ineffable	<i>arrêtos</i>	ἄρρητος
inequality	<i>anisotês</i>	ἀνισότης
inerrant	<i>aplanês</i>	ἄπλανής
inferior	<i>katadeesteros</i>	καταδεέστερος
inferior, be	<i>hypheisthai</i>	ὑφείσθαι
inferiority	<i>hypheisis</i>	ὑφεσις
infimae species	<i>atoma eidê</i>	ἄτομα εἶδη
infinite in power	<i>apeirodynamos</i>	ἄπειροδύναμος
infinite	<i>apeiros</i>	ἄπειρος
infinite, to become	<i>apeirousthai</i>	ἄπειροῦσθαι
infinito-form	<i>apeiroeidês</i>	ἄπειροειδής
infinity	<i>apeiria</i>	ἄπειρία
inflexible	<i>adamastos</i>	ἀδάμαστος
inflexible	<i>ameiliktos</i>	ἀμείλικτος
inhere	<i>henoun</i>	ἐνοῦν
innate	<i>symphyês</i>	συμφυής
innately	<i>autophyôs</i>	αὐτοφυῶς
innermost sanctuary	<i>adyton</i>	ἄδυτον
innumerable	<i>aperiêgêtos</i>	ἄπεριήγητος
inscribe	<i>engraphein</i>	ἐγγράφειν
inscribe	<i>katagraphein</i>	καταγράφειν
inseparable	<i>achôristos</i>	ἄχώριστος
inseparable	<i>anekphoitêtos</i>	ἀνεκφοίτητος
insert	<i>paremballein</i>	παρεμβάλλειν
instrument	<i>organon</i>	ὄργανον

English–Greek glossary

instrumental	<i>organikos</i>	ὀργανικός
insubstantial	<i>anousios</i>	ἀνούσιος
intellect	<i>nous</i>	νοῦς
intellect, endowed with	<i>ennous</i>	ἐννους
intellection	<i>noêsis</i>	νόησις
intellective	<i>noêtikos</i>	νοητικός
intellective manner, in an	<i>noerôs</i>	νοερῶς
intellectual	<i>noeros</i>	νοερός
intellectualised	<i>nenooômenos</i>	νενοωμένος
intelligible	<i>noêtos</i>	νοητός
intelligible	<i>noêtikos</i>	νοητικός
intelligible manner, in an	<i>noêtôs</i>	νοητῶς
intelligized, that which is	<i>to nooumenon</i>	τὸ νοούμενον
intention	<i>dianoia</i>	διάνοια
intermediary	<i>mesotês</i>	μεσότης
intermediary	<i>mesos</i>	μέσος
intermediate	<i>mesotês</i>	μεσότης
intermediate	<i>mesos</i>	μέσος
intermediate between	<i>en mesôi</i>	ἐν μέσῳ
intermingling	<i>diaplokê</i>	διαπλοκή
interpenetrate	<i>pboitan</i>	φοιτᾶν
interpenetration	<i>chôrêseôs</i>	χωρήσεως
interpolate	<i>paremballein</i>	παρεμβάλλειν
interpret	<i>akroasthai</i>	ἀκροᾶσθαι
interpret	<i>exêgeisthai</i>	ἐξηγεῖσθαι
interval	<i>apostêma</i>	ἀπόστημα
interval	<i>diastêma</i>	διάστημα
interval of three tones	<i>triêmitonion</i>	τριημιτόνιον
interval of two tones	<i>ditonon</i>	δίτονον
interweaving	<i>diaplokê</i>	διαπλοκή
interwoven with, be	<i>syndiaplakênai</i>	συνδιαπλακῆναι
intrinsically alive	<i>autozôs</i>	αὐτόζως
invariant	<i>aklinês</i>	ἀκλινής
invariant	<i>aplanês</i>	ἀπλανής
invisible	<i>aphanês</i>	ἀφανής
irrational	<i>alogos</i>	ἄλογος
irreducible fraction	<i>pythmenikos</i>	πυθμενικός
isthmus	<i>isthmos</i>	ἰσθμός
kind	<i>genos</i>	γένος
king	<i>basileus</i>	βασιλεύς
know, able to	<i>gnôstikos</i>	γνωστικός
knowing, act of	<i>gnôsis</i>	γνώσις
knowledge	<i>epistêmê</i>	ἐπιστήμη
knowledge	<i>gnôsis</i>	γνώσις
Knowledge Itself	<i>autoepistêmê</i>	αὐτοεπιστήμη

English–Greek glossary

knowledgeable	<i>epistêmonikos</i>	ἐπιστημονικός
known, capable of being	<i>gnôrimos</i>	γνώριμος
komma	<i>komma</i>	κόμμα
Kronos, of	<i>Kronias</i>	Κρονίας
lambda-shaped	<i>labdoeidês</i>	λαβδοειδής
law	<i>thesmos</i>	θεσμός
<i>Laws</i> (Plato's)	<i>Nomoi</i>	Νόμοι
lead back	<i>anagein</i>	ἀνάγειν
Leader of the Muses	<i>Mousêgetês</i>	Μουσηγέτης
leading gods	<i>hêgemones (theoi)</i>	ἡγεμόνες (θεοί)
leading up	<i>anagôgos</i>	ἀναγωγός
legendary	<i>mytheuomenos</i>	μυθευόμενος
lesser term in a ratio	<i>hypologos</i>	ὑπόλογος
Leto	<i>Lêtô</i>	Λητώ
level	<i>bathos</i>	βάθος
level	<i>platos</i>	πλάτος
level	<i>taxis</i>	τάξις
liberated	<i>apolytos</i>	ἀπόλυτος
life giving/engendering	<i>zôiogonos</i>	ζωογόνος
Life Itself	<i>autozôn</i>	αὐτόζων
life, way of	<i>bios</i>	βίος
life	<i>zôê</i>	ζωή
life-bearing	<i>zôêphorios</i>	ζωηφόριος
life-giving process	<i>zôopoia</i>	ζωοποιία
light	<i>phôs</i>	φῶς
light ray	<i>augê</i>	αὐγή
Likeness itself	<i>autoomoios</i>	αὐτοόμοιος
limit (opp. ἄπειρον)	<i>peras</i>	πέρας
line	<i>grammê</i>	γραμμή
Living Being Itself	<i>autozôion</i>	αὐτοζῶον
living being	<i>zôion</i>	ζῶον
localised	<i>topikôs</i>	τοπικῶς
located above	<i>hyperkeimenos</i>	ὑπερκείμενος
location	<i>topos</i>	τόπος
logos	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
love	<i>erôs</i>	ἔρως
lover of spectacles	<i>philothēamôn</i>	φιλοθεάμων
lover of wisdom	<i>philosophos</i>	φιλόσοφος
lunar	<i>selēniakos</i>	σεληνιακός
magnitude	<i>megethos</i>	μέγεθος
Man Itself	<i>autoanthrôpos</i>	αὐτοάνθρωπος
manner	<i>tropos</i>	τρόπος
masculine, be	<i>arrenousthai</i>	ἄρρενοῦσθαι
master	<i>despotês</i>	δεσπότης

English–Greek glossary

material	<i>enylos</i>	ξύλος
material	<i>hylaïos</i>	ύλαϊος
material things	<i>ta enyla</i>	τά ἔνυλα
materiality	<i>to enylon</i>	τὸ ἔνυλον
maternal	<i>mêtrikos</i>	μητρικός
mathematical	<i>mathêmatikos</i>	μαθηματικός
mathematical entities	<i>mathêmata</i>	μαθήματα
mathematics	<i>mathêmata</i>	μαθήματα
matter	<i>hylê</i>	ύλη
maximally opposed	<i>enantiôtatos</i>	ἐναντιώτατος
maximally particular	<i>merikôtatos</i>	μερικώτατος
mean (arithmetic/ geometric/harmonic)	<i>mesotês</i>	μεσότης
mean/middle term (arithmetic/ geometric/harmonic)	<i>mesos</i>	μέσος
measure, to	<i>metrein</i>	μετρεῖν
measure	<i>metron</i>	μέτρον
measure, absence of	<i>ametria</i>	ἀμετρία
measure, lacking	<i>ametros</i>	ἄμετρος
messenger	<i>angelos</i>	ἄγγελος
meteorological matters	<i>meteôra, ta</i>	μετέωρα, τὰ
middle	<i>mesotês</i>	μεσότης
middle	<i>mesos</i>	μέσος
middle term	<i>to meson</i>	τὸ μέσον
midwife, to act as	<i>maieuesthai</i>	μαιεύεσθαι
mindless	<i>anoêtos</i>	ἀνόητος
mix together	<i>synanakirnan</i>	συνανακίρνειν
mixed	<i>kekramenos</i>	κεκραμένος
mixture	<i>krama</i>	κράμα
mixture	<i>krasis</i>	κράσις
mixture	<i>migma</i>	μίγμα
mixture	<i>mixis</i>	μίξις
mixture, absence of	<i>amixia</i>	ἀμιξία
mobility	<i>kinêton, to</i>	κίνητον, τὸ
monad	<i>monas</i>	μονάς
monadic manner, in a	<i>monadikôs</i>	μοναδικῶς
monochord	<i>kanôn</i>	κανών
monochrome	<i>homochrous</i>	ὁμόχρους
monument (ancient)	<i>stêlê</i>	στήλη
Moon	<i>Selênê</i>	σελήνη
mortal	<i>thnêtos</i>	θνητός
mother	<i>mêtêr</i>	μήτηρ
motion	<i>kinêsis</i>	κίνησις
motion	<i>phora</i>	φορά

English–Greek glossary

motionless	<i>akinêtos</i>	ἀκίνητος
moved by another	<i>heterokinêtos</i>	ἑτεροκίνητος
moved by itself	<i>autokinêtos</i>	αὐτοκίνητος
movement	<i>kinêsis</i>	κίνησις
mule	<i>hemionos</i>	ἡμίονος
multi-formed	<i>polyeidês</i>	πολυειδής
multiplication	<i>pollaplasiasmos</i>	πολλαπλασιασμός
multiply	<i>pollaplasiazein</i>	πολλαπλασιάζειν
multitude	<i>plêthos</i>	πλήθος
Muse	<i>Mousa</i>	Μοῦσα
Muses, in the manner of the	<i>Mousikôs</i>	Μουσικῶς
musical	<i>mousikos</i>	μουσικός
musical fifth	<i>pente, dia</i>	πέντε, διὰ
musical fourth	<i>tessarôn, dia</i>	τεσσάρων, διὰ
musical fourth	<i>tettarôn, dia</i>	τεττάρων, διὰ
musical scale	<i>genos</i>	γένος
mutual destruction	<i>symphtharsis</i>	σύμφθαρσις
mutually destroyed, be	<i>symphthairesthai</i>	συμφθείρεσθαι
mysteriously	<i>kryphiôs</i>	κρυφίως
mystic rites, he who	<i>telestikos</i>	τελεστικός
practises		
myth	<i>mythos</i>	μῦθος
name	<i>onoma</i>	ὄνομα
name, to	<i>onomazein</i>	ὀνομάζειν
name-giver	<i>onomatothetês</i>	ὀνοματοθέτης
naming, act of	<i>onomatizein, to</i>	ὀνοματίζειν, τὸ
natural	<i>physikos</i>	φυσικός
natural manner, in a	<i>physikôs</i>	φυσικῶς
naturally similar	<i>homophyês</i>	ὁμοφυής
nature	<i>physis</i>	φύσις
necessity	<i>anankê</i>	ἀνάγκη
next to	<i>prosechês</i>	προσεχής
Night	<i>Nyx</i>	Νύξ
non-being	<i>to mê on</i>	τὸ μὴ ὄν
non-universal	<i>merikos</i>	μερικός
note (music)	<i>phthongos</i>	φθόγγος
notion	<i>epinoia</i>	ἐπίνοια
number	<i>arithmos</i>	ἀριθμός
number one	<i>monas</i>	μονάς
number two	<i>dyas</i>	δυάς
number three	<i>trias</i>	τριάς
number four	<i>tetras</i>	τετράς
number five	<i>pempas</i>	πemptάς
number six	<i>hexas</i>	ἑξάς

English–Greek glossary

number seven	<i>hebdomas</i>	ἑβδομάς
number seven	<i>heptas</i>	ἑπτάς
number eight	<i>ogdoas</i>	ὀγδοάς
number eight	<i>oktas</i>	ὀκτάς
number nine	<i>enneas</i>	ἐννεάς
number ten	<i>dekas</i>	δεκάς
number twelve	<i>dyôdekas</i>	δυωδεκάς
number eighteen	<i>oktôkaidekas</i>	ὀκτωκαιδεκάς
number twenty-seven	<i>eikosieptas</i>	εἰκοσιεπτάς
number twenty-seven	<i>eikosikaieptaplasia</i>	εἰκοσικαιεπταπλασία
number twenty-seven	<i>heptakaieikosas</i>	ἑπτακαιεικοσάς
numberless	<i>anarithmon</i>	ἀνάριθμον
Numenius	Noumênios	Νουμήνιος
numerator	<i>prologos</i>	πρόλογος
octahedron	<i>oktaedron</i>	ὀκτάεδρον
octave	<i>pasôn, to dia</i>	πασῶν, τὸ διὰ
odd (number)	<i>perissos</i>	περισσός
odd (number)	<i>perittos</i>	περιττός, opp. ἄρτιος
odd in form, in the mode of that which is	<i>perissoeidôs</i>	περισσοειδῶς
one in form	<i>henoeidês</i>	ἐνοειδής
one in form	<i>monoeidês</i>	μονοειδής
One, the	<i>hen, to</i>	ἐν, τὸ
One Itself	<i>autoen</i>	αὐτόεν
One-Being	<i>to hen on</i>	τὸ ἐν ὄν
One-Being, the	<i>to hen on</i>	τὸ ἐν ὄν
opine, able to	<i>doxastikos</i>	δοξαστικός
opining faculty	<i>to doxastikon</i>	τὸ δοξαστικόν
opinion	<i>doxa</i>	δόξα
opinion, in the manner of	<i>doxastikôs</i>	δοξαστικῶς
opportune moment, adapted to the	<i>kairophyês</i>	καιροφυής
opposition	<i>enantiôsis</i>	ἐναντίωσις
Oracle	<i>logion</i>	λόγιον
order	<i>taxis</i>	τάξις
orderly way, in an	<i>eutaktôs</i>	εὐτάκτως
organ	<i>organon</i>	ὄργανον
organise	<i>diakosmein</i>	διακοσμεῖν
origin	<i>archê</i>	ἀρχή
original	<i>prôtos</i>	πρώτος
originary	<i>archêgikos</i>	ἀρχηγικός
originate	<i>exarchein</i>	ἐξάρχειν
originate, such as to	<i>archêgos</i>	ἀρχηγός
Orpheus	Orpheus	Ὀρφεύς
Orphic	<i>Orphikos</i>	Ὀρφικός

English–Greek glossary

paradigm	<i>paradeigma</i>	παράδειγμα
paradigm, in the manner of a	<i>paradeigmatikôs</i>	παραδειγματικῶς
paradigmatic	<i>paradeigmatikos</i>	παραδειγματικός
parallel	<i>parallêlos</i>	παράλληλος
paramesos	<i>paramesos</i>	παράμεσος
<i>Parmenides</i> (title of Platonic dialogue)	<i>Parmenidês</i>	Παρμενίδης
paronymous	<i>parônymôs</i>	παρωνύμως
part	<i>meros</i>	μέρος
part	<i>morion</i>	μόριον
part	<i>moira</i>	μοῖρα
partial manner, in a	<i>meristôs</i>	μεριστῶς
partial or particular	<i>merikos</i>	μερικός
partial, in a manner that is	<i>merikôs</i>	μερικῶς
participant	<i>methektos</i>	μεθεκτός
participant	<i>metochos</i>	μέτοχος
participate	<i>metechein</i>	μετέχειν
participated	<i>methektos</i>	μεθεκτός
participated (in)	<i>metechomenos</i>	μετεχόμενος
participation	<i>methexis</i>	μέθεξις
partless	<i>amerês</i>	ἀμερής
paternal	<i>patrikos</i>	πατρικός
pentad	<i>pentas</i>	πεντάς
Pentheus	Pentheus	Πενθεύς
perceptible	<i>aisthêtos</i>	αἰσθητός
perception	<i>aisthanesthai, to</i>	αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ
perceptual	<i>aisthêtikos</i>	αἰσθητικός
perfect	<i>pantelês</i>	παντελής
perfect	<i>teleios</i>	τέλειος
perfect	<i>teleos</i>	τέλεος
perfect, such as to	<i>telesiourgos</i>	τελεσιουργός
perfect, to	<i>teleioun</i>	τελειοῦν
perfection	<i>teleiotês</i>	τελειότης
perfection	<i>to teleion</i>	τὸ τέλειον
Peripatetic	Peripatêtikos	Περιπατητικός
Peripatos	peripatos	περίπατος
permeate	<i>phoitan</i>	φοιτᾶν
perpetual	<i>aidios</i>	αἰδῖος
Persians	Persis	Περσίς
<i>Phaedo</i> (title of Platonic dialogue)	<i>Phaidôn</i>	Φαῖδων
<i>Phaedrus</i> (title of Platonic dialogue)	<i>Phaidros</i>	Φαῖδρος
<i>Philebus</i> (title of Platonic dialogue)	<i>Philêbos</i>	Φίληβος

English–Greek glossary

Philolaus	Philolaos	Φιλόλαος
philosopher	<i>philosophos</i>	φιλόσοφος
philosophically	<i>philosophhôs</i>	φιλοσόφως
philosophise	<i>philosophhein</i>	φιλοσοφεῖν
philosophy	<i>philosophia</i>	φιλοσοφία
physical	<i>physikos</i>	φυσικός
physically	<i>physikôs</i>	φυσικῶς
physics	<i>ta physika</i>	τὰ φυσικά
place	<i>chôra</i>	χώρα
place	<i>topos</i>	τόπος
plane	<i>epipedos</i>	ἐπίπεδος
planet	<i>planêtês</i>	πλανήτης
planet Jupiter	Dis	Δίς
planet Jupiter	Zeus	Ζεὺς
planet Mars	Arês	Ἄρης
planet Saturn	Kronos	Κρόνος
planet Venus	Aphroditê	Ἀφροδίτη
plant	<i>phyton</i>	φυτόν
Plato	Platôn	Πλάτων
Platonic	<i>Platônikos</i>	Πλατωνικός
Platonist	<i>Platônikos</i>	Πλατωνικός
plausibly	<i>eikotôs</i>	εἰκότως
pleasure	<i>bêdonê</i>	ἡδονή
plenum	<i>plêrôma</i>	πλήρωμα
Plotinus	Plôtinos	Πλωτίνος
plural, make	<i>plêthyein</i>	πληθύνειν
pluralisation	<i>to plêthyomenon</i>	τὸ πληθυνόμενον
Plutarch	Ploutarchos	Πλούταρχος
pneuma	<i>pneuma</i>	πνεῦμα
poet	<i>poiêtês</i>	ποιητής
point	<i>sêmeion</i>	σημεῖον
pointless	<i>matên</i>	μάτην
politics	<i>politeia</i>	πολιτεία
Porphry	Porphyrrios	Πορφύριος
portion	<i>morion</i>	μόριον
portion	<i>moira</i>	μοῖρα
possible	<i>dynatos</i>	δυνατός
possible, be	<i>dynasthai</i>	δύνασθαι
potentially	<i>dynamei</i>	δυνάμει
power	<i>dynamis</i>	δύναμις
predominance	<i>epikrateia</i>	ἐπικράτεια
pre-exist	<i>proeinai</i>	προεῖναι
pre-exist	<i>proûparchein</i>	προϋπάρχειν
pre-exist, make	<i>proûpotithenai</i>	προϋποτιθέναι
preliminary causal manner, in a	<i>kat' aitian</i>	κατ' αἰτίαν

English–Greek glossary

present (in), be	<i>henoun</i>	ἐνοῦν
preserve, able to	<i>sôstikos</i>	σωστικός
preside over	<i>hyperkathêsthai</i>	ὑπερκαθῆσθαι
primary manner/mode/way, in a	<i>prôtôs</i>	πρώτως
primary-effective	<i>prôtourgos</i>	πρωτουργός
prime (number)	<i>prôtos</i>	πρῶτος
principle	<i>archê</i>	ἀρχή
probabilistic explanation	<i>eikotologia</i>	εἰκοτολογία
proceed	<i>proerchesthai</i>	προέρχεσθαι
proceed	<i>proïenai</i>	προϊέναι (<εἶμι)
procession	<i>exodos</i>	ἐξοδος
procession	<i>parodos</i>	πάροδος
procession	<i>proodos</i>	πρόοδος
product of activity	<i>energêma</i>	ἐνέργημα
productive	<i>gonimos</i>	γόνιμος
project	<i>epilampein</i>	ἐπιλάμπειν
project	<i>proïenai</i>	προϊέναι (<ἵημι)
property	<i>dynamis</i>	δύναμις
property	<i>idiôma</i>	ἰδίωμα
property	<i>idiotês</i>	ἰδιότης
property, to acquire a	<i>peponthenai</i>	πεπονθέναι
proportion	<i>analogia</i>	ἀναλογία
proportionally	<i>ana logon</i>	ἀνὰ λόγον
providence	<i>pronoia</i>	πρόνοια
providential	<i>pronoêtikos</i>	προνοητικός
proximate	<i>prosechês</i>	προσεχής
psychic	<i>psychikos</i>	ψυχικός
psychogenesis	<i>psychogonia</i>	ψυχογονία
Ptolemy	<i>Ptolemaios</i>	Πτολεμαῖος
pure	<i>achrantos</i>	ἄχραντος
pure	<i>amigês</i>	ἀμιγής
puzzle	<i>aporia</i>	ἀπορία
puzzled, be	<i>aporein</i>	ἀπορεῖν
Pythagorean	<i>Pythagoreios</i>	Πυθαγόρειος
quadrilateral	<i>tetrapleuros</i>	τετράπλευρος
quality	<i>poiôtês</i>	ποιότης
qualityless	<i>apoios</i>	ἄποιος
quarter-tone	<i>diesis</i>	δίεσις
quasi-relation	<i>hemischetos</i>	ἡμίσχετος
random	<i>eikaios</i>	εἰκαῖος
rank	<i>systoichia</i>	συστοιχία
rank	<i>taxis</i>	τάξις
ratio	<i>logos</i>	λόγος

English–Greek glossary

ratio, arithmetic	<i>l. arithmêtikos</i>	λ. ἀριθμητικός
ratio 3:2	<i>hemiolios</i>	ἡμιόλιος
ratio 3:2, in the mode of the	<i>hemoliôs</i>	ἡμιολίως
ratio 9:8	<i>epogdoos</i>	ἐπόγδοος
ratio where the larger number contains the smaller number two or more times	<i>pollaplasiepimerês</i>	πολλαπλασιασεπιμερής
rational (arithm.)	<i>rbêtos</i>	ῥητός
rational	<i>logikos</i>	λογικός
rational-forming principle	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
reasoning	<i>logismos</i>	λογισμός
reasoning, faculty of	<i>logizomenon</i>	λογιζόμενον
receptacle	<i>hypodochê</i>	ὑποδοχή
receptive	<i>dektikos</i>	δεκτικός
receptive	<i>epitêdeios</i>	ἐπιτήδειος
reciprocal proportion	<i>antipeponthêsis</i>	ἀντιπεπόνθησις
recollection	<i>anamnêsis</i>	ἀνάμνησις
relation	<i>schesis</i>	σχέσις
remain (in a place or state)	<i>menein</i>	μένειν
remaining	<i>monimos</i>	μόνιμος
reproductive	<i>gennêtikos</i>	γεννητικός
reproductive	<i>gonimos</i>	γόνιμος
<i>Republic</i> (title of Platonic dialogue)	<i>Politeia</i>	Πολιτεία
Rest (opp. Motion)	<i>stasis</i>	στάσις (opp. κίνησις)
rest, be at	<i>histasthai</i>	ἵστασθαι
retrogradation (opp. προποδισμός)	<i>hypopodîsmos</i>	ὑποποδισμός
return to same point	<i>apokathistasthai</i>	ἀποκαθίστασθαι
return to same/original point/position	<i>apokatastasis</i>	ἀποκατάστασις
reversion	<i>epistrophê</i>	ἐπιστροφή
revert	<i>epistrephein</i>	ἐπιστρέφειν
revertive	<i>epistreptikos</i>	ἐπιστρεπτικός
revolution	<i>anakyklêsis</i>	ἀνακύκλησις
revolution	<i>periaîgôgê</i>	περιαγωγή
revolution	<i>periphora</i>	περιφορά
revolve	<i>anakykleisthai</i>	ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι
Rhea	<i>Rhea</i>	Ῥέα
right angle, at a	<i>pros orthas</i>	πρὸς ὀρθάς
rising	<i>anodos</i>	ἄνοδος
root	<i>rbiza</i>	ρίζα
rough breathing (gramm.)	<i>daseia</i>	δασεῖα
row/sequence of numbers	<i>stichos</i>	στίχος

English–Greek glossary

ruler	<i>kanôn</i>	κανών
ruler	<i>prostatis</i>	προστάτις
sacred	<i>hieros</i>	ἱερός
salvation	<i>sôtêria</i>	σωτηρία
Same (opp. Difference, the Different)	<i>tauto(n)</i>	ταυτό(ν), ταυτό(ν), τὸ
Sameness	<i>tautotês</i>	ταυτότης
saviour	<i>sôtêr</i>	σωτήρ
scale	<i>diagramma</i>	διάγραμμα
science	<i>epistêmê</i>	ἐπιστήμη
scientific	<i>epistêmonikos</i>	ἐπιστημονικός
scientific knowledge	<i>epistêmê</i>	ἐπιστήμη
scientific manner, in the	<i>epistêmonôs</i>	ἐπιστημόνως
second	<i>deuteros</i>	δεύτερος
secondary	<i>deuteros</i>	δεύτερος
secondary way or manner, in a	<i>deuterôs</i>	δευτέρως
secrecy	<i>epikrupsis</i>	ἐπίκρυψις
secrecy	<i>krypsis</i>	κρύψις
secret	<i>aporrêtos</i>	ἀπόρρητος
sediment	<i>hypostathmê</i>	ὑποστάθμη
see	<i>theasthai</i>	θεᾶσθαι
seed	<i>sperma</i>	σπέρμα
self-actualising	<i>autenergêtos</i>	αὐτενέργητος
self-generated	<i>autogonos</i>	αὐτόγονος
self-motion	<i>autokinêsia</i>	αὐτοκινησία
self-motive	<i>autokinêtos</i>	αὐτοκίνητος
self-productive	<i>autophyês</i>	αὐτοφυής
self-subsistent	<i>authypostatos</i>	αὐθυπόστατος
semi-circle	<i>hemikyklus</i>	ἡμίκυκλος
semi-tone	<i>leimma</i>	λεῖμμα
sense faculty (opp. intellectual)	<i>aisthêtikos</i>	αἰσθητικός
sense object	<i>to aisthêton</i>	τὸ αἰσθητόν
sense perception	<i>aisthêsis</i>	αἴσθησις
sensible	<i>aisthêtos</i>	αἰσθητός
sensible particulars	<i>ta gignomena</i>	τὰ γιγνόμενα
separable	<i>chôristos</i>	χωριστός
separable, in a manner that is	<i>chôristôs</i>	χωριστῶς
separated	<i>diêirêmenos</i>	διηρημένος
series	<i>seira</i>	σειρά
Severus	<i>Seuêros</i>	Σευήρος
shape	<i>schêma</i>	σχῆμα

English–Greek glossary

shape, devoid of	<i>amorphôs</i>	ἀμόρφως
Shape, Form of	<i>autoschêma</i>	αὐτοσχῆμα
shape, in a manner that is without	<i>aschêmatistôs</i>	ἀσχηματίστως
shape, provide a	<i>schêmatizein</i>	σχηματίζειν
side (of triangle etc.)	<i>pleura</i>	πλευρά
sight	<i>opsis</i>	ὄψις
signify	<i>sêmainein</i>	σημαίνειν
signify, such as to	<i>sêmantikos</i>	σημαντικός
silence, to	<i>aporrapein stoma</i>	ἀπορράπτειν στόμα
similar in form	<i>homoeidês</i>	ὁμοειδής
similar, make	<i>aphomoiooun</i>	ἀφομοιοῦν
similar, make	<i>homoiooun</i>	ὁμοιοῦν
similarity	<i>homoiôsis</i>	ὁμοίωσις
simple fraction, as a	<i>en pythmesin</i>	ἐν πύθμεσιν
simplicity	<i>haplotês</i>	ἀπλότης
simultaneously	<i>homou</i>	ὁμοῦ
single	<i>heniaios</i>	ἐνιαῖος
single-formed	<i>benoeidês</i>	ἐνοειδής
Sirens	<i>Seirênes</i>	Σειρήνες
size	<i>megethos</i>	μέγεθος
smuggle in	<i>pareiskyklein</i>	παρεισκυκλεῖν
snow	<i>chiôn</i>	χιών
Socrates	<i>Sôkratês</i>	Σωκράτης
solar	<i>beliakos</i>	ἡλιακός
solid (number, proportion, thing)	<i>stereos</i>	στερεός
solution	<i>lysis</i>	λύσις
<i>Sophist</i> (title of Platonic dialogue)	<i>Sophistês</i>	Σοφιστής
Sosicrates	<i>Sôsikratês</i>	Σωσικράτης
soul	<i>psychê</i>	ψυχή
Soul Itself	<i>autopsychê</i>	αὐτοψυχή
soul of the universe	<i>he bolê psychê</i>	ἡ ὅλη ψυχή
soul of the universe	<i>he tou pantos psychê</i>	ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή
soul simpliciter	<i>he haplôs psychê</i>	ἡ ἀπλῶς ψυχή
soul, generation of the	<i>psychogonikos</i>	ψυχογονικός
soul-making	<i>psychopoios</i>	ψυχοποιός
source	<i>pêgê</i>	πηγή
species	<i>eidos</i>	εἶδος
speech	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
spermatic logos	<i>l. spermatikos</i>	λ. σπερματικός
sphere	<i>sphaira</i>	σφαῖρα
sphere of the fixed stars	<i>s. aplanês</i>	σ. ἀπλανής
spherical	<i>sphairikos</i>	σφαιρικός
spherical in form	<i>sphairoeidês</i>	σφαιροειδής

English–Greek glossary

splitting	<i>schisis</i>	σχίσις
stable	<i>monimos</i>	μόνιμος
star	<i>astēr</i>	ἀστήρ
<i>Statesman</i> (title of Platonic dialogue)	<i>Politikos</i>	Πολιτικός
station (astron.)	<i>stêrignmos</i>	στηριγμός
stationary, be	<i>histasthai</i>	ἵστασθαι
stimulate	<i>egeirein</i>	ἐγείρειν
Strife	<i>neikos</i>	νεῖκος
subcontrary (opp. πρόλογος)	<i>hypologos</i>	ὑπόλογος
subject	<i>to hypokeimenon</i>	τὸ ὑποκείμενον
subject to, be	<i>paschein</i>	πάσχειν
sublunary	<i>hypo selênên</i>	ὑπὸ σελήνην
submultiple (ratio)	<i>hypopollaplasios</i>	ὑποπολλαπλάσιος
subparticular	<i>hypēpimorios</i>	ὑπεπιμόριος
subsistence	<i>hyparxis</i>	ὑπαρξις
substance, lacking in	<i>anousios</i>	ἀνούσιος
substance, of similar	<i>homousios</i>	ὁμοούσιος
substantial aspect/ character/nature	<i>to ousiôdes</i>	τὸ οὐσιῶδες
substantial manner, in a	<i>ousiôdôs</i>	οὐσιωδῶς
substantial	<i>ousiôdês</i>	οὐσιώδης
substantial, make	<i>ousioun</i>	οὐσιοῦν
substrate	<i>to hypokeimenon</i>	τὸ ὑποκείμενον
sub-superparticular (reciprocal of super-particular)	<i>hypēpimorios</i>	ὑπεπιμόριος
sub-superpartient (reciprocal of super-partient)	<i>hypēpimerês</i>	ὑπεπιμερής
subterranean	<i>hypochthonios</i>	ὑποχθόνιος
subtraction, mutual	<i>anthyphairesis</i>	ἀνθυφαίρεσις
Sun	<i>helios</i>	ἥλιος
supernatural	<i>hyperphyês</i>	ὑπερφυής
super-particular	<i>epimorios</i>	ἐπιμόριος
super-partient	<i>epimerês</i>	ἐπιμερής
supposition	<i>hypothesis</i>	ὑπόθεσις
symbol	<i>symbolon</i>	σύμβολον
symbolise	<i>apeikonizesthai</i>	ἀπεικονίζεσθαι
symbolise	<i>eneikonizesthai</i>	ἐνεικονίζεσθαι
sympathetic	<i>sympathês</i>	συμπαθής
synchronise	<i>synapokathistanai</i>	συναποκαθιστάναι
synthesis	<i>synthesis</i>	σύνθεσις
Tartarus	<i>Tartara</i>	Τάρταρα
teacher	<i>begemôn</i>	ἡγεμών

English–Greek glossary

teacher	<i>kathêgemôn</i>	καθηγεμών
tearing apart	<i>sparagmos</i>	σπαραγμός
temple	<i>krotaphos</i>	κρόταφος
temporal	<i>chronikos</i>	χρονικός
temporal	<i>enchronos</i>	ἐγχρονος
temporal	<i>kata chronon</i>	κατὰ χρόνον
temporally	<i>chronikôs</i>	χρονικῶς
temporally	<i>kata chronon</i>	κατὰ χρόνον
terrestrial	<i>chthonios</i>	χθόνιος
terrestrial manner, in a	<i>chthoniôs</i>	χθονίως
tetrachord	<i>tetrachordon</i>	τετράχορδον
tetrad	<i>tetras</i>	τετράς
tetrad, in the manner of the	<i>tetradikôs</i>	τετραδικῶς
tetradic	<i>tetradikos</i>	τετραδικός
Theaetetus	<i>Theaitêtos</i>	Θεαίτητος
Themis	<i>Themis</i>	Θέμις
Theodore (of Asine)	<i>Theodôros</i>	Θεόδωρος
theologian	<i>theologos</i>	θεολόγος
Theophrastus	<i>Theophrastos</i>	Θεόφραστος
theorem	<i>theôrêma</i>	θεώρημα
theoretical	<i>theôrêtikos</i>	θεωρητικός
theory	<i>theôria</i>	θεωρία
theurgy	<i>theourgia</i>	θεουργία
think, able to	<i>dianoêtikos</i>	διανοητικός
thought	<i>dianoia</i>	διάνοια
thought	<i>ennoia</i>	ἐννοια
thought	<i>noêsis</i>	νόησις
thought	<i>to noeîn</i>	τὸ νοεῖν
thought, content of	<i>noêma</i>	νόημα
three tones	<i>tritonon</i>	τρίτονον
thrice-plaited	<i>triplekês</i>	τριπλεκῆς
through participation	<i>kata methexin</i>	κατὰ μέθεξιν
throughout eternity	<i>diaiônios</i>	διαιωνίως
thunder	<i>brontai</i>	βρονταί
<i>Timaeus</i> (title of Platonic dialogue)	<i>Timaios</i>	Τίμαιος
Timaeus	<i>Timaios</i>	Τίμαιος
time	<i>chronos</i>	χρόνος (opp. αἰών)
time, in	<i>en chronôi</i>	ἐν χρόνῳ
time, in	<i>kata chronon</i>	κατὰ χρόνον
Titan	<i>Titan</i>	Τιτάν
Titanic	<i>Titanikos</i>	Τιτανικός
Titans, in the manner/mode of the	<i>Titanikôs</i>	Τιτανικῶς
token	<i>synthêma</i>	σύνθημα
tonal	<i>toniaios</i>	τονιαῖος

English-Greek glossary

tone	<i>tonos</i>	τόνος
tool	<i>organon</i>	ὄργανον
touched, capable of being	<i>epaphêtos</i>	ἐπαφητός
trace	<i>ichnos</i>	ἵχνος
tragedy	<i>tragôidia</i>	τραγωδία
transcend	<i>exêirêsthai</i>	ἐξηρῆσθαι
transcend	<i>hyperanechein</i>	ὑπερανέχειν
transcendent	<i>exêirêmenos</i>	ἐξηρημένος
transition	<i>metabasis</i>	μετάβασις
transition, subject to	<i>metabatikos</i>	μεταβατικός
triad	<i>trias</i>	τριάς
triad, in the manner of the	<i>triadikôs</i>	τριαδικῶς
triadic	<i>triadikos</i>	τριαδικός
triangle	<i>trigônon</i>	τρίγωνον
triangular	<i>trigônikos</i>	τριγωνικός
triangular	<i>trigônos</i>	τρίγωνος
tri-morphic	<i>trimorphos</i>	τρίμορφος
tripartite	<i>trimerês</i>	τριμερής
triple	<i>triplekês</i>	τριπλεκής
triple, to	<i>triplasiazein</i>	τριπλασιάζειν
triple-natured	<i>triphyês</i>	τριφυής
trivial	<i>eklytos</i>	ἐκλυτος
Tropic of Cancer	<i>tberinos kyklos</i>	θερινὸς κύκλος
Tropic of Capricorn	<i>cheimerinos kyklos</i>	χειμερινὸς κύκλος
trouble	<i>tarachôdes, to</i>	ταραχῶδες, τὸ
true	<i>alêthês</i>	ἀληθής
true	<i>alêthinos</i>	ἀληθινός
true being	<i>on alêthes</i>	ὄν ἀληθές
trustworthy, in a manner that is	<i>pistôs</i>	πιστῶς
truth	<i>alêtheia</i>	ἀλήθεια
uncaused	<i>anaitios</i>	ἀναίτιος
unceasing	<i>ameiliktos</i>	ἀμείλικτος
unceasing	<i>apaustos</i>	ἄπαυστος
unchanging	<i>akinêtos</i>	ἀκίνητος
undefiled	<i>achrantos</i>	ἄχραντος
undergo	<i>paschein</i>	πάσχειν
undergo positive affections	<i>eupathein</i>	εὐπαθεῖν
underlying subject	<i>to hypokeimenon</i>	τὸ ὑποκείμενον
undifferentiated	<i>adiaphoros</i>	ἀδιάφορος
undiminished	<i>anelattôtos</i>	ἀνελάττωτος
undivided	<i>adiairetos</i>	ἀδιαίρετος
undivided	<i>ameristos</i>	ἀμέριστος
unequal	<i>anisos</i>	ἄνισος
unextended	<i>adiastatos</i>	ἀδιάστατος

English–Greek glossary

ungenerated	<i>agenêtos</i>	ἀγένητος
unification	<i>benôsis</i>	ἐνωσις
unified	<i>beniaios</i>	ἐνιαῖος
unified manner, in a	<i>beniaiôs</i>	ἐνιαίως
uniform manner, in a	<i>benoeidôs</i>	ἐνοειδῶς
uni-form	<i>benoeidês</i>	ἐνοειδής
uni-form	<i>monoeidês</i>	μονοειδής
unify	<i>benoun</i>	ἐνοῦν
union	<i>benôsis</i>	ἐνωσις
unit	<i>monas</i>	μονάς
unit, in the manner of a	<i>monadikôs</i>	μοναδικῶς
universal	<i>holikos</i>	ὀλικός
universal	<i>holos</i>	ὅλος
universal soul	<i>he holê psychê</i>	ἡ ὅλη ψυχή
universal soul	<i>pasa he psychê</i>	πᾶσα ἡ ψυχή
universals	<i>ta hola</i>	τὰ ὅλα
universals	<i>ta katholou</i>	τὰ καθόλου
universe	<i>pan, to</i>	πᾶν, τὸ
universe	<i>to holon</i>	τὸ ὅλον
unlike	<i>anomoios</i>	ἀνόμοιος
unlimited	<i>apeiros</i>	ἄπειρος
Unlimited, the	<i>to apeiron</i>	τὸ ἄπειρον
Unlimited, of the form of	<i>apeiroeidês</i>	ἄπειροειδής
unmixed	<i>amigês</i>	ἄμιγής
unmixed	<i>amiktos</i>	ἄμικτος
unparticipated	<i>amethektos</i>	ἀμέθεκτος
unrelated	<i>aschetos</i>	ἄσχετος
unspeakable	<i>aneklalêtos</i>	ἀνεκλάλητος
untransferred	<i>anexallaktos</i>	ἀνεξάλλακτος
unwearied	<i>akmêtos</i>	ἄκητος
unwritten	<i>agraphos</i>	ἄγραφος
up there (in the realm of intelligibles)	<i>ekei</i>	ἐκεῖ
upright position	<i>orthotês</i>	ὀρθότης
upright	<i>orthos</i>	ὀρθός
upward journey	<i>anodos</i>	ἀνοδος
vault of heaven	<i>periphora</i>	περιφορά
vehicle	<i>ochêma</i>	ὄχημα
virtue	<i>aretê</i>	ἀρετή
visible	<i>horatos</i>	ὀρατός
vision	<i>manteia</i>	μαντεία
vital	<i>zôtikos</i>	ζωτικός
voice	<i>phthongos</i>	φθόγγος
void	<i>kenon</i>	κενόν

English–Greek glossary

wandering [planetary bodies]	<i>planômenos</i>	πλανώμενος
watchword	<i>synthêma</i>	σύνθημα
water	<i>hydôr</i>	ὕδωρ
way of life	<i>diagôgê</i>	διαγωγή
West	<i>dytikos</i>	δυτικός
whole	<i>holos</i>	ὅλος
whole	<i>to holon</i>	τὸ ὅλον
whole, in a manner that is	<i>holikôs</i>	ὀλικῶς
wholeness	<i>holotês</i>	ὀλότης
width	<i>platos</i>	πλάτος
wisdom	<i>phronêsis</i>	φρόνησις
word	<i>lexis</i>	λέξις
word	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
word	<i>onoma</i>	ὄνομα
world	<i>pan, to</i>	πᾶν, τὸ
world	<i>to holon</i>	τὸ ὅλον
World Soul	<i>he holê psychê</i>	ἡ ὅλη ψυχή
World Soul	<i>ps. tou holou</i>	ψ. τοῦ ὅλου
World Soul	<i>ps. tou pantos</i>	ψ. τοῦ παντός
world-making	<i>d. kosmourgos</i>	δ. κοσμουργός
world-making	<i>kosmourgos</i>	κοσμουργός
X (the letter <i>chi</i>)	<i>chiasmos</i>	χιασμός
Xenocrates	<i>Xenokratês</i>	Ξενοκράτης
Zeus	<i>Dis</i>	Δῖς
Zeus	<i>Zeus</i>	Ζεὺς
zodiac	<i>zôidiakos</i>	ζωδιακός

Greek word index

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α. γόνιμον, reproductive, 257.4

α. ζωογονικόν, life-engendering, 257.5

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α. νοερόν, intellectual, 198.5

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α. πατρικόν, paternal, 257.3

α. συνοχικόν, encompassing, 257.4

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without deviation, 309.11

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ἄκμητος, unwearied, 309.15

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112.33
so many in number, 167.3
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270.19
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τριγωνικός, triangular, 217.17
τριημιτόνιον, interval of three tones,
168.20, 168.28
τριμερής, tripartite, 276.27, 277.1
τρίμορφος, tri-morphic, 209.11
τριπλασιάζειν, triple, 177.8
τριπλασίως, in the mode of the multiple of
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triple, 272.13, 286.25
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τριττός, of three sorts, 195.25
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with a three-fold/triple nature, 125.24,
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229.28
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204.9, 232.10
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289.31, 298.11
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τὸν τρόπον, in the manner/way, 220.6,
289.15
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κατὰ τρόπον, in respect of the manner
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ὡς τύπῳ, in a general way, 139.12,
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- υγεία, health, 132.26
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 ὕδωρ, water, 106.24, 216.30, 217.2,
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 ὕλαϊος, material, 107.11
 ὕλη, matter, 102.11, 119.21, 127.30,
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 263.29, 266.15, 271.5, 280.23,
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 ὑπεναντίος, utter opposite, 149.19
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 ὑπεπιμερής, sub-superpartient (reciprocal
 of superpartient, e.g. $x/(x+2)$,
 $x/(x+3)$. etc.), 200.26, 202.5
 ὑπεπιμόριος, sub-superparticular
 (reciprocal of superparticular, e.g.
 $(x-1)/x$), 200.26, 202.3
 ὑπεπίτριτος, reciprocal of the epitritos (i.e.
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 168.10
 ὑπερανέχειν, transcend, 196.15
 ὑπερτρέχειν, be situated above,
 196.17
 ὑπεριδρύνεσθαι, be set over,
 143.32
 ὑπερκαθῆσθαι, preside over, 143.28,
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 ὑπερκείμενος, located above, 225.4
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 ὑπερουράνιος, entirely hypercosmic,
 273.31
 ὑπερούσιος, hypercosmic, 213.19
 ὑπεροχή, superiority, 108.29, 118.3,
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 superior, 200.5, 226.32, 288.1
 posterior, 226.32
 ὑπερφυής, supernatural, 153.19
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 ὑποδοχή, reception, 111.27
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 ὑποδύσκολος, difficult to understand,
 265.12
 ὑπόθεσις, hypothesis, 146.29, 264.24,
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 ὑποποδισμός, retrogradation (opp.
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 ὑποπολλαπλάσιος, submultiple (ratio),
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ὑποστάτης, creator, 195.2, 259.25
ὑποστατικός, giving existence, 151.29
be constituted, 162.26
constituting, 166.17
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ὑποστίζειν, propose a punctuation mark,
302.23
ὑποφερόμενος, carried off, 133.25
ὑποχθόνιος, subterranean, 146.8
ὑπτίας, ἐξ, lying on one's back, 113.27
ὑστερογενής, that which comes after,
151.20
ὑφεῖσθαι, be inferior, 102.15, 117.25,
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237.13
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φθαρείς, destroyed, 149.28
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φιλοσοφείν, philosophise, 277.24
φιλοσοφία, philosophy, 132.27
φιλόσοφος, lover of wisdom, 276.8
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φιλοσοφώτερον, in a more philosophical
manner, 154.1
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φοιτᾶν, interpenetrate, 255.2
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 be naturally engendered, 314.9
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 φ. αἰσθητή, sensible, 131.28
 φ. ἄλογος, irrational, 116.8
 φ. ἀσώματος, incorporeal, 166.21
 φ. ἐξηρημένη, transcendent, 151.23
 φ. ἐπίπεδος, two-dimensional, 201.9
 φ. κατὰδεεστέρα, inferior, 253.18
 φ. μεριστή, divisible, 250.18
 φ. ὅλη σωματική, universal corporeal,
 158.8
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 φ. τῆς ζωῆς, light of life, 284.6

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 χ. μέσος, middle, 276.15
 χ. οὐσιώδης, substantial, 255.29
 χ. ψυχικός, psychic, 255.33, 256.3
 χαρακτηρίζειν, characterise, 135.4, 234.4,
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 χαρακτηριστικός, characteristic, 137.23
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 χ. ἀπειρος, unlimited, 289.22
 χ. ζώωδης, animate, 292.5
 χ. θεϊότερος, more divine, 115.7

χρόνος, time (*cont.*)

- χ. μερκώτερος, more partial, 289.16
- χ. νεώτερος, younger, 115.7
- χ. πρεσβύτερος, senior, 115.6
- χ. ψυχικός, psychic, 129.8
- κατὰ χρόνον, at some time, 104.5
 - in a temporal sense, 115.1, 117.11
 - in the same way as time, 166.8
 - in time, 288.10, 292.2, 293.20
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- ἐν χρόνῳ, in time, 104.15, 128.18
 - into time, 288.6
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- χρωματικός, (music) chromatic, 168.15, 168.19, 169.6, 169.26
- χώρα, place, 122.23, 129.24, 293.15, 143.19
 - position, 129.26
- χωρεῖν, advance, 226.14, 275.32
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- χωρήσεως, extension, 151.7
 - interpenetration, 254.4
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- χωριστῶς, in a manner that is separable, 285.13

Ψ

ψυχή, soul, *passim*

- ἡ ἀπλῶς ψυχή, the soul simpliciter, 275.4
- ἡ ὅλη ψυχή, the soul of the universe, 152.4

- the whole soul, 114.31, 157.29, 225.32, 231.14, 234.5, 252.27
- the entire soul, 299.22
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- the World Soul, 236.28, 285.16, 285.32, 289.7, 305.15
- ἡ πᾶσα ψυχή, all soul, 114.32, 267.11
 - the entire soul, 301.11, 311.29
- πᾶσα ἡ ψυχή, all soul, 114.20
 - the entire soul, 163.4, 282.26, 299.17, 311.26, 315.2
 - universal soul, 309.27–28
- ψ. ἀγένητος, ungenerated, 117.13, 293.12
- ψ. ἀδελφή τοῦ σώματος, sister to the body, 114.15, 118.6
- ψ. ἀδιάρητος καὶ διήρηται, indivisible and divided, 274.6
- ψ. ἀθάνατος, immortal, 131.4
- ψ. αἰώνιος, eternal, 147.28, 148.29
- ψ. ἀκίνητος, unchanging, 147.28
- ψ. ἀμέθεκτος, unparticipated, 105.19
- ψ. ἀμέριστος, indivisible, 147.28, 194.21
- ψ. ἀμφίστομος, double-mouthed, 246.19
- ψ. ἀμφιπρόσωπος, two-faced, 246.19
- ψ. ἀνθρωπική, human, 201.28
- ψ. ἀνθρωπίνη, human, 143.31, 144.6, 144.15, 230.18, 236.23, 287.28
- ψ. ἀνώλεθρος, indestructible, 117.13
- ψ. ἀόρατος, invisible, 293.10
- ψ. ἀπλοῦς, simple, 154.13
- ψ. ἀρίστη τῶν γεννηθέντων, the best of the things that have been generated, 293.20
- ψ. ἄρχει τοῦ παντός, rules over all, 118.28
- ψ. ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, principle of motion, 122.12
- ψ. ἄρχουσα, ruler, 117.4, 118.22
- ψ. ἀπόλυτος, liberated, 105.17, 115.27
- ψ. ἀσώματος, incorporeal, 131.4, 154.13, 209.8
- ψ. αὐτοκίνητος, self-moving, 113.11
- ψ. ἄχραντος, pure, 112.23
 - undefiled, 230.8
- ψ. γενητός, generated, 293.12
- ψ. γεωμετρικός λόγος, geometric ratio, 275.15

ψυχή, soul, *passim* (cont.)

ψ. γραμμή, line, 243.12

ψ. δαιμόνια, daemonic, 201.28, 236.22, 236.29

ψ. δεσπότης, master, 117.4, 118.23, 118.25, 118.27, 119.6

ψ. διαιρετή, divisible, 242.12

ψ. δοξαστική, opinative, 310.9

ψ. δυάς, dyad, 197.2, 197.11, 252.9, 257.14, 260.22, 263.14, 308.6

ψ. δύναμις ἄπειρος, having infinite power, 242.28

ψ. δυοειδής, bi-formed, 242.12, 242.15, 257.28, 267.11
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ψ. ἑβδομαδική, hebdomadic, 203.2

ψ. ἐγκόσμιος, encosmic, 115.27, 144.13, 144.31, 274.1, 290.9

ψ. ἔγχρονος, temporal, 147.28

ψ. ἐν ὅλῳ, one whole, 195.29

ψ. ἐξηρημένη, transcendent, 105.17

ψ. ζωὴ νοερά, intellectual life, 275.27

ψ. ζωὴ οὐσιώδης, essentially living, 134.27

ψ. ζωογόνος, Life-giving, 163.21

ψ. ἡγεμονική, ruling, 118.23

ψ. ἡμετέρα, our, 129.10, 129.17, 163.17, 165.14, 228.14, 296.21

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ψ. καθόλου, universal, 215.32, 275.5

ψ. κίνησις αὐτοκίνητος, self-moving motion, 251.6

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ψ. κύκλος, circle, 243.11, 278.32

ψ. λογική, rational, 299.22

ψ. λόγος, discourse, 300.21
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ψ. μερική, individual, 142.15
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ψ. μονάς, monad, 197.2, 197.11
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ψ. μονοειδής, uni-form, 299.32

ψ. νοερή, intellectual, 240.22

ψ. νοητή, intelligible, 147.28

ψ. νοῦς λογικός, rational intellect, 301.7

ψ. ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, of the whole
cosmos, 105.1

ψ. ὁμοιομερής, homoiomerous, 163.4, 253.24

ψ. ὁμόχρους, consubstantial, 163.4
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ψ. οὐράνια, celestial,

ψ. οὐσία, being, 123.24

ψ. πᾶσιν ἐνεξουσιάζουσα, exercising
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ψ. πηγαία, Fontal, 117.30, 118.24, 215.32, 275.2

ψ. πλήθος, plurality, 123.21, 214.8, 246.17, 257.14, 316.5

ψ. πλήρωμα λόγων, sum of ratios, 200.21

ψ. προτέρα τοῦ σώματος, prior to the
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ψ. πρεσβύτερα τοῦ σώματος, senior to
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ψ. πρώτη ἀρχική, primary leading, 277.24

ψ. πρώτη τῶν συνθέτων, first of the
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ψ. πρωτίστη τῶν ὄλων, first [principle]
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